Differentiated Duopoly with Asymmetric Costs

In this paper, we compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with linear demand and cost functions. We extend the Singh and Vives (1984) model by allowing for a wider range of cost and demand (product quality) asymmetry between firms. Focusing on the case of substitute goods, we show that both the efficient firm's profits and industry profits are higher under Bertrand competition when asymmetry is strong and/or products are weakly differentiated. Therefore, Singh and Vives's ranking of profits between the two modes of competition is reversed in a sizeable portion of the relevant parameter space. Contrary to the standard result with symmetric firms, we also show that product differentiation can reduce both the efficient firm's and industry profits, implying that a local incentive towards less differentiation may arise.     

Managerial Bonus Systems in a Differentiated Duopoly: A Comment

A differentiated Cournot duopoly is considered where firm owners delegate the output decision to a manager, who is rewarded on the basis of his performance. If this performance is measured in terms of (i) pure profits, (ii) a combination of profits and sales, (iii) a combination of profits and market share or (iv) relative profits, the latter option strictly dominates the others if the products are perfect substitutes. Recently it was claimed that this result does not hold for all levels of product substitutability. In this comment, we show however that this result is robust against the introduction of product differentiation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly with Upstream Suppliers

This paper analyzes the noncooperative game on the choice of strategic variable to set in duopoly in the presence of an upstream market for the input. For the case of labor input, the analysis shows that if the wage is the result of decentralized firm-union bargain, a duopoly producing substitutes may choose to compete either in the quantity space or in the price space, depending upon the distribution of bargaining power in the wage negotiation and the union's relative preference over the wage. For the case of input suppliers as profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that a vertically differentiated duopoly may prefer to compete either in the quantity space or in a mixed strategy setting where the high-quality firm plays price and the low-quality firm plays quantity, depending upon the extent of substitutability, the degree of vertical product differentiation and the distribution of bargaining power in the input price negotiation.     

基于共享模式的高校电子资源共享平台的设计和实现

随着企业和组织的发展,特别是电子类资源在企业和组织的广泛使用,企业和组织积累了大量的各类电子资料资源,在很多情况下,不同项目和工作的资料是重复和交叉的,但是不同申报者要根据项目和工作需要进行收集和整理,这样无论对项目申报者,还是跟项目有关的被收集的员工之间,都造成了大量的时间、资源的浪费。为此,文章简述了电子资源共享平台的设计和实现意义,探究了系统设计的实现内容,希望对电子资源共享平台设计与实现有所裨益。     

基于收益共享的差异化物流服务供应链协调研究

通过设计收益共享契约对差异化物流服务供应链定价决策问题进行协调,旨在提高各参与主体和系统整体利润。由于消费者对配送时间需求的差异化,设计了普通配送和快速配送服务供其选择,首先通过Stackelberg博弈模型求解供应链节点企业最优定价决策,然后加入收益共享契约进行协调优化,最后利用数值分析进一步证明收益共享契约的有效性。     

Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly

We investigate a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which a public authority can either tax or subsidize firms, in order to induce duopolists to choose the socially optimal locations. The policy proposed here is such that welfare maximization is achieved by directly affecting firms' location without explicitly modifying their price behavior.     

基于收益共享的差异化物流服务供应链协调研究

通过设计收益共享契约对差异化物流服务供应链定价决策问题进行协调,旨在提高各参与主体和系统整体利润。由于消费者对配送时间需求的差异化,设计了普通配送和快速配送服务供其选择,首先通过Stackelberg博弈模型求解供应链节点企业最优定价决策,然后加入收益共享契约进行协调优化,最后利用数值分析进一步证明收益共享契约的有效性。     

宁夏图书馆数字文献共享平台建设

数字化、网络化技术的发展,使得宁夏地方特色馆藏文献可以通过纸质文献转化为数字化信息,并且可以将数字化信息通过数字文献共享平台发布,有利的提高了本地特色文献精品化和服务优质化。对地方文化的传播发展将起到积极的推动作用。     

港口物流信息共享平台的构建

本文通过分析我国港口物流操作中出现的问题，提出了构建港口物流信息平台的总体结构和基本框架，并具体说明港口物流信息平台的实现功能。     

高校公共技术共享平台管理系统开发

结合山东大学公共技术共享平台建设的探索和实践,介绍了大型仪器设备共享管理系统的功能开发,实现了仪器的信息共享、预约授权使用、自动收费、实时信息收集与监控、数据统计分析、仪器使用绩效考核等多方面的实时动态全面管理。     

差异性社会和双头垄断中的价格歧视

正则幂函数在数学上容易处理,而且包括了常数和线性函数作为特例,因而适用于研究经济行为人的差异性的有无及大小对各种经济现象的影响.继Ulph和Vulkan采用非正则幂函数的一文之后,本文通过用正则幂函数来描述消费者的差异性来改进传统的Hotelling双头垄断模型,并用新模型对双头垄断中的价格歧视问题进行了分析.     

Duopoly locations and optimal zoning in a small open city

This paper analyzes a duopoly location model with an asymmetric zoning that prohibits firms from locating to a specific interval in a small open linear city. It is shown that the maximum differentiation principle presented in d'Aspremont et al. [Econometrica 47 (1979) 1145] is still valid under area zoning regulation. Moreover, a zoning regulation can be seen as a policy instrument to limit firms' excess profits, and a proper regulation may even reduce the distortion in total transportation costs, therefore enhancing social welfare. Specifically, the optimal zoning is about 29.5 percent of the city with no amenity effect. Finally, all the land rents raised by zoning are eventually confiscated by the absentee landowner.     

以零售商为核心的供应链信息共享平台的设计

从供应链管理的角度出发,研究以零售商为核心的供应链信息共享平台设计,并且根据零售企业的运营特点,设计相应的功能模块,希望能够给零售商的信息共享平台的建设提供一些参考,特别是大型超市之类的零售商。     

以零售商为核心的供应链信息共享平台的设计

从供应链管理的角度出发,研究以零售商为核心的供应链信息共享平台设计,并且根据零售企业的运营特点,设计相应的功能模块,希望能够给零售商的信息共享平台的建设提供一些参考,特别是大型超市之类的零售商.     

Product Line Choice in Retail Duopoly

This paper develops a successive duopoly model to identify conditions under which differentiated retailers that compete in quantities, when deciding on the range of brands to offer, will carry overlapping product lines. They will do so when retail margins on each brand are not too asymmetric. Otherwise, the less profitable brand is foreclosed from the market. It is shown that welfare increases if the upstream industry is perfectly competitive, even though fewer brands may be sold. With price competition though, exclusive dealing arises when retailers are not too differentiated and in‐store competition is sufficiently intense.     

Mixed Duopoly with Subcontracting

Existing literature on mixed oligopoly focuses on competition among different types of firms but ignores their possible cooperation. We allow cooperation between a public firm and a private firm through subcontracting in a Hotelling mixed‐duopoly model. We find that when subcontracting is possible, the equilibrium without subcontracting is not socially optimal because subcontracting can lower total production costs. And if both firms engage in subcontracting, the existence of a public firm can guarantee the first best equilibrium, whether it is the low‐cost firm or not. But when a private firm is the low‐cost firm, it is more profitable for it to choose vertical foreclosure. And the consequent equilibrium is not socially desirable anymore. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Empirical Analysis of a Dynamic Duopoly Model of Competition

Empirically validating and testing the specification of game theoretic models has received limited attention in the marketing literature. The authors provide an econometric framework for estimating the parameters of response functions when the observed data in the market place are the Nash equilibrium outcomes of an underlying dynamic duopoly game specification. Specifically, the estimation procedure accounts for the joint endogeneity of market shares and marketing efforts of market rivals using a system of simultaneous equations that included the market response function and the Nash equilibrium conditions. A formal statistical test is used to detect model misspecification. The empirical analysis is carried out using data from four product markets: pharmaceutical, soft drink, beer, and detergent. Comparisons are provided with conventional estimation of the response function parameters in which the equilibrium conditions are ignored in the estimation. Managerial implications of the empirical results are discussed.     

Price and Quantity Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with a Socially Concerned Firm

I study the endogenous choice of a price or quantity contract in a mixed duopoly with a socially concerned firm, which maximizes a combination of profit and consumer welfare. Equilibria with price and quantity contracts might co‐exist; welfare under price competition might be lower than under quantity competition; the firms' profit ranking might be different from that of a private duopoly or mixed duopoly with a public firm. Hence, if a firm follows a social strategy, the optimal market strategy crucially depends on the levels of social concern and competition in the market. The presence of socially concerned firms may change the mode of competition. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Estimating a Parsimonious Model of Inequality Aversion in Stackelberg Duopoly Experiments*

In the Stackelberg duopoly experiments in Huck et al. (2001) , nearly half of the followers’ behaviours are inconsistent with conventional prediction. We use a test in which the conventional self‐interested model is nested as a special case of an inequality aversion model. Maximum likelihood methods applied to the Huck et al. (2001) data set reject the self‐interested model. We find that almost 40% of the players have disadvantageous inequality aversion that is statistically different from zero and economically significant, but advantageous inequality aversion is relatively unimportant. These estimates provide support for a more parsimonious model with no advantageous inequality aversion.     

高校国有资产共建共享信息化及平台建设的探讨

在分析高校国有资产共建共享信息化及平台建设的意义、存在问题及现状和可行性基础上,我们提出了高校资产管理信息化及共享共建平台建设的实施方案,利用网络技术将各高校仪器设备管理系统通过中间平台进行互联,实现高校国有资产信息资源共享,通过资产信息资源的共享和利用,从而达到节约资金,提高国有资产的利用率。