The Core of Large Differentiable TU Games

For suitable non-atomic TU games ν, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of ν, yielding one of two stark conclusions: either core(ν) is empty or it consists of a single measure that can be expressed explicitly in terms of derivatives of ν. In this sense, core theory for a class of games may be reduced to calculus. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.     

A Note on Best Response Dynamics

We investigate the relationship between the continuous time best response dynamic, its perturbed version, and evolutionary dynamics in relation to mixed strategy equilibria. We find that as the level of noise approaches zero, the perturbed best response dynamic has the same qualitative properties as a broad class of evolutionary dynamics. That is, stability properties of equilibria are robust across learning dynamics of quite different origins and motivations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D83.     

The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of a specific class of the convex games: the almost positive games. These games have non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above result we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition.     

Market Games in Large Economies with a Finite Number of Types

We study market games derived from an exchange economy with a continuum of agents, each having one of finitely many possible types. The type of agent determines his initial endowment and utility function. It is shown that, unlike the well-known Shapley–Shubik theorem on market games (Shapley and Shubik in J Econ Theory 1:9–25, 1969), there might be a (fuzzy) game in which each of its sub-games has a non-empty core and, nevertheless, it is not a market game. It turns out that, in order to be a market game, a game needs also to be homogeneous. We also study investment games – which are fuzzy games obtained from an economy with a finite number of agents cooperating in one or more joint projects. It is argued that the usual definition of the core is inappropriate for such a model. We therefore introduce and analyze the new notion of comprehensive core. This solution concept seems to be more suitable for such a scenario. We finally refer to the notion of feasibility of an allocation in games with a large number of players. Some of the results in this paper appear in a previous draft distributed by the name “Cooperative investment games or Population games”. An anonymous referee of Economic Theory is acknowledged for his/her comments     

Two remarks on the inner core

For the case of smooth concave exchange economies, we provide a characterization of the inner core as the set of feasible allocations such that no coalition can improve on it, even if coalitions are allowed to use some random plans. For the case of compactly generated games, we discuss Myerson's definition of the inner core, and we characterize it using lexicographic utility weight systems.     

The aggregate-monotonic core

We introduce the aggregate-monotonic core as the set of allocations of a transferable utility cooperative game attainable by single-valued solutions that satisfy core-selection and aggregate-monotonicity. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core and the aggregate-monotonic core. Finally, we introduce upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity for set-valued solutions, and characterize the aggregate-monotonic core using core-selection and upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity.     

Stability and Largeness of the Core

In general, there are examples of TU games where the core is stable but is not large. In this paper, we show that the extendability condition introduced by Kikuta and Shapley (1986, “Core Stability in n-Person Games,” Mimeo) is sufficient for the core to be stable as well as large, for TU games with five or fewer players. We provide a counter example when the number of players is six. We then introduce a stronger extendability condition and show that it is necessary and sufficient for the core to be large. Our proof makes use of a well-known result from the theory of convex sets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.     

围绕核心知识和能力的企业多元化战略

本文对多元化战略的内涵和分类进行了简要述评,然后分析了企业核心知识和能力与多元化战略之间的关系。从核心知识和能力的角度．对企业的多元化战略的类型进行了重新划分。对我国企业实施多元化战略提出了建议．强调了我国企业围绕核心知识和能力实施多元化战略的重要性。     

Adaptation and complexity in repeated games

The paper presents a learning model for two-player infinitely repeated games. In an inference step players construct minimally complex inferences of strategies based on observed play, and in an adaptation step players choose minimally complex best responses to an inference. When players randomly select an inference from a probability distribution with full support the set of steady states is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria in which only stage game Nash equilibria are played. When players make ‘cautious’ inferences the set of steady states is the subset of self-confirming equilibria with Nash outcome paths. When players use different inference rules, the set of steady states can lie between the previous two cases.     

Dynamics in near-potential games

We consider discrete-time learning dynamics in finite strategic form games, and show that games that are close to a potential game inherit many of the dynamical properties of potential games. We first study the evolution of the sequence of pure strategy profiles under better/best response dynamics. We show that this sequence converges to a (pure) approximate equilibrium set whose size is a function of the “distance” to a given nearby potential game. We then focus on logit response dynamics, and provide a characterization of the limiting outcome in terms of the distance of the game to a given potential game and the corresponding potential function. Finally, we turn attention to fictitious play, and establish that in near-potential games the sequence of empirical frequencies of player actions converges to a neighborhood of (mixed) equilibria, where the size of the neighborhood increases according to the distance to the set of potential games.     

Common property, information, and cooperation: Commercial fishing in the Bering Sea

A substantial theoretical and experimental literature has focused on the conditions under which cooperative behavior among actors providing public goods or extracting common-pool resources arises. The literature identifies the importance of coercion, small groups of actors, or the existence of social norms as conducive to cooperation. This research empirically investigates cooperative behavior in a natural resource extraction industry in which the provision of a public good (bycatch avoidance) in the Alaskan flatfish fishery is essential to the duration of the fishing season, and an information provision mechanism exists to relay information to all individuals. Using a mixed logit model of spatial fishing behavior our results show that conditionally cooperative behavior is prevalent but deteriorates as bycatch constraints tighten.     

Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies

Summary. A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implements it. Our main theorem proves that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if and only if it is interim individually rational, interim efficient, coalitional B ayesian incentive compatible, and satisfies a coalitional Bayesian monotonicity condition as well as a closure condition. As an application of our main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are coalitionally implementable. Received: January 12, 1998; revised version: March 30, 2000     

基于顾客价值的核心竞争力识别

在回顾有关企业核心竞争力识别的相关理论的基础上,阐述了为什么要以顾客价值为原则对核心竞争力进行识别,最后提出了基于顾客价值的核心竞争识别的有效方法。     

基于核心能力的公司业务组合

本文指出基于核心能力的公司业务组合才能使企业保持持续的竞争优势,并分析了在核心能力的导向下,企业如何进行公司业务组合。     

提升中小企业核心竞争力之对策

从国内与国外实际情况看,中小企业在发展过程中,成功与失败的原因主要归因于其核心竞争力的强弱问题。中小 企业核心竞争力较差,不仅是因为其受到诸多内部环境的影响,同样也受到许多外部各种因素的制约,因此提升中小企业核心 竞争力应从其内外两方面着手。     

基于创新的企业核心竞争力解释

探寻企业核心竞争力的根源一直是理论界和企业界研究的焦点,从不同的角度和侧面提出了企业的核心竞争力的许多理论.在分析和整合这些理论的基础上,提出企业核心竞争力源于企业的自主创新,认为企业只有创新才能获取和维持核心竞争力.     

论网络媒体核心竞争力的培育

网络媒体要在激烈的媒体竞争中求的发展,离不开竞争力的培育,而核心竞争力的培育是网络媒体能否在这崭新的信息时代发挥其应有作用的关键。本文正是结合当代网络媒体业的实践,阐述了网络媒体核心竞争能力的内涵、特征及其构成要素,并探讨了网络媒体在现有资源和能力中培育核心竞争力的具体方法。     

Stable governments and the semistrict core

We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of power within winning coalitions. These distributions induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the semistrict core, depending on conditions we impose on the solution concept. A bounded power condition, which connects exogenous weights and the solution, turns out to be crucial. It generalizes a condition termed “absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions” that was previously used to derive core existence results.     

浅谈企业绿色核心竞争力的构建

绿色管理是以人类社会可持续发展为宗旨,把环保和节能融入企业生产经营过程中,强调社会效益、经济效益、生态效益有机统一的企业管理新战略.在现代全球一体化和市场经济变革浪潮的冲击下,我国企业只有构建以绿色管理为核心的竞争力,才能在竞争中占据优势,获得可持续发展的能力.本文从不同的角度分析了什么是绿色管理、什么是企业绿色竞争力以及我国企业打造绿色核心竞争力的必要性,并就如何实施绿色管理战略提出了建议.     

企业核心竞争力与市场竞争

在经济全球化形势下,面对跨国公司大举进入及其竞争优势,企业必须要依靠核心竞争力参与市场竞争。本文综述企业核心竞争力的基本内涵和作用,探讨多元化经营发展战略的模式和技术创新与核心竞争力的关系,提出培育和提升企业核心竞争力的基本对策。