Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms

Drawing on social comparison theory, this study examines the relationship between politically connected boards and top executive pay. Moreover, given the socialist orientation of China, tests are also carried out to establish the relationship between politically connected directors and pay dispersion across the firm. We find a negative association between politically connected boards and top executive pay. We also find that politically connected boards are negatively associated with pay dispersion, i.e., the higher the number of political directors on the board the smaller the gap between top executive pay and average employee pay. Finally, our study shows that politically connected directors weaken the pay‐performance link. These findings have important theoretical, policy, and managerial implications. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate social responsibility as an employee governance tool: Evidence from a quasi‐experiment

Research summary : This study examines whether companies employ corporate social responsibility (CSR) to improve employee engagement and mitigate adverse behavior at the workplace (e.g., shirking, absenteeism). We exploit plausibly exogenous changes in state unemployment insurance (UI) benefits from 1991 to 2013. Higher UI benefits reduce the cost of being unemployed and hence increase employees' incentives to engage in adverse behavior. We find that higher UI benefits are associated with higher engagement in employee‐related CSR. This finding suggests that companies use CSR as a strategic management tool—specifically, an employee governance tool—to increase employee engagement and counter the possibility of adverse behavior. We further examine plausible mechanisms underlying this relationship. Managerial summary : This study examines whether companies employ corporate social responsibility (CSR) to improve employee engagement and mitigate adverse behavior at the workplace (e.g., shirking, absenteeism). We find that companies react to increased risk of adverse behavior by strategically increasing their investment in employee‐related CSR (e.g., work‐life balance benefits, health and safety policies). Our findings have important managerial implications. In particular, they suggest that CSR may help companies motivate and engage their employees. Hence, companies dealing with employees that are unmotivated, regularly absent, or engage in other forms of adverse behavior, may find it worthwhile to design and implement effective CSR practices. Further, our findings suggest that CSR can be used as employee governance tool. Accordingly, managers could benefit from integrating CSR considerations into their strategic planning. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reassessing board member allegiance: CEO replacement following financial misconduct

Research summary: We examine how board members' reactions following financial misconduct differ from those following other adverse organizational events, such as poor performance. We hypothesize that inside directors and directors appointed by the CEO may be particularly concerned about their reputation following deceptive financial practices. We demonstrate that directors more closely affiliated with the CEO are more likely to reduce their support for the CEO following financial misconduct, increasing the likelihood of CEO replacement. Enactment of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act similarly alters governance dynamics by creating a greater expectation for sound corporate governance. We demonstrate our findings in U.S. public firms that restated their financial earnings during a 12‐year period before and after the passage of Sarbanes‐Oxley. Managerial summary: Given past concerns about lack of oversight by boards of directors leading to firm financial misconduct, we examine how the relationship between directors and CEOs may be altered in the face of such misconduct. We argue that directors most closely tied to the CEO (inside board members and board members appointed by the CEO), typically the most supportive of the CEO, may become most concerned about their own reputation following financial misconduct. We find that CEOs receive less support from these directors, a finding in contrast to past studies demonstrating that such board members tend to shield CEOs following poor performance. These findings are accentuated following the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, which places greater responsibility on the CEO for the accuracy of financial reports. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Flexible work designs and employee well‐being: examining the effects of resources and demands

Advances in communication technology continue to expand the possibilities for redesigning work environments to allow for temporal and spatial flexibility. Although flexible work designs (FWDs) are typically launched with high expectations, recent research shows that FWDs also pose challenges to employees and can even impede employee well‐being. Based on the Job Demands–Resources model, we argue that FWDs offer both advantages (FWD‐related resources) and challenges (FWD‐related demands) to employee well‐being. The results (n = 999) show that FWDs are related to employee well‐being through several positive and one negative pathways. FWDs are positively associated with employee well‐being through enhanced work/life balance, autonomy, and effective communication and negatively associated with employee well‐being through increased interruptions. Thus, we introduce a framework that reveals the underlying positive and negative mechanisms in the relationship between FWDs and employee well‐being.     

Undervaluation of directors in the board hierarchy: Impact on turnover of directors (and CEOs) in newly public firms

Research summary: We examine the consequences of the formalization of the board leadership structure at IPO for board‐level turnover. We introduce the concept of director undervaluation. It indicates the degree to which a director’s qualifications based on normatively accepted criteria for board leadership are not duly reflected in his/her appointments to the board chair and committee chair positions. We find that the higher the average undervaluation of directors on the board (“board undervaluation”), the greater the turnover levels of undervalued directors. This effect is stronger when board interaction frequency is higher. We contribute to the behavioral perspective on corporate governance by introducing justice‐based legitimacy as a key normative institution, and by providing a novel predictor of aggregate turnover of directors (as well as the firm’s CEO). Managerial summary: Why do outside directors exit the board? We offer a novel answer to this question in the context of newly public firms. We suggest that when directors are passed over for the board chair and committee chair positions despite having higher qualifications than their peers, they have been “undervalued,” and a negative board climate is likely to develop. We find that the higher the average undervaluation of directors on the board, the higher the turnover levels of these undervalued directors. More frequent board meetings exacerbate these turnover levels. Further, these turnover effects are not restricted to undervalued directors—even the CEO is more likely to exit. This study demonstrates the critical importance of developing a legitimate and fair board leadership structure.     

How does CEO tenure matter? The mediating role of firm‐employee and firm‐customer relationships

While the direct influence of CEO tenure on firm performance has been examined in the strategy literature, the underlying channels of influence have remained largely unexplored. This article draws upon the career seasons paradigm, learning perspectives, and marketing literature to examine whether firm‐employee and firm‐customer relationships are the pathways through which CEO tenure influences firm performance. Results from the analysis of a large data set reveal that: (1) CEO tenure has a positive and linear association with firm‐employee relationship strength but an inverted U‐shaped association with firm‐customer relationship strength; (2) industry uncertainty intensifies these associations; and (3) firm‐employee and firm‐customer relationship strength mediate the effects of CEO tenure on firm performance. These findings have implications for a more balanced and nuanced view of CEO tenure. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Constraints in acquiring and utilizing directors' experience: An empirical study of new‐market entry in the pharmaceutical industry

In this study we provide evidence that firms considering entering new markets are more likely to appoint directors with experience in those markets; and subsequently, we show that directors' market experience increases the likelihood of new‐market entry. Moreover, we explore the presence of constraints in both, acquiring experienced directors and utilizing their experience. Specifically, we find that experienced directors are less likely to join firms with financial restatements in the recent past as well as firms with a lower status than the firms where they currently serve. In addition, we find that interlocking directors' experience is less likely to lead to new‐market entry for firms that lack new‐product development experience and that exhibit a high level of market overlap with interlocked firms. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Narcissism,director selection,and risk‐taking spending

We explain why CEOs favor new directors who are similar in narcissistic tendency or have prior experience with other similarly narcissistic CEOs. Because powerful CEOs are more able to select such individuals onto their boards, CEO power is predicted to be positively associated with the above characteristics of new directors. These associations are expected to be stronger when a new director is more different from the CEO in salient demographic characteristics. Moreover, we explain why new directors favored by CEOs are more supportive of their decision making, strengthening the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and risk‐taking spending. Our findings provide considerable support for our theory. This study introduces personality theories to corporate governance research on director selection and to research on how triads influence dyadic relations. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

External COO/presidents as expert directors: A new look at the service role of boards

Much of the scholarship on boards of directors has examined either the control (i.e., monitoring) role or the resource dependence role that boards fill. Relatively little has examined the service role, wherein directors provide advice and guidance to management. This study builds on recent work exploring director expertise by asking how operational expertise on boards impacts firm performance. We find that having external COO/presidents on a board of directors positively impacts firm performance when the firm's operational efficiency is declining, but negatively impacts performance when the firm's operational efficiency is improving. We also find that other types of external executives serving as directors exhibit the opposite relationship, suggesting that the value of director expertise is context‐dependent. We discuss the implications of these findings for director selection. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Let them go? How losing employees to competitors can enhance firm status

Research summary : Because employees can provide a firm with human capital advantages over competitors, firms invest considerably in employee recruiting and retention. Departing from the retention imperative of strategic human capital management, we propose that certain employee departures can enhance a firm's competitiveness in the labor market. Specifically, increased rates of career‐advancing departures by a firm's employees can signal to potential future employees that the firm offers a prestigious employment experience that enhances external mobility opportunities. Characterizing advancement based on subsequent employers and positions, we analyze data on U.S. law firm hiring and industry surveys of perceived firm status between 2004 and 2013. We find that increased rates of employee departures lead to increases in a firm's prestige when these departures are for promotions with high‐status competitors. Managerial summary : Firms often emphasize employee retention. Employee departures, especially as a result of being hired away by competitors, are often viewed as threats to a firm's competitive advantage. We propose, however, that employee retention need not be an unconditional strategic imperative. We argue that certain employee departures can enhance a firm's competitiveness in the market for human capital by signaling to potential employees that the firm offers a prestigious employment experience, which can help them obtain attractive positions with other employers. Analyzing data on U.S. law firm hiring and industry surveys of firm associates between 2004 and 2013, we find that increased rates of employee departures lead to increases in a firm's prestige when these departures are for promotions with high‐status competitors. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Context matters: Diversity's short‐ and long‐term effects in fortune's “best companies to work for”

Research summary: Previous research has examined the racial diversity‐productivity relationship in corporations with an evident high commitment to minority programs, Fortune's “Best Companies for Minorities.” To assess generalizability, we replicate this research using a different context of high organizational‐employee value congruence, Fortune's “Best Companies to Work For.” We are not able to find evidence for the curvilinear relationships previously found, but do uncover a linear negative relationship between racial diversity and short‐run performance. Managerial summary: Using Fortune's “Best Companies for Minorities,” previous research found that racial diversity affected both firm productivity and Tobin's q. To see if we could find these results in a different group of firms, we replicate this research using a sample drawn from Fortune's “Best Companies to Work For.” The former sample is distinguished by high commitment to minority programs, while the one used here stresses high congruence of values between the organization and all its employees. We are unable to replicate the relationships previously found, however, but do find that increasing racial diversity had a negative effect on firm productivity. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Shareholders and stakeholders: How do directors decide?

This study examines how directors make decisions that involve shareholders and other stakeholders. Using vignettes derived from seminal court cases, we construct an index of directors' shareholderism as a general orientation on this issue. In a survey of the entire population of directors and CEOs in public corporations in one country, we find that directors' personal values and roles play an important part in their decisions. Directors and CEOs are more pro‐shareholder the more they endorse entrepreneurial values—specifically, higher achievement, power, and self‐direction values and lower universalism values. While employee representative directors exhibit a lower baseline level of shareholder orientation, they nonetheless often side with shareholders. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Under the microscope: An experimental look at board transparency and director monitoring behavior

Research Summary: It is well known in corporate governance scholarship that independent directors differ in the vigilance with which they monitor corporate insiders. This difference depends largely on whether independent directors are concerned more with their public reputation or with their prospects in the director labor market. The explanation for this difference depends on an assumption of information asymmetry, however. In the present study, we relax the assumption of information asymmetry to examine how boardroom transparency affects directors’ monitoring behavior. Using a randomized experimental study of actual independent directors, we find that boardroom transparency amplifies the effect of directors’ inclinations toward either active or passive monitoring, with directors inclined toward vigilant monitoring becoming even more vigilant, and directors inclined toward passive monitoring becoming even more passive. Managerial Summary: In most advanced economies, the board's internal decision processes are either undisclosed or disclosed only to a very limited extent. It remains unknown, then, whether directors would behave differently if their behaviors were made public. We find that when their actions are disclosed to the public, directors concerned with their public reputations become more vigilant, whereas those concerned with their prospects for additional board seats become more passive in monitoring corporate insiders. Whereas regulatory bodies and corporate governance watchdogs have recently advocated for greater disclosure of the boardroom decision‐making process, our study suggests that such mandatory disclosure requirements can exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the problem of passive director monitoring.     

False Self‐Employment,Autonomy and Regulating for Decent Work: Improving Working Conditions in the UK Stripping Industry

A large‐scale study of working conditions in UK‐based strip dancing clubs reveals that dancers are against de facto self‐employment as it is defined and practised by management, but in favour of de jure self‐employment that ensures sufficient levels of autonomy and control in the workplace. While dancers could potentially seek ‘worker’ or ‘employee’ status within the existing legal framework, their strong identification with the label ‘self‐employed’ and their desire for autonomy will likely inhibit these labour rights claims. We propose an alternative avenue for improving dancers’ working conditions, whereby self‐employed dancers articulate their grievances as a demand for decent work, pursued through licensing agreements between clubs and local authorities and facilitated by collective organization.     

Is there a “Dark Side” to Monitoring? Board and Shareholder Monitoring Effects on M&A Performance Extremeness

Research summary: W e investigate the effects of monitoring by boards of directors and institutional shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A ) performance extremeness using a sample of M&A deals from 1997 to 2006. Both governance research and legal reforms generally have espoused a “raise all boats” view of monitoring. We instead investigate whether monitoring may serve as a double‐edged sword that limits CEO discretion to undertake both value‐destroying M&A deals and value‐creating ones. Our findings indicate that the relationship between monitoring and M&A performance is more complex than previously believed. Rather than “raising all boats” in a shift towards better M&A outcomes, monitoring instead is associated with lower M&A losses, but also with lower M&A gains . Managerial summary: M ergers and acquisitions (M&A s) are a quintessential corporate activity. There were $3.8 trillion worth of M&A deals in 2015, despite scholars and practitioners reporting that M&A s often perform poorly. We question the widespread belief that more vigilant monitoring by boards of directors and large shareholders will raise M&A performance, overall. Put differently, does monitoring constrain CEO s' discretion to pursue bad deals, while simultaneously encouraging them to pursue good ones? We find that monitoring limits both large M&A losses and large M&A gains. Contrary to widely held beliefs, our results indicate that constraining executives' ability to pursue value‐destroying M&A deals does not simultaneously encourage or enable CEO s to pursue value‐creating deals . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dancing with the stars: Benefits of a star employee’s temporary absence for organizational performance

Research Summary: While research has focused primarily on stars as individual contributors, we examine organizational situations where stars must work closely with non‐stars. We argue that, in such situations, building teamwork around a star is an exercise in learning under complexity. In response, organizations prioritize interactions involving the star to simplify learning. This simplification, however, creates organizational myopia. We claim that a star’s temporary absence helps the organization overcome myopia by triggering a search for new routines. When he returns, the organization may combine these new routines with pre‐absence routines to improve teamwork and performance. We exploit injuries to star players in the National Basketball Association as an exogenous shock and find that on average, teams perform better after a star’s return than before his absence. Managerial Summary: This study examines the effect of the temporary absence of a star employee on organizational performance. We find evidence that a star employee’s temporary absence helps the organization overcome an over‐reliance on the star and improve teamwork. Improved teamwork, in turn, enables the organization to perform better upon the star’s return than it did prior to his absence. This result suggests that organizations might want to revisit the tendency to view stars as too valuable to lose, even for a short time. In particular, organizations may want to pull stars from ongoing projects and encourage them to attend professional development programs. A star’s temporary absence and return from such a program improves not only the star’s skills but also the organization’s teamwork.     

Strategic human capital management in the context of cross‐industry and within‐industry mobility frictions

Research Summary: We develop and test a theory examining how frictions that restrict mobility across industries and frictions constraining mobility within an industry can co‐occur to effectively isolate individual human capital, ultimately changing the firm's make‐versus‐buy decision for human capital. Empirically, we demonstrate that when cross‐industry frictions in the form of limited skill transferability and within‐industry frictions in the form of noncompete enforceability are both present, employees exhibit longer tenures, firms hire workers with less initial experience, firms change the amount and nature of training provided, and wages marginally increase. These findings suggest that sufficiently strong and complementary mobility frictions shift the emphasis of firms’ human capital management practices toward internal development of human capital relative to acquisition on the external market. Managerial Summary : In the face of frictions to employee mobility both within and across industries, which we capture empirically using measures of noncompete enforceability and limited skill transferability across industries, firms tend to hire less experienced workers, such workers exhibit longer tenures, and firms invest more in their training, particularly in the development of new skills. Our findings imply that for firms operating under such complementary frictions, better hiring and internal development capabilities are particularly important for performance, while those firms without such capabilities may benefit from considering ways to circumvent the mobility frictions, including moving out of the focal state or lobbying for different noncompete laws.     

Using meta‐analytic structural equation modeling to advance strategic management research: Guidelines and an empirical illustration via the strategic leadership‐performance relationship

This paper demonstrates how meta‐analysis can be combined with structural equation modeling (MASEM) to address new questions in strategic management research. We review this integration, describe its implementation, and compare findings from bivariate meta‐analyses, a direct‐effect structural equations model, and two mediating frameworks using data on the strategic leadership and performance relationship. Results drawn from 208 articles that collectively included data on 495,638 observations demonstrate the new insights available from MASEM while also suggesting a revision to conventional thinking on strategic leadership. Whereas some theories posit that boards of directors influence firm performance through monitoring and disciplining the top management team, MASEM provides more support for the view that boards mediate the top management teams' decisions. Implications for applying MASEM in strategic management are offered. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Ethnographic Contribution to Understanding Co‐worker Relations

Relations among co‐workers are becoming both more important and more complex in modern workplaces as authority over job decisions is shifted from supervisors to quasi‐independent teams. The author develops a model of co‐worker relations that recognizes these changes and evaluates this model using data content coded from the full population of published book‐length workplace ethnographies (N = 204). Confirmatory factor analysis techniques support the existence of three distinct aspects of co‐worker relations: cohesiveness, conflict and peer supervision. The most important determinants of co‐worker relations are employee involvement programmes and management behaviour. Returning to specific case studies allows a theoretical elaboration of how employee involvement and management behaviour condition co‐worker relations. The author concludes by noting the importance of intellectual exchanges between qualitative and quantitative methods for generating new advances in the study of work and employment relations.     

The Relationships of Informal High Performance Work Practices to Job Satisfaction and Workplace Profitability

Recent empirical evidence reveals considerable divergence between management reports and employee reports regarding organizational high performance work practices (HPWPs). This divergence implies that employees may not participate in some HPWPs that are formally present in their organizations, but also, that employees may participate in HPWPs that are not formally present in their organizations. In this study, we examine the implication of the latter case (i.e., employee participation in “informal” HPWPs) for employee‐level and organization‐level outcomes. Our analyses, using data from the Statistics Canada Workplace and Employee Survey, suggest that employee participation in informal HPWPs is associated with enhanced job satisfaction and workplace profitability in a similar way as employee participation in formal HPWPs is associated with these outcomes.