Do Capital Structure Adjustments by Takeover Targets Influence Acquisition Gains?

We link debt issuances by target companies around takeover announcements to enhanced target bargaining power in negotiations with bidders over merger synergy gains in completed takeovers. Announcements of debt issuances by targets—especially new bank loans—are associated with more positive target equity returns relative to those made by nontargets, particularly for debt issuances immediately surrounding the takeover announcement. At least some of these gains to targets come at the expense of bidder shareholders, as bidder equity abnormal returns at target debt issuance are negative. We further show that targets issuing debt are primarily those with relatively low acquisition abnormal returns, consistent with initially poor target bargaining power. Subsequent debt issuances by targets increase the likelihood of positive adjustments to acquisition premiums offered by acquirers.     

Do auctions induce a winner's curse? New evidence from the corporate takeover market

We contrast the winner's curse hypothesis and the competitive market hypothesis as potential explanations for the observed returns to bidders in corporate takeovers. The winner's curse hypothesis posits suboptimal behavior in which winning bidders fail to adapt their strategies to the level of competition and the amount of uncertainty in the takeover environment and predicts that bidder returns are inversely related to the level of competition in a given deal and to the uncertainty in the value of the target. Our measure of takeover competition comes from a unique data set on the auction process that occurs prior to the announcement of a takeover. In our empirical estimation, we control for the endogeneity between bidder returns and the level of competition in takeover deals. Controlling for endogeneity, we find that the returns to bidders are not significantly related to takeover competition. We also find that uncertainty in the value of the target does not reduce bidder returns. Related analysis indicates that prestigious investment banks do not promote overbidding. Analysis of post-takeover operating performance also fails to find any negative effects of takeover competition. As a whole, the results indicate that the breakeven returns to bidders in corporate takeovers stem not from the winner's curse but from the competitive market for targets that occurs predominantly prior to the public announcement of bids.     

Failed takeovers, methods of payment, and bidder returns

This study documents bidding-firm stock returns upon the announcement of takeover terminations. On average, bidding firms that offer common stock experience a positive abnormal return, and firms that offer cash experience a negative abnormal return. The positive performance is primarily driven by bidders initiating the takeover termination. Commonstock-financed bidders earn a return not significantly different from that earned by cashfinanced bidders when terminations are initiated by the target firm. The results are consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis, that the decision not to issue common stock conveys favorable information to the market. In addition, bidder returns at takeover termination are positively related to the amount of undistributed cash flow, supporting the free cash flow hypothesis.     

Takeovers of Privately Held Targets, Methods of Payment, and Bidder Returns

We examine bidder returns at the announcement of a takeover proposal when the target firm is privately held. In stock offers, bidders experience a positive abnormal return, which contrasts with the negative abnormal return typically found for bidders acquiring a publicly traded target. On the other hand, bidders experience no abnormal return in cash offers. Our analysis suggests that the positive wealth effect is related to monitoring activities by target shareholders and, to an extent, reduced information asymmetries.     

Synergy disclosures in mergers and acquisitions

We examine bidding firms' motives for disclosing a synergy forecast when announcing a merger or acquisition. Our sample consists of 1990 M&A deals, of which 345 announce synergy estimates. Our results suggest that synergy disclosures serve to obtain a more favorable market reception for deals that would otherwise induce highly negative bidder announcement returns. After controlling for the endogeneity of the disclosure decision, synergy forecast disclosures result in approximately 5% higher bidder stock returns. The main deterrents of disclosing synergy values are lack of precise information on synergy values available to bidding firm management, and shareholder litigation risk. Bidders do not seem to use synergy disclosures to strategically influence takeover premiums or competition for the target.     

Director networks and takeovers

We study the impact of corporate networks on the takeover process. We find that better connected companies are more active bidders. When a bidder and a target have one or more directors in common, the probability that the takeover transaction will be successfully completed augments, and the duration of the negotiations is shorter. Connected targets more frequently accept offers that involve equity. Directors of the target firm (who are not interlocked) have a better chance to be invited to the board of the combined firm in connected M&As. While connections have a clear impact on the takeover strategy and process, we do not find evidence that the market acknowledges connections between bidders and targets as the announcement returns are not statistically different from those bidders and targets which are ex ante not connected.     

Bidder returns and merger anticipation: Evidence from banking deregulation

This paper examines the anticipated components of bidder returns by focusing on the banking industry around the passage of interstate deregulation (Riegle Neal Act of 1994). Overall, firms that became bidders after Riegle Neal have large significant positive returns during its passage. Moreover, these positive wealth effects are significantly larger than the effects at the merger announcement. These results suggest that bidder returns are anticipated and focusing only on narrow event windows underestimates gains to bidders. Finally, the positive bidder returns appear to provide evidence against both the entrenchment and hubris hypotheses. Additional tests provide evidence to suggest that mergers are motivated by synergy rather than disciplinary motives.     

Convertible securities in merger transactions

This paper provides a rationale for the use of convertible securities as the medium of exchange in corporate change-of-control transactions. We argue that convertible securities can resolve the information asymmetry about the bidder’s value while at the same time mitigating the information asymmetry about the target’s value. In contrast, deals with cash or stock can only address one information asymmetry or the other but not both. Empirically, we find that a bidder is more likely to offer convertible securities, rather than all cash or all stock, when both the bidder and its target face large asymmetric information problems. We also find that both bidders and targets in convertible deals enjoy positive abnormal stock returns around takeover announcements. These findings provide empirical support for the use of convertible securities to resolve the double-sided asymmetric information problem. Finally, we find that bidder returns in convertible deals are larger than in all-cash and all-stock deals, but that target returns in convertible deals are smaller than in all-cash and all-stock deals.     

Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and Cross‐border Takeover Bids

This paper analyses the short‐term wealth effects of large intra‐European takeover bids. We find announcement effects of 9% for the target firms compared to a statistically significant announcement effect of only 0.7% for the bidders. The type of takeover bid has a large impact on the short‐term wealth effects with hostile takeovers triggering substantially larger price reactions than friendly operations. When a UK firm is involved, the abnormal returns are higher than those of bids involving both a Continental European target and bidder. There is strong evidence that the means of payment in an offer has an impact on the share price. A high market‐to‐book ratio of the target leads to a higher bid premium, but triggers a negative price reaction for the bidding firm. We also investigate whether the predominant reason for takeovers is synergies, agency problems or managerial hubris. Our results suggest that synergies are the prime motivation for bids and that targets and bidders share the wealth gains.     

Partial acquisitions,the acquisition probability hypothesis,and the abnormal returns to partial targets

The acquisition of a partial stake in a target firm has been positively linked to the likelihood that the target will be involved in a follow on full acquisition involving either the original bidder or a third party bidder. Existing studies provide only suggestive evidence of this linkage by comparing the abnormal returns to partial targets that are ultimately acquired to those that are not. Using a sample of partial acquisitions, we identify characteristics that impact the probability of a full acquisition and provide a tangible link between partial target gains and the ex ante probability of acquisition. Partial targets experience positive announcement effects, and the gains are greater for subsequently acquired targets. Partial bids initiated by corporate bidders are more likely to result in a full acquisition, and the size of the acquired stake and the level of institutional ownership are positively linked to the probability of acquisition. Further, the partial target gains are positively linked to the ex ante probability of acquisition even after controlling for any increased monitoring and discipline that the partial bidder is expected to impose. The findings are robust across various time horizons and model specifications.     

Hostile bank takeover offers : Analysis and implications

A comparison of the financial characteristics of banks involved in hostile takeover bids with a control group of nonhostile bank mergers indicates: (1) hostile targets experience abnormal returns that are significantly greater than for the targets of nonhostile bank mergers; (2) hostile bidders experience negative abnormal returns that are insignificantly different than for bidders involved in nonhostile bank mergers; (3) hostile bank acquisition announcements produce positive net wealth effects which are larger than the wealth effects of nonhostile acquisitions; (4) a Logit regression model using financial ratios, stock price data, and ownership data is able to distinguish between hostile and nonhostile targets.     

Corporate Mergers and Shareholder Wealth Effects: 1977-1986

The paper investigates the distribution of returns to shareholders of UK companies involved in acquisitions during the period 1977-1986. Three control models were used in the analysis: the market model with parameters identified through OLS regression, a model based on adjusted betas, and finally an index-relative model. Abnormal returns were identified around both bid announcement and outcome dates for bidders and targets in completed and abandoned bids. Examination was also made of the distribution of wealth changes for bidders and targets separately and for both in combination. The results demonstrate that, although there is no net wealth decrease to shareholders in total as a result of takeover activity, shareholders of bidder firms do suffer wealth decreases. By contrast, shareholders in target firms obtained significant, positive wealth increases in both completed and abandoned bids.     

Regulation, taxes and the market for corporate control in Belgium

This paper examines the effect of regulation and taxation on the characteristics of the merger and acquisition process in Belgium. Regulatory provisions are reflected in the fact that Belgian bidders own large toeholds in the target before they engage in takeover bids. Although these toeholds do not have to be disclosed, bidders do not earn any significant returns as a result of the takeover. It is also found that tax considerations are important when a firm chooses to pay with cash or with shares. Finally, it is found that in negotiated offers, the gain to target firms is negatively related to the toehold of the bidder and positively related to the number of shares controlled by large block holders.     

Spillover of corporate governance standards in cross-border mergers and acquisitions

In cross-border acquisitions, the differences between the bidder and target corporate governance (measured by newly constructed indices capturing shareholder, minority shareholder, and creditor protection) have an important impact on the takeover returns. Our country-level corporate governance indices capture the changes in the quality of the national corporate governance regulations over the past 15 years. When the bidder is from a country with a strong shareholder orientation (relative to the target), part of the total synergy value of the takeover may result from the improvement in the governance of the target assets. In full takeovers, the corporate governance regulation of the bidder is imposed on the target (the positive spillover by law hypothesis). In partial takeovers, the improvement in the target corporate governance may occur on voluntary basis (the spillover by control hypothesis). Our empirical analysis corroborates both spillover effects. In contrast, when the bidder is from a country with poorer shareholder protection, the negative spillover by law hypothesis states that the anticipated takeover gains will be lower as the poorer corporate governance regime of the bidder will be imposed on the target. The alternative bootstrapping hypothesis argues that poor-governance bidders voluntarily bootstrap to the better-governance regime of the target. We do find support for the bootstrapping effect.     

Ownership structure and target returns

Contrary to past literature, ownership defined as “all officers and directors” of the target firm has no association with target returns. Rather, we find that inside (managerial) ownership has a positive relation with target returns, whereas active-outside (non-managing director) ownership has a negative relation with target returns. Using accounting-based versus market-based performance measures, we find that the relation between inside ownership and target returns is best explained by takeover anticipation. Using bidder and synergy returns we find that the relation between outside ownership and target returns is best explained by outsiders' willingness to share gains with the bidder. While the relations are more pronounced for non-tender deals, they also hold for tender offers when active-outside ownership is corporate rather than institutional.     

Do private equity consortiums facilitate collusion in takeover bidding?

We address whether the joint bidding by private equity consortiums facilitates collusion in the takeover market. We employ a sample of 870 takeovers of publicly traded targets in the 2003 to 2007 period, the time period which is the focus of investigation by the Justice Department and the source of cases for class action lawsuits. A unique aspect of our analysis is that we determine the identification of private equity bidders from actual merger documents rather than rely on sources such as Securities Data Corp and that we analyze both prominent private equity bidders as well as smaller private equity firms. Our analysis finds competitive reasons for consortium formation based on scale, risk and bidder expertise. We also find that both single private equity bidders and private equity consortiums are associated with significantly greater levels of takeover competition than other types of bidders. While we find some evidence that target abnormal returns are lower in private equity consortium deals for narrow windows around the initial takeover-related announcement date, we find that these results do not hold for longer event windows that better account for the differences in the takeover process across types of bidders. Analysis that controls for the endogenous selection of consortium formation also fails to find any negative effect of consortiums on either takeover competition or target returns. We also do not find any negative effects of consortiums formed by prominent private equity firms. We interpret the evidence to be inconsistent with a collusive explanation for consortium formation in the 2003 to 2007 period and to be consistent with competitive reasons for consortium formation.     

The impact of possible-offer announcements on the wealth effect of target firms

The stock market materially and positively responds to released information on possible offers, likely because such announcements signal the high probability that formal bids will be offered. If potential takeover discussions are revealed earlier, then target shareholders will gain significantly lower abnormal returns around the time of when formal offers are announced. Financial bidders are less likely to approach targets with earlier possible offers; however, if they do offer possible takeovers, they need to pay incrementally higher bid premiums in their formal offers. The reform inherent in the U.K. Takeover Code of 2011 weakens a bidder’s willingness to offer possible takeovers. The pre-reform effects of possible offers on the wealth effect of targets differ from those seen after the reform.     

The valuation effects of bank mergers

This paper examines the valuation effects of a sample of 558 bank mergers from 1980–1997. The overall results indicate that bank mergers create wealth. On average over a 36-day (−30, +5) event window, targets gain over 22%, bidders break even, and combined firms gain 3%. The results further indicate that mergers in the 1990s, which have not been extensively studied in prior work, have positive effects. In the 1990s over the 36-day window: target gain significantly, bidder returns are positive and statistically larger than the mid-1980s, and combined firm returns are significantly positive. These results are consistent with the notion that bank mergers occur for synergistic reasons and are not the result of empire building. However, bidder returns are sensitive to the event window implemented. Examining returns over an 11-day (−5, +5) window, target returns remain significantly positive, while bidder returns are statistically negative, and combined firm returns are statistically positive. Results over both windows indicate that overall wealth effects from bank mergers are positive over time, particularly in the 1990s.     

A Reexamination of the Conglomerate Merger Wave in the 1960s: An Internal Capital Markets View

One possible explanation for bidding firms earning positive abnormal returns in diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s is that internal capital markets were expected to overcome the information deficiencies of the less-developed capital markets. Examining 392 bidder firms during the 1960s, we find the highest bidder returns when financially "unconstrained" buyers acquire "constrained" targets. This result holds while controlling for merger terms and for different proxies used to classify firms facing costly external financing. We also find that bidders generally retain target management, suggesting that management may have provided company-specific operational information, while the bidder provided capital-budgeting expertise.     

Are Golden Parachutes an Optimal Contracting Response or Evidence of Managerial Entrenchment?: Evidence from Successful Takeovers

Two models that attempt to explain the adoption of golden parachutes are examined. The first model views golden parachutes as an optimal contracting response to a takeover, the other perceives them as an outgrowth of severe managerial entrenchment that results in contracts for the benefit of managers. Using a sample of 169 successful acquisitions of NYSE targets from 1981 through 1989, I document that targets that have adopted golden parachutes experience significantly higher excess returns around the announcement of a takeover than targets without these contracts. I find similar increased excess returns for the bidder/target portfolios. In addition, bidder excess return is independent of the existence of golden parachutes in targets. Additional results suggest that golden parachutes do not reduce managerial resistance to takeovers. The results are consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis and inconsistent with the optimal contracting hypothesis. Sensitivity tests confirm these results.