Bank credit risk and macro-prudential policies: Role of counter-cyclical capital buffer

This paper investigates the impact of macro-prudential policy (proxied by the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB)) on bank credit risk during uncertain times, as banking sector stability is crucial in promoting financial intermediation. Using a unique daily data set consisting of 4939 credit default swaps (CDS) of 70 banks from 25 countries over the period 2010–2019, we find that CCyB tightening decreases bank-level CDS spreads, while CCyB loosening increases CDS spreads. This heterogeneous effect of CCyB arises due to its asymmetric effect on the capital ratio (i.e., the equity-to-total assets ratio) of banks. Tightening CCyB significantly increases capital, whereas loosening CCyB does not impact capital. Thus, the risks that emanate from the banking sector during periods of heightened uncertainty and financial distress can be significantly dampened when CCyB regulation is enabled. Consequently, macro-prudential policies for banks to hold higher levels of capital during good times are justified to contain financial market risks during downturns.     

The effects of macroprudential policy on banks' profitability

We estimate the effects of macroprudential policy on bank profitability, using a sample of 7250 global banks over 1990–2018. A number of policy measures have a negative impact on profitability, but these effects vary according to countries' economic development, bank type and time period. Macroprudential policy also adversely affects profitability of small and highly capitalised banks more than larger and less capitalised banks. Comparing our results with existing estimates of the impact of macroprudential policy on credit expansion, some measures are found to reduce lending but not profitability; others affect both negatively; and some affect profitability with no significant effect on lending. Since it is desirable for banks to make profits and thus be able to build up capital from retained earnings, our results suggest that care is needed in choosing measures according to their effects on bank profitability.     

Calibrating the Magnitude of the Countercyclical Capital Buffer Using Market-Based Stress Tests

This paper proposes a novel methodology to calibrate the magnitude of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) using market-based stress tests. The macroprudential authority in our paper aims to contain the possibility of a breach of a minimum capital ratio in the event of a severe system-wide shock within a certain permissible failure probability. We apply the methodology by stress-testing major banks in six advanced economies on a quarterly basis over a period of 27 years. The estimates suggest that the cap on the CCyB should not be less than around 1.7% of total assets. Its potential normal-times level is estimated at approximately 0.8% of total assets.     

When arm's length is too far: Relationship banking over the credit cycle

We conduct face-to-face interviews with bank chief executive officers to classify 397 banks across 21 countries as relationship or transaction lenders. We then use the geographic coordinates of these banks’ branches and of 14,100 businesses to analyze how the lending techniques of banks near firms are related to credit constraints at two contrasting points of the credit cycle. We find that while relationship lending is not associated with credit constraints during a credit boom, it alleviates such constraints during a downturn. This positive role of relationship lending is stronger for small and opaque firms and in regions with a more severe economic downturn. Moreover, relationship lending mitigates the impact of a downturn on firm growth and does not constitute evergreening of loans.     

Aggregate Investment Externalities and Macroprudential Regulation

Evidence suggests that banks tend to lend a lot during booms and very little during recessions. We propose a simple explanation for this phenomenon. We show that instead of dampening productivity shocks, the banking sector tends to exacerbate them, leading to excessive fluctuations of bank credit, output, and asset prices. Our explanation relies on three ingredients that are characteristic of modern banks’ activities: moral hazard, high exposure to aggregate shocks, and the ease with which capital can be reallocated to its most productive use. At the competitive equilibrium, banks offer privately optimal contracts to their investors, but these contracts are not socially optimal: banks reallocate capital excessively upon aggregate shocks. This is because banks do not internalize the impact of their decisions on asset prices. We examine the efficacy of possible policy responses to these properties of credit markets, and derive a rationale for macroprudential regulation in the spirit of a Net Stable Funding Ratio.     

HOW DID THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AFFECT SMALL-BUSINESS LENDING IN THE UNITED STATES?

We analyze changes in lending by U.S. banks to businesses from 1994 to 2011. We find that lending to businesses, and in particular to small businesses, declined precipitously following onset of the financial crisis. We also examine the relative changes in business lending by banks that did, and did not, receive Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds from the U.S. Treasury, and find that banks receiving capital injections from the TARP failed to increase their small-business lending. Finally, we find strong and significant positive relations of both bank capital adequacy and profitability with small-business lending.     

How important are small banks to small business lending?: New evidence from a survey of small firms

Typically, small banks lend a larger proportion of their assets to small businesses than do large banks. The recent wave of bank mergers has thinned the ranks of small banks, raising the concern that small firms may find it difficult to access bank credit. However, bank consolidation will reduce small business credit only if small banks enjoy an advantage in lending to small businesses. We test the existence of a small bank cost advantage in small business lending by conducting the following simple test: If such advantages exist, then we should observe small businesses in areas with few small banks to have less bank credit. Using data on small business borrowers from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance, we find that the probability of a small firm having a line of credit from a bank does not decrease in the long run when there are fewer small banks in the area, although short-run disruptions may occur. Nor do we find that firms in areas with few small banks are any more likely to repay trade credit late, suggesting that such firms are no more credit constrained than firms in areas with many small banks.     

Macroprudential stress testing of credit risk: A practical approach for policy makers

Drawing on the lessons from the global financial crisis and especially from its impact on the banking systems of Eastern Europe, the paper proposes a new practical approach to macroprudential stress testing. The proposed approach incorporates: (i) macroeconomic stress scenarios generated from both a country specific statistical model and historical cross-country crises experience; (ii) indirect credit risk due to foreign currency exposures of unhedged borrowers; (iii) varying underwriting practices across banks and their asset classes based on their relative aggressiveness of lending; (iv) higher correlations between the probability of default and the loss given default during stress periods; (v) a negative effect of lending concentration and residual loan maturity on unexpected losses; and (vi) the use of an economic risk weighted capital adequacy ratio as the relevant outcome indicator to measure the resilience of banks to materializing credit risk. The authors apply the proposed approach to a set of Eastern European banks and discuss the results.     

TARP announcement,bank health,and borrowers’ credit risk

Theory suggests that unhealthy banks exhibit more pronounced flight-to-quality behavior during financial crises and, hence, the infusion of capital through unhealthy banks is less effective in relieving the liquidity shocks of vulnerable borrowers. We test these predictions by investigating how the financial health of leading US banks influenced their borrowers’ credit risk surrounding the announcement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Changes in borrower credit risk, measured by credit default swap (CDS) spreads, should reflect the expected relief from liquidity shocks and other benefits of rescuing banks, such as maintaining the existing lending relationships. Consistent with the theory, prior to the TARP capital infusions, unhealthy banks’ borrowers with high leverage experienced a greater increase in their credit risk relative to similar healthy banks’ borrowers. Following the event, the CDS market anticipated less liquidity relief to these vulnerable unhealthy banks’ borrowers, but more liquidity relief to the vulnerable healthy banks’ borrowers.     

Foreign Banks in Transition Countries: To Whom Do They Lend and How Are They Financed?

We use focused interviews with managers of foreign parent banks and their affiliates in Central Europe and the Baltic States to analyze the small‐business lending and internal capital markets of multinational financial institutions. Our approach allows us to complement the standard empirical literature, which has difficulty in analyzing important issues such as lending technologies and capital allocation. We find that the acquisition of local banks by foreign banks has not led to a persistent bias in these banks' credit supply toward large multinational corporations. Instead, increased competition and the improvement of subsidiaries' lending technologies have led foreign banks to gradually expand into the SME and retail markets. Second, it is demonstrated that local bank affiliates are strongly influenced by the capital allocation and credit steering mechanisms of the parent bank.     

A darker side to decentralized banks: Market power and credit rationing in SME lending

We use loan-level data to study how the organizational structure of banks impacts small business lending. We find that decentralized banks—where branch managers have greater autonomy over lending decisions—give larger loans to small firms and those with “soft information.” However, decentralized banks are also more responsive to their own competitive environment. They are more likely to expand credit when faced with competition but also cherry pick customers and restrict credit when they have market power. This “darker side” to decentralized banks in concentrated markets highlights that the level of local banking competition is key to determining which organizational structure provides better lending terms for small businesses.     

Economic policy uncertainty and the credit channel: Aggregate and bank level U.S. evidence over several decades

Economic policy uncertainty affects decisions of households, businesses, policy makers and financial intermediaries. We first examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on aggregate bank credit growth. Then we analyze commercial bank entity level data to gauge the effects of policy uncertainty on financial intermediaries’ lending. We exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity to back out indirect evidence of its effects on businesses and households. We ask (i) whether, conditional on standard macroeconomic controls, economic policy uncertainty affected bank level credit growth, and (ii) whether there is variation in the impact related to banks’ balance sheet conditions; that is, whether the effects are attributable to loan demand or, if impact varies with bank level financial constraints, loan supply. We find that policy uncertainty has a significant negative effect on bank credit growth. Since this impact varies meaningfully with some bank characteristics – particularly the overall capital-to-assets ratio and bank asset liquidity-loan supply factors at least partially (and significantly) help determine the influence of policy uncertainty. Because other studies have found important macroeconomic effects of bank lending growth on the macroeconomy, our findings are consistent with the possibility that high economic policy uncertainty may have slowed the U.S. economic recovery from the Great Recession by restraining overall credit growth through the bank lending channel.     

Macroprudential regulation and macroeconomic activity

I develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine the impact of macroprudential regulation on banks’ financial decisions and the implications for the real sector. I model an occasionally binding capital requirement constraint and analyze its costs and benefits. This friction means that the banks refrain from valuable lending. At the same time, capital requirements provide structural stability to the financial system. I show that higher capital requirements can dampen the business cycle fluctuations and raise welfare. I also show that switching to a countercyclical capital requirement regime can help reduce volatility and raise welfare. Finally, by means of the welfare analysis, I also obtain the optimal level of capital requirement.     

The value of bank capital buffers in maintaining financial system resilience

There is a current controversy concerning the appropriate size of banks’ capital requirements, and the trade-off between the costs and benefits of implementing higher capital requirements. We quantify the size of capital buffers required to reduce system-wide losses using confidential regulatory data for Australian banks from 2002 to 2014 and annual public accounts from 1978 to 2014. We find that a moderate increase in bank capital buffers is sufficient to maintain financial system resilience, even after taking economic downturns into consideration. Furthermore, while banks benefit from paying a lower cost of debt when they have a higher capital buffer, lending volumes are lower indicating that credit supply may be hampered if bank capital levels are too high within a financial system.     

Government guarantees of loans to small businesses: Effects on banks’ risk-taking and non-guaranteed lending

We analyzed the loan guarantees that the Japanese government provided for banks’ loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We modeled and estimated how much and under what conditions loan guarantees affected banks’ risk-taking and banks’ non-guaranteed lending.In the presence of controls for bank capital and other factors that might affect supplies of bank credit, our estimates supported our model's implications that loan guarantees increased banks’ risk-taking.Consistent with our model, our estimates imply that, when banks initially had fewer guaranteed loans and then got more guaranteed loans, guaranteed loans were complements to, rather than substitutes for, non-guaranteed loans. As complements, loan guarantees could be “high-powered” in that they generated increases not only in guaranteed loans, but also increases in non-guaranteed loans that were a multiple of the increases in guaranteed loans. In addition, banks’ having more capital was associated with doing more non-guaranteed lending.     

The impact of CRA agreements on community banks

We develop three empirical models to identify the impact of Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) agreements on the mortgage lending behavior of small banking institutions during the period 1990–1997. CRA agreements are pledges banking institutions make to extend levels of credit to targeted populations and are often used by institutions to reaffirm their commitment to the goals of the CRA. We hypothesize that CRA agreements increase the level of competition for mortgage loans in the targeted area, which in turn causes a reduction in the quantity of mortgage credit to be supplied by community banks. Consistent with the quantity hypothesis, the results show that CRA agreements are associated with less mortgage lending, including lending in lower-income communities (CRA lending) and in minority communities (minority lending), by small community lenders. Evidence does not support a second hypothesis – that community banks respond to the increased competition by providing credit to riskier individuals.     

The international transmission of bank capital requirements: Evidence from the UK

We use data on UK banks? minimum capital requirements to study the impact of changes to bank-specific capital requirements on cross-border bank loan supply from 1999Q1 to 2006Q4. By examining a sample in which each recipient country has multiple relationships with UK-resident banks, we are able to control for demand effects. We find a negative and statistically significant effect of changes to banks? capital requirements on cross-border lending: a 100 basis point increase in the requirement is associated with a reduction in the growth rate of cross-border credit of 5.5 percentage points. We also find that banks tend to favor their most important country relationships, so that the negative cross-border credit supply response in “core” countries is significantly less than in others. Banks tend to cut back cross-border credit to other banks (including foreign affiliates) more than to firms and households, consistent with shorter maturity, wholesale lending which is easier to roll off and may be associated with weaker borrowing relationships.     

Efficient Recapitalization

We analyze government interventions to recapitalize a banking sector that restricts lending to firms because of debt overhang. We find that the efficient recapitalization program injects capital against preferred stock plus warrants and conditions implementation on sufficient bank participation. Preferred stock plus warrants reduces opportunistic participation by banks that do not require recapitalization, although conditional implementation limits free riding by banks that benefit from lower credit risk because of other banks’ participation. Efficient recapitalization is profitable if the benefits of lower aggregate credit risk exceed the cost of implicit transfers to bank debt holders.     

Reputation,risk-taking,and macroprudential policy

This paper examines the role of macroprudential capital requirements in preventing inefficient credit booms in a model with reputational externalities. In our model, unprofitable banks have strong incentives to invest in risky assets when macroeconomic fundamentals are good in order to avoid the stigma of being assessed as low ability by the market. We show that across-the-system countercyclical capital requirements that deter such gambling are constrained optimal when fundamentals are neither extremely weak nor extremely strong.