US government TARP bailout and bank lottery behavior

Considerable debate surrounds how the US government's TARP bailout intervention has affected the risk-taking and moral hazard behavior of U.S. banks around the global financial crisis. We examine this issue with a focus on lottery behavior introducing MAX/MIN as a new measure of lotteryness in banking to capture the loss protection from bank bailout guarantees. We find that the TARP bailout increased the likelihood of bank lotteryness and risk shifting. Lottery-like bank equities are riskier after TARP and exhibit fatter right to left tails. A consistent pattern of risk taking and lottery behavior extends both before and after the 2008–2009 crisis, engulfing the largest systemic banks (SIFIs). While confirming that lottery-like bank equities have lower short-term return, we find they exhibit better cumulative long-term return performance. Our findings have important policy implications regarding government intervention in banking crises.     

Ben Bernanke and Bagehot's Rules

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has claimed that the Fed's bank bailouts during the 2008 financial crisis were consistent with Walter Bagehot's rules for a lender of last resort. This paper demonstrates Bernanke's claims to be mistaken. First, we outline Bagehot's doctrine for a classical lender of last resort. Next, we discuss Bernanke's theory of bank bailouts and his statements regarding the Fed's role in the 2008 bank bailouts. Finally, we examine the bailouts and demonstrate that, contrary to Bernanke's claims, the Fed's actions were not consistent with Bagehot's rules for a lender of last resort.     

Supply and Demand Effects of Bank Bailouts: Depositors Need Not Apply and Need Not Run

We address two key issues concerning bank bailout effects on depositor and bank behavior. The first is whether bailouts weaken or strengthen market discipline by depositors through deposit supplies. The second is if bailed-out banks decrease or increase their deposit demands. These questions can only be adequately addressed by analyzing the effects of bailouts on both deposit quantities and prices. We do so for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bailouts. Overall, we find that demand changes empirically dominate supply changes, and suggest significantly reduced deposit demand from bailouts. In some cases, however, supply changes dominate and indicate weakened market discipline.     

Geopolitical,economic uncertainty and bank risk: Do CEO power and board strength matter?

This study examines whether economic and geopolitical uncertainties affect bank risk. Using a sample of 574 banks from 19 countries for 2009–2020, our findings show that increasing economic and geopolitical uncertainty significantly constrain the bank risk and worsens its stability. Furthermore, we explore whether CEO power and board strength have played a moderate role in mitigating the adverse impact of economic and geopolitical uncertainty on bank risk. The finding shows that CEOs' power and strong boards improve the bank's performance and minimize the adverse effects of economic and geopolitical uncertainty on bank risk. The results are robust to alternative bank risk, economic uncertainty, and geopolitical uncertainty measures and address endogeneity. Additional analyses on bank heterogeneity show that the bank stability of listed, domestic and private-owned banks is more immune to such uncertainty.     

‘Too systemically important to fail’ in banking – Evidence from bank mergers and acquisitions

In this paper, we examine the systemic risk implications of banking institutions that are considered ‘Too-systemically-important-to-fail’ (TSITF). We exploit a sample of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in nine EU economies between 1997 and 2007 to capture safety net subsidy effects and evaluate their ramifications for systemic risk. We find that safety net benefits derived from M&A activity have a significantly positive association with rescue probability, suggesting moral hazard in banking systems. We, however, find no evidence that gaining safety net subsidies leads to TSITF bank's increased interdependency over peer banks.     

Bank Competition: Measurement,Decision‐Making,and Risk‐Taking

This paper investigates whether greater competition increases or decreases individual bank and banking system risk. Using a new text‐based measure of competition, and an instrumental variables analysis that exploits exogenous variation in bank deregulation, we provide robust evidence that greater competition increases both individual bank risk and a bank's contribution to system‐wide risk. Specifically, we find that higher competition is associated with lower underwriting standards, less timely loan loss recognition, and a shift toward noninterest revenue. Further, we find that higher competition is associated with higher stand‐alone risk of individual banks, greater sensitivity of a bank's downside equity risk to system‐wide distress, and a greater contribution by individual banks to downside risk of the banking sector.     

Securitization and systemic risk: An empirical investigation on Italian banks over the financial crisis

This research examines the effects of securitization on the bank's risk exposure both in terms of individual expected shortfall and marginal expected shortfall as a measure of systemic risk. The relationship between securitization activity and tail risks is especially relevant in light of the consequences for financial stability, both for the individual securitizing banks and for the market as a whole, as the financial crisis 2007–2008 reveals. By using a sample of Italian listed banks over the period 2000–2009, we find that securitizing banks have, on average, higher expected losses in case of extreme events. This adds new evidence on the main findings in the literature that focused on the evidence that risk transfer through securitization is relatively insignificant compared to the risk retained by the originating bank. We show that this risk retention is in terms of an increase of tail risk. We also find that securitization increases the probability of banks to become “systemically” riskier, but we find no difference when comparing the pre-crisis with the post-crisis period. This suggests that the systemic exposures of Italian banks are still as high as before the crisis with severe implications for financial stability.     

Firm Performance and CEO Reputation Costs: New Evidence from the Venezuelan Banking Crisis

When searching for outside directors, the performance of the candidate as a manager of other firms is important. Using a sample of Venezuelan banks during a systemic crisis, we find that the outside directorships of chief executive officers (CEOs) are negatively affected by banks' performances, measured by their default risk. Our results suggest that a CEOs' personal monitoring talents are what is being purchased when CEOs are appointed as outside directors. In addition, the negative effect of firms' performances on their CEOs' reputations is significantly stronger in an emerging market, suggesting that CEO reputation helps to control for managerial agency costs when other governance mechanisms are absent. The size of the bank has a positive effect on CEO reputation, which partially offsets the negative reputation effect of the bank risk.     

BANK REGULATIONS,CAPITAL STRUCTURE,AND RISK

The joint influence of the Federal Reserve's (Fed) discount window credit and reserve requirements and FDIC's deposit insurance on a bank's optimal capital structure and asset risk choices is analyzed. The specific seniority of such regulatory claims, and potentially strong negative correlation between bank asset classes, significantly alters our traditional view of such regulatory influences on bank behavior. I find that the discount window's presence does not always prompt bank risk taking and leverage, but it does partially offset such incentives under certain conditions. In addition to its cost, a reserve requirement provides the bank with an indirect subsidy that may encourage deposit funding. Thus, regulatory reforms, such as the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, which curtail banks' access to the discount window, may not always be appropriate to resolve a bank's incentive for moral hazard behavior. The Fed's presence needs to be more comprehensively examined to design effective regulatory policy.     

Do Business Borrowers Benefit from Bank Bailouts?: The Effects of TARP on Loan Contract Terms

We investigate benefits to business borrowers from bank bailouts, specifically the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Applying difference‐in‐difference methodology to loan‐level data, we find more favorable borrower contract terms in five dimensions, spread, amount, maturity, collateral, and covenants, suggesting increased credit supply at the intensive margin by bailed‐out banks. Findings are robust to dealing with endogeneity and other issues. Riskier borrowers benefit more, consistent with moral hazard exploitation. Small and unlisted borrowers benefit less, suggesting fewer benefits for financially constrained firms. Benefits accrue to both relationship and nonrelationship borrowers. Results contribute to the research and policy debates on bank bailouts.     

Not all bank systemic risks are alike: Deposit insurance and bank risk revisited

This study investigates how deposit insurance, especially in terms of its design features, affects the sources of banking systemic risk. We do so by decomposing a bank's contribution to systemic risk into idiosyncratic tail risk (Alpha), the exposure to fundamental macroeconomic and finance factors (Beta) and bank interconnectedness (Gamma). Our results indicate that while deposit insurance may increase Alpha, there is a U-shaped relationship between deposit insurance coverage and Beta and Gamma, indicating the existence of an optimal coverage level that minimizes systemic risk. We also find that insurance design characteristics significantly affect the U-shaped relationship. Deposit insurance designed to be independently organized, with public administration, additional supervision and risk minimization functions, and private funding, further reduces the systemic risk associated with any given level of coverage. With several robustness checks, including potential endogeneity, heterogeneity, and possible limits in the sample, the results remain valid. Our results should benefit policymakers who design and optimize deposit insurance schemes to ensure that they play a positive role.     

Implications of bank regulation for loan supply and bank stability: a dynamic perspective

ABSTRACT

We show that internal funds play a particular role in the regulation of bank capital, which has not received much attention, yet. A bank's decision on loan supply and capital structure determines its immediate bankruptcy risk as well as the future availability of internal funds. These internal funds in turn determine a bank's future costs of external finance and its future vulnerability to bankruptcy risks. Using a partial equilibrium model, we study how internal funds affect these intra- and intertemporal links. Moreover, our positive analysis identifies the effects of risk-weighted capital-to-asset ratios, liquidity coverage ratios and regulatory margin calls on the dynamics of internal funds and thus loan supply and bank stability. Only regulatory margin calls or large liquidity coverage ratios achieve bank stability for all risk levels, but for large risks a bank will stop credit intermediation.     

On the determinants of bank interest margins under credit and interest rate risks

This paper explores the determinants of optimal bank interest margins based on a simple firm-theoretical model under multiple sources of uncertainty and risk aversion. The model demonstrates how cost, regulation, credit risk and interest rate risk conditions jointly determine the optimal bank interest margin decision. We find that the bank interest margin is positively related to the bank's market power, to the operating costs, to the degree of credit risk, and to the degree of interest rate risk. An increase in the bank's equity capital has a negative effect on the spread when the bank faces little interest rate risk. The effect of rising interbank market rate on the spread is ambiguous and depends on the net position of the bank in the interbank market. Our findings provide alternative explanations for the empirical evidence concerning bank spread behavior.     

Bank governance,regulation and risk taking

This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and we show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings show that the same regulation has different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.     

Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions and Systemic Risk in the Banking Industry

This study examines the relation between earnings management through discretionary loan loss provisions (LLPs) and systemic risk in the U. S. banking sector using a large sample of commercial banks from 1996 to 2009. We find that earnings management increases a bank's contribution to systemic crash risk and systemic distress risk, consistent with the notion that earnings management increases information opacity, facilitates bad news hoarding, co‐moves with macroeconomic conditions, and exhibits cross‐sectional correlation and herding in earnings management. However, the effect of earnings management through discretionary LLPs on systemic risk disappears during the crisis period, consistent with weakened earnings management in crisis times. We also find that the same effect strengthens with bank uncertainty and homogenous loans, and weakens in the post‐SOX period, and when banks are audited by Big 4 auditors.     

It takes more than two to tango: Multiple bank lending,asset commonality and risk

Multiple-bank lending is the most prevalent form of bank-firm credit relationships in nearly all countries. It results in high asset commonality and interconnectedness, allows idiosyncratic risks to become systemic, and makes the banking system more fragile and vulnerable to shocks. Using detailed, granular-level, supervisory data on large corporate loans, we show that multiple bank lending is driven, inter alia, by regulatory limits on large credit exposures. These limits, aimed at mitigating an individual bank's concentration risk, force firms to explore alternative sources of funding, making the common borrowers' phenomenon more prominent. We find that multiple bank lending is determined endogenously, and its likelihood increases with the level of portfolio similarity between lenders. The size of the original lender and its systemic importance magnifies this effect. We argue that banks do not internalize the systemic effect of their lending decisions and that multiple bank lending constitutes an insurance mechanism related to an implicit "too-many-to-fail" guarantee. Its externalities are suboptimal and should be reinforced with better monitoring by the related authorities.     

Bank funding modes: Securitization versus deposits

We examine a bank's choice of whether to fund the loans it originates by emitting deposits or to sell the loans to investors. With common knowledge of loan quality and laissez faire banking, we find that the choice is irrelevant. With asymmetric information but without government intervention, we find that better quality assets will be sold (securitized) and poorer quality assets will be funded with deposits. Public regulation can influence the bank's choice; subsidies can cause a bank to favor deposit funding, but mutual funds and third-party insurers may mitigate the effects of governmental subsidies.     

Payment obligations,reserve requirements,and the demand for central bank balances

We develop a model in which a bank's demand for reserves depends on the joint distribution of transactions, reserve requirements, and the interest rate. By devoting resources to its liquidity management, a bank can save on costly reserves required to settle its payments on time. We test the model with data from the largest banks in the Swiss Interbank Clearing system. We find that the turnover ratio (the speed with which a bank turns over its reserves in the payment system) depends largely on the aggregate value of its payments. We also find that reserve requirements impose a highly uneven burden on the banks.     

A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

We model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. A distressed financial sector induces government bailouts, whose cost increases sovereign credit risk. Increased sovereign credit risk in turn weakens the financial sector by eroding the value of its government guarantees and bond holdings. Using credit default swap (CDS) rates on European sovereigns and banks, we show that bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk in 2008. We document that post‐bailout changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank‐level determinants of credit spreads, confirming the sovereign‐bank loop.     

The implications of TARP: Evidence from bank performance and CEO pension benefits

This study examines the effect of compensation restrictions introduced by the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) of 2008 on the performance of banks and their compensation structures. It documents significant performance improvement among TARP banks that experienced Chief Executive Officer (CEO) resignations after their banks accepted TARP funds. The improvement is most significant in the year following CEO resignation. In addition, TARP banks that kept their CEOs show a significant increase in CEO pensions post-TARP. TARP banks that did not experience CEO resignations, thus, appear to substitute pension increases for their CEOs to mitigate the TARP-induced decrease in conventional forms of compensation. Further analysis on all banks without CEO resignations shows that TARP banks have significantly higher increase in pension benefits post 2009 than banks that chose to decline TARP funds. The evidence shows that increased pension arrangements play a significant role in CEOs’ decisions to remain in their roles despite the constraints imposed by TARP.