The mediating effect of REM on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and subsequent firm performance moderated by IFRS adoption: A moderated-mediation analysis

The present paper is pursuing a new direction in the analysis of behavioral finance based on examining whether future performance of the firm is related to overconfidence displayed by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). We suggest two channels for this relationship, real earnings management (REM) and the mandatory IFRS adoption. First, examining the impact of IFRS adoption on firms’ future performance, we find that overconfident CEOs who do not adopt IFRS exhibit poorer future performance. Other interactions related to overconfidence and IFRS are not significant. Second, examining the relationship between overconfidence and IFRS adoption on REM, we find that overconfident CEOs indulge in higher REM than non-overconfident CEOs. Further, overconfident CEOs who adopt IFRS display greater REM than do those who not adopt IFRS. Therefore, we prove that the indirect effect of CEO overconfidence on the subsequent firm performance through REM is contingent on the mandatory IFRS adoption.     

Overconfidence and tax avoidance: The role of CEO and CFO interaction

We investigate how overconfident CEOs and CFOs may interact to influence firms’ tax avoidance. We adopt an equity measure to capture overconfident CEOs and CFOs and utilize multiple measures to identify companies’ tax-avoidance activities. We document that CFOs, as CEOs’ business partners, play an important role in facilitating and executing overconfident CEOs’ decisions in regard to tax avoidance. Specifically, we find that companies are more likely to engage in tax-avoidance activities when they have both overconfident CEOs and overconfident CFOs, compared with companies that have other combinations of CEO/CFO overconfidence (e.g., an overconfident CEO with a non-overconfident CFO), which is consistent with the False Consensus Effect Theory. Our study helps investors, regulators, and policymakers understand companies’ decision-making processes with regard to tax avoidance.     

The impact of shareholder intervention on overinvestment of free cash flow by overconfident CEOs

This paper examines the impact of shareholder intervention on investment distortions, which we capture using overinvestment of free cash flow by overconfident CEOs. Using this definition and U.S. data for 1996–2014, our fixed effects and difference-in-difference matching estimation results provide consistent evidence that the threat of potential intervention of shareholders can curb overinvestment by overconfident CEOs. Specifically, firms with greater voting premium and hedge fund activism experience less overinvestment and exhibit lower sensitivity of free cash flow to investment. Such disciplining effects are stronger for firms managed by overconfident CEOs. Overall, our results suggest that shareholder intervention is particularly effective at mitigating overinvestment that is more likely to be distorted.     

CEO overconfidence and corporate cash holdings

This study proposes chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence to be an alternative explanation to corporate cash holdings. We find positive effects of CEO overconfidence on the level of cash holdings and the value of cash, which are mainly due to the investment environments faced by firms. The positive effects of CEO overconfidence on cash holdings level and cash value are barely affected by the traditional motives of cash holdings based on trade-off and agency theories. The analysis of cash sources further explains why firms with overconfident CEOs can aggressively pursue risky investments and maintain large cash holdings at the same time. Although the prior literature indicates that overconfident CEOs tend to avoid equity issues for their capital investments, the contribution to cash savings from equity is higher than that from debt. Additional robustness tests also support our empirical findings.     

CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment

We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company‐specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity‐dependent firms.     

Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?

Previous empirical work on adverse consequences of CEO overconfidence raises the question of why firms hire overconfident managers. Theoretical research suggests a reason: overconfidence can benefit shareholders by increasing investment in risky projects. Using options‐ and press‐based proxies for CEO overconfidence, we find that over the 1993–2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development expenditures. However, overconfident managers achieve greater innovation only in innovative industries. Our findings suggest that overconfidence helps CEOs exploit innovative growth opportunities.     

An ill wind? Terrorist attacks and CEO compensation

Using multiple measures of attack proximity, we show that CEOs employed at firms located near terrorist attacks earn an average pay increase of 12% after the attack relative to CEOs at firms located far from attacks. CEOs at terrorist attack-proximate firms prefer cash-based compensation increases (e.g., salary and bonus) over equity-based compensation (e.g., options and stocks granted). The effect is causal and it is larger when the bargaining power of the CEO is high. Other executives and workers do not receive a terrorist attack premium.     

Chief financial officer overconfidence and stock price crash risk

Numerous studies have shown the prevalence of overconfidence among Chief Financial Officers (CFOs). Surprisingly, the real effect of CFO overconfidence is under-researched. Using data from a large sample of US-listed firms over the period 1993–2019 and adopting an eclectic theoretical approach, we find that overconfident CFOs are more likely to increase stock price crash risk than non-overconfident CFOs through risk-taking and bad news hoarding. These findings pass a series of robustness tests. Furthermore, departing from most overconfident studies that merely examine one type of top managers (i.e., Chief Executive Officer (CEO)), we consider the influence of CEO and CFO overconfidence jointly. Interestingly, we find that CFO overconfidence outweighs CEO overconfidence in influencing stock price crash risk. Moreover, the overconfidence effect is intensified when overconfident CFOs collaborate with overconfident CEOs, thus raising stock price crash risk. However, stronger governance and a transparent information environment constrain overconfident CFOs' effect on stock price crash risk. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of CFO overconfidence in determining stock return tail risks.     

Terrorism activities and long-term annual management forecasts

We study the effects of terrorist attacks on firms’ long-term annual management earnings forecasts bias. We find that the managers of firms located closer to the epicenters of attacks are more likely to issue optimistic long-term annual earnings forecasts relative to the managers of a control group of unaffected firms. The exposure effect is stronger for more severe terrorist events, and firms with more uncertain fundamentals and less geographic diversification. In addition, we document that managers’ forecast optimism intensifies for firms with stronger negative stock market reaction to the terrorist event, for CEOs with higher ability and for companies that are more likely to issue equity or engage in acquisitions following the terrorist event. Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that long-term annual earnings forecasts are used by managers to counterbalance the short-term pessimistic response to terrorist attacks.     

Are overconfident CEOs better leaders? Evidence from stakeholder commitments

We find evidence that the leadership of overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) induces stakeholders to take actions that contribute to the leader's vision. By being intentionally overexposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms, overconfident CEOs exhibit a strong belief in their firms’ prospects. This belief attracts suppliers beyond the firm's observable expansionary corporate activities. Overconfident CEOs induce more supplier commitments including greater relationship-specific investment and longer relationship duration. Overconfident CEOs also induce stronger labor commitments as employees exhibit lower turnover rates and greater ownership of company stock in benefit plans.     

CEO overconfidence and bank loan contracting

In this paper, we examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on bank loan spreads. Our theoretical model and empirical results support that firms with highly overconfident CEOs have lower loan spreads and that the reducing effect of these CEOs on the spread is more pronounced when the loan contracts have collateral or covenants. Unlike firms with highly overconfident CEOs, firms with moderately overconfident CEOs do not receive lower loan spreads. We perform various tests to alleviate the concerns about endogeneity, and the results are robust. The results are consistent with the idea that highly overconfident CEOs are more willing to pledge collateral and accept covenants in exchange for a reduction in their loan rate.     

Overconfidence,CEO Selection,and Corporate Governance

We develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager, who sometimes makes value‐destroying investments, has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately promoted to CEO under value‐maximizing corporate governance. Moreover, a risk‐averse CEO's overconfidence enhances firm value up to a point, but the effect is nonmonotonic and differs from that of lower risk aversion. Overconfident CEOs also underinvest in information production. The board fires both excessively diffident and excessively overconfident CEOs. Finally, Sarbanes‐Oxley is predicted to improve the precision of information provided to investors, but to reduce project investment.     

CEO过度自信对薪酬的影响研究

CEO过度自信是影响其自身薪酬的重要因素。本文以2008—2018年A股上市公司CEO的薪酬情况为研究样本,实证检验了在中国情境下CEO过度自信对薪酬水平和薪酬结构的影响。研究发现:过度自信的CEO比非过度自信的CEO拥有更高的总薪酬和股权激励强度以及更低的现金薪酬比例;同时,相比非国有企业,国有企业中CEO过度自信对薪酬的影响更为显著。进一步研究发现:企业面临的风险大小和创新程度会强化过度自信与CEO薪酬之间的关联关系。     

CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies

Prior theoretical work generates conflicting predictions with respect to how CEO age impacts risk-taking behavior. Consistent with the prediction that risk-taking behavior decreases as CEOs become older, I document a negative relation between CEO age and stock return volatility. Further analyses reveal that older CEOs reduce firm risk through less risky investment policies. Specifically, older CEOs invest less in research and development, make more diversifying acquisitions, manage firms with more diversified operations, and maintain lower operating leverage. Further, firm risk and the riskiness of corporate policies are lowest when both the CEO and the next most influential executive are older and highest when both of these managers are younger. Although older CEOs prefer less risky investment policies, I document results suggesting that CEO and firm risk preferences tend to be aligned. Lastly, I find that a trading strategy that goes long in a portfolio of stocks consisting of firms managed by younger CEOs and short in a portfolio of stocks comprised of firms led by older CEOs would generate positive risk-adjusted returns. Overall, my results imply that CEO age can have a significant impact on risk-taking behavior and firm performance.     

CEO overconfidence and dividend policy

We develop a model of the dynamic interaction between CEO overconfidence and dividend policy. The model shows that an overconfident CEO views external financing as costly and hence builds financial slack for future investment needs by lowering the current dividend payout. Consistent with the main prediction, we find that the level of dividend payout is about one-sixth lower in firms managed by CEOs who are more likely to be overconfident. We document that this reduction in dividends associated with CEO overconfidence is greater in firms with lower growth opportunities and lower cash flow. We also show that the magnitude of the positive market reaction to a dividend-increase announcement is higher for firms with greater uncertainty about CEO overconfidence.     

Do CEOs Matter? Evidence from Hospitalization Events

Using variation in firms’ exposure to their CEOs resulting from hospitalization, we estimate the effect of chief executive officers (CEOs) on firm policies, holding firm-CEO matches constant. We document three main findings. First, CEOs have a significant effect on profitability and investment. Second, CEO effects are larger for younger CEOs, in growing and family-controlled firms, and in human-capital-intensive industries. Third, CEOs are unique: the hospitalization of other senior executives does not have similar effects on the performance. Overall, our findings demonstrate that CEOs are a key driver of firm performance, which suggests that CEO contingency plans are valuable.     

CEO overconfidence and corporate debt maturity

This paper extends our knowledge of corporate debt maturity structure by examining whether and to what extent overconfident CEOs affect maturity decisions. Consistent with a demand side story, we find that firms with overconfident CEOs tend to adopt a shorter debt maturity structure by using a higher proportion of short-term debt (due within 12 months). This behavior of overconfident CEOs is not deterred by the high liquidity risk associated with such a financing strategy. Our demand side explanation remains robust even after considering six possible alternative drivers including a competing supply side explanation (in which creditors are reluctant to extend long-term debt to overconfident CEOs).     

CEO overconfidence and IRS attention

We examine the likelihood that the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS), in its enforcement role, will accord particular attention to firms that are managed by CEOs who exhibit over-confidence, given that such CEOs may be more aggressive in their tax policies and strategies. Using data from 7757 firms, we find that this is indeed the case. Such attention is even more pronounced in the instance of overconfident CEOs whose firms are financially constrained and/or financially distressed. We also find that the IRS has augmented its audit processes to give more attention to overconfident CEOs during and post financial crisis. This may be due to the increased vulnerability of their firms to external shocks, which consequently increases the incentives to embark on tax avoidance strategies, value-destroying investments, and/or highly biased financial reporting (and forecasting responses) to tax authorities. Our results are robust after accounting for the possibility of endogeneity and using a wide range of specifications, measures, and econometric models.     

CEO Overconfidence and Long‐Term Performance Following R&D Increases

We examine the relation between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) overconfidence and significant increases in research and development (R&D) expenditures. Although prior studies reveal a significantly positive market reaction to increases in R&D expenditures in both the long and short run, we find that long‐run stock performance is positive only for firms whose CEOs are not overconfident. Our findings, which may be attributable to overinvestment and the overestimation of future cash flows, imply that R&D resulting from overconfident behavior does not provide any value to firms.     

Corporate social responsibility overinvestment in mergers and acquisitions

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been advocated by scholars and practitioners whereas overinvestment in CSR can destroy value. This paper investigates how CSR overinvestment influences firm value in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Specifically, we examine the shareholder wealth and financial performance of firms who bid on targets with CSR overinvestment. The results suggest that firms purchasing CSR-overinvesting targets experience significant declining market reactions to the M&A announcements and deteriorating financial performance following the M&A transactions. We further show significant improvement in CSR ratings and CEO pay among acquirers purchasing CSR-overinvesting targets. Moreover, the adverse effects of CSR-overinvesting targets on M&A outcomes are more pronounced for the acquiring firms with weak corporate governance or with retiring CEOs. Our findings suggest that a firm makes a value-destroying M&A with a CSR-overinvesting target probably for the benefit of improved CSR and CEO gains. This study provides evidence for the agency view of CSR investment in the context of M&As.