交易、交易费用与银企关系的合约选择

从现代制度经济学的理论出发 ,银企关系的实质应是交易关系 ,银企交易关系的形成可从货币金融领域的社会分工和产权界定中得到说明。银企交易关系之间 ,存在交易费用 ,而为了减少交易费用 ,银企交易也会选择不同的合约安排。从制度经济学的理论来看 ,市场治理型的合约关系应是使银企交易费用最小的合约安排。     

从银企关系看内控治理

企业远远没有最大限度地通过内部控制监督过程来整合内部控制和公司治理目标,企业的内部控制过程将伴随银行商业化进程体现出不同的含义。我国商业银行由政府型到企业型转变,其商业化进程是不可逆转的,由于国家对金融业长期的过度管制以及金融市场不发达,中国银行业的商业化进程尚有很长的路要走。企业与银行之间的关系管理是银行商业化进程和企业长期发展的前提,建立长期的良性互动关系不但能保证企业融资渠道的畅通,对企业的内部控制和治理结构也将产生重要影响。     

从中小银行与中小企业依存关系看中小银企共赢

中小银行是一个相对的、发展的概念,不同国家或同一国家在不同时期对中小银行的界定都各有不同。本文中的中小银行是指在宏观调控能力、资产负债规模、信用担保体系、网络覆盖范围、机构整体机能以及服务手段、社会地位等方面都明显低于国有大银行和全国性股份制商业银行的区域性股份制商业银行、城市商业银行、城乡信用合作社等。     

交易费用与吸引FDI

中国是当今世界吸引外商直接投资（FDI）最多的发展中国家。从交易费用角度看,中国之所以能吸51大量FDI,一是因中国在同外资缔结契约的环节中存在着吸引外资的较低交易费用;二是因国有企业资产专用性、国有企业代理成本与产权缺陷导致的中国国有企业为降低交易费用而进行的改革也吸引了外资流入。     

供应链管理与交易费用

供应链管理是一个正在迅速发展的学科,它为我们理解企业是用何种方式进行组织及在不同组织结构下做到提高效率提供了许多视角。供应链管理是一个跨学科的概念,在许多专业中都有运用,例如:市场学,经济学,逻辑学。本文叙述了交易费用(TCA)的起源与发展,并解释了该框架中的关键概念。并讨论交易费用对科层及供应链管理的潜在影响。     

从创始人控制权看公司治理相关问题

控制权是公司治理的核心问题之一。本文从公司治理的相关理论和原则入手,分析了控制权的相关表现形式,进而探讨了公司创始人掌握控制权的方式,即基于股权层面、基于董事会层面以及基于经营管理层面的控制权以及相关案例借鉴。     

通过关系营销建立新型的银企关系

国有商业银行银企关系是其形成竞争优势的重要资源,银企关系的塑造是企业文化的一部分,国有商业银行应将巩固优质客户群作为一项长期的战略.目前我国银企关系存在的主要问题是由于目标市场细分不够、有效益的客户群的不稳定以及仍不能避免的行政干预使银企关系不够正常,这些问题主要依靠国有商业银行制定和实施全面的关系营销战略予以解决.其侧重点包括:以客户需求为导向,树立质量、服务和营销融为一体的关系营销观念;科学地进行目标市场选择和定位;完整制定和全面实施关系营销战略;建立和完善营销组织机构,培养高素质的员工队伍.     

PUBLIC ENTERPRISE: THE NEXUS BETWEEN ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL

An appropriate control framework for public corporations must reflect the distinctive organizational features of this policy instrument. There are circumstances where it is desirable to undertake public production, and to do so through a corporate structure. But the advantages of public production are unlikely to be realized where the control system involves a contractual-type arrangement between the government and the public firm. Alternatively, too close direction may undermine the advantages of using a corporation rather than a government department. Both current discussion and current practice reveal an inadequate appreciation of the nexus between organization and control.     

BANK OF AMERICA ROUNDTABLE ON THE LINK BETWEEN CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE

A number of popular business magazines have recently run cover stories describing the “return of leverage.” Although full of interesting details about individual leveraged deals and the investment bankers who put them together, they are largely silent on several issues of economic importance: Why is this happening now? What are the most important benefits as well as costs of debt financing? Is there such a thing as a value-maximizing, or “optimal,” capital structure for public corporations? No financial economist has thought and written as much about corporate capital structure and its relationship to shareholder value and corporate governance as Harvard professor Michael Jensen. The first economist to see the value-adding potential of LBOs in the 1980s, he was also the first to identify the source of the problems with the late-'80s deals. In this roundtable discussion, Professor Jensen explores the “real” effects of corporate financial policies on managerial decision-making and shareholder value with a distinguished group of corporate executives and financial advisors.     

THE COST OF MUTUAL FUND DISTRIBUTION FEES

Many individuals purchase shares in mutual funds as investments. With a lack of evidence supporting performance persistence in fund returns, investors should consider expenses as a fund-selection tool since fund expenses have a negative effect on fund returns. One of the largest expenses incurred by fund investors is distribution expenses, which include both load charges and annual fees. Close to two-thirds of all equity funds charge investors for fund distribution. The true cost of these distribution fees to investors is hard to measure because a myriad of distribution arrangements have evolved that vary both the timing and magnitude of distribution charges. We derive a simple methodology that expresses the present value of distribution costs as a percentage of the original investment in fund shares for any expected holding period. This methodology allows direct comparison of the effect on investors of distribution fees for mutual funds with different types of sales arrangements.     

德国银行在企业控制与管理中的作用及其借鉴

银行贷款是德国企业最重要的外部资金来源,银行向企业董事会选派代表,同时,德国银行还可以代表小股东行使代理投票权。通过这些方式,德国银行与企业形成了密切的合作关系,银行不仅参与企业的管理,而且在企业的控制和管理中发挥了非常重要的作用。德国这种密切的银企关系不仅使企业能够获得长期、稳定的贷款,而且能够缓解政策性波动对企业经营活动可能带来的影响,促进经济的稳定发展。学习德国这方面的经验,建立密切的银企关系,有利于解决我国企业融资困难的问题,充分发挥银行对企业经营活动的监督管理作用,减轻政策波动对经济发展的影响。     

企业激励理论与国有商业银行内部收入分配制度改革

本文依据有关企业激励理论,结合国有商业银行的实际情况,对国有商业银行现阶段的收入分配政策改革进行了探讨.首先通过对企业内部激励理论和经理股票期权激励制度的概述分析,总结出市场经济条件下企业制定激励手段的主要特点.其次,对国有商业银行内部激励机制形成条件和当前收入分配方式进行了简要说明,在此基础上提出国有商业银行现阶段建立科学、有效的收入分配制度需要解决的两个问题.最后基于内、外部制约条件分析,提出了收入分配改革的基本原则,并引入"内部账户"概念,设计了一套现阶段国有商业银行内部收入分配制度改革的具体实施方案.