Asset liquidity,corporate investment,and endogenous financing costs

We analyze how the liquidity of real and financial assets affects corporate investment. The trade-off between liquidation costs and underinvestment costs implies that low-liquidity firms exhibit negative investment sensitivities to liquid funds, whereas high-liquidity firms have positive sensitivities. If real assets are not divisible in liquidation, firms with high financial liquidity optimally avoid external financing and instead cut new investment. If real assets are divisible, firms use external financing, which implies a lower sensitivity. In addition, asset redeployability decreases the investment sensitivity. Our findings demonstrate that asset liquidity is an important determinant of corporate investment.     

中国实业部门金融化的异质性

本文基于实业和金融两类投资组合模型的构建,重点考察不同所有权性质和不同行业企业的金融化驱动机制是否具有异质性,并探究不同类别金融投资对应结果的差异性特征。实证结果与已有研究以及传统印象并不一致:我们发现,风险规避是中国非国有企业和制造业企业金融化的显著驱动因素,而国有企业和非制造业企业则不存在这一特征;同时,非制造业企业的金融投资主要由收益率差驱动,而在其他企业样本中均没有证据显示追逐利润是企业金融化的推动因素。不同企业样本的融资约束、杠杆率、成长性、流动性水平以及资产质量等因素对企业金融资产占比的影响也存在显著差异。进一步区分企业金融投资中货币和非货币类金融资产的不同特性并考虑企业的长期股权投资,结果表明货币类金融资产和非货币类金融资产的驱动机制存在明显差异:对于货币类金融资产投资,国有企业主要受资本逐利因素推动,其他企业则未体现这一特征;对于非货币类金融资产投资,非国有企业、制造业和非制造业企业均受到风险因素驱动,而国有企业则不受影响;将企业长期股权投资纳入金融资产后结果则未产生明显差异。     

The impact of idiosyncratic risk on corporate financialisation——Evidence from China

Using the quarterly data of non-financial companies listed on China's A-share market from 2007 to 2019, this paper examines the relationship between the idiosyncratic risk formed based on the secondary market exchanges and the corporate financialization from the perspective of a market feedback effect. The empirical results show that idiosyncratic risk has a significant impact on the allocation of financial assets of non-financial enterprises, which is one of the motivating factors for the financialization of non-financial enterprises. Compared with SOEs, large enterprises and non-manufacturing enterprises; private enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and manufacturing enterprises will allocate more financial assets when idiosyncratic risk increases. Mechanism analysis shows that managers risk aversion and financing constraints increase the impact of idiosyncratic risk on financial asset allocation while strengthening the external monitoring mechanism of institutional investors has the opposite effect. The research findings of this paper help to understand whether secondary financial markets affect the financial investment decisions of real firms in transition economies, and also have implications for how to govern the “transition from real to virtual” of real enterprises in China.     

杠杆率变动、固定资产投资与研发活动——兼论金融赋能高质量发展

本文通过构建一个包含企业固定资产投资与研发投资的理论模型,分析得出企业杠杆率变动与投资行为的非线性关系。实证结果表明,低杠杆下,杠杆率的增大会使企业增加固定资产和研发投资的规模。对于财务柔性更强、发展前景更好的企业,杠杆率的提升能够增大此类企业的研发投入占比,即企业开展更多能够提升技术水平的研发活动。进一步研究发现,短期杠杆与商业信用杠杆的提升有助于财务柔性较好的企业提高研发投资占比,而对于发展前景不佳的僵尸企业,长期杠杆和银行杠杆的提升反而会使其扩大固定资产投资,加剧产能过剩问题。本文的政策含义在于,要在保持宏观杠杆率基本稳定的前提下,引导金融资源更多投入到创新型经济上,给予优质及前景较好的企业一定杠杆率调整空间和自由度,使其能够更好地利用社会资金,激励其开展研发活动,促进金融更好地服务实体经济,赋能高质量发展。     

金融资产配置与违约风险:蓄水池效应,还是逐利效应？

本文以2007—2016年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,检验了企业金融资产配置对违约风险的影响。实证研究发现:金融资产持有量越多,企业的违约风险越低,金融资产配置的“蓄水池效应”显著;在货币政策宽松时期,金融资产配置导致的代理冲突显现,宽松的货币政策会抑制金融资产投资对违约风险的降低作用。政府规制也会有一定的公司治理作用,将产业政策纳入讨论发现:对于产业政策支持的行业来说,企业金融资产配置能够降低违约风险,但是宽松的货币政策会刺激管理层的短视投资行为,抑制政府规制的公司治理作用。进一步地,本文提出会计稳健性的提升是企业金融资产配置降低违约风险的重要路径。本文的研究结论丰富了企业金融资产配置动机和违约风险影响因素的讨论,能够为政府部门防范经济运行中的内在风险提供有益借鉴。     

Bank competition and corporate financial asset holdings

This paper investigates how bank competition measured by the geographical distribution of bank branches impacts the financial asset holdings of nonfinancial firms. By using a sample of listed nonfinancial firms in China between 2007 and 2019, we find that intensified bank competition caused by the increase in the number of bank branches around firms significantly increases their noncash financial asset holdings, especially for the firms with a higher level of credit constraints or a greater degree of information asymmetry. The result implies that achieving higher yields is the underlying motive for firms to hold noncash financial assets. Moreover, the competition among non-state-owned banks shows a greater impact on corporate financial asset holdings, and the impact of bank competition on noncash financial asset holdings is more pronounced for non-state-owned firms. Our findings provide insight into the determinants of noncash financial asset holdings of firms in a transitional economy.     

Monetary Policy,Asset Prices,and Liquidity in Over‐the‐Counter Markets

We develop a model where agents can allocate their wealth between a liquid asset, which can be used to purchase consumption goods, and an illiquid asset, which represents a better store of value. Should a consumption opportunity arise, agents may visit a frictional “over‐the‐counter” secondary asset market where they can exchange illiquid for liquid assets. We characterize how monetary policy affects both the issue price and the secondary market price of the asset. We also show that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, search and bargaining frictions in the secondary asset market can improve welfare if inflation is low.     

Real asset liquidity,cash holdings,and the cost of corporate debt

We study the impact of the interplay between cash holdings and asset sales on the corporate debt spread. We allow cash holdings and asset sales to assist with both debt repayment and sequential investments. The interplay between cash holdings and asset sales leads to a convex relationship between credit spreads and the liquidity of the market for real assets. We use the 2008 financial crisis as a natural experiment and find that post-2008, the nonlinearity of the link between credit spreads and asset liquidity is pronounced, closely matching analytical predictions. This is especially acute for highly leveraged and low profitability firms.     

Performance of Thinly Traded Assets: A Case in Real Estate

Thinly traded private assets do not fit into the traditional finance paradigm of a liquid and well‐functioning market where trading is continuous and instantaneous. Since private assets cannot be bought and sold easily, they bear liquidity risk. Classical finance theories cannot properly gauge the performance of illiquid private assets because they implicitly assume such illiquidity is trivial. This paper proposes an alternative performance metric for the illiquid private asset, which explicitly captures liquidity risk in a formal analysis. Applying the new performance metric, we are able to explain the decades‐old “real estate risk premium puzzle.”     

Internal financial constraints,external financial constraints,and investment choice: Evidence from a panel of UK firms

This paper uses a panel of 24,184 UK firms over the period 1993–2003 to study the extent to which the sensitivity of investment to cash flow differs at firms facing different degrees of internal and external financial constraints. Our results suggest that when the sample is split on the basis of the level of internal funds available to the firms, the relationship between investment and cash flow is U-shaped. On the other hand, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow tends to increase monotonically with the degree of external financial constraints faced by firms. Combining the internal with the external financial constraints, we find that the dependence of investment on cash flow is strongest for those externally financially constrained firms that have a relatively high level of internal funds.     

储蓄率与杠杆率:一个U型关系

近年来,中国呈现典型的“高储蓄—高杠杆”特征,高储蓄率也被认为是中国杠杆率偏高的主要原因之一。能否通过降低储蓄率的方式来去杠杆成为了广泛讨论的问题。为此,本文构建了一个含有融资约束的动态宏观模型,研究了储蓄率对杠杆率的影响机理。并且,基于41个代表性经济体1966-2017年的面板数据,对储蓄率与杠杆率之间的关系进行了实证分析,主要有两点研究发现:(1)虽然高储蓄率会导致高杠杆率,但是储蓄率与杠杆率不是简单的正相关关系,而是呈现显著的U型关系。结合测算的U型曲线拐点值与中国实际情况,预计储蓄率下降在降低杠杆率方面的作用效果有限。(2)高杠杆下,较高的储蓄率可以有效降低发生金融危机的概率,而储蓄率下降则会加大发生金融危机的概率。基于此,本文认为中国不能通过降低储蓄率的方式来降低杠杆率,反而需要对近年来储蓄率下滑的现象予以高度重视,从而更好地守住不发生系统性金融风险的底线。     

Bank systemic risk and corporate investment: Evidence from the US

In this paper, we develop a simple two-period model in which a bank’s investment (e.g., loans) is influenced by short-term financing and a probability of a financial crisis. When banks ex ante expect to be bailed out during financial crises, they do not necessarily internalize the cost of financial crises and invest more. We argue that the level of systemic risk in the banking sector is largely driven by (1) the way in which banks finance their investment (e.g., loans) using more short-term debt and/or (2) the increase in asset commonality amongst banks. We use three measures that arguably capture two dimensions of “bank systemic risk”, namely, (1) bank funding maturity and (2) bank asset commonality, to empirically test whether bank systemic risk has a positive effect on corporate investment. We document that in a sample of publicly listed firms in the United States over the period 1991–2013, bank systemic risk is positively associated with the firm-level investment ratio after controlling for a large set of country- and firm-level variables. In addition, we show that a firm's leverage strengthens the positive effect of bank systemic risk on corporate investment, suggesting that more financially constrained firms experience a larger effect of bank systemic risk on corporate investment than less financially constrained firms.     

CEO EXTRAVERSION AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS: THE ROLE OF FIRM DYNAMICS,PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION,AND FINANCIAL CRISIS

Using panel data of U.S. firms, we focus on an important yet understudied facet of the chief executive officer's (CEO) personality—extraversion—and how it affects corporate capital structure decisions. We examine how this relation is moderated by financing (tax) benefits, financial crisis, firm size, growth opportunities, and collateralization. The results show that firms managed by extraverted CEOs use greater financial leverage, adjusting toward target leverage levels at a faster speed, with about half-life within a year for book and market leverage. In addition, the positive extraversion–leverage relation is enhanced for firms that are large, have greater collateralizable assets, and are more vulnerable to external shocks (financial crisis). Last, although the positive extraversion–leverage relation holds particularly when product market competition is high, the effect is attenuated for high-growth opportunity firms.     

美国货币政策推升了新兴市场国家非金融企业杠杆率吗？

全球金融危机后,美国量化宽松货币政策的实施导致全球流动性异常充裕,对新兴市场国家非金融企业外部融资环境造成显著影响。本文运用28个新兴市场国家2003-2015年非金融类上市企业财务数据和美国影子利率数据对美国货币政策调整与新兴市场国家非金融企业杠杆率变动之间的关系进行了实证分析。结果显示,美国影子利率与新兴市场国家非金融企业杠杆率变动之间存在显著负相关关系,即美国影子利率的降低会促使新兴市场国家非金融企业杠杆率出现更大幅度的上涨。进一步地,这一影响在融资约束程度较高的企业、外部融资依赖度较高的行业以及资本账户开放程度较高但汇率弹性僵化的国家表现得更为显著。上述发现意味着新兴市场国家在调控企业部门杠杆率的过程中,除要考虑国内因素外,也应高度重视美国货币政策的变化。     

土地资产价格波动与经济中的流动性供给——基于以地融资视角的研究

本文通过构建理论模型探讨土地资产价格波动与流动性供给之间的关系。在本文模型中,土地兼具生产资本与抵押资产属性,银行贷款同时受到投资需求、抵押品价值与信贷额度的约束。本文主要结论是:(1)土地资产价格在低于一个由基础货币供给决定的临界值后,能影响企业的抵押品价值并反映投资需求变化,故而与存款货币流动性供给正相关。这也使土地资产价格变化与企业杠杆周期一致且具有“预期自我实现”特征。(2)基础货币供给能够通过影响土地的流动性价值的方式来引导土地资产价格,前提是央行可掌握土地资产价格外生变化的原因。(3)信贷资产证券化会提高存款货币供给与土地价格的关联度,但也会削弱基础货币供给对土地价格的引导能力。本文的研究有助于认识土地资产价格与货币政策效果以及系统性金融风险的关联机制,为房地产调控政策提供启示。     

Levered Returns

This paper revisits the theoretical relation between financial leverage and stock returns in a dynamic world where both corporate investment and financing decisions are endogenous. We find that the link between leverage and stock returns is more complex than static textbook examples suggest, and depends on the investment opportunities available to the firm. In the presence of financial market imperfections, leverage and investment are generally correlated so that highly levered firms are also mature firms with relatively more (safe) book assets and fewer (risky) growth opportunities. A quantitative version of our model matches several stylized facts about leverage and returns.     

社会互动与家庭金融资产配置

运用中国家庭金融调查(CHFS)数据,研究社会互动与家庭金融资产配置之间的关系。研究发现,适当增强社会互动会促进家庭更多地参与风险金融市场,增加投资风险资产的比例,提高金融资产的分散化程度,优化资产的配置效率。但当社会互动达到一定程度后,过度的社会互动则会抑制家庭参与风险市场,减少风险资产的投资比重,降低金融资产的分散化程度以及资产配置的有效性。因此,家庭需要建立适度而高质量的社会互动,这有助于家庭获得更多的外部资源,缓解信息不对称,降低交易成本,从而优化家庭金融资产配置。     

Effects of Ownership Structure on Capital Structure of Indian Listed Firms: Role of Business Groups vis-à-vis Stand-Alone Firms

The objective of this study was to explore the relationship between promoter ownership and capital structure of firms’ using a sample of Indian publicly listed firms for the period from 2006 to 2013. We find that the relationship between promoter ownership and leverage is inversely U-shaped in group-affiliated firms, whereas in stand-alone firms there is a U-shaped relationship. We argue that a substantial presence of family owners and the selection of managers from within the family play some role for such relationship in group-affiliated firms. On the other hand, the argument for observed relationship in stand-alone firms follows from alignment hypothesis, entrenchment hypothesis, managerial risk aversion hypothesis, and active monitoring hypothesis.     

宏观审慎政策是否推动了企业去杠杆？——基于沪深A股上市公司的实证分析

依据2007—2019年中国沪深两市A股非金融上市公司年度财务数据,运用多元线性回归模型,考察宏观审慎政策和企业杠杆率之间的作用关系。结果表明：适度从紧的宏观审慎政策有利于降低企业杠杆率,受企业特征和地区金融结构异质性影响,非国有控股、规模较小、非过度负债状态企业及金融结构化程度较高地区更为明显;进一步分析发现,宏观审慎政策通过银行信贷渠道和资产价格渠道影响企业杠杆率,其中非国有控股及小规模企业受影响更深。因此,应优化宏观审慎政策对企业杠杆率的调节方式,加强宏观审慎政策结构性监管与跨部门监管,提高宏观审慎政策的有效性和针对性。     

The Design of Financial Policies in Corporate Spin-offs

We examine differences in financial leverage between parentand spun-off firms that emerge from corporate spin-offs. Ourtests control for past financing choices and the costs of adjustingcapital structure, factors that can obscure cross-sectionalpatterns among firms' target leverage ratios. We find that firmsthat emerge from spin-offs with more financial leverage havea higher cash flow return on assets, lower variability of industryoperating income, and a greater proportion of fixed assets.The positive relation between profitability and the use of financialleverage, in a setting that is free of pecking order effects,is particularly important because it contrasts with existingevidence. Our results indicate that the ability to cover debtpayments and default-related costs are important determinantsof the use of financial leverage, as implied by the trade-offtheory of capital structure. We find no evidence that managerialincentives or governance characteristics affect the differencein leverage ratios in firms that emerge from spin-offs.