Management quality,certification, and initial public offerings

We empirically examine the relationship between the quality and reputation of a firm's management and various aspects of its IPO and post-IPO performance, a relationship that has so far received little attention in the literature. We hypothesize that better and more reputable managers are able to convey the intrinsic value of their firm more credibly to outsiders, thereby reducing the information asymmetry facing their firm in the equity market. Therefore, IPOs of firms with higher management quality will be characterized by lower underpricing, greater institutional interest, more reputable underwriters, and smaller underwriting expenses. Further, if higher management quality is associated with lower heterogeneity in investor valuations, firms with better managers will have greater long-term stock returns. Finally, since better managers are likely to select better projects (having a larger NPV for any given scale) and implement them more ably, higher management quality will also be associated with larger IPO offer sizes and stronger post-IPO operating performance. We present evidence consistent with the above hypotheses.     

Going-concern initial public offerings

We study the relation between audit reports and the capital-raising activities of small business by studying the role of going-concern (GC) audit opinions in IPOs. After controlling for other effects, we find that the presence of a GC opinion is positively related to whether a stock delists (for deleterious reasons) within two years of IPO. We also find that GC IPOs suffer less first-day underpricing. Based on Rock (1986), this implies that firms with GCs have less ex ante uncertainty in the sense that the information conveyed by a GC helps uninformed investors estimate the dispersion of secondary market values.     

Technological innovation and initial public offerings

This article shows how both technological and competitive risksaffect the timing of private and initial public offerings inan emerging industry. Early private financing occurs in industriesthat are perceived to be risky, with high development costsand low probability of being displaced by technologically superiorrivals. Early public financing occurs in industries perceivedto be viable, with low development costs and low probabilityof displacement. Due to feedback effects between financial andproduct markets, the value of investors' proprietary informationis greater in private than in initial public offerings. Thishas implications for underpricing.     

Laddering in initial public offerings

Laddering is a practice whereby the allocating underwriter requires the ladderer to buy additional shares of the issuer in the aftermarket as a condition for receiving shares at the offer price. This paper identifies factors that create incentives to engage in this type of manipulation and models the effect of laddering on initial public offering (IPO) pricing. I show that laddering has a bigger effect on the market price of IPOs with greater expected underpricing (without laddering) and greater expected momentum in the aftermarket; laddering increases the IPO offer price, the aftermarket price, and the money left on the table but does not necessarily increase the percentage underpricing; laddering contributes to long-run underperformance and creates a negative correlation between short-run and long-run returns; and profit-sharing increases the extent of laddering and the percentage underpricing.     

Earnings quality at initial public offerings

We show that, contrary to popular belief, initial public offering (IPO) firms report more conservatively. We attribute this to the higher quality reporting demanded of public firms by financial statement users and consequentially higher monitoring by auditors, boards, analysts, rating agencies, press, and litigants, and to greater regulatory scrutiny [Ball, R., Shivakumar, L., 2005. Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 83–128]. We also question the evidence of Teoh et al. [1998b. Earnings management and the subsequent market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 53, 1935–1974] supporting the alternative hypothesis that managers opportunistically inflate earnings to influence IPO pricing. We conjecture that upward-biased estimates of “discretionary” accruals occur in a broad genre of studies on earnings management around similar large transactions and events.     

Securities litigation,withdrawal risk and initial public offerings

I examine the relations between litigation risk, withdrawal risk, and the costs of going public using a sample of withdrawn and completed initial public offerings (IPOs) filed during 1996–2005. Firms with a higher probability of offer withdrawal face higher litigation risk if they complete these offers. Firms with higher litigation risk pay slightly higher gross spreads, but do not underprice their IPOs by a greater amount. Withdrawal probability is strongly and positively associated with underwriter gross spreads, consistent with underwriters charging fees that reflect the probability of not getting paid. When the pre-market demand for an IPO is weak, a higher withdrawal probability raises underpricing on completed deals.     

Short selling in initial public offerings

Short sale constraints in the aftermarket of initial public offerings (IPOs) are often used to explain short-term underpricing that is subsequently reversed. This paper shows that short selling is integral to aftermarket trading and is higher in IPOs with greater underpricing. Perceived restrictions on borrowing shares are not systematically circumvented by “naked” short selling. Short sellers, on average, do not appear to earn abnormal profits in the near term and our findings are not driven by market makers. Short selling in IPOs is not as constrained as suggested by the literature, implying that other factors may be responsible for underpricing.     

Divergence of opinion and initial public offerings

This article analyzes several IPO patterns in the framework of divergence of opinion. Considering a new industry with few publicly traded companies, the investors in this IPO market do not initially have complete knowledge about the industry, but may learn from other IPOs in the sector. Our model shows that the equilibrium is consistent with empirical evidence documented for IPO underpricing and hot issue markets. We also characterize the association between share overhang, trading volume, and IPO prices. Furthermore, we discuss the decision of going public, analyst coverage, and IPO lockup expiration in the presence of divergent opinions.     

Predicting mispricing of initial public offerings

This article investigates the ability of neural network models to predict mispricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). The aim is to improve the modest explanatory power of existing models that are based on the theory of asymmetrically informed economic agents surrounding post‐issue market value of IPOs. This study develops and compares linear regression and neural network models. The results show that modelling variable interactions and non‐linearity allows a potentially fruitful approach for stagging in IPOs. Neural networks have been criticized for being a black box; however, this paper shows that, by using sensitivity analysis, neural networks can provide a reasonable explanation of their predictive behaviour and direction of association between variables. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The timing of initial public offerings

We study the dynamics of IPOs by examining the tradeoff between an entrepreneur's private benefits, which are lost whenever the firm is publicly traded, and the gains from diversification. We characterize the timing dimension of the decision to go public and its impact on firm value and the evolution of firm risk over time. By endogenizing the timing of the decision to go public, we explain the clustering of IPOs and buyouts in time, the industry concentration of IPO waves, the high incidence of reprivatization of recent IPOs, and the long-run underperformance of recently issued stock relative to the shares of longer-listed companies.     

The waiting period of initial public offerings

The length of time it takes an IPO firm to go public (called ‘waiting period’) reflects multiple layers of scrutiny from underwriters, auditors, venture capitalists, institutional investors, and regulators. Accordingly, we show that the waiting period is a good barometer of ex ante uncertainty about future cash flows and that it has predictive power after the firm goes public. We find that firms marked by short waiting periods experience lower underpricing and less uncertainty and superior stock/operating performance in the aftermarket. We also report that smaller firms are taking longer to go public after SOX Act, thus providing justification for the 2012 JOBS Act.     

The short-term timing of initial public offerings

This paper examines the effect of stock market conditions on the waiting time of initial public offering (IPO) candidates, from the date firms file a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the effective IPO date. I find that issuers are going public faster when time-varying stock market valuations are high, and when time-varying market returns and time-varying market volatility are low. The volatility effect is not driven by regulatory delays consecutive to changes in the terms of the offers during the IPO process. Taken together, these results indicate that firms use a short-term market timing strategy when deciding the right time to go public and are consistent with a real option interpretation of IPO timing.     

Local corporate misconduct and local initial public offerings

This paper investigates the cost of going public through initial public offerings (IPOs) for firms located in regions with significant fraud density. We find that companies in regions with a high proportion of nearby firms that have committed corporate misconduct have more pronounced underpricing, experience higher post-IPO stock return volatility, and are more likely to withdraw their offerings. Overall, our results show that local corporate misconduct is associated with the pricing of IPOs, and the breach of trust is related to costly IPOs for newcomers.     

Litigation risk, intermediation, and the underpricing of initial public offerings

We formally examine the role of litigation risk in initial publicoffering (IPO) pricing. The underwriter's pricing decision tradesoff current revenue against expected future litigation costs,both of which are increasing in the IPO price. Given a time-consistencyconstraint and rational expectations on the part of investors,however, the 'standard' litigation risk argument does not leadto equilibrium underpricing. We develop a richer model thatprovides sufficient conditions under which there is equilibriumunderpricing. The issuer's choice of employing an underwriterversus floating the IPO on its own is examined, and varioustestable implications of the model are developed.     

Preplay communication, participation restrictions, and efficiency in initial public offerings

The extent to which the observed procedures for selling newissues are efficient is studied. We show that a posted-pricedmechanism, in conjunction with nonbinding preplay communicationand participation restrictions, leads to an allocation of thesecurity (and payment) that maximizes the seller's expectedrevenue, given the informational constraints imposed by theoptimizing incentives of the potential buyers.     

Uncertainty,prospectus content,and the pricing of initial public offerings

This study reports evidence on the relation between the pre-market due diligence and book-building processes in determining initial public offering (IPO) share prices. The evidence suggests that there is a complementarity between these processes that has not been discussed in the literature. We find that when there is greater uncertainty regarding the value of the shares, more information of the type that investors are likely to have a comparative advantage in evaluating tends to be included in the offering prospectus prior to the roadshow. The increase in these disclosures is, in turn, associated with greater information discovery during book-building.     

A law and finance analysis of initial public offerings

Do families keep control of their firms because they, operating in an environment with weak protection of minority shareholders, fear being exploited by management after the IPO? Or is ownership concentration due to the value families attach to control? We find a positive relation between use of security designs that separate votes from capital and frequency of family-controlled firms in Sweden and other countries. It is not caused by differences in legal regimes or in minority protection. Since control blocks are never sold piecemeal to preserve control value, ownership remains highly concentrated. Family-controlled firms trade at a discount because of the misallocation of control rights to heirs who make inefficient decisions, not because of extraction of pecuniary benefits.     

The over/underpricing of initial public offerings

This article shows that lawsuit avoidance motivation can lead entrepreneurs to overprice, as well as underprice, initial public offerings of equity. The article simplifies the lawsuit avoidance argument by addressing the entrepreneur's acceptable probability of lawsuit predicated on the loss of reputation capital, in lieu of the explicit offering revenue/litigation cost trade-off previously treated in the literature. The model yields offering price regimes which include rational cases of overpricing and correct pricing, as well as underpricing, and comparative statics results for the relationship of the optimal offering price with project size, project risk, investors' litigiousness, and the entrepreneur's acceptable probability of lawsuit. The article argues that existing empirical evidence previously used to refute the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis supports the hypothesis in the context of the model.