Do banks appraise internal capital markets during credit shocks? Evidence from the Greek crisis

Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated firms and are less likely to downgrade the affiliates’ credit profile. Finally, banks are more likely to show forbearance to affiliated firms with non-performing loans. The results are consistent with the view that banks manage their relationships with firms in a business group jointly, as opposed to viewing each firm as an independent entity. Our findings also suggest that the value of risk sharing through internal capital markets increases when external financing is scarce.     

Do the business cycle and revenue diversification matter for banks’ capital buffer and credit risk: Evidence from ASEAN banks

We examine the association of the business cycle and revenue diversification with the banks’ capital buffer and credit risk for a sample of banks from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region from 1998 to 2018, using 2847 banking firm–year observations. We find that ASEAN region banks react anticyclically in adjusting their capital buffer levels and credit risk. We find revenue diversification benefits and that banks, through revenue diversification, can reduce their credit risk while achieving capital savings when confronting economic downturns. Our results offer support for the Basel III accord. However, the relations revealed are somewhat moderated by the regulatory quality, competition, and phase of the business cycle encountered by ASEAN region banks.     

Can learnability save new-Keynesian models?

McCallum (2009) argues that “learnability” can save new-Keynesian models from indeterminacies. He claims the unique bounded equilibrium is learnable, and the explosive equilibria are not. However, he assumes that agents can directly observe the monetary policy shock. Reversing this assumption, I find the opposite: the bounded equilibrium is not learnable and the unbounded equilibria are learnable. More generally, I argue that a threat by the Fed to move to an “unlearnable” equilibrium for all but one value of inflation is a poor foundation for choosing the bounded equilibrium of a new-Keynesian model.     

Who benefits from capital account liberalization? Evidence from firm-level credit ratings data

Using a novel panel data set on corporate foreign-currency credit ratings and capital account restrictions in advanced and emerging economies during 1995–2004, we find a strong positive effect of capital account liberalization on firms' credit risk, as measured by corporate credit ratings. As an identification strategy, we exploit within-country variation in firms' ability to obtain foreign currency and, thus, their ability to repay foreign currency debt. We find that liberalizing the capital account benefits significantly more those firms with more limited foreign currency access, namely, those producing nontradables. Our findings demonstrate a novel channel through which capital account restrictions affect economic outcomes, and they are robust to a broad range of alternative specifications.     

Are capital buffers pro-cyclical?: Evidence from Spanish panel data

We estimate the relationship between the Spanish business cycle and the capital buffers held by Spanish commercial and savings banks in an incomplete panel of institutions covering the period 1986–2000, which comprises a complete cycle. After controlling for other potential determinants of the surplus capital we find a robustly significant negative relationship between the position in the cycle and capital buffers. From a quantitative standpoint, an increase of 1 percentage point in GDP growth might reduce capital buffers by 17%. This relationship is, moreover, asymmetric, being closer during upturns.     

What drives portfolio investments of German banks in emerging capital markets?

After decades of steady liberalization and financial market development, emerging capital markets experienced unparalleled capital inflows in the aftermath of the emerging markets crisis of the 1990s. This paper studies portfolio investment decisions of German banks in emerging capital markets from 2002 to 2007. The use of a dynamic time-series cross-section framework and the micro database External Position Report provided by Deutsche Bundesbank permit insights into the various determinants of portfolio investments in ECMs. For example, there is evidence that German banks take into account the various dimensions of financial market development in their portfolio investment decisions and anticipate the special risks inherent in emerging markets. Proxies for the overall development and efficiency of capital markets have the highest economic significance of all variables. The introduction of depositary receipts programs has a positive impact on stock market investment. Moreover, there is evidence that global risk aversion exerts a significant influence in times of financial turmoil.     

Do banks price discriminate spatially? Evidence from small business lending in local credit markets

In this paper we explore the effects of bank–borrower physical proximity on price and non-price aspects of small business lending in local credit markets. Along the price dimension, our analysis reveals that interest rates increase with bank–borrower distance and decrease with the distance between borrower and other competing banks. Along the quantity dimension, we observe that more distant borrowers are more likely to experience binding credit limits. We also show that the quantity effects of bank–borrower distance are concentrated among less transparent firms. Our findings are consistent with pricing based on marginal costs that reflect information-based factors, and are in contrast to the established paradigm, where banks adopt spatial discriminatory pricing rules when lending to small-sized enterprises.     

Are regulatory capital adequacy ratios good indicators of bank failure? Evidence from US banks

Motivated by massive bank failures during the financial crisis, this paper examines whether capital adequacy ratios required by regulators are associated with bank failure. It investigates whether the association is affected by the bank's proximity to the minimum required capital ratios. If results show a significant association between regulatory capital and failure of banks falling below the minimum capital ratios, then the ratios are set at an adequate level. Examining a sample of 560 US bank holding companies for the period 2003–2009, results reveal that the association between the core (Tier 1) capital ratio and bank failure becomes significant only if the bank holding company has a Tier 1 capital ratio of less than 6%. This is the level below which US bank regulators do not regard banks as being well capitalized. During the financial crisis period of 2007–2009, there is a significant association only when the criterion is set at or above 8%. Market-based probability of default is more significantly associated with failure relative to Tier 1 capital ratio. The findings of this paper are relevant to regulatory policy discussions and Basel III deliberations on capital adequacy at times of financial turmoil.     

What makes a bank risky? Insights from the optimal capital structure of banks

Assessing the risk of bank failures is the paramount concern of bank regulation. This paper argues that in order to assess the default risk of a bank, it is important to consider its financing decisions as an endogenous dynamic process. We provide a continuous-time model, where banks choose the deposit volume in order to trade off the benefits of earning deposit premiums against the costs that occur at future capital structure adjustments. The bank’s asset value may suffer from shocks and follows a jump-diffusion process.     

Working capital as a firm performance savior? Evidence from Scandinavian countries

This study examined the relationship between working capital management (WCM) and firm performance in Scandinavian markets from 2007 to 2020. The initial data set comprised 8821 observations; only 5331 yearly observations remained after data filtration. The data are extracted from a reliable Bloomberg database. This empirical study adopts a multiple regression analysis for unbalanced panel data on Scandinavian markets, reporting an inverse relationship between WCM and firm performance measured through return on assets, gross operating income, and market-to-book value ratio. The control variables also showed a significant relationship order. To assess the robustness of our baseline regression results, we considered various indicators, (i) including alternative measures of firm performance, (ii) excluding the 2008 global financial crisis period, and (ii) running all countries in one equation as a group analysis. This study adds to the existing literature and outlines how efficient WCM can help managers to improve firm performance.     

Background filtrations and canonical loss processes for top-down models of portfolio credit risk

In single-obligor default risk modeling, using a background filtration in conjunction with a suitable embedding hypothesis (generally known as ℍ-hypothesis or immersion property) has proven a very successful tool to separate the actual default event from the model for the default arrival intensity. In this paper we analyze the conditions under which this approach can be extended to the situation of a portfolio of several obligors, with a particular focus on the so-called top-down approach. We introduce the natural ℍ-hypothesis of this setup (the successive ℍ-hypothesis) and show that it is equivalent to a seemingly weaker one-step ℍ-hypothesis. Furthermore, we provide a canonical construction of a loss process in this setup and provide closed-form solutions for some generic pricing problems. Financial support by the National Centre of Competence in Research “Financial Valuation and Risk Management” (NCCR FINRISK) is gratefully acknowledged. NCCR FINRISK is a research program supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). The authors would like to thank Monique Jeanblanc and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. Parts of this paper were presented at RiskDay 2006, Zurich. All remaining errors are our own. Comments and suggestions are very welcome.     

Does a manager's gender matter when accessing credit? Evidence from European data

Firms can be credit constrained either because a loan has been denied by the lender or because they decide not to apply for such a loan due to expected rejection. Using a large sample of European small and medium enterprises, we investigate the relationship between gender and credit constraints. Although no evidence is found that financial institutions are biased against female managers, female-run firms are less likely to file a loan application, as they anticipate being rejected. As a consequence, firms managed by women obtain less bank financing.     

Do banks price environmental transition risks? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

This paper assesses the risk arising from transition toward a low-emission economy and examines its transmission channels within the financial system. The environmental dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (E-DSGE) model shows that tightening environmental regulation impairs firms' balance sheets in the short term, as it enforces firms to internalize the pollution costs, which consequentially escalates the risks facing the financial system. For the empirical analysis, we employ the Clean Air Action that the Chinese government launched in 2013 as a quasi-natural experiment. The analysis on a unique dataset containing more than one million loans indicates that the default rates of high-polluting firms rose by around 80% along their environmental policy exposure. Further analysis shows those joint equity commercial banks with lower degree of government intervention and better corporate governance structure were able to appropriately manage their exposure to transition risks, while the state-owned banks failed to factor in such risks when extending credit to the borrowers targeted by the environmental regulation.     

Do banks really monitor? Evidence from CEO succession decisions

We demonstrate that banks play an important monitoring role in CEO succession that is not observed for other types of lenders, particularly public bondholders. There is a stronger relation between cash flow performance and forced CEO turnover for firms issuing bank debt during the year of CEO turnover than for firms not issuing bank debt, and bank debt issuance increases the likelihood of external CEO succession. The stock price reaction to CEO succession is higher when bank monitoring is prevalent. Our results are consistent with theories of relationship banking that propose a valuable monitoring role for well informed, incentivized bank lenders.     

What determines the profitability of banks? Evidence from Spain

This paper empirically analyses the factors that determine the profitability of Spanish banks for the period of 1999–2009. We conclude that the high bank profitability during these years is associated with a large percentage of loans in total assets, a high proportion of customer deposits, good efficiency and a low doubtful assets ratio. In addition, higher capital ratios also increase the bank’s return, but only when return on assets (ROA) is used as the profitability measure. We find no evidence of either economies or diseconomies of scale or scope in the Spanish banking sector. Finally, our study reveals differences in the performance of commercial and savings banks.     

Does hedge disclosure influence cost of capital for European banks?

Upon extracting and quantifying relevant hedge information from the narrative section of European banks annual reports, this paper examines the impact of such information on cost of capital [as measured by weighted average cost of capital (WACC), cost of equity (COE) and cost of debt (COD)]. Using a sample of 1885 bank-year observations from 19 countries, we find that textual hedge disclosure leads to a significant reduction in WACC, COE, and COD; thus explains a substantial portion of variation in cost of capital. Further, we find that these results are stronger in countries with high corruption and financial openness. Our results are robust to several controls and model specification. Collectively, our findings enrich prior evidence which examines the economic consequences of hedge disclosure.     

Does the ownership structure matter for banks’ capital regulation and risk-taking behavior? Empirical evidence from a developing country

This paper applies the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator to examine the bi-directional relationship between banks’ capital regulation and risk-taking behavior concerning the impact of ownership structure. We have used a balanced panel dataset of banks from a developing country over the most recent period between 2006 and 2014. The empirical findings of this study suggest that higher capital regulation enhances banks’ stability when it combats with credit risk but higher credit risk often persuades abating capital ratio. Particularly, the key results are as follows: (i) the higher association of minority active shareholding in stability issues is positive; (ii) the higher contribution of active share holding promotes banks’ capital ratio; (iii) the lower ownership concentration prevents credit risk; (iv) private commercial banks are more risk averse and stable than state-owned banks and other type of banks; and (v) notably, Islamic banks show their superiority through overall performance despite their lower capital stability than conventional banks. Besides, no models show significant non-linear relationship between capital regulation and risk-taking except models of stability show a U-shaped relation in capital equation, indicating that when regulatory pressure works in a country then bank lose solvency at the initial stage. Finally, it also provides some imperative policy implications which will be very useful for a wide range of stakeholders.     

Does bancassurance add value for banks? - Evidence from mergers and acquisitions between European banks and insurance companies

This paper investigates the risk and wealth effects of 72 mergers and acquisitions between banks in Europe and insurance companies during the period 1989-2004. The empirical results indicate that acquirers’ total risks remain constant relative to the world, home market indices and home banking indices. There are no changes for the systematic risks (beta) with respect to the world market index or the home banking index. After removing world and home market indices effect, systematic risk against home banking index reduce significantly for domestic deals. In addition, positive wealth effects are documented. Two factors have contributed to the bidders’ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs): relative deal size and being a serial acquirer. Finally, change of beta shows negative relations with CARs.     

Can credit spreads help predict a yield curve?

In this paper we investigate whether information in credit spreads helps improve the forecasts of government bond yields. To do this, we propose and estimate a joint dynamic Nelson–Siegel (DNS) model of the U.S. Treasury yield curve and the credit spread curve. The model accounts for the possibility of regime changes in yield curve dynamics and incorporates a zero lower bound constraint on yields. We show that our joint model produces more accurate out-of-sample density forecasts of bond yields than does the yield-only DNS model. In addition, we demonstrate that incorporating regime changes and a zero lower bound constraint is essential for forecast improvements.     

Is the venture capital market liquid? Evidence from India

This paper models investment duration in the Indian venture capital (VC) market, by industry and exit route. We examined 3416 investment and exit transactions in India during the period 2000–2017 and found that the probability of staying invested for more than ten years was 70%. Exit probabilities were low in most sectors. Investment duration was not positively associated with the investment valuation; rather, it was impossible to exit from the majority of investments because of the illiquidity of the VC market.