Irreversible investment and R&D spillovers in a dynamic duopoly

Investments in new production processes usually involve a significant amount of R&D, generating spillovers that lowers the second comer's investment cost. We show that these spillovers substantially affect the equilibrium of the dynamic game. Even for low spillover values, the leader delays her investment until the stochastic fundamental has gone past the level such that the follower's optimal strategy is to invest as soon as he attains the spillover. This bears several interesting implications. First, because the follower invests as he benefits from the spillover, in equilibrium the average time delay between the two investments is short, as it should be expected. Second, in case of a major innovation, an optimal public policy requires an intervention in favor of the investment activity; an increase in uncertainty - delaying the equilibrium - calls for higher subsidization rates. Third, numerical simulations show that the spillover reduces the difference between the leader's and the follower's maximum value functions. Accordingly, our model can help generate realistic market betas.     

Incomplete markets, ambiguity, and irreversible investment

The problem of irreversible investment with idiosyncratic risk is studied by interpreting market incompleteness as a source of ambiguity over the appropriate no-arbitrage discount factor. The maxmin utility over multiple priors framework is used to model and solve the irreversible investment problem. Multiple priors are modeled using the notion of κ‐ignorance. This set-up is used to analyze finitely lived options. For infinitely lived options the notion of constant κ‐ignorance is introduced. For these sets of density generators the corresponding optimal stopping problem is solved for general (in-)finite horizon optimal stopping problems driven by geometric Brownian motion. It is argued that an increase in the set of priors delays investment, whereas an increase in the degree of market completeness can have a non-monotonic effect on investment.     

信息不完全的信用风险定价模型及其在我国的应用

基于信息不完全的信用风险定价模型与传统的结构化模型和约化模型的最大区别在于它将信息不完全这一前提引入了以信息完全为前提的结构化模型,同时它又考虑了约化模型中强度的优点,引入短期信用风险的度量,成为当前最切合现实的信用风险定价模型。本文认为,应用基于信息不完全的信用风险定价模型来测度信用风险,将具有十分重要的现实意义。     

Robust implementation under alternative information structures

In this paper we consider a model in which agents have complete information about their neighbors and, possibly, incomplete information about the rest of the environment. We consider two different informational frameworks. In the first, agents do not have priors about the relevant characteristics in the rest of the environment. In the second, agents are supposed to have priors about the unknown characteristics. We present a mechanism which implements any social choice correspondence satisfying monotonicity and no veto power in both informational settings for every possible prior thus requiring little knowledge from the point of view of the designer of the information possessed by agents about the environment. The authors wish to thank J. Canals, B. Chakravorty, P. Chander, C. Herrero, G. Orosel, D. Schmeidler, W. Thomson, W. Trockel, F. Vega, A. Villar, T. Yamato and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. The first author acknowledges financial support from the Institució Valenciana d’Estudies i Investigació; L.V.I.E. and DGICYT under projects PB/88-0289 and PB/91-0756. The second author acknowledges financial support from DGICYT under project PB/90-0156. A previous version of the paper was written when authors visited (May 1991) the Institute of Mathematical Economics (Bielefeld) to which authors are grateful.     

Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games

We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. We identify a class of two-way communication mechanisms which mirror those considered in the single principal analysis of Myerson (1982). In such mechanisms, every agent truthfully reveals her type to all principals, and obeys the private recommendations she receives from each of them. We show that there is a rationale in restricting attention to this class of mechanisms: if principals use these mechanisms, there is no unilateral incentive to deviate towards more sophisticated ones. We develop three examples to analyze possible extensions and limits of our approach. The first two examples show that the restriction to direct and incentive compatible mechanisms is not sufficient to provide a complete characterization of all pure strategy equilibria. The third one shows that private recommendations play a fundamental role in competing mechanism games, suggesting that one cannot safely restrict to one-sided communication mechanisms.     

An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision

Abstract.  This paper surveys what can be learned from recent advances in the incomplete contract literature to understand how public goods are or should be provided. The paper starts with a section on the full information case that presents and discusses the classical Samuelson condition on the optimal provision of public goods. The rest of the paper presents results under asymmetric information. It is constituted of two main parts. In the first one, the social planner has complete contracting ability. We discuss the basic setting and assumptions of this comprehensive contracting approach and study the trade-offs it generates. The second part of the paper is devoted to the study of contracting incompleteness. Such incompleteness can emerge from various sources, which we present and discuss. We then study the case of a politically chosen decision-maker and the consequences of its inability to commit for more than one period and of the ability for individuals to form groups. Finally, we address the problem of the choice between public and private forms of public good provision. The concluding section summarizes the main policy lessons.     

公共选择理论在完善我国政府投资项目决策机制中的应用

通过对目前我国政府投资项目决策机制中存在问题的分析,借鉴公共选择理论中的宪法经济理论和官僚经济理论的合理思想,提出了完善我国政府投资项目决策机制的具体对策。     

Coordinating under incomplete information

We show that, in a minimum effort game with incomplete information where player types are independently drawn, there is a largest and smallest Bayesian equilibrium, leading to the set of equilibrium payoffs (as evaluated at the interim stage) having a lattice structure. Furthermore, the range of equilibrium payoffs converges to those of the deterministic complete information version of the game, in the limit as the incomplete information vanishes. This entails that such incomplete information alone cannot explain the equilibrium selection suggested by experimental evidence. We thank Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Hans Carlsson, Ani Guerdjikova and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Part of this work was done while Asheim was visiting Cornell University, which hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.     

环境不确定条件下企业动态财务能力的分析框架

分析了环境不确定条件下动态能力、财务柔性、权变财务研究的现状与不足,构建了动态财务能力分析框架。认为动态财务能力包括两个层次:第一层次包括财务状态评判能力、财务机会创造与识别能力;第二层次包括公司治理结构、组织结构和财权配置结构调整能力,财务战略及政策调整、财务资源整合能力。企业只有在正确评判财务状态、识别财务机会的基础上,适时调整公司治理结构、组织结构、财权配置结构、公司战略与政策,有效整合财务资源,才能实现环境、行为与价值的动态协调。     

浅谈动库容调洪法在老口水库中的应用

文章阐述了采用一维非恒定流法对老四水库进行动库容调洪,该法对狭长形水库、稀遏洪水影响显著,能同时提出各频率洪水相应坝前最高水位及库区回水线。     

Alliances and negotiations: an incomplete information example

We study a bargaining game between an individual and an ‘alliance’ in the sense of Manzini and Mariotti (J Econ Theory 121:128–41, 2005), in which the opponent of the alliance is incompletely informed about the relative strengths of its members. The best equilibrium outcome for the alliance under a unanimity rule is not attainable with a non-unanimity rule. However, unlike in the complete information model, less than optimal outcomes and delays may occur with positive probability even under unanimity, depending on the prior beliefs and the preferences of the agents. We are grateful to a careful referee for comments. We wish to thank Clara Ponsati for useful comments.     

Can learning cause shorter delays in reaching agreements?

This paper uses a continuous-time war of attrition model to investigate how learning about private payoffs affects delays in reaching agreement. At each point in time, players may receive a private Poisson signal that completely reveals the concession payoff to be high (good-news learning) or low (bad-news learning). In the good-news model, the expected delay is always non-monotonic in the learning rate: an increase in the learning rate prolongs delay in agreement if the learning rate is sufficiently low. In the bad-news model, numerical examples suggest learning prolongs delay as well.     

CH市利用外商投资的发展战略

CH市利用外商直接投资工作优势与劣势并存,机遇与威胁同在,但二者比较,优势大于劣势,机遇大于威胁,故采取SO战略即增长型战略。本文尝试以波特的菱形理论为基础,从要素禀赋、需求情况、相关和支持产业以及企业战略、结构和竞争等方面构建CH市利用外商直接的优势,得出关于CH市利用外商直接投资的战略选择。