审计治腐改革初探

国家审计在反腐方面具有专业性、主动性和预见性等优势。发挥审计治腐的“利剑”功能,有利于完善对腐败的惩防体系。审计机关应当改革治腐理念,实施查防并举、强化审计建议、实施整体治腐,通过加强权力型治腐主体间、权利型治腐主体间以及它们相互间的协作,来整合治腐主体,通过强化审计鉴证、优化审计建议、完善审计移送、推进审计公告来改革治腐方式。     

审计治腐改革初探

国家审计在反腐方面具有专业性、主动性和预见性等优势。发挥审计治腐的"利剑"功能,有利于完善对腐败的惩防体系。审计机关应当改革治腐理念,实施查防并举、强化审计建议、实施整体治腐,通过加强权力型治腐主体间、权利型治腐主体间以及它们相互间的协作,来整合治腐主体,通过强化审计鉴证、优化审计建议、完善审计移送、推进审计公告来改革治腐方式。     

加强审计监督深化源头治腐的思考

纵观近几年审计查处的各类经济腐败典型案例,分析那些腐败者堕落的轨迹,无一不是因“小”积“大”,随着“一次次得手”、“一回回甜头”而贪欲膨胀,最终跌入犯罪的深渊。之所以这样,究其根源：一是放松了学习,没有时刻绷紧反腐倡廉这根弦;二是权力过于集中,使腐败份子有可乘之机;三是监督乏力,没有从源头上及时遏止腐败现象的滋生蔓延。     

经济责任审计促进源头治腐制度化

领导干部不廉洁和腐败问题，主要发生在经济方面。深化经济责任审计，对于治理经济工作中的腐败，具有十分重要的作用和明显的效果。     

依法审计 任重道远

回顾刚刚过去的１９９９年,我市各级审计机关在打假治乱、维护财经秩序、促进廉政建设等方面取得了突出成绩。全年共查处各类违纪金额２８２５３万元,收缴财政２５６６万元,查处“三乱”３７７起,处理处罚金额３１１万元。查出各种小金库、账外账２３３个、涉及金额２５４...     

依法审计之我见

依法审计就是审计专职机构和人员,依照法规对被审计单位的财政、财务收支及其有关经济活动的真实性、合法性和效益性进行审查,评价经济责任,用以维护财经法纪,改善经营管理,提高经济效益,独立行使审计监督权的活动。 　　江总书记在党的十五大报告中提出：“依法治国是党领导人民治理国家的基本方略”。还指出：“一切政府机关必须依法行政。”九届全国人大二次会议通过的宪法修正规定：“中华人民共和国实行依法治国,建设社会主义法治国家”。依法治国的基本要求就是党领导人民当家作主,带领人民制定法律,把人民的意愿变成国家的…     

依法审计 服务大局

依法治国、依法行政是文明社会发展的方向。十八大将依法治国方略提到了新高度。2月23日,习近平总书记再次丰富了其内涵:坚持依法治国、依法执政、依法行政共同推进,坚持法治国家、法治政府、法治社会一体建设,不断开创依法治国新局面。通过第四届全市领导干部学习班的学习和交流,并联系到工作实际,笔者更加深刻领会到了党中央在法治建设上的思想高度。     

依法审计 服务大局

江泽民总书记在党的第十五次全国代表大会上明确提出“依法治国”的基本方略。因此审计人员必须牢固树立依法审计的基本原则,不管在任何情况下,都要坚定不移地依法履行职责,把审计监督纳入依法治国的大环境。同时,审计机关作为国家综合经济监督部门,只有用“三个代表”的重要思想总揽审计工作大局。才能牢固树立政治意识,大局意识,     

谈依法审计

依法审计,是《审计法》的基本原则之一。《审计法》第三条明确规定:“审计机关依照法律规定的职权和程序,进行审计监督”。这就要求审计机关的审计人员要在法定职权范围内依照法定程序执法。由于审计机关是代表国家的执法者,审计监督是国家综合性的经济监督,它属于宏观调控体系的重要组成部分,任何违法或不当行为都可能带来严重后果。《审计法》及其《实施条例》从领导、审计组、审计人员的每个环节都比较明确地规定了责任和权力,相互之间形成一种制约的内部控制机制;同时从制定审计工作计划、编制审计工作方案、送达审计通知书、审计取证、…     

浅谈财政财务收支审计的重要环节

财政财务收支审计是《审计法》赋予国家审计机关对行政事业单位实施审计监督的权力。根据多次的审计实践．笔者认为做好财政财务收支审计应把握以下三个重要环节。     

审计是我国金融系统健康运行的重要保证

在现代经济中,金融是经济运行的中心.缺乏一个健康运行的金融系统而经济能顺利发展是不可想象的.     

Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary

This note reports part of a larger study of “petty corruption“ by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are “socially efficient”, and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureaucrats’ bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.     

Personnel administration and the will to manage

How many personnel managers start with a will to manage and unremittingly stay with it? How many give up, and retreat to the personnel technology of recordkeeping and filling out forms? Advances in the behavioral sciences and new conceptions of the personnel manager's role allow us to redefine the personnel job–all we need is more of the will to manage.     

Social welfare,corruption and credibility

Abstract

Economic development requires that investments by entrepreneurs are not subject to expropriation by government. Unfortunately, public agencies often serve as the instruments by which political elites engage in corruption and extracting rents from the economy. The question is how to design institutions that credibly commit to a stable system of guarantees of property rights and contract enforcement.

Principal agent theory and the new public management favor greater accountability of public managers to elected officials or eliminating public agencies through privatization. We argue for institutional designs that provide a degree of public agency autonomy. We show that public agency autonomy is a by-product of the competition between elites in democracies with multiple veto players. We show that transparency, professionalism, and legality help ensure that public managers do not engage in rent-extraction. The institutional design problem is how to induce public managers to serve the public interest without being fully responsive to elected political officials.     

立足于现场管理,构建系统的企业管理体系

我国国有企业管理的重心,往往是围绕着国家的企业政策展开,而不是立足于本企业实际情况,进行系统化的管理,尤其是由于基础管理中的现场管理落后,严重制约其他管理的提升。如何解决这些问题,文章从理论与实践两方面提出了建设性意见。     

审计委员会女性董事、事务所声誉与审计定价

文章以2011-2013年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,考察审计委员会女性董事、事务所声誉以及二者之间的交互作用对审计定价的影响。研究结果表明,审计委员会女性董事与审计定价之间存在负相关关系,国际"四大"与审计定价之间存在正相关关系,审计委员会女性董事削弱了国际"四大"与审计定价之间的正相关关系。进一步研究发现,审计委员会女性董事和事务所声誉两者之间的交互作用对审计定价的影响在非国有控股公司中更为显著。     

The plough,gender roles,and corruption

Cross-country empirical studies of corruption using ordinary least squares commonly find that nations in which women play a greater role in economic and public life suffer less corruption. This has been a controversial finding since measures of women’s participation in the economy and politics are likely endogenous. This study uses an aspect of national ancestral geography as a novel instrumental variable in the estimation of the true causal effects of gender upon corruption. It thereby finds that ordinary least squares estimates of the effects of gender upon corruption are biased. This conclusion is upheld in time-series fixed-effects estimation.     

Using Quick Response to manage the material flow

The long-awaited "paperless society" now truly appears to be within our grasp. Quick Response will reduce the mounds of paper on which we depend and minimise the time and expense needed to satisfy customers' demands/requirements. Quick Response will accomplish this while keeping inventory level at a minimum. Quick Response will significantly increase the bottom line.     

Deforestation, corruption, and private ownership in the forest sector

One of the remedies launched in combating corruption in the forest sector is privatization of state forests (and private forest ownership). We hypothesized that privatization could reduce deforestation through reducing corruption. We found a statistically significant strong positive relation between corruption and deforestation for the period between 1995 and 2008 by using two different corruption indices and panel data, a highly statistically significant negative correlation between private forest ownership and corruption across countries by using univariate and multivariate models for three different corruption indices, and a highly statistically significant negative correlation between private forest ownership and deforestation across countries by using univariate and multivariate models.