银行权益资本使用及其对规模经济测度的影响

将所有者权益的作用嵌入银行技术模型,测算中国十六家上市商业银行满足成本最小化时的所有者权益影子价格,并以成本最小化为标准评价权益资本使用情况。研究发现,五家国有大型商业银行持有高于最小化成本水平的所有者权益;其余大部分股份制商业银行的权益资本低于成本最小化要求。进一步测算规模经济,发现所有者权益进入成本方程后计算出的规模经济效应比仅以所有者权益为条件调节项和使用标准成本方程估计出的规模经济结果都要高,说明规模经济的轨迹将依赖于银行对负债与所有者权益相对信任度,即提高存款和所有者权益的相对成本及所有者权益资本以多大程度进入到成本函数设定中。     

Political considerations in the decision of Chinese SOEs to list in Hong Kong

This paper investigates why Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with strong political connections (i.e., politically connected firms) are more likely to list overseas than non-politically connected firms. We find that connected firms' post-overseas listing performance is worse than that of non-connected firms. This evidence suggests that connected firms' managers list their firms overseas for private (political) benefits. Consistent with this private benefits explanation, we further find that connected firms' managers are more likely to receive political media coverage or a promotion to a senior government position subsequent to overseas listing than domestic listing.     

Political connections and the cost of equity capital

Motivated by recent research on the costs and benefits of political connection, we examine the cost of equity capital of politically connected firms. Using propensity score matching models, we find that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital than their non-connected peers. We find further that political connections are more valuable for firms with stronger ties to political power. In additional analyses, we find that the effect of political connection on firms' equity financing costs is influenced by the prevailing country-level institutional and political environment, and by firm characteristics. Taken together, our findings provide strong evidence that investors require a lower cost of capital for politically connected firms, which suggests that politically connected firms are generally considered less risky than non-connected firms.     

Characteristics of non-audit services and financial restatements in Malaysia

Various types of purchased non-audit services (NAS) and their recurring nature affect the likelihood of financial statement restatements in Malaysia. Based on 953 firm-year observations during the period 2007–2009, evidence of a negative relationship between non-audit fees and financial statement restatements is provided. The purchase of both tax-related and audit-related NAS decreases the likelihood of restatements. Recurring (as opposed to non-recurring) tax-related and audit-related NAS are negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of restatements. These findings support our hypothesis that both types of NAS and their recurrence provide knowledge spillover, which enhances audit and financial reporting quality. When considering institutional settings, we find that politically connected firms are more likely to require financial restatements than non-politically connected firms, while audit committee independence and the purchase of tax-related, recurring tax-related and other NAS decrease this likelihood. The purchase of audit-related and recurring audit-related NAS and non-recurring other NAS decreases the likelihood of restatements for non-politically connected firms.     

审计质量对影子银行业务风险的影响研究 ——基于中国商业银行数据的实证研究

以中国68家非上市银行和16家上市银行2007-2017年的数据为样本,检验注册会计师审计在抑制商业银行从事影子银行业务风险中发挥的重要作用,并探究高质量的审计对商业银行从事影子银行业务风险的具体影响.研究表明:国际四大会计师事务所的审计质量更高,更能有效抑制银行从事影子银行业务的风险;股权集中度较高和处于法律保护水平较低地区的银行从事影子银行业务的风险更大,高质量的审计对其风险的抑制效果更强.     

The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms

We document that the quality of earnings reported by politically connected firms is significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected companies. Our results are not due to firms with ex-ante poor earnings quality establishing connections more often. Instead, our results suggest that, because of a lesser need to respond to market pressures to increase the quality of information, connected companies can afford disclosing lower quality accounting information. In particular, lower quality reported earnings is associated with a higher cost of debt only for the non-politically connected firms in the sample.     

Politically connected boards,family and business group affiliations,and cost of capital: Evidence from Indonesia

We investigate the effect of politically connected boards (both supervisory boards [SBs] and boards of directors [BODs]) on cost of debt and equity capital of listed companies in Indonesia which has established a two-tier corporate governance system. The results, based on 250 firms, suggest that companies with politically connected SBs experience lower cost of debt and equity capital, whereas politically connected BODs have no association with cost of either debt or equity. Furthermore, we find that family firms and firms belonging to business groups with politically connected SBs enjoy lower cost of debt and equity capital. Our main results are robust to alternative measures and to tests for endogeneity.     

Bank political connections and performance in China

We examine the effects of bank’s political connection on bank performance and risk in China. We use hand-collected information on CEOs’ professional background to identify their political affiliations, and find that banks whose CEOs have former government experiences have higher return on assets, lower default risk, and lower credit risk. Additionally, politically connected banks have disproportionally higher performance when the CEOs previous worked in the same city where the current bank’s headquarter locates, had past banking experiences, spend more on entertainment and travel costs, and have higher previous administrative rankings (e.g., at the provincial or state level). These results suggest that politically connected banks have better access to lending to politically connected firms, which are high yield assets and more likely to be bailed out when in distress. Our results offer a mechanism of political rent seeking, consistent with the institutional environment of China’s banking and political system.     

Does political connection distort competition and encourage corporate risk taking? International evidence

We investigate the impact of political connection on corporate risk-taking by connected firms, their industry counterparts, as well as non-rival firms from 48 countries. We find that political connection induces higher risk taking by connected firms. By contrast, we do not find evidence that political connection, with the attendant potential competitive distortions in the industry, induces higher risk taking by competitors. We focus on non-financial industries. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the inability to avail themselves of political rents compels the non-connected rivals to adopt more conservative strategies. However, large rival firms, generally considered to be too-important-to-fail, exhibit evidence of higher risk taking. The top size quartile industry rivals take as much risk as the politically connected firms. The higher risk exhibited by large rivals of politically connected firms suggests that our baseline regression results of lower risk-taking among rivals of politically connected firms are biased upward by firms that would be considered too-big-to-fail. This finding also suggests that the too-big-to fail phenomenon is not unique to banks. Our results are robust to the use of alternative measures of risk, to the exclusion of privatized and state-owned firms, and to controlling for the effects of financial crisis.     

Does the truth rest with the minority? Divergent views on nonfinancial firms' financial investments from the private equity market

We investigate how the seasoned equity market evaluates nonfinancial firms that recently bought wealth management products (WMPs). Using a sample of Chinese firms, we find that the stock market reacts less positively to private equity placements (PEPs) by firms that recently purchased WMPs (i.e., quasi-deposits) than to those that did not. Further analysis suggests that compared with retail investors, sophisticated (i.e., institutional and high-net-worth) investors pay a higher price for the shares of these WMP-buying firms. After PEPs, we find that the long-term operating performance and firm value of WMP-buying firms are higher than those of non-buying firms. Overall, the findings suggest that: (i) engaging in shadow banking activities (buying WMPs) does not mean a firm is distracted, and (ii) sophisticated investors are less concerned than retail investors about a firm's shadow banking activities.     

Do controlling shareholders collude with their related large shareholders? Evidence of equity pledges and shareholding increases from China

The key for controlling shareholders to prevent the risk of equity pledge is to increase the stock price, and the large shareholders' shareholding increases have the effect of increasing the stock price. Using the data of Chinese A-share firms from 2007 to 2019, this paper examines the relationship between the controlling shareholders' equity pledges and their related large shareholders' shareholding increases. We find that when the controlling shareholders pledge equity, their related large shareholders are more likely to increase their shareholdings. By analyzing the necessity, ability and motivation of related large shareholders to provide help, we find that shareholding increases of related large shareholders are behaviors of helping controlling shareholders to mitigate the risk of equity pledge. Based on the analysis of external acquisition threats, stability heterogeneity of control rights and exogenous impact of Vanke Equity Competition, it is shown that the controlling shareholders pledging equity promote their related large shareholders to increase their shareholdings for the purpose of preventing the risk of control transfer. In further analysis, we find that the shareholding increases of related large shareholders have the practical effect of improving the stock price and preventing pledge risks. This paper proves that the controlling shareholders pledging equity collude with their related large shareholders, which is reflected in the fact that the shareholding increases of the related large shareholders have become a means for controlling shareholders to prevent the risk of equity pledge.     

Home equity lines of credit and the unemployment rate: Have unemployed consumers borrowed themselves into the next financial crisis?

Some economists argue the recent recovery has been so meager because many consumers have lost their main source of income and maxed-out their home-equity borrowings. Further, banks that were able to make consumer loans did so with less security because home prices fell so dramatically. This paper argues that at least part of that recovery story is purely anecdotal and, in fact, incorrect. In spite of the precipitous decline in home prices, the original price increases were so large that many homeowners still have/had adequate equity in their homes to borrow. The paper presents evidence that the average quarterly increase in aggregate home equity line of credit (HELOC) lending after housing prices began their decline is, statistically, no different than the average quarterly increase in HELOC lending before housing prices began their downward trend. The evidence also suggests that increased HELOC lending during the recession is not correlated with higher unemployment.     

Politically Connected Private Equity and Employment

We investigate the employment consequences of private equity buyouts. We find evidence of higher job creation, on average, at the establishments operated by targets of politically connected private equity firms than at those operated by targets of nonconnected private equity firms. Consistent with an exchange of favors story, establishments operated by targets of politically connected private equity firms increase employment more during election years and in states with high levels of corruption. In additional analyses, we provide evidence of specific benefits experienced by target firms from their political connections. Our results are robust to tests designed to mitigate selection concerns.     

Interest-rate exposure and bank mergers

This study examines how interest rates and interest-rate exposures affect the level of acquisition activity, the identities of targets and acquirers, and the pricing of acquisitions in the banking industry. Using a sample of 477 large mergers from 1980 to 1994, we find that the level of acquisition activity is more positively correlated with equity indices and more negatively correlated with interest rates for banks than for non-banks. Although we find that targets and acquirers have significantly different interest-rate exposures, we find little evidence that one group is consistently better or worse positioned, ex post, for various interest-rate environments. Finally, we find some evidence that merger pricing is a function of the interest-rate environment, with acquirers paying higher prices and earning lower returns when rates are low (and when more deals are announced).     

Do different forms of government ownership matter for bank capital behavior? Evidence from China

This study attempts to reconcile the conflicting theoretical predictions regarding how government ownership affects bank capital behaviour. Using a unique Chinese bank dataset over 2006–2015 we find that government-owned banks have higher target capital ratios and adjust these ratios faster compared to private banks, supporting the ‘development/political’ view of the government’s role in banking. This effect is stronger for local government-owned and state enterprise-owned banks than for central government-owned banks. We also find that undercapitalized government-owned banks increase equity while undercapitalized foreign banks contract assets and liabilities as their respective main strategy to adjust their capital ratios.     

Clawbacks and Cronyism: Evidence from China

This paper is the first to examine the long‐term impact on bank lending policy of clawbacks in executive compensation contracts. Using a hand‐gathered database of Chinese business lending, we find evidence of reduced cronyism at the Big Four Chinese banks during the period after the introduction of a clawback program, marking a shift from earlier studies covering earlier time periods that find evidence of widespread cronyism at the Big Four banks. Politically connected borrowers received fewer and smaller loans relative to non‐Big Four banks, consistent with a backlash against cronyism at the Big Four banks. In contrast, we find that cronyism persisted (i.e., politically connected borrowers received more and larger loans) at non‐Big Four Chinese banks where the clawback policy was not effective.     

Partial Anticipation and the Gains to Bank Merger Targets

We design an empirical model to determine the prior probability of a bank becoming an acquisition target. We find that the probability of a bank being acquired is higher for banks that are larger, have a lower return on assets, a higher capital level, more non-performing loans, higher runup in price, a lower market-to-book multiple, a higher core deposit ratio, and a higher loan concentration. The probability is also higher since the passage of the Riegle–Neal Act of 1994. We also examine whether the full gains to target banks are conditioned on the probability of being acquired. We find that the gains to target banks in the one-year pre-announcement period are more pronounced for banks that exhibit high-logit probability characteristics. The gains are large and significant in the short-term announcement period, but not significantly related to the logit probabilities among banks. Our results suggest that the share price adjustment for the characteristics that make some banks more appealing targets appears to be completed in the pre-announcement period. Thus, studies that estimate the gains to targets using only the announcement period are underestimating the gains.     

Ownership and the Value of Political Connections: Evidence from China

Research has found that political connectedness can have both positive and negative effects on firm value. To resolve these mixed findings, we investigate the impact of political ties conditional on ownership for a sample of Chinese firms over the period 1999–2006. We find that private firms with politically connected managers have a higher value and obtain more government subsidies than those without connected managers, whereas local state‐owned enterprises with connected managers have a lower value and employ more surplus labour than those without connected managers. Our results indicate that the effect of political ties is subject to firm ownership.     

Learning by lending

This paper studies bank learning through repeated interactions with borrowers from a new perspective. To understand learning by lending, we adapt a methodology from labor economics to analyze how loan contract terms evolve as banks acquire new information about borrowers. We construct “proxy” variables for this information using data from borrowers’ out-of-sample, future credit performance. Due to the timing of their construction, banks could not have used these variables directly to price loans. We nonetheless find that these proxies increasingly predict loan prices as relationships progress, even after controlling for possible omitted variable bias. Our methodology provides strong evidence that: (a) bank learning affects loan prices, and (b) relationship benefits are heterogeneous. In particular, higher quality borrowers face differentially lower spreads as their relationship with lenders develop – and banks learn about their quality – while lower quality borrowers see loan prices increase and their loan amounts fall. We further find suggestive evidence that banks incorporate CEO-specific information into loan prices.