Firm-level political sentiment and corporate tax avoidance

This paper examines how managers' tone on political issues in earnings conference calls relates to corporate tax avoidance. We find a positive relationship between managers' tone of using political linguistics and tax avoidance, while controlling for non-political tone. The relationship is more pronounced for firms with greater political exposure, higher lobbying expenditures, greater information asymmetry, and more risk-taking. The empirical results remain robust with various additional checks. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers employ the sentiment of political risk disclosure for aggressive tax purposes.     

Firm-level political risk and distance-to-default

This study provides the first empirical evidence of the relationship between firm-level political risk and distance-to-default. Based on our examination of a quarterly dataset of 2727 U.S. firms covering a period from January 2002 to April 2019, we conclude that firm-level political risk is negatively associated with distance-to-default. We document three economic mechanisms through which political risk increases default risk: information asymmetry, organizational capital, and investment growth. The evidence indicates that the association is more pronounced for firms with low analysts’ forecast accuracy, organizational capital, and investment growth. Employing hand-collected data, we also reveal that firms are able to exploit their corporate lobbying to immunize themselves against default risk. Our findings are robust to different endogeneity identifications, including a natural experiment, alternative distance-to-default proxies, and different sub-samples. Overall, we present novel evidence of an adverse impact of firm-level political risk on distance-to-default and how such a negative effect can be mitigated.     

Firm-level political risk and debt choice

We examine the effect of firm-level political risk on debt choices and find: (i) firms with higher political risk display a preference for private debt over public debt; (ii) the magnitude of this preference varies with the aggregate policy uncertainty; (iii) politically risky firms indeed receive less favorable terms in the bond market. To explain such findings, we show that private lenders have several advantages in serving politically risky borrowers. First, to the extent that lenders cannot perfectly foresee the adoption of new government policies, private lenders' expertise in implementing the reorganization process is important to limit their potential loss. Second, politically risky borrowers must undertake significant operation adjustments facing rising policy uncertainty. Private lenders can gather accurate information and closely monitor these adjustments. Last, as the severity of political risk varies with aggregate policy uncertainty, there exists an implicit contract between a borrower and its relationship bank, whereby a borrower accepts less favorable terms during normal times in exchange for the bank's support during difficult times. Taken together, this study advances our understanding of how cross-sectionally heterogeneous political risk influences corporate debt choice.     

Firm-level political risk and earnings opacity

Given the recent growing global uncertainties, firms have encountered increasing political risks and responded accordingly to avoid a negative impact on their performance. This study examines the impact of firm-level political risk on corporate earnings opacity among listed U.S. firms. Our empirical results reveal that higher firm-level political risk engenders greater corporate earnings opacity via three channels of market scrutiny, political proximity, and multiple business objectives. Further analyses show that politically risky firms are more prudent in earnings management when they are highly dependent on government spending. The results hold after a wide range of robustness tests. Our findings provide several implications for the management of earnings quality in response to increasing firm-level political risk in the U.S.     

Choice over asset economies: Default risk and corporate leverage

This paper attempts to clarify the apparent conflict between the recent contribution of Stiglitz and Smith (S-S) and the established Modigliani-Miller (M-M) leverage theorem. The two approaches differ in their treatment of asset creation. Whereas M-M restrict their discussion to a given set of competitive asset markets, S-S consider the addition of an extra asset to the original systems.     

Labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions

This paper presents evidence that firms choose conservative financial policies partly to mitigate workers' exposure to unemployment risk. We exploit changes in state unemployment insurance laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells. We find that higher unemployment benefits lead to increased corporate leverage, particularly for labor-intensive and financially constrained firms. We estimate the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress due to unemployment risk to be about 60 basis points of firm value for a typical BBB-rated firm. The findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions.     

Investment,leverage and political risk: Evidence from project-level FDI

Does capital structure influence firms' FDI capital expenditure decisions into countries with varying degrees of political risk? We explore this question using a novel dataset that matches 10,000 unique outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) projects with 1135 distinct U.S. firms over the period 2003–2014. We find that capital expenditures allocated to FDI projects are significantly lower for highly leveraged firms, in particular for firms with low growth opportunities. Firms also commit lower capital amounts to investments located in countries characterized by higher political risk. Furthermore, leverage and political risk interact with one another in determining the financial commitment of the FDI, with leverage exerting a significantly stronger negative effect on capital expenditures in countries where political risk is elevated. Our findings are consistent with the monitoring role of debt in curbing exposure to political risk in multinational firms' foreign operations, and corroborate the disciplinary role of leverage on firms' investment decisions.     

Uncertainty avoidance,risk tolerance and corporate takeover decisions

In this paper, we examine the role of national culture in corporate takeover decisions, by arguing that managerial risk tolerance (a combination of risk aversion and risk perception), at the national level, is a cultural trait and affects the expected net synergies CEOs require. We propose a theoretical framework that links CEO risk tolerance to the expected net synergies. We empirically show that CEOs of firms located in countries with lower levels of risk tolerance, measured by Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) uncertainty avoidance score, require higher premiums on takeovers, and show that uncertainty avoidance plays a greater role in relatively large takeovers. Additional testing reveals that CEOs from high uncertainty avoiding nations engage less in cross-border/cross-industry takeovers, suggesting that uncertainty avoidance captures more the CEO’s risk perception than his/her risk aversion.     

Behavioral consistency in corporate finance: CEO personal and corporate leverage

We find that firms behave consistently with how their CEOs behave personally in the context of leverage choices. Analyzing data on CEOs' leverage in their most recent primary home purchases, we find a positive, economically relevant, robust relation between corporate and personal leverage in the cross-section and when examining CEO turnovers. The results are consistent with an endogenous matching of CEOs to firms based on preferences, as well as with CEOs imprinting their personal preferences on the firms they manage, particularly when governance is weaker. Besides enhancing our understanding of the determinants of corporate capital structures, the broader contribution of the paper is to show that CEOs' personal behavior can, in part, explain corporate financial behavior of the firms they manage.     

Performance choice,executive bonuses and corporate leverage

This study examines the causal link between a firm's leverage decisions and the characteristics of its CEO bonus plans. Results from a simultaneous equations model strongly suggest that highly levered firms are less likely to use return on equity (ROE) or ROE-based accounting performance measures to determine executive bonuses. Estimates also indicate that firms with fewer debt covenants, higher interest rates on debt, and a greater proportion of executive pay in the form of stock options are less likely to adopt ROE-based measures for use in CEO bonus plans. These findings lend strong support to the efficient contracting hypothesis. The conflicting interests of corporate stakeholders, especially between stockholders and creditors, encourage firms to tie executive pay to performance metrics like return on assets (ROA) that will strike the optimal balance between the agency costs of debt and the agency costs of equity.Data availability: all data are available from public sources.     

Emerging market corporate leverage and global financial conditions

This paper explores how global financial conditions influence corporate leverage growth in emerging markets (EMs). Using a sample of 800,000 listed and non-listed firms across 28 EMs, we find that accommodative global financial conditions—initially proxied with a measure of U.S. monetary policy—are associated with faster leverage growth. The impact is more pronounced for financially constrained firms, such as small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and for EMs whose domestic monetary policy is more aligned with that of the United States. The findings suggest that global financial conditions affect EM firms' leverage growth by influencing domestic interest rates and by relaxing corporate borrowing constraints. Finally, leverage increases disproportionately more for firms that are either relatively less profitable or less solvent when global financial conditions become looser.     

Financial leverage changes associated with corporate mergers

We empirically examine whether firms increase financial leverage following mergers. Firms could increase financial leverage either because of an increase in debt capacity or because of unused debt capacity from pre-merger years. We find that financial leverage of combined firms increases significantly following mergers. A cross-sectional analysis shows that the change in financial leverage around mergers is significantly positively correlated with the announcement period market-adjusted returns. Further tests indicate that the increase in financial leverage is an outcome of an increase in debt capacity, although there is weak evidence that some of the increase in financial leverage is a result of past unused debt capacity.     

Operating leverage,financial leverage,and equity risk

The analysis investigates the combined leverage effect of a fixed capacity decision (fixed cost) plus debt on the risk of equity returns. It is argued that the traditional DOL-DFL calculation is incorrect. A correct calculation is given, using the fact that the capacity decision is endogenous to the firm's decision process. The analysis reveals that the capacity decision partially offsets the effect on equity risk of increasing business risk or debt. However, this ability is lost at high levels of debt.     

Financial leverage and corporate taxation: evidence from German corporate tax return data

To estimate the impact of profit taxation on the financial leverage of corporations, this study uses a pseudopanel constructed from comprehensive corporate tax return microdata for the period 1998–2001, which saw the introduction of major corporate tax reform in Germany. Financial leverage refers to the ratio of long-term debt to total capital. The endogeneity of the firm-specific marginal after-financing corporate income tax rate is controlled for by an instrumental variable approach. The instrument for the observed marginal tax rate is the counterfactual tax rate that a corporation would have faced in a particular period had there been no endogenous change, triggered by the tax reform, of its financial leverage and tax base. This counterfactual tax rate is derived from a detailed microsimulation model of the corporate sector, based on tax return microdata. The marginal tax rate has a statistically significant and relatively large positive effect on corporate leverage; for firms reporting positive profits, an increase of the marginal tax rate of 1 % would increase the financial leverage by approximately 0.7 %, on average. The debt ratio is less responsive to tax incentives for small corporations and firms facing high economic risks.     

Capacity overhang and corporate disinvestment decisions

We use a stochastic frontier model to estimate a firm's capacity overhang. We find that excess capacity is positively related to a drop in new capital expenditures, an accumulation of depleted long-term assets, and outright sales of investment assets. However, the sale of long-term assets (property, plant, and equipment [PP&E]) peaks for intermediate levels of excess capacity and then declines. We attribute this to growth options. We test for evidence of a preference ordering in the firm's choice of responding to excess capacity and find evidence for a pecking order in firm disinvestment, where sales of long-term assets are a measure of last resort.     

Outside directors and corporate board decisions

Between 1993 and 2000, at least 18 countries saw publication of guidelines proposing minimum representation of outside directors on corporate boards. Underlying this movement is an apparent presumption that boards with significant outside directors will make different and, perhaps, better decisions than boards dominated by insiders. As the first-mover in this movement, the United Kingdom provides a laboratory for a “natural experiment” to examine this presumption empirically. We find that UK boards that complied with the exogenously imposed standard were more likely to appoint outside chief executive officers (CEOs). Additionally, announcement period stock returns indicate that investors appear to view appointments of outside CEOs as good news. Apparently, boards with more outside directors make different (and perhaps better) decisions.     

Cost management and corporate payout decisions

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We investigate the relationship between cost management and dividend payout decisions. Prior studies document that firms with consistent earnings or...     

Bankruptcy law and corporate investment decisions

Major European countries have recently adopted bankruptcy codes that strengthen entrepreneurs’ power to renegotiate outstanding liabilities. Renegotiation in bankruptcy allows lenders to increase recovery rates, however it also weakens the contract’s ability to solve the moral hazard problem embedded in the production project. Hinging on this trade-off, I show in which circumstances a soft bankruptcy law that resembles Chapter 11 in the balance of lenders’ and entrepreneur’s rights encourages the choice of investments that privilege the achievement of long-term results. However, I also show that, in contrast to the common wisdom, soft bankruptcy can lead to the choice of investments that are biased towards the achievement of short-term outcomes.