A nested logit model of strategic promotion

This paper presents a test of the nature of the pricing and promotion game played by supermarket retailers in a large, U.S. market. Using a nested-logit modeling approach, the results show that retailers set discount depth and promotional frequency in a manner that is less competitive than Bertrand. We also find that the elasticity of substitution among competing stores is lower than among products within each store, but not equal to zero. Therefore, sales do cannibalize existing products, but can also build a significant amount of store-traffic. Relative to strategic factors, price promotions have their greatest impact on store-conditional product demand.

Online Auction Fraud: Ethical Perspective

Internet fraud is an issue that increasingly concerns regulators, consumers, firms, and business ethics researchers. In this article, we examine one common form of internet fraud, the practice of shill bidding (when a seller in an auction enters a bid on his or her own item). The significant incidence of shill bidding on eBay (in spite of the fact that it is illegal just as it is in live auctions) exemplifies the current ineffectiveness of regulatory means as well as the lack of effective societal mechanisms to prevent online fraud. Further, the proliferation of shill bidding along with other types of internet fraud may have broader implications. If unethical behavior such as shill bidding becomes too widespread on the internet, regulators and other societal forces may deem it necessary to institute controls that will impact the entire online marketplace as well as the future development and regulation of business activities on the internet. Our results indicate that shill bidding is perpetrated on eBay significantly more often than 0.1% rate of fraud estimated by the firm. This suggests that regulators, users, and others stakeholders may become concerned enough to act. The impact of those responses on the internet of the future may affect a broad array of users beyond the unethical sellers on eBay. Alex Nikitkov is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at Brock University in St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada Darlene Bay is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at Brock University in St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada     

How category characteristics affect the number of store brands offered by the retailer: a model and empirical analysis

Our research examines why retailers offer, not one, but multiple store brands in some product categories. More specifically, we are interested in how certain product category characteristics affect the number of store brands. We model a product category consisting of two incumbent national brands that may differ in strength. The retailer may introduce one or two store brands depending on which maximizes category profits. Our analysis suggests that the retailer is likely to carry two store brands in categories where (i) the national brands are similar in strength; and (ii) the price sensitivity between the national brands is low. Interestingly, the conditions that support the introduction of more than one store brand are quite different than the conditions that would facilitate the introduction of additional national brands. We provide empirical evidence that support our model-based predictions.     

Information asymmetry, pricing strategy and firm's performance in the retailer- multi-channel manufacturer supply chain

In this research paper, we assume a retailer-multi-channel manufacturer (with online and traditional retail channels) supply chain where both the multi-channel manufacturer and the retailer have private information about the state of consumer demand. In this setting, we examine the effect of an information sharing strategy on both firms' performance. Our results show that the multi-channel manufacturer always benefits from an information sharing strategy. When the product is highly compatible with the online channel, information sharing becomes much more valuable to the multi-channel manufacturer. On the other hand, the retailer's performance is not impacted by an information sharing strategy. Thus, a bargaining model is utilized to implement profit sharing for the multi-channel manufacturer and retailer so that an information sharing equilibrium can be reached. Based on our results, we derive optimal market strategies and identify probable paths of future research.     

Vendor bidding on online auctions

This article examines the legal protection of consumers from vendor bidding on New Zealand online auctions sites. The current lack of legal control over online vendor bidding is contrasted with the more restrictive legal position taken in respect of vendor bidding in traditional auctions. The article argues that online vendor bidding is misleading in nature and harmful to consumers. It argues that the law is justified in intervening in order to prevent or discourage the practice. Suggestions are made for a multilayered legal approach to the problem.

Economics, Psychology, and Social Dynamics of Consumer Bidding in Auctions

With increasing numbers of consumers in auction marketplaces, we highlight some recent approaches that bring additional economic, social, and psychological factors to bear on existing economic theory to better understand and explain consumers' behavior in auctions. We also highlight specific research streams that could contribute towards enriching existing economic models of bidding behavior in emerging market mechanisms. This paper is based on the special session at the 6th Triennial Invitational Choice Symposium, University of Colorado Boulder, June 2004 (co-chaired by the first two authors).     

‘Fair play for the small man’: Perspectives on the contribution of the independent shopkeeper 1930–c.1945

Detailed accounts of the social role of the independent shopkeeper rarely go beyond 1914. This article identifies a perception that his value in providing both a personal and community service endured beyond this date. Consultation of a variety of documentary sources from the 1930s and 1940s demonstrates that the independent shopkeeper remained an integral part of retailing and society in Britain in this period. More widely, the article contextualizes the continued support for the small shopkeeper in relation to theories of retail institutional change derived from the marketing literature. Acknowledging an open-systems perspective, it assesses the influence of the social and political environment in explaining the persistence of small shopkeeper support.     

Competitive and Cooperative Behavior in Embedded Markets: Developing an Institutional Perspective on Bazaars

In an ethnographic study of a retail setting, we examine relationships among competitors. We find that competitors often emphasize various forms of cooperation, and we describe socio-economic behaviors that illustrate how cooperation transcends or mediates competition among retailers. Retailers selectively cooperate and compete for customers in ways that alter our understandings of concepts such as loyalty and market stability, and practices such as marketing communications and pricing. We highlight the significance of these institutional practices and the role they play in forming and maintaining community in a bazaar.     

Retail customers' self-awareness: The deindividuation effects of others

The presence of others often affects retail shopping behavior. Other customers tend to increase one's self-awareness and cause negative self-conscious emotions. This research's findings suggest fellow customers also mitigate focal customers' evaluative concerns. Deindividuation theory, which posits that other customers create anonymity and reduce self-awareness, helps explain this phenomenon. A laboratory experiment and a quasi-experimental field study in a retail setting support the notion that the presence of other customers creates a deindividuation effect on a focal customer during unwanted social evaluation from salespeople. Results show a small group of other customers resulted in lower levels of emotional discomfort and behavioral inhibition than either an empty store or a larger group size, suggesting a U shape relationship.     

When auction meets fixed price: a theoretical and empirical examination of buy-it-now auctions

Recently fixed pricing and auctions have been brought together in a new pricing format that offers bidders the option of prematurely ending an auction at a fixed price. The growing popularity of auctions presents an interesting pricing decision for managers: whether to sell at a fixed price, in a regular auction, or through a buy-it-now auction. This paper studies eBay’s buy-it-now auction and answers the following research questions: why is fixed price used at traditional auctions, will buy-it-now increase the seller’s profit, how is an optimal price determined, and how is the buy-it-now decision influenced by key factors such as the customer’s cost of participating in the auction, the seller’s reserve price, and the number of potential customers. Our results show that when customers make endogenous participation decisions according to their participation costs, buy-it-now auctions can increase both customers’ utility and sellers’ profit. Endogenous participation has important implications for seller’s pricing decisions such as price formats and levels. Depending on the level of the posted price, the resulting price format could be either fixed price, buy-it-now auction or pure auction. Therefore, the seller needs to be careful and take into account market conditions when posting a price at auctions. We empirically test the model assumptions and predictions using data collected from eBay.

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Advertising budgets in competitive environments

Firms can approach advertising competition either by setting advertising budgets (as in the percentage of sales method) or target sales levels (as in the objective and task approach). We study firms’ incentives to adopt one or the other posture using a two-stage model of duopolistic competition. In the first stage, each firm chooses to commit either to an advertising budget, letting its sales follow from the market response function, or to a desired sales level, promising to adjust its advertising spending accordingly. In the second stage, firms choose the actual levels of their advertising budget or sales target. When prices are exogenous, we show that, due to strategic effects, if a firm benefits from its rival’s advertising (as when advertising increases awareness of the product category) then setting an advertising budget dominates setting a sales target. On the other hand, if a firm is harmed by its rival’s advertising (as when advertising increases the firm’s share of a fixed market), then committing to a sales level dominates. We extend these results in several directions and show that when firms engage in price competition as well as advertising the nature of advertising and product-market competition interact to determine whether setting an advertising budget or sales target dominates.

Compete in Price or Service?—A Study of Personalized Pricing and Money Back Guarantees

Retailers use both pricing and service strategies to respond to intensified competition. Here we develop a duopoly model to investigate the impact of the increasingly popular personalized pricing strategy (PPS) and the widely used Money Back Guarantee (MBG) customer returns policy. We consider two retailers who differ in customer satisfaction rates. Each retailer chooses a pricing strategy, PPS or uniform pricing, and a product return strategy, MBG or ‘no returns.’ We show that both PPS and MBG are dominant strategies, but their impact on retailers’ prices and profits are different; while PPS intensifies price competition and may lead to a prisoner’s dilemma in which both retailers may lose profit, MBG mitigates price competition and may result in a Pareto improvement in both retailers’ profits. Both PPS and MBG increase the size of the overall market, but not the total duopoly profit. The total customer surplus and social welfare may increase under either strategy. In addition, we obtain some interesting observations as to how our results may change if the product quality/customer satisfaction rate is endogenously chosen in the duopoly. Some of our findings are in contrast to related results reported in the literature.     

Self-reporting mechanism for risk regulation

One problem in implementing risk regulation has to do with asymmetries in information between regulators and licensees. A possible solution is to provide incentives (e.g., more lenient standards) if violations (e.g., risk levels above some specified standard) are disclosed voluntarily by regulated firms, rather than being discovered through the regulator's monitoring efforts. This study adapts game-theoretic work in regulatory economics (where firms are usually viewed as being either compliant or non-compliant) to apply to the case of risk regulation (where firms can be described by continuously varying risk levels). This article derives equilibrium solutions for the self-reporting mechanism under different model formulations, and discusses the conditions under which these solutions are better than a traditional direct-monitoring regulatory scheme. For example, when firms can benefit (in the form of reduced costs) by increasing their risk levels, the results show that offering a loosened standard to encourage voluntary disclosure of risk levels is worthwhile only when a sufficiently large proportion of firms is believed to have high risk levels.     

Stay positive or go negative? Memory imperfections and messaging strategy

This paper studies the optimal mix of message content in elections while explicitly accounting for voters' memory imperfections. We build an analytical model of a political contest between two candidates facing an election with an electorate consisting of supporters, opponents, and undecided voters. The candidates take decisions on advertising sequence and content (positive vs. negative). Our model explicitly considers the role of memory processes, in particular decay (the idea that memories fade with time) and rehearsal (the idea that accessing a memory eases its recall,) that crucially affect how effective ads are in influencing choice. The model yields several interesting insights: (a) when both candidates have low initial support, they invest only in positive messages; (b) when both candidates are endowed with high initial support, their messaging strategies take a “pulsing” shape involving negative advertising accompanied by positive advertising; (c) when one candidate has low initial support while the other has high initial support, the former adopts a “pulsing” strategy while the latter adopts only positive advertising. Furthermore, we show that a candidate with low initial support facing a candidate with high initial support responds with a messaging strategy bunched with negative content towards the end of the election cycle. Our model's predictions are shown to find empirical support in a dataset assembled from 2016 U.S. Senate races.