WORLD OUTLOOK

The rise in the oil price since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in early August does not radically alter prospects for the world economy; rather it exacerbates existing trends. The US economy was, in any case, heading towards recession and a sizeable overshoot of its budget deficit targets. Japan, especially, but also continental Europe had still not reached the peak of the economic cycle so that inflation and interest rates were still rising. While the higher oil price adds to costs and prices in all countries, the policy response is unlikely to be unborn. In the US the adverse effects on output are being emphasized while elsewhere the inflationary implications are to the fore. In Japan, where acute labour shortages are emerging, the monetary authorities have already raised interest rates and we expect a similar response from the Bunds bank In the US such a move is unlikely; indeed once an agreement on the budget deficit is obtained between President and Congress, we would effect the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates. Despite this view on policy, the forecast offers little prospect of the US avoiding a pronounced slowdown and takes a gloomy view on US growth in the medium term. In Japan and Germany on the other hand the short-term inflation outlook appears containable and growth prospects over the medium term robust. The central forecast is based on a $25 oil price; we explore in a simulation what might happen if the price rose to $45 a barrel for a limited period.     

POST-BUDGET ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS OF OIL PRICE CHANGES

In this Forecast Release we update our February forecast to take account of the Budget and other new information, particularly about oil prices and the exchange rate. This updated forecast is then used as the basis for a set of three simulations in which we explore the consequences of lower oil prices, a fall in the exchange rate and a tightening of fical and monetary policy. The main conclusions are first that the Budget (the contentr of which we broadly anticipated) has not significantly changed our assessment of the short-term prospects for output and inflation. However, a detailed examination of the Government's revenue and expenditure estimates suggests that fiscal policy in 1983-4, though broadly in line with the Medium-Term Financial Strategy, has been loosened compared with 1982-3 by rather more than appears from the PSBR projections. We ako believe that there is a risk that the PSBR will be significantly higher than officially forecast in 1983-4.
Our simulations show the size of the PSBR overshoot in the event of a further sharp fall in the oil price. I f this were accompanied by a fall in the exchange rate, inflation would quickly be back in double figures. Whether the exchange rate falls or not a lower oil price gives significant output gains. However, if the authorities reacted by tightening fiscal and monetary policy, inflation would be broadly the same as in the Post Budget forecast, but there would still be output gains from the lower oil price.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

This forecast release examines the latest monthly indicators. In general they are in line with the detailed forecast published in February; retail sales have recovered from the fall in 1977 and price inflation is firmly in single figures, whilst output is showing only slight signs of recovery. The most disturbing indications are for money supply and the exchange rate. Monetary growth has been above the limit and the exchange rate has drifted in a manner that we did not expect until later this year. These indicators are related and give a clear warning for the Budget strategy. Unless the rate of monetary growth is brought back below 12 per cent it will not be possible to maintain a stable exchange rate. The target of maintaining single-figure inflation would then be virtually impossible.     

The Dollar, the Oil Price and Policy Divergence

There is currently a clear divergence of policy between the United States, Japan and Germany. With the US in recession and concern growing over the severity of the slump, interest rates have been cut in a move to revive the economy. In contrast Japan and Germany are both experiencing strong growth and monetary policy remains tight to combat inflation. This divergence was seen most clearly when the Federal Reserve Board lowered its discount rate to 6 per cent on 1 February, the day after the Bundesbank had raised its Lombard rate to 9 per cent. With G7 increasingly concerned about domestic factors, less emphasis is placed upon stable exchange rates and as a result the dollar is at an all-time low. The last two G7 communiqués have stressed ‘stability oriented monetary policies’, an ambiguous phrase which fails to define ‘stability’ either in terms of exchange rates, inflation or growth. Thus both the German and Japanese policy of high interest rates to reduce inflation and low US interest rates aimed at stimulating the economy can be termed as ‘stability oriented’. This analysis focuses on these divergent policy responses in two alternative scenarios to the world forecast we presented last month. The first scenario considers what might happen if the Federal Reserve Board were to stimulate the US economy by further cuts in interest rates, whilst Japanese and German rates were unchanged in the face of inflationary pressures. This case may be relevant if the recent US loosening of monetary policy is not sufficient to encourage growth because of a ‘credit crunch’, so that a more expansionary policy is required by the Fed. As a consequence, policy diverges further and the dollar weakens. The second scenario focuses upon a reduction in inflationary pressures in Japan and Germany brought about by an oil price fall. In this case we assume that US policy is already loose enough to avoid a prolonged recession, but that German and Japanese monetary policy is relaxed as inflationary forces recede. In this case policies converge. Each scenario thus concentrates on one of !he two features which are causing the policy divergence amongst G3 countries: recession in the US, inflation in Germany and Japan.     

Quasi ex-ante inflation forecast uncertainty

We propose a measure of the effects of monetary policy based on an analysis of the distribution of the ex-post inflation forecast uncertainty. We argue that the difference between the distributions of the ex-ante and ex-post uncertainties reflects the impact of monetary policy decisions. Using the theoretical background of the New Keynesian model with imperfect information and a monetary policy rule, we derive a proxy for ex-ante inflation uncertainty called quasi ex-ante forecast uncertainty, which is free to a certain extent of the effects of monetary policy decisions. Furthermore, we introduce the compound strength measure of monetary policy, as well as the uncertainty ratio, which approximates the impact of monetary policy on the reduction of the inflation forecast uncertainty. Our empirical results show that the greatest policy effect in reducing the inflation forecast uncertainty occurs for countries which conduct either a well-established or a relatively pure inflation targeting policy.     

Monetary policy in open economies: Practical perspectives for pragmatic central bankers

This paper reviews and interprets some of the key policy implications that flow from a class of DSGE models for optimal monetary policy in the open economy. The framework suggests that good macroeconomic outcomes in open economies are possible by focusing inflation targeting that is implemented by a Taylor type rule, a rule that in equilibrium is reflected in the exchange rate as an asset price. Optimal monetary policy will not be able deliver a stationary (‘stable’) nominal exchange rate – let alone a fixed exchange rate or one that remains inside a target zone – because, absent a commitment device, optimal monetary can’t deliver a stationary domestic price level. Another feature in the data for inflation targeting countries that is consistent with monetary policy via Taylor type rule is that it will tend push the nominal exchange rate in the opposite direction from PPP in response to an ‘inflation’ shock—the ‘bad news god news’ result of Clarida and Waldman (2008. Is Bad News about Inflation Good News for the Exchange Rate. In: John Campbell, (Ed.), Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press), Clarida and Waldman (2014. Bad News About Inflation is Good News for the Nominal Exchange Rate Under Optimal Monetary Policy: DSGE Theory and a Decade of Empirical Evidence). This is so even though in the long run of these models the nominal exchange rate must in expectation obey PPP.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Last year saw the most coordinated cyclical upturn in the world economy since the early I970s, with OECD output rising 4per cent, industrial production and world trade even more rapidly. The boom in demand, which followed five years of continuous expansion, has outstripped supply and prices have begun to accelerate. To tackle inflation, the G7 monetary authorities have tightened policy over the last year, reversing the short-lived drop in interest rates necessitated by the stock market crash. This tightening may have to go further, especially in Germany and Japan where the effects of a rising oil price and higher indirect taxes are being exacerbated by currency depreciation. Although the rise in interest rates came too late to stop inflation rising, it has beet pursued with sufficient vigour to prevent inflation from seriously breaching the 5 per cent level. It is on these grounds that we forecast a relatively soft lending for the world economy on output, with growth continuing at 2.5–3per cent, accompanied by a limited reduction in inflation which stays in the 4–5per cent range. Progress on current account balances is also likely to be sluggish: in the absence of a serious attack on the budget deficit, the US deficit is likely to stay in the region of $140bn a year.     

Does trade integration alter monetary policy transmission?

This paper explores the role of trade integration—or openness—for monetary policy transmission in a medium-scale new Keynesian model. Allowing for strategic complementarities in price setting, we highlight a new dimension of the exchange rate channel by which monetary policy directly impacts domestic inflation: a monetary contraction which appreciates the exchange rate lowers the local currency price of imported goods; this, in turn, induces domestic producers to lower their prices too. We pin down key parameters of the model by matching impulse responses obtained from a vector autoregression on time series for the US relative to the euro area. Our estimation procedure yields plausible parameter values and suggests a strong role for strategic complementarities. Counterfactual simulations show that openness alters monetary transmission significantly. While the contractionary effect of a monetary policy shock on inflation and output tends to increase in openness, we find that monetary policy's control over inflation increases, as the output decline which is necessary to bring about a given reduction of inflation is smaller in more open economies.     

Forecast Release

Although the Chancellor did not say in so many words precisely what lay behind his thinking on the Budget, the implicit message was clear. His aim was to rebalance fiscal and monetary policy, tightening the former so that the monetary relaxation that we have already had does not have to be quickly reversed. In so doing, he has increased the chances that interest rates can stay lower for longer than would have been the case if he had not acted on the PSBR. The reaction of the foreign exchanges critical but again the Budget makes it more likely that the devaluation of the pound since last September can be made one off, not the precursor to a prolonged downward float. This is a necessary condition for a 'successful' devaluation, but it is not sufficient: the wage response is also critical. High unemployment is helpful in this respect, though it has not stopped us frittering away the benefits of previous devaluations. Our February forecast was pessimistic on the UK's ability to hold onto the competitive advantage that devaluation brings; the Budget, while short on monetary underpinning, increases the odds in favour of a more optimistic outturn.     

Inflation targeting in Canada: Experience and lessons

In 1991, the Canadian government and the Bank of Canada agreed on targets for inflation reduction. The major lesson that we at the Bank of Canada draw from our experience with inflation control since then is related to the advantages of establishing a credible anchor for monetary policy by focusing on the predictability of inflation. Overall, it became increasingly evident through the last decade that the inflation target deals with expectational problems. It promotes a much greater degree of confidence and understanding than monetary targets or a vaguely expressed desire for price stability ever did.     

通货膨胀目标制:加拿大银行的政策实践与启示

在加拿大的通货膨胀目标制政策框架下,中央银行定期向公众宣布政策通货膨胀目标,然后根据通货膨胀预测值与政策目标之间的差距来确定调控方向;在实践中,加拿大银行通过使用利率操作区间和公告操作,从而很好地实现了对市场流动性及短期利率目标的调控,进而影响到市场主体的经济决策,并最终成功实现了实际通货膨胀率稳定地波动在中央银行的目标范围内。基于此,我国有必要借鉴加拿大银行的做法,建立一个更为简单透明的政策操作框架,以保证货币政策操作的效果。     

Asset price targeting in an open economy with cognitive limitations: The best for macroeconomic and financial stability?

The choices of policy targets and the formation of agent expectations have been critical issues addressed by monetary policy management since the financial crisis of 2008. This paper evaluates macroeconomic stability in a new Keynesian open economy in which agents experience both cognitive limitations and asset market volatility. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule with- or without asset price targeting, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict CPI inflation targeting, and exchange rate peg) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and thus create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Simulations confirm that a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target is the best choice. In contrast, the business cycles induced by Keynesian “animal spirits” are enhanced by strict inflation targeting. Furthermore, a credible exchange rate pegging system with an international reserve pooling arrangement can improve social welfare and stability in an open economy, even though its absolute value of the loss function is slightly lower than a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target.     

MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: SURVEYING THE SURVEYABLE

Abstract.  This paper surveys recent advances in empirical studies of the monetary transmission mechanism, with special attention to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Our results indicate that the strength of the exchange rate pass-through substantially declined over time mainly due to a fall in inflation rates and to some extent due to the so-called composition effect. The asset price channel is weak and is likely to remain weak because of shallow stock and private bond markets and because of low stock and bond holdings of domestic households. House prices may become an exception with booming mortgage lending and with high owner occupancy ratios. While the credit channel could be a powerful channel of monetary transmission – as new funds raised on capital markets are close to zero in CEE – it is actually not, as both commercial banks and non-financial corporations can escape domestic monetary conditions by borrowing from their foreign mother companies. The moderately good news, however, is that those banks and firms are influenced by monetary policy in the euro area because their parent institutions are themselves subjected to the credit channel in the euro area.     

Testing the Structural Interpretation of the Price Puzzle with a Cost‐Channel Model*

We estimate a variety of small‐scale new‐Keynesian DSGE models with the cost channel to assess their ability to replicate the ‘price puzzle’, i.e. the inflationary impact of a monetary policy shock typically arising in vector autoregression (VAR) analysis. To correctly identify the monetary policy shock, we distinguish between a standard policy rate shifter and a shock to ‘trend inflation’, i.e. the time‐varying inflation target set by the Fed. Our estimated models predict a negative inflation reaction to a monetary policy tightening. We offer a discussion of the possible sources of mismatch between the VAR evidence and our own.     

The Conduct of Monetary Policy Without Monetary Aggregates

A central dilemma for the monetary authorities is how to determine monetary policy. The increasing unreliability of monetary aggregates has led over the past few years to less concern for monetary targeting, both in the UK and elsewhere, and a greater influence for the exchange rate on monetary policy. But in the UK, most recently, there has been a move away from setting monetary policy in relation to the exchange rate and external considerations in favour of setting monetary policy in relation to domestic demand. Not surprisingly, this shift has occurred at a time of rising concern about domestic overheating. It illustrates the dilemma of whether monetary policy should be driven by domestic demand considerations or by external, exchange rate considerations. This dilemma is not just confined to the UK for it is a real source of conflict underlying the Louvre Accord and its successors that seek to determine G7 exchange rates in a cooperative manner. In what follows, we argue that exchange rate developments should have an appreciable influence on monetary policy, since this is helpful in attaining stable inflation. But we also suggest that this influence should not go too far, since this stability of inflation may be at the expense of stability of domestic demand and output. Targeting of exchange rates within narrow bands is unlikely to be desirable, unless fiscal policy can be used more flexibly to stabilize domestic demand. This suggests that, in the period up to the spring, the use of monetary policy to hold the £/JDM exchange rate within narrow limits may have been overdone. More seriously, international exchange rate agreements among the G7 countries are likely to founder under adverse market pressures, unless current imbalances in fiscal policy are adjusted. In the absence of greater flexibility in fiscal policy, policy makers will have to trade off domestic and exchange rate considerations in determining monetary policy. An important outstanding issue that needs further consideration is what indicators should be used for monetary policy, in a world in which monetary aggregates provide unreliable signals.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

World output, which was strengthening immediately prior to last October, appears to have barely suffered in the short term from the stock market crash. Apart from an early reaction by US consumers - since reversed - demand is proving robust and in early 1988 OECD industrial production is, we estimate, 6 per cent up on year-earlier levels, with GNP more than 4 per cent higher. Indeed such is the strength of activity that the present balance of risk is not that recession is imminent but that inflation may pick up again. In the United States, where activity rates are at their highest level for eight years and unemployment is at a fourteen-year low, monetary policy has been tightened and interest rates are moving higher. The Bundesbank is keen to follow suit and the BoJ is keeping the situation under review. Nevertheless, with wages in most countries still adjusting to the low inflation rates of the last two years, there is little evidence yet that prices are accelerating.
We expect to see world interest rates edging higher in the second half of the year as recorded inflation picks lip. But we believe that underlying inflation remains low and that, even on the assumption that oil prices return to 18 a barrel, OECD consumer price inflation will peak early next year at a little over 4 per cent. Tighter monetary policy is also expected to hold back demand over the next 12 months. Consequently, we expect some weak- ness in output in the first half of next year but discount the possibility of a severe recession. GNP growth in the OECD area is forecast to decline from the 3 per cent rate of 1987–8 to a little over 2 per cent next year and to a sustainable 2½ per cent p.a. over the medium term.     

Monetary policy,housing rents,and inflation dynamics

In this paper we study the effect of monetary policy shocks on housing rents. Our main finding is that, in contrast to house prices, housing rents increase in response to contractionary monetary policy shocks. We also find that, after a contractionary monetary policy shock, rental vacancies and the homeownership rate decline. This combination of results suggests that monetary policy may affect housing tenure decisions (own versus rent). In addition, we show that, with the exception of the shelter component, all other main components of the consumer price index (CPI) either decline in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock or are not responsive. These findings motivated us to study the statistical properties of alternative measures of inflation that exclude the shelter component. We find that measures of inflation that exclude shelter have most of the statistical properties of the widely used measures of inflation, such as the CPI and the price index for personal consumption expenditures, but have higher standard deviations and react more to monetary policy shocks. Finally, we show that the response of housing rents accounts for a large proportion of the “price puzzle” found in the literature.     

PRICE STABILITY AND THE ECB'S MONETARY POLICY STRATEGY*

Abstract.  This paper focuses on the price stability objective within the framework of the single monetary policy strategy. It starts by reviewing what this objective, which is common to all central banks, means. Second, this paper focuses exclusively on the anchoring of short- to medium-term inflation expectations (Part 2). Several measures show that this anchoring is effective. A 'two-pillar' small structural macro-economic model framework is used to analyze the impact that this anchoring of expectations has on the determination of the short- to medium-term inflation rate. From this point of view, observed inflation in the euro area seems to be in line with the theory and the ECB's action seems to be very effective. Third, we focus on the other aspect of monetary stability: the degree of price-level uncertainty and the anchoring of inflation expectations in the medium to long term. Even though this assessment is more difficult than it is in the short to medium term, since we only have a track record covering 6 years, various indicators from the theoretical analysis paint a fairly reassuring picture of the effectiveness of the device used by the ECB.     

The London Business School with Gover Publishing

The world economy is in poor shape. OECD industrial production fell 0.5per cent in both 1991 and 1992 arid though it may now have stopped falling it is still, on our estimates, below year-earlier levels. The US recovery continues to disappoint; recession persists in Japan and Europe; inflationary pressures, already weak, are waning. Next month's UK forecast would normally be based on the world forecast published in June's International Economic Outlook, when we were looking for G7 output to rise 1.2 per cent this year, 2.5 per cent next. But this now looks on the high side and although a detailed revision to the world forecast mist wait until the December IEO, as at1 input to the UK forecast we are shading our G7 growth forecasts - to I per cent this year and 2.25 per cent in 1994. Similar downward revisions are also in train at the OECD arid IMF, according to recent press reports. The more sluggish output performance is already having mi impact on the oil price, which has fallen below £16 a barrel. Together, these developments imply lower world inflation and, particularly in post-ERM Europe, a faster easing of monetary policy than we had allowed for in June.     

THE 1987 BUDGET

Our pre-Budget forecast published last month correctly anticipated the main Budget measures (with the exception of the decision not to re-valorise excise duties) and is very close to the Treasury's own forecast. We have updated the forecast for the Budget measures and other new information. Compared with the February Economic Outlook, our post-Budget assessment has revised down slightly the short-term forecast for output, inflation and the current account deficit. Consequently we share the Treasury's view that output will rise 3 per cent this year, but we are a little more optimistic on the outlook for inflation and the current account.
In holding the PS BR to last year's expected outturn of £4bn, and more particularly in cutting the PSFD by £11/2zbn, the Budget represents a tightening in fiscal policy. Whether the overall policy stance is tightened depends on the response of the monetary authorities. Early indications are that the government will prevent interest rates from falling as far or as fast as they would otherwise do and that the exchange rate will be allowed to rise. This implies a tightening of policy in order to head off problems on inflation or the balance of payments. This argument is supported by the Treasury's own forecast, which is more pessimistic on both inflation and the current account than its predecessor in the Autumn Statement, and explains the Chancellor's decision not to re-valorise excise duties. The post-Budget forecast incorporates this change in policy. We now assume that the sterling index averages 70 this year and that base rates fall to 9 per cent by the end of the year.