Financing constraints and the use of performance-sensitive debt

Performance-sensitive debt (PSD) is a popular financial instrument in the corporate private debt market. In a real-options setting, this paper aims to clarify how PSD impacts on investment policy, capital structure, and agency cost of financing constraints when the firm faces the upper limit of debt issuance. We show that the constrained leverage hardly depends on the performance sensitivity. In particular, our conclusions predict that PSD can decrease the severity of financing constraints relative to the fixed-coupon debt case and the loss of firm value arising from investment and financing distortions due to the presence of financing constraints. The higher the performance sensitivity, the less likely that the firm is financially constrained. These findings provide a novel investment-based explanation for issuance of PSD.     

Write-down bonds,credit risk and imperfect information

A structural model of pricing Write-Down (hereafter WD) bonds under imperfect information has been developed to investigate the effect of WD bonds issuance on credit risk. Information is not only delayed but also asymmetrically distributed between managers and outside investors. We derive analytical solutions for corporate securities prices and find the issuance of WD bonds could significantly improve firm value via reducing bankruptcy cost. Our numerical results further demonstrate that the WD bonds issuance increases corporate risk tolerance and reduces the risk of bankruptcy and credit spreads under imperfect information.     

Financial Distress and Optimal Capital Structure Adjustments

We show that asymmetric information may prevent firms with pure discount bonds from renegotiating their capital structure prior to the maturity of the debt, although this would increase the value of the firm when its prospects are poor. This inefficiency can be reduced if the firm issues debt with a risky intermediate debt payment, such as a coupon or a sinking fund payment. We also demonstrate that bankruptcy institutions leading to deviations from absolute priority can improve the timing of recapitalizations by financially distressed firms. Finally, we show that, under certain conditions, the optimal capital structure adjustment during financial distress consists of a convertible debt-for-straight debt swap.     

Firm financing and growth in the Arab region

This paper documents how firms in Arab countries use equity, corporate bond and syndicated loan markets to obtain financing and grow. Working with a new dataset on issuance activity in domestic and international markets and firm performance, the paper finds that capital raising through these markets has grown rapidly since the early 1990s and involved an increasing number of firms. Whereas the amounts raised in equity and loan markets (relative to gross domestic product) stand well relative to international standards, bond issuance activity lags behind. However, bond financing has gained importance over time. Equity issuances take place primarily in domestic markets, whereas bonds and loans are mostly issued internationally, display long maturities and entail low levels of credit risk. Issuing firms from the Arab region are very large compared to international standards. They also tend to be larger, faster growing and more leveraged than non-issuing firms in Arab countries.     

Methods for multicountry studies of corporate governance: Evidence from the BRIKT countries

We discuss empirical challenges in multicountry studies of the effects of firm-level corporate governance on firm value, focusing on emerging markets. We assess the severe data, “construct validity”, and endogeneity issues in these studies, propose methods to respond to those issues, and apply those methods to a study of five major emerging markets—Brazil, India, Korea, Russia, and Turkey. We develop unique time-series datasets on governance in each country. We address construct validity by building country-specific indices which reflect local norms and institutions. These similar-but-not-identical indices predict firm market value in each country, and when pooled across countries, in firm fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) regressions. In contrast, a “common index”, which uses the same elements in each country, has no predictive power in FE regressions. For the country-specific and pooled indices, FE and RE coefficients on governance are generally lower than in pooled OLS regressions, and coefficients with extensive covariates are generally lower than with limited covariates. These results confirm the value of using FE or RE with extensive covariates to reduce omitted variable bias. We develop lower bounds on our estimates which reflect potential remaining omitted variable bias.     

Investment decisions and debt financing under information uncertainty

This study examines how information uncertainty influences investment decisions. In contrast to prior studies, which assume no information uncertainty, our model includes a discrepancy in valuing debt between shareholders and debtholders at the time of debt issuance. We derive the values of corporate securities and the optimal investment threshold and coupon under information uncertainty. We show that compared with the absence of information uncertainty, debtholders value debt less than shareholders do, and hence, shareholders should contribute more investment funds. Debt financing restraints due to information uncertainty lead to delayed investment. We find that information uncertainty plays a mitigating role in shareholder-debtholder conflicts over investment policy. Moreover, the information uncertainty costs that shareholders incur increase sharply with the level of information uncertainty.     

Venture capital firms’ lead orientation,network position,and selection of familiar syndicate partners

This study explores how a venture capital (VC) firm’s lead orientation (i.e., acting more as a lead investor rather than a follower investor in past syndication investments) influences its selection of familiar syndicate partners. By conducting empirical research that uses detailed information of 11,219 investment deals in China from January 1999 to June 2016, we find that a VC firm’s lead orientation has an inverted U-shaped relationship with its propensity to select familiar syndicate partners. In other words, as a VC firm’s lead orientation increases, its familiarity degree with the partners in the subsequent syndicated investment will first increase and then decrease. In addition, a VC firm’s network centrality and network constraint imposed by the VC network structure both weakens the inverted U-shaped relationship between its lead orientation and the selection of familiar partners. Robustness checks with different measures and samples, together with the instrumental variable approach and the Heckman selection model that address potential endogeneity problems, show the reliability of our findings.     

Dividend reinvestment plans and Pecking Order capital structure behavior: An empirical investigation

Due to the asymmetric information effect, corporations have been reluctant to use external sources of equity capital. The adoption of dividend reinvestment plans (DRP) by large numbers of firms may indicate an alternative way to raise external equity funds. It has been shown that many factors may explain a firm’s decision concerning the source of the shares made available to DRP participants. The hypothesis to be tested is that the nature of the DRP actually selected may be predicted by financial characteristics such as cash flow generation, investment needs, historical dividend policy, firm ownership structure and firm capital structure. Using logistic regression analysis, results of joint tests of financial variables suggested by the Pecking Order Theory of capital structure indicate significant support for the hypothesis. Specifically, ownership structure, historical dividend policy and debt ratio are found to be key determinants of the type of DRP utilized.     

Contingent capital,capital structure and investment

We examine the interaction between investment and financing policies in a dynamic model for a firm with existing assets-in-place and a growth option, of which investment cost is financed with equity and contingent convertible bonds (CoCos). We attempt to clarify how CoCos impact on investment timing, capital structure and inefficiencies arising from debt overhang and asset substitution. We show that there is a conversion ratio (the fraction of equity allocated to CoCo holders upon conversion) to eliminate the inefficiencies. Our conclusions predict that debt leverage decreases with investment option payoff factor and the average appreciation rate of the cash flow. In contrast to traditional corporate finance theory saying that a firm's value decreases globally with business risk, our model indicates that it might first decrease and then increase with asset volatility.     

公开发行债券能提高企业创新产出吗？

以2006—2021年我国A股上市公司为样本，探讨了企业首次发行债券如何影响企业的创新水平。研究发现，企业首次公开发行债券能够显著提升企业的创新水平。机制分析结果表明,企业发行债券通过建立替代性融资渠道缓解融资约束，延长整体债务期限，提高信息披露水平这三个路径来提升企业创新水平。进一步研究发现,在控制了企业后续发债行为后，公开发行债券与企业创新的关系仍然存在；相比于公司债，企业首次发行债券种类为中期票据和企业债时，企业创新水平提升更显著；企业首次发行债券时，债券信用评级越高、发行利率越低，对于企业创新水平的提升越显著。研究结论丰富了债券市场经济后果的研究，也为企业创新发展和实现经济高质量发展提供了来自债券市场的建议。     

Do institutional investors monitor management? Evidence from the relationship between institutional ownership and capital structure

We examine the dynamic relations between institutional ownership and a firm's capital structure. We find that a firm's leverage decreases when institutional ownership increases. This result implies that a firm reduces its debt level as institutional investors substitute for the monitoring role of debt. More importantly, we find that a firm's suboptimal leverage decreases when the institutional ownership increases, and institutional ownership decreases when a firm's suboptimal leverage increases. This finding shows that institutions not only effectively monitor a firm's capital structure but they also passively sell their shares when dissatisfied with it. In addition, we find that the monitoring evidence on a firm's leverage and suboptimal leverage are more pronounced when the institutional investors are less likely to have business relationships with a firm or the information asymmetry is high in the market.     

Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions

Firms appoint CEOs with different types of human capital in order to manage resource dependencies. How CEOs are compensated thus can be conceptualized as a valuation process of how boards view the value of CEOs' human capital. Two types of human capital – international experience and political ties – have emerged as potential drivers of CEO compensation during institutional transitions. But how they impact CEO compensation has remained unclear. We develop a resource dependence‐based, contingency framework to focus on the external and internal factors that enable or constrain human capital to impact CEO compensation. Because of the tremendous regional diversity within China, externally, we focus on the level of marketization of the region in which firms are headquartered. Internally, we pay attention to two corporate governance mechanisms: politically connected outside directors and compensation committee. Data from 10,329 firm‐year observations at 94 per cent of listed firms in China largely support our framework. Overall, our study contributes to resource dependence research by extending this research to the context of institutional transitions with a focus on how human capital impacts CEO compensation.     

Emerging market mutual fund performance: Evidence for Poland

This paper provides evidence on the performance of mutual funds in a prominent emerging market; Poland. Studying an emerging market provides an excellent opportunity to test whether the consensus on the inability of mutual funds in developed and highly efficient markets to beat the market, also holds in less efficient markets. While the weaknesses of legal institutions and underdeveloped capital markets in emerging countries could negatively contribute to performance, a certain level of market inefficiency might also enable fund managers to successfully apply security selection and therefore beat the market. This paper presents an overview of the Polish mutual fund industry and investigates mutual fund performance using a survivorship bias controlled sample of 140 funds. The latter is done using the Carhart (1997) 4-factor asset-pricing model. In addition, we investigate whether Polish fund managers exhibit “hot hands”, persistence in performance. Finally the influence of fund characteristics on risk-adjusted performance is considered. Our overall results suggest that Polish mutual funds on average are not able to add value, as indicated by their negative net alphas. Interestingly, domestic funds outperform internationally investing funds, which points at informational advantages of local over foreign investors. Finally, we detect strong persistence in mean returns up to 1 year. It is striking that “winning” funds are able to significantly beat the market, based on their significantly positive alpha's. These results deviate from studies on developed markets that conclude that even past winners are not able to significantly beat the market.     

CEO overconfidence and agency cost of debt: An empirical analysis of CEO turnover events

We develop a model and characterize the differences between the investment policies of a rational CEO and an overconfident CEO. In the presence of risky outstanding debt, we show that an overconfident CEO has the incentive to overinvest more than that of a rational CEO. However, this incentive is mitigated by the discipline imposed by outside investors when an overconfident CEO seeks external financing. In contrast, when the firm has sufficient internal funds to meet its investment needs and outstanding debt is relatively safer, the overconfident CEO has no necessity to seek external funds and the overinvestment incentive persists. We examine bondholders’ and stockholders’ reaction around CEO turnover announcements and find evidence consistent with the over investment hypothesis.     

The value added by government venture capital funds compared with independent venture capital funds

Government venture capital (GVC) funds have been a common policy initiative in European countries to overcome funding gaps in the promotion of early-stage ventures. In this work, we focus on the performance of such government funds. We compare the importance for the firm's development of post-investment, valueadded activities by GVC firms and independent venture capital (IVC) firms.We use a unique data set based on the results of a survey addressed to young high-techVC-backed firms from seven European countries. The survey gauged the importance of the contribution by the first lead investor in a variety of activity areas, as assessed by the investee companies. Attention was paid to potential adverse effects of the post-investment engagement of investors.Using a composite indicator of the value added, we find no statistically significant difference between the two types of investors. However, the profiles of value added differ across investor types, and, in particular, the contributions of IVC funds prove to be significantly higher than those of GVC funds in a number of areas, including the development of the business idea, professionalisation and exit orientation.     

中小企业营运资金管理现状及对策研究

中小企业在促进我国经济快速发展的过程中发挥了越来越重要的作用,这已经为各界人士所公认。营运资金管理是企业财务管理的重要组成部分,营运资金在中小企业资产中占有相当大的比重,但是,中小企业在营运资金管理过程中存在着流动资金不足、融资困难以及运营低效等问题,所以提高营运资金的管理水平,解决企业在生产经营过程中的流动资金不足、营运资金低效运营以及融资难的问题已经成为了中小企业管理工作的重中之重。     

我国航运企业的融资模式分析

随着WTO的加入,我国航运企业面临着激烈而残酷的挑战。目前我国已有不少航运企业通过公司上市、金融租赁等融资方式,在国际国内资本市场成功地筹集到所需资金。航运企业作为资本密集型行业,比其他行业更需要拓宽融资渠道,以适应国际市场的发展。     

资本结构与企业价值的最大化

理论与实证表明,我国企业资本结构对企业价值的影响具有相关性,并测算了我国上市公司企业价值最大化的最优资本结构区间,认为提高我国企业价值就要抑制过度股权融资,加强债券融资。     

Real options and contingent convertibles with regime switching

We consider a firm with no assets in place but an option to invest in a project. The investment is irreversible but delayable in a regime-switching economy. The firm issues equity, straight bonds (SBs) and contingent convertibles (CoCos). We provide the closed-form prices for the firm׳s securities and the pricing and timing of the option. Our numerical analyses discover that issuing CoCos instead of SBs induces much less agency cost of debt. The agency cost is higher in a boom economy than in recession but the difference is small. There is a unique CoCos׳ conversion ratio such that the agency cost arrives at the minimum value zero. The inefficiencies arising from asset substitution and debt overhang are much more significant in recession than in boom. Only if the conversion ratio is not too small, the two inefficiencies disappear during boom periods. While the effects of the conversion rate on optimal capital structure and firm value and those of supervision and jump intensity on optimal CoCos׳ coupon are ambiguous and weak, the stricter the supervision or the longer the economy remains in recession, the less the option value and the optimal SBs׳ coupon.     

Investments in flexible production capacity

We examine the technology and capacity choice problem of a multi-output firm facing stochastic demands in a continuous-time framework. The firm can install output-specific capital, or, at greater cost, flexible capital that can be used to produce different outputs. Investment is irreversible. The firm must choose a technology and decide how much capital to install, knowing it can add more later as demand evolves. We formulate the capacity choice problem as a singular stochastic control problem, show that the value of the firm equals the value of its installed capital plus the value of its options to add capacity in the future, and derive an optimal investment rule that maximizes the firm's market value. We also address the analogous problem for a multi-input firm that faces stochastically evolving factor costs, and can install input-specific or flexible capital.