How does R&D intensity influence firm explorativeness? Evidence of R&D active firms in four advanced countries

Despite R&D is seen as a starting point of innovation, firms usually confront a trade-off in allocating limited R&D resources to either exploratory or exploitative activities. Relative to the latter, the former produces a more distinctive variation from the prior knowledge base and helps the firm tap into new opportunity. Given the increasing importance of firm explorativeness in the fast changing environments, the influence of R&D investment on firm explorativeness is not yet conclusive in the literature, not to mention whether the increased R&D investment induces firms to become more explorative. This study aims to generate insight into how and when firm explorativeness is determined by their R&D intensity. As a notion of the use of knowledge new to the organization, firm explorativeness is treated as the degree of using knowledge new to the organization in the pursuit of innovation. Based on a panel data of 1267 firm-year observations in four advanced countries during 1999–2003, the results reveal that a higher level of R&D intensity makes firms more exploitative and less explorative. Nevertheless, the negative relationship between R&D intensity and firm explorativeness is found to be alleviated in the presence of technological opportunity or financial slack. The configurational model sheds further light on the combined and relative weight of two moderators.     

Managerial incentives and R&D investments: The moderating effect of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance

Literature regarding the impact of managerial incentives on firm’s research and development (R&D) investments suggests that due to the riskiness of R&D activities, firms need to provide managerial incentives to encourage managerial discretion on corporate long-term investments of R&D. In spite that managerial incentives influence corporate R&D spending, some also argue corporate R&D spending a function of managerial incentive schemes. This paper applies the simultaneous equation to investigate the association between managerial discretion on R&D investments and the incentive scheme of CEO compensations by using the sample firms listed in Taiwan Security Exchange and Taipei Exchange. The results indicate that the listed firms in Taiwan simultaneously determine corporate R&D investments and CEO compensations. They reward their CEOs in compliance with their efforts on R&D investments and CEO compensation motivates CEOs to align their interests with firms’ long-term investments on R&D. A further analysis of the protection effect from the directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance suggests that D&O protection intensifies the relationship between R&D investments and CEO compensation. It encourages CEOs to allocate resources on R&D activities and make CEO incentive contracts efficacious on corporate long-term investments. The result is robust in the electronic industry of Taiwan.     

Should Directors Have Term Limits? – Evidence from Corporate Innovation

This paper examines the effect that directors with extended tenure have on corporate innovation based on a sample of US firms from 1996 to 2006. Using the propensity-score matched-pair research design, I find that firms with a higher portion of outside directors enjoying extended tenure produce significantly fewer patents and that these patents receive fewer subsequent citations. These firms also have lower research and development (R&D) productivity and exploration intensity than their matched control firms, although I found no significant difference in their R&D investment intensity. Difference-in-differences tests based on director deaths and regulatory changes in the early 2000s suggest that the adverse effect of long director tenure on innovation performance is causal. I also find that the effect is mitigated when long-tenured directors have more years of overlap in service with CEOs, and when long-tenured directors are executives at other firms. Finally, I find that boards with extended tenure attenuate the contributions of innovation outputs to future firm value and performance. These findings shed new light on the debate over length of board tenure and provide another justification for imposing term limits on directors.     

CEO overconfidence and labor investment efficiency

We examine the impact of CEO overconfidence on labor investment efficiency (LIE). The findings suggest that firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to have lower LIE. The findings are robust to alternative measures of CEO overconfidence and LIE and after accounting for endogeneity and CEO experience, age, managerial ability, high tech industry, and economic recession. Further analysis shows that: i) our findings are not due to the relation between net hiring and contemporaneous non-labor investments and the difference between high- and low-skilled labor, ii) firms with more analyst following, financially constrained firms, and firms located in states with wrongful discharge laws force CEOs to invest more efficiently in labor. In contrast, firms with dominant CEOs or facing high economic policy uncertainty are less efficient in labor investments, iii) firms with overconfident CEOs exhibit higher labor cost stickiness than those of non-overconfident CEOs, and iv) a lower LIE caused by CEO overconfidence has negative impacts on a firm's future profitability.     

Innovating Beyond the Horizon: CEO Career Horizon,Top Management Composition,and R&D Intensity

Decreasing research and development (R&D) can impair the ability of firms to remain innovative in the long run. CEOs have been accused of curtailing R&D investments as they approach expected retirement, yet received findings on R&D investment behaviors of late‐career CEOs are mixed. We argue that one reason for these inconsistent findings could be that traditional approaches overlook the fact that CEOs are not isolated agents in making R&D decisions. We build on the premise that CEOs interact with their top management team (TMT) when shaping R&D strategy and advance a contextualized view of CEO dispositions in their late career stages as being constrained or enabled by their TMT. We hypothesize that some TMT attributes (e.g., tenure and age) may amplify, whereas others (e.g., functional experience and education) may mitigate inclinations to reduce R&D. Our findings, based on a longitudinal sample of 100 US manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2008, provide nuanced insights into how different TMT characteristics influence CEO‐TMT dynamics, with TMT age and TMT tenure playing particularly pronounced roles. We discuss implications of our CEO‐TMT interface approach for theory and practice. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The blind power: Power-led CEO overconfidence and M&A decision making

The behavioral finance literature attributes failed M&As to CEO overconfidence. We investigate the source of CEO overconfidence that leads to failed M&As. Among various determinants of CEO overconfidence, we propose that power-led CEO overconfidence delivers undesirable consequences in corporate investments. Using CEO-level data, we find that CEO power increases the probability of a CEO being overconfident. We also show that power-led overconfident CEOs tend to complete more deals regardless of economic circumstances, do stock acquisitions, and make diversifying acquisitions, relative to non-overconfident CEOs. The results suggest that the findings of previous studies on M&As by overconfident CEOs could be driven by power-led overconfident CEOs.     

The differential effects of public R&D support on firm R&D: Theory and evidence from multi-country data

This paper aims to evaluate the effects of various forms of public research and development (R&D) support on firms’ incentives to invest in R&D. First, in order to identify potential channels through which public R&D support influences firm R&D, a formal model of firm R&D with public R&D support is developed and analyzed. Four potential channels are identified: the technological-competence-enhancing effect, the demand-creating effect, the R&D-cost-reducing effect and the (project) overlap (or duplication) effect. These multiple channels indicate that it is difficult to evaluate the aggregate effect of public R&D support and that there are differential effects of public R&D support on firm R&D, depending on various firm- or industry-specific characteristics. Second, the differential effects of public R&D support are empirically tested using unique firm-level data for nine industries across six countries. Public support tends to have a complementarity effect on private R&D for firms with low technological competence, for firms in industries with high technological opportunities and for firms facing intense market competition. In contrast, firms with high technological competence and firms that have enjoyed fast demand growth in recent years show a crowding-out effect, and firm size and age do not show any discernible differential effect.     

The R&;D and productivity relationship of Korean listed firms

This study analyzes the relationship between R&D investment and the productivity of Korean R&D-engaged firms. An interdependent chain of equations including the propensity to invest, R&D investment and productivity are estimated in a multi-step procedure accounting for selectivity and simultaneity biases. Using Korean firm level panel data of listed firms from 1986 to 2002, we find four main empirical results. First, there is a two-way causal relationship between R&D investment and productivity for Korean listed firms. Second, Chaebol firms were associated with lower R&D growth as well as lower labor productivity growth in comparison to non-Chaebol firms. Third, there was a substantial reduction in growth rates both in R&D investment and labor productivity in 1997-1998, immediately following the Asian financial crisis. Fourth, considering the positive feedback effect from productivity growth to R&D growth, a decrease in R&D investment growth after the Asian financial crisis should have been harmful by further decreasing productivity growth.     

The retention of CEOs that make poor acquisitions

Does the failure to replace CEOs following a bad takeover represent a cost-effective strategy or a failure of boards of directors and the market? We study 104 white knight contests to examine why poorly performing firms retain their CEOs. We find the majority are poor performers before they enter the control contest (q?相似文献   

How do firm characteristics affect behavioural additionalities of public R&D subsidies? Evidence for the Austrian transport sector

Interest of STI policies to influence the innovation behaviour of firms has been increased considerably. This gives rise to the notion of behavioural additionality, broadening traditional evaluation concepts of input and output additionality. Though there is empirical work measuring behavioural additionalities, we know little about what role distinct firm characteristics play for their occurrence. The objective is to estimate how distinct firm characteristics influence the realisation of behavioural additionalities. We use survey data on 155 firms, considering the behavioural additionalities stimulated by the Austrian R&D funding scheme in the field of intelligent transport systems in 2006. We focus on three different forms of behavioural additionality—project additionality, scale additionality and cooperation additionality—and employ binary regression models to address this question. Results indicate that R&D related firm characteristics significantly affect the realisation of behavioural additionality. R&D intensive firms are less likely to substantiate behavioural additionalities, while small, young and technologically specialised firms more likely realise behavioural additionalities. From a policy perspective, it may be concluded that direct R&D promotion of firms with a high R&D intensity may be misallocated. Attention of public support should be shifted to smaller, technologically specialised firms with lower R&D experience. The findings deliver important insights into interactions of public R&D support and R&D behaviour of firms operating in the Austrian transport sector, bearing significant implications for future policy designs.     

In Pursuit of Greatness: CEO Narcissism,Entrepreneurial Orientation,and Firm Performance Variance

Building upon the perspective that narcissism is a leadership trait with both ‘bright’ and ‘dark’ sides, the present study examines the question of whether companies led by narcissistic CEOs exhibit higher levels of entrepreneurial orientation (EO). Moreover, this research examines whether EO partially explains why narcissistic CEO‐led firms experience greater variability in firm performance. Using survey data collected from 173 CEOs, and an archival measure of firm performance variance, we find support for our model. These findings offer an improved understanding of how CEO narcissism influences performance variance, and why the firms they lead may even, at times, be viewed as on a path to success. Study implications are discussed.     

On the R&D/marketing interface in knowledge intensive entrepreneurial firms

In this paper we focus on the performance impact associated with whether R&D or marketing takes the lead in product innovations and/or product development. We examine empirically the performance of a sample of entrepreneurial firms across 10 European Union countries for which we can identify alternative regimes in which R&D, or in which marketing, is viewed as being relatively more important in creating and sustaining the firm’s competitive advantage. We find that when R&D is the dominant strategy, firms realize greater growth in sales, other factors held constant.     

Myth or reality? Assessing the moderating role of CEO compensation on the momentum of innovation in R&D

This study researches the influences of CEO compensation on firm behavior to examine the interactive relationship between the behavioral momentum of innovation in R&D and CEO compensation. The models presented in this study are based on evolutionary, institutional, and agency theories to test hypotheses using data from 107 companies in the high-technology sectors in the United States. The results indicate that the pre-succession innovative behavior of these high-technology firms on R&D can positively affect these firms' post-succession innovative behavior towards R&D. That is, positive momentum in R&D innovation prevails in a firm across a change of the CEO. However, for the role of CEO compensation, short- and long-term compensation does not positively moderate this behavioral momentum in R&D. Hence, the moderating impact of short- and long-term CEO compensation to enhance the momentum of innovation in R&D can be romanticized. These findings provide boards of directors with evidence as to how a CEO succession matters to a firm's behavioral momentum in R&D, and whether CEO compensation can be strategized to change a firm's innovation and momentous behavior.     

Spillovers,absorptive capacity and agglomeration

I study knowledge spillovers in an industry where firms are heterogeneous in their ability to adopt knowledge (absorptive capacity). I set up a model in which firms choose locations anticipating potential gains and losses from other firms’ R&D activity. I apply the model to the US software industry and obtain the following results: the data supports localized knowledge spillovers; firms that have higher absorptive capacity are sorted into more agglomerated counties; ignoring firm heterogeneity leads to biased estimates of gains from spillovers; spillovers play an important role in explaining the geographic distribution of firms, but only within regions with high R&D activity.     

Dominant CEO,Deviant Strategy,and Extreme Performance: The Moderating Role of a Powerful Board

This study examines the effect of dominant CEOs – defined as CEOs who are very powerful relative to other executives in their top management teams – on firm strategy and performance. Based on a sample of 51 publicly traded, single‐business firms from the US computer industry for the period 1997–2003, our results suggest that firms with dominant CEOs tend to have a strategy deviant from the industry central tendency and thus extreme performance – either big wins or big losses. Further, powerful boards weaken the tendency of dominant CEOs towards extremeness and, more important, improve the likelihood of dominant CEOs having big wins versus big losses. This study reconciles the pessimistic and heroic views regarding dominant CEOs, and suggests that the notion of power balance should be considered in a broader context.     

Over-investment in corporate R&D,risk, and stock returns

Large-size firms which significantly increase their R&D expenditures experience subsequently three-year-long negative abnormal stock returns on the magnitude of 56 basis-points per month. We find no robust evidence of significant event-induced abnormal returns for small-size sample firms or any systematic risk changes for the small- and large- size firms. We also find that the large-size sample firms generate relatively much larger cash flows (i.e., have significantly greater over-investment discretion) and have significantly larger (over-) valuation multiples than the small-size firms. Moreover, some of their operating performance measures show signs of deterioration instead of improvement following these R&D programs. These findings are consistent with the view that investors initially underestimate the over-investment in R&D by some large-size firms that appear to be overvalued and have high cash flows at the time of the investment, only to be disappointed later.     

An analysis of firm-level innovation strategies in the US biotechnology industry

This study examines factors that may affect innovation strategies and performance of firms in the biotechnology industry. Specifically, differences between factors common to firms with high R&D intensity and those to firms with low R&D intensity are investigated. Biotechnology firms with relatively higher levels of R&D intensity attribute their innovation performance to research-based innovation factors and strategies such as strengthening their own research capabilities, entering into research collaborations with universities, industry leaders and other biotech firms, and licensing their technology. These strategies can be summarized as alignment within the industry. Firms with relatively lower R&D intensity have a hybrid focus—they invest in R&D but may also have products on the market. These firms attribute their innovation performance more so to production-based innovation factors and strategies such as gaining market access and maintaining connections with customers. Their strategy focuses on competitiveness, marketing, and distribution channels, while not ignoring the importance of a strong research base and the need to advance technologically. In a sense, strategies employed to achieve successful innovation reflect the stage of innovation in which a firm is operating for a particular product or process.     

Corporate cash holdings and total factor productivity – A global analysis

Studies concerning total factor productivity (TFP) have investigated the effect of TFP on economic growth from a country-level perspective, which is a critical issue in the macroeconomics field. Few studies have examined how corporate financial decisions influence TFP from a firm-level perspective. Specifically, no extant studies have investigated how cash holdings affect firm productivity. This study utilizes data for firms in 65 countries during 1993–2017 to investigate the effect of cash holdings on TFP from a corporate perspective. The findings show that firms with higher cash holdings can enhance TFP. The results hold after considering endogenous problems, financial constraints, financial crises, corporate governance, institutional quality, and financial development as well as various robustness tests. Furthermore, we examine whether firms consistently invest their cash holdings into research and development (R&D) expenditures enhances firm productivity. The evidence indicates that higher cash holdings lead to steady increases in R&D expenditure, which improves firms’ TFP.     

Board Effectiveness and CEO Pay: Board Information Processing Capacity,Monitoring Complexity,and CEO Pay‐for‐Performance Sensitivity

We have developed an information processing theory of board effectiveness to examine board‐chief executive officers (CEOs) pay relations. We theorize that CEO pay reflects the information processing context of boards. Boards have limited information processing capacity and therefore prefer to use outcome‐based CEO pay when they have difficulty in processing information for monitoring their CEOs. Using a longitudinal sample of Standard and Poor's (S&P's) large‐, medium‐, and small‐cap manufacturing firms in the United States from 1998 through 2005, we found support for our theory. Large boards and boards in less complex monitoring contexts tend to link CEO pay less tightly to firm performance by providing less stock‐based incentives, and the tendency of large boards to decrease outcome‐based CEO pay is even greater when boards are not busy or when boards are in less complex monitoring contexts. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The Value of CEO Mobility: Contextual Factors That Shape the Impact of Prior CEO Experience on Market Performance and CEO Compensation

This study examines the value that prior CEO experience has for the companies that hire such CEOs—as reflected in the firms’ subsequent market‐based performance—as well as its value for the CEO that possesses this experience—as reflected in his or her initial compensation. While we suggest that shareholders tend not to benefit from firms hiring experienced CEOs, we also argue that particular firm and industry contextual factors that shaped the prior CEO experience help ameliorate this detrimental effect. Regardless, we also suggest that prior CEO experience generally stands to benefit the CEOs, in that it brings them a compensation premium over those CEOs without such prior experience. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 654 US CEO succession events that occurred between 2001 and 2004 and found broad support for our hypotheses. We close with a discussion of the implications of our findings for future research as well as what they mean for firms hiring experienced CEOs and for CEO careers more generally. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.