论团体贷款对信贷市场低效率的可能改进

团体贷款以其骄人的还款率和在扶贫方面的突出表现吸引了众多经济学家和政策制定者的目光。但是 ,现有研究更多的是从不同角度来解释并不需要抵押或担保的团体贷款的还款率为何如此高 ,而忽视了团体贷款与个人贷款的效率的比较。对于“团体贷款的效率是否比个人贷款的效率更高 ?”和“团体贷款对信贷市场中的低效率问题有无改进以及是如何改进的 ?”等重要问题的回答构成了该研究领域中的核心内容。     

Foreign Aid as Prize: Incentives for a Pro-Poor Policy

The authors develop a theoretical model of foreign aid to analyze a method of disbursement of aid which induces the recipient government to follow a more pro-poor policy than it otherwise would do. In their two-period model, aid is given in the second period and the volume of it depends on the level of well-being of the target group in the first period. They find that this way of designing aid does increase the welfare of the poor. They also consider the situations where the donor and the recipient governments act simultaneously as well as sequentially, and they find that, by moving first in a sequential game, the donor country can, under certain conditions, increase the welfare of the poor and that of its own country compared to the case of simultaneous moves.     

IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device

A theoretical model is developed in which both buybacks and the adoption of an IMF programme can be used as screening devices which enable a creditor to discriminate between debtor countries which are willing to use debt relief in order to invest and repay and countries which are not. Asymmetric information is assumed. This problem can be solved if the country has sufficient resources to engage in a debt buyback and so gain the debt relief. When the country is credit constrained, an alternative screening mechanism is to undertake an IMF programme in return for debt reduction and possibly an IMF loan.     

Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device

We analyse the decision of an agent with time-inconsistent preferences to consume a good that exerts an externality on future welfare. The extent of the externality is initially unknown, but may be learned via a costless sampling procedure. We show that when the agent cannot commit to future consumption and learning decisions, incomplete learning may occur on a Markov perfect equilibrium path of the resulting intra-personal game. In such a case, each agent's incarnation stops learning for some values of the posterior distribution of beliefs and acts under self-restricted information. This conduct is interpreted as strategic ignorance. All equilibria featuring this property strictly Pareto dominate the complete learning equilibrium for any posterior distribution of beliefs.     

Barter Trading as a Microeconomics Teaching Device

Karpoff reports on a “barter trading game” in which students exchanged real goods over a period of seven weeks with different market constraints imposed each week. Student comments about the exercise were favorable.     

组织激励与知识员工的信息产出

本文以知识属性为组织激励效果的调节变量,即当个体对知识属性的认知不同时,外生激励促进个体产生知识转移的内生动机的效果不同。以江苏省两家大型商业银行信贷部门员工为对象的实证研究（N=307）支持了本文的假设。本文为冯帆、廖飞和杨忠（2007）的理论模型提供了实证依据。     

Cournot Duopoly With Multi-period Competition: Inventory as a Coordination Device

This paper analyses a Cournot duopoly model with finitely repeated competition. Each firm is allowed to hold inventories for a period. When there are more than two periods, inventory-holdings encourage firms to take collusive actions. By holding large inventories, a firm can commit to large sales in the next period, giving inventories a strategic value. When a firm deviates from collusion, the strategic value of inventories allows the non-defecting firm to become the Stackelberg leader in future markets, forcing the defecting firm to become the Stackelberg follower. Collusive sales can be attained with this threat of punishment.     

Dynamic bilateral bargaining under private information with a sequence of potential buyers

A seller owning a single, indivisible asset faces the random arrival of privately informed buyers, with whom he can bargain sequentially. Our key result is that despite the arrival of alternative buyers the Coase conjecture continues to hold under stationary strategies if the distribution of buyer valuations has convex support: Negotiations end almost immediately and the asset is sold almost at the minimum of the seller's own reservation value and the lowest possible valuation of a buyer. We also show existence of multiple stationary equilibria, though, in the special case where the support of buyers' valuations exhibits a sufficiently large “interior gap”. Taken together, our findings thus also point to a potential pitfall when analyzing only two-type distributions in more applied work.     

Dynamic Incentive Contracts under No-Commitment to Periodic Auditing and a Non-retrospective Penalty System

This paper generalizes Khalil’s (1997) static model to a multiperiod one. The associated optimal dynamic contracts are derived and analyzed. At every-period’s equilibrium, the principal conducts no sure auditing. While duplication of the Baron-Myerson-type (1982) contract cannot be optimal, duplication of the Khalil-type (1997) contract can be optimal when the cheating penalty is large or discount factors are small. This implies that static contracts with no-commitment to auditing can describe players’ long-run behavior only under specific conditions. Moreover, our separating and pooling equilibria are compared with Baron and Besanko’s (1984a) and Laffont and Tirole’s (1987) equilibria, respectively.     

Institutional Design as a Commitment Device in Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information: Experimental Evidence

The aim of this experiment is to test the role of institutional design in credit markets as a commitment device against renegotiation: when there is asymmetric information does a lower degree of centralization enhance efficiency? Does decentralization alleviate the adverse selection problem in credit markets? We run a large‐scale computerized experiment involving 12 different data sets and 3 different uncertainty scenarios on a sample of 120 subjects. The results obtained confirm the superiority of a decentralized institutional framework: the number of poor projects undertaken in a decentralized market was significantly smaller than the number of poor projects undertaken in centralized markets in all the scenarios. This experimental evidence shows that the institutional design is crucial in seeking financial discipline and therefore can shed some light on the debate on ‘Anglo‐Saxon’ versus ‘German–Japanese’ credit practices. (J.E.L.: C90, D82, G21, L10).     

Ecological-economic viability as a criterion of strong sustainability under uncertainty

Strong sustainability, according to the common definition, requires that different natural and economic capital stocks be maintained as physical quantities separately. Yet, in a world of uncertainty this cannot be guaranteed. To therefore define strong sustainability under uncertainty in an operational manner we propose to use the concept of viability. Viability means that the different components and functions of a dynamic, stochastic system at any time remain in a domain where the future existence of these components and functions is guaranteed with sufficiently high probability. We develop a unifying and general ecological-economic concept of viability that encompasses the traditional ecological and economic notions of viability as special cases. It provides an operational criterion of strong sustainability under a mild form of uncertainty and for medium spatial and temporal scales. We illustrate this concept and demonstrate its usefulness by applying it to livestock grazing management in semi-arid rangelands.     

Imprecise probabilistic beliefs as a context for decision-making under ambiguity

Coherent imprecise probabilistic beliefs are modeled as incomplete comparative likelihood relations admitting a multiple-prior representation. Under a structural assumption of Equidivisibility, we provide an axiomatization of such relations and show uniqueness of the representation. In the second part of the paper, we formulate a behaviorally general “Likelihood Compatibility” axiom relating preferences and probabilistic beliefs and characterize its implications for the class of “invariant biseparable” preferences that includes the MEU and CEU models among others.     

战略群组视角下产业政策对行业结构的影响——以中国房地产业限购限贷等政策为例

从战略群组的视角出发,以中国房地产业为研究对象,以2009—2013年131家房地产业上市公司为样本,实证分析了房地产业的限购限贷等产业政策对行业结构的影响。结果如下:消极的产业政策会导致行业中战略群组数量增大、群组成员企业数量发生变化;消极的产业政策使战略群组的匹配率降低、移动率变化率加大、稳定率下降;消极的产业政策使企业与本战略群组中心的战略距离变小。研究结果表明,产业政策是行业结构变化的主要原因。在此基础上,对企业管理和政府政策制定提出了建议。     

跨文化交际背景下对外汉语教学中民间谚语问题

民间谚语超越了一般意义上的语言范畴而深入到一个民族的历史与文化层面,它凝结着丰富的民族历史、生活经验、文化理念、审美情趣、集体无意识等等形而上的内涵。民间谚语在对外汉语教学中,与其说是语言问题,不如说是如何理解一个民族特定的历史与文化的问题。把民间谚语分为不同的层次,由易而难透过字面,体会文化;通过形而下,到达形而上,应当是对外民间谚语教学的基本途径。     

作为战略群体的企业家--一位德国学者关于中国私营企业家社会与政治功能的研究

改革开放以来 ,随着中国社会主义市场经济体制的逐步建立和完善 ,转型过程中企业家的作用日益凸显 ,越来越多的学者关注、重视并直接致力于这一课题的研究 ,相关著作和理论成果层出不穷。由德国著名中国问题研究专家、杜伊斯堡大学政治学研究所和东亚研究所所长、前德中友协主席托马斯·海贝勒教授撰写的《作为战略群体的企业家》(中央编译出版社 2 0 0 3年出版 ) ,堪称这一研究领域的国际前沿性著作。作者以自己对中国近 30年的了解、理解、感知和经验认识为基础 ,从一个欧洲学者的视角出发 ,将理论与实际、定量与定性、多学科交叉综合的研…     

城乡统筹背景下的农民工养老保险模式设计

农民工问题是实现城乡统筹的重要突破口之一,而农民工养老保险模式能否适应城乡统筹发展,这是问题的关键所在。目前部分省市试行的农民工养老保险制度带有明显的地域性、封闭性和过渡性。为此,文章以城乡统筹为背景对现有农民工养老保险模式进行分析,然后在精算分析的基础上提出了相应的设计方案与建议。     

战略群组视角下消极产业政策对行业和群组绩效的影响——以房地产业的限购限贷等政策为例

以2010年限购限贷等消极产业政策为分析节点,运用2009—2013年中国131家房地产业上市公司的数据,利用配对t检验统计分析方法,研究了产业政策对行业绩效和战略群组绩效的影响。结果显示:消极的产业政策使行业整体绩效变差,但这种影响具有一定的滞后性;消极的产业政策使战略群组的稳定率下降;具有不同稳定率的战略群组具有不同的绩效,高(低)稳定率战略群组的企业平均绩效高(低);消极产业政策对高稳定率群组绩效的影响小于低稳定率群组。