Excess of the PBO over the ABO and hard pension freezes

This paper examines the role of the excess of the projected benefit obligation (PBO) over the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) in hard pension freezes. Using a sample of 109 firms that announced hard freezes during the period 2003–2008, I find that firms with a larger excess of the PBO over the ABO are more likely to hard freeze their pension plans. Furthermore, I document an average abnormal return of more than 1.2 % on the announcement day for the freeze firms. More importantly, the cumulative abnormal returns around pension freeze announcements are positively associated with the excess of the PBO over the ABO, and this positive association is more pronounced for firms with a higher level of institutional ownership, suggesting that institutional investors are more likely to understand the impact of hard pension freezes on firm value by incorporating pension information disclosed in the footnotes. Overall, this study provides evidence that firms shift away from defined benefit plans through pension freezes, and also highlights the importance of considering the excess of the PBO over the ABO in research on hard pension freezes.     

How does the Funding Status of Defined Benefit Pension Plans Affect Investment Decisions of Firms in the United States?

We investigate whether the flexibility in making contributions towards defined benefit pension plans sponsored by firms in the United States allows managers to save cash and increase investments. Firms invest more at higher levels of pension deficit, defined as pension benefit obligations less pension assets, and scaled by total assets. At the median level (90^th percentile) of pension deficit, investments increase by 6.7 cents (9.4 cents) for every dollar increase in cash. As the pension deficit increases, firms deviate more from the predicted level of investment. These findings suggest that the incremental investments are more likely to represent overinvestment by managers. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and endogeneity concerns that may arise if investments are jointly determined with the funding policy of pension plans and the firm's target cash level. We repeat our main analysis for the United Kingdom and also find for that country that, at a fixed cash level, total investment increases as pension deficit increases.     

Does freezing a defined benefit pension plan affect firm risk?

This paper examines the impact of a defined benefit (DB) pension plan freeze on the sponsoring firm's risk and risk-taking activities. Using a sample of firms declaring a hard freeze on their DB plans between 2002 and 2007, we observe an increase in total risk (proxied by the standard deviation of EBITDA and asset beta), equity risk (standard deviation of returns), and credit risk following a DB-plan freeze. The increase in credit risk is reflected in a decline in credit ratings and an increase in bond yields for freezing firms. When we examine investment strategies, we observe a shift in investment from capital expenditures before the freeze to more-risky R&D projects after the freeze, and an increase in leverage. These strategies (increased focus on R&D and higher leverage) increase the operating and financial risk the firm faces. Overall, we observe an increase in risk-taking following DB plan freezes, consistent with theories that DB plans act as “inside debt” that aligns managers’ interests with bondholders’.     

Pension Contributions and Firm Performance: Evidence from Frozen Defined Benefit Plans

We study the impact of freezing defined benefit (DB) pension plans and replacing them with defined contribution (DC) plans on liquidity, financial leverage, investment, and market value of a sample of firms over 2001‐2008. We find evidence that the pension freeze tends to attenuate the drain on corporate liquidity and relieve the pressure to borrow to pay for mandatory contributions (MCs) associated with underfunded DB plans. Although investors seem to favor the pension freeze as evidenced by positive announcement abnormal stock returns, there is little reliable evidence that the freeze increases investment efficiency and long‐term stock performance.     

Were internal capital markets affected by the ‘perfect’ pension storm?

We examine capital expenditures in multi-segment firms before and after the “perfect storm” that affected pension plans between 2000 and 2002, when bond yields and stock prices both fell precipitously. Our sample of firms went from having overfunded to underfunded pension plans as a result of the storm. We examine the segment-level relation between investment, Tobin's q, and cash flow both before and after the event. We find mixed evidence on the change in the relation between investment and q, which may be a result of measurement error in q. We find stronger evidence for the conclusion that after the pension storm, firms with underfunded pension plans directed more investment towards segments that produce higher cash flow.     

Friends or foes? Target selection decisions of sovereign wealth funds and their consequences

This paper examines investment strategies of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), their effect on target firm valuation, and how both of these are related to SWF transparency. We find that SWFs prefer large and poorly performing firms facing financial difficulties. Their investments have a positive effect on target firms' stock prices around the announcement date but no substantial effect on firm performance and governance in the long run. We also find that transparent SWFs are more likely to invest in financially constrained firms and have a greater impact on target firm value than opaque SWFs. Overall, SWFs are similar to passive institutional investors in their preference for target characteristics and in their effect on target performance, and SWF transparency influences SWFs' investment activities and their impact on target firm value.     

The Value and Risk of Defined Contribution Pension Schemes: International Evidence

We use historical data on investment returns and labor income from 16 countries to quantify the value and risk of defined contribution pension plans, building frequency distributions of pension fund and pension replacement ratios for each country. We show that pension risk is substantial and find that pension fund ratios are lower and less variable than when the correlation between wage growth and investment returns is ignored, typically halving the median pension fund ratio. We also show that an all‐equity fund is the dominant investment strategy across all countries, although sometimes a life‐cycle strategy insures against downside risk.     

The Effect of Regulations on Pension Risk Shifting: Evidence from the US and Europe

This paper provides evidence that pension regulations can incentivize or curb risk shifting in the investment of defined benefit plan assets. We document that in the US, where the pension insurance premium charged by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is largely flat, financially distressed firms with severely underfunded plans shift pension investment risk. We further find that risk shifting is mitigated in the UK after the implementation of risk‐adjusted pension insurance premiums, and in the Netherlands where full pension funding is mandatory. Overall the results in this paper lend support to the view that structural flaws in the US statutory pension insurance scheme incentivize high‐risk sponsors to gamble their pension assets when distress terminations of their plans become foreseeable.     

Human Survival at Older Ages and the Implications for Longevity Bond Pricing

Abstract

Governments are concerned about the future of pension plans, for which increasing longevity is judged to be an important risk to their future viability. We focus on human survival at age 65, the starting age point for many pension products. Using a simple model, we link basic measures of life expectancy to the shape of the human survival function and consider its various forms. The model is then used as the basis for investigating actual survival in England and Wales. We find that life expectancy is increasing at a faster rate than at any time in history, with no evidence of this trend slowing or any upper age limit. With interest growing in the use of longevity bonds as a way to transfer longevity risks from pension providers to the capital markets, we seek to understand how longevity drift affects pension liabilities based on mortality rates at the point of annuitization, versus what actually happens as a cohort ages. The main findings are that longevity bonds are an effective hedge against longevity risk; however, it is not only the oldest old that are driving risk, but also more 65-year-olds reaching less extreme ages such as 80. In addition, we find that the possibility of future inflation and interest rates could be as an important a risk to annuities as longevity itself.     

Managerial ownership dynamics and firm value

From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. We find that managers are more likely to significantly decrease their ownership when their firms are performing well and more likely to increase their ownership when their firms become financially constrained. When controlling for past stock returns, we find that large increases in managerial ownership increase Tobin's q. This result is driven by increases in shares held by officers, while increases in shares held by directors appear unrelated to changes in firm value. There is no evidence that large decreases in ownership have an adverse impact on firm value. We rely on the dynamics of the managerial ownership/firm value relation to mitigate concerns in the literature about the endogeneity of managerial ownership.     

Risk Allocation in Retirement Plans: A Better Solution

The corporate world is reconsidering the cost‐effectiveness of defined benefit pension plans while contemplating a change to defined contribution plans. This article begins by examining the three primary risks faced by sponsors of most DB pension plans—investment risk, interest rate risk, and longevity risk—and shows how shifting these risks to employees through a DC plan would affect both the corporation and the individual. Although DC plans clearly help companies manage risks, they provide at best an incomplete solution for individual participants. This article describes an innovation in pension design—the Retirement Shares Plan (RSP)—that combines many of the best features of DB and DC plans. An RSP provides:

• ? predictable and stable cost to the plan sponsor, with little chance of unfunded liabilities;
• ? lifetime income, guaranteeing that retirees will never outlive their benefits;
• ? a benefit accrual pattern comparable to that of traditional pension plans that preserves value for older, long‐service employees; and
• ? potential inflation protection for retirees.

The RSP accomplishes this by allocating risk to sponsors and individuals differently than either a traditional DB plan or a DC plan. Unlike most DB plans, the RSP shifts investment and interest rate risks from plan sponsors to participants. Unlike DC plans, the RSP keeps longevity risk with the sponsor.     

The decision to terminate overfunded pension plans

This paper examines management's decision to terminate overfunded pension plans. Plan terminations are controversial because they sometimes redistribute pension funds from employee trusts to the firm. This empirical study compares a sample of firms terminating overfunded pension plans with a sample of firms continuing overfunded plans. The examination finds that both business-related and management-related variables help to explain the termination decision. With respect to business-related variables, firms are more likely to terminate overfunded plans that do not include union employees. These firms also tend to be smaller, have tax carryforwards, and have high financial leverage. With respect to management-related variables, termination firms tend to have management compensation plans based on income and high owner control. The results suggest that management motivation to terminate overfunded plans may be increased when the decision will advance the personal interests of managers.     

Threshold Events and Identification: A Study of Cash Shortfalls

Threshold events are discrete events triggered when an observable continuous variable passes a known threshold. We demonstrate how to use threshold events as identification strategies by revisiting the evidence in Rauh (2006, Investment and financing constraints: Evidence from the funding of corporate pension plans, Journal of Finance 61, 33–71) that mandatory pension contributions cause investment declines. Rauh's result stems from heavily underfunded firms that constitute a small fraction of the sample and that differ sharply from the rest of the sample. To alleviate this issue, we use observations near funding thresholds and find causal effects of mandatory contributions on receivables, R&D, and hiring, but not on investment. We also provide useful suggestions and diagnostics for analyzing threshold events.     

ISO certification,financial constraints,and firm performance in Latin American and Caribbean countries

We employ World Bank Enterprise Survey data collected in 2006–2010 for 21,852 firms from 31 Latin American and Caribbean countries to investigate determinants of the adoption of International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certification, the relation between ISO certification and firm financial constraints, and the effect of ISO certification on firm performance. We find that ISO accreditation is positively related to firm size and firm age. Exporters and foreign firms are more likely to adopt ISO certification. We document that ISO-certified firms exhibit significantly lower level of financial constraints and higher labor productivity and lower cost of sales than non-certified firms.     

Predicting corporate governance in emerging markets

This paper investigates what predicts corporate governance in emerging markets. Specifically, we examine what predicts governance changes and the level of governance itself. To conduct this study, we utilize a unique dataset from AllianceBernstein that consists of monthly firm-level corporate governance ratings for 24 emerging market countries for almost seven years. Since the AllianceBernstein ratings are time-series data, they allow us to determine the direction of change in a firm’s corporate governance, and the timing of these changes. Using these data, we find two main results. First, as firms grow they are more likely to improve their governance. Second, the level of political risk where the firm resides is negatively and significantly related to the level of firm governance but positively and significantly related to changes in firm governance. Hence, firm governance is better in countries with lower political risk but firms are more likely to improve their governance in countries with higher political risk.     

Earnings management and the allocation of net periodic pension costs to interim periods

We examine the pattern of reported quarterly net periodic pension costs. Quarterly pension costs are one of the largest single expense items for firms with pension plans (around 15% of income before extraordinary items in our sample). Under ASC 270, net pension costs should be recognized as incurred, or as the benefit provided by the expense is realized. We find that over the period of 2004–2010, there is significant variation in the amount of quarterly pension cost firms report. In addition, we find that income-increasing changes in pension costs are significantly associated with meeting or beating analysts' forecasts in a given quarter. We also show that income-decreasing changes to net periodic pension costs that would cause a firm to miss its earnings forecast are extremely rare. Finally, we find evidence that income-increasing and income-decreasing changes in quarterly pension costs are “settled up” in the fourth quarter (e.g., they are reversed).     

Options trading activity and firm valuation

Options may have an effect on firm value because they help complete markets and stimulate informed trades. However, these benefits are likely to manifest themselves in active, rather than inactive, options markets. Supporting this observation, we find that firms with more options trading have higher values of Tobin's q, after accounting for other determinants of value. Corporate investment in firms with greater options trading is more sensitive to stock prices. Options trading affects firm valuation more strongly in stocks with greater information asymmetry. These results indicate that options trading is positively associated with firm values as well as information production.     

The impact of cash flows and firm size on investment: The international evidence

This paper examines the degree to which cash flow availability influences firm investment in six OECD countries. In particular, we are interested in the extent to which the reliance on internal funds is affected by firm size, since there is general agreement that smaller firms have less access to external capital markets and, thus, should be more affected by the availability of internal funds. Earlier work has concluded that the documented positive relationship between cash flow and investment is evidence of the existence of financial constraints. We first examine all firms, regardless of size, in each country, and we find that the amount of corporate investment is affected by internal resources in all six countries; that is, internal financing affects firm investment. We then repeat the analysis segmenting the sample using three measures of firm size. Contrary to our a priori expectations, we find that the cash flow-investment sensitivity is generally highest in the large firm size group and smallest in the small firm size group. We deduce that the explanations for these findings are grounded in managerial agency considerations, and in the greater flexibility enjoyed by large firms in timing their investments. Thus, we conclude that the degree of sensitivity of a firm's investments to its cash flows cannot be interpreted as an accurate measure of its access to capital markets (as do Kaplan, S., Zingales, L., 1997. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 169–215), since small firms are known to have less access to external markets.     

Leverage and investment in diversified firms

Within diversified firms, the negative impact of leverage on investment is significantly greater for high q than for low q segments and significantly greater for non-core than for core segments. This differs substantially from focused firms and is consistent with the view that diversified firms allocate a disproportionate share of their debt service burden to their higher q and non-core segments. We also find that, among low-growth firms, the positive relation between leverage and firm value is significantly weaker in diversified firms than in focused firms. We conclude that the disciplinary benefits of debt are partially offset by the additional managerial discretion in allocating debt service that is provided by the diversified organizational structure.     

Downside Risk Management of a Defined Benefit Plan Considering Longevity Basis Risk

To control downside risk of a defined benefit pension plan arising from unexpected mortality improvements and severe market turbulence, this article proposes an optimization model by imposing two conditional value at risk constraints to control tail risks of pension funding status and total pension costs. With this setup, we further examine two longevity risk hedging strategies subject to basis risk. While the existing literature suggests that the excess-risk hedging strategy is more attractive than the ground-up hedging strategy as the latter is more capital intensive and expensive, our numerical examples show that the excess-risk hedging strategy is much more vulnerable to longevity basis risk, which limits its applications for pension longevity risk management. Hence, our findings provide important insight on the effect of basis risk on longevity hedging strategies.