National pricing with local quality competition

We study the incentives of national retail chains to adopt national (uniform) prices across local markets that differ in size and competition intensity. In addition to price, the chains may also compete along a quality dimension, and quality is always set locally. We show that absent quality competition, the chains will never use national pricing. However, if quality competition is sufficiently strong there exist equilibria where at least one of the chains adopts national pricing. We also identify cases in which national pricing benefits (harms) all consumers, even in markets where such a pricing strategy leads to higher (lower) prices.     

Spatial duopoly with discriminatory pricing

The concept and existence of an equilibrium is established for profit maximizing competitors whose decisions involve choices of both delivered price schedules and firm locations. Each firm faces a production function; each is allowed to locate in the plane and to set discriminatory prices. Any transport cost function that is continuous in the firm location variable may be used. It is shown that the locations of the two firms are in equilibrium if each firm is minimizing social cost (i.e., the total cost to the firms of supplying the market with the good it demands is minimized) with respect to the opponent's fixed location.     

The profit equivalence of mill and uniform pricing policies

In this note we point out a simple fact that seems to have been overlooked in the voluminous literature on mill pricing and uniform delivered pricing in location theory — the profit maximization problems involved are mathematically equivalent when the demand functions are linear.     

Market competition and pricing strategies in retail supply chains

This study provides a better explanation for the continued prevalence of high–low (Hi–Lo) pricing strategy. We investigate the impact of market competition on adopting two different pricing strategies in the retail industry: everyday low price (EDLP) strategy and Hi–Lo strategy. We developed two analytic models using a game-theoretic modeling approach: the profit maximization model and the sales revenue maximization model. We then conducted an econometric analysis based on retail store-level dataset. The result shows that an EDLP player's equilibrium price depends highly on the cost level rather than competitor's price whereas the Hi–Lo player's equilibrium price depends mainly on the range of promotional basket as well as the cost level.     

Spatial competition between shopping centers

We study competition between two shopping centers that sell the same set of goods and are located at the extremes of a linear city, without restricting consumers to make all their purchases at a single place. In the case of competition between a shopping mall (set of independent single-product shops) and a department store (single multiproduct shop), we find that: if the number of goods is low, all consumers shop at a single place; if it is moderately high, some consumers travel to both shopping centers to buy each good where it is cheaper (a single good is cheaper at the shopping mall). The shops at the mall, taken together, obtain a lower profit than the department store. Nevertheless, two shopping malls should be expected to appear endogenously.     

Transfer pricing under asymmetric information

This paper analyses optimal transfer prices in a firm organized in two divisions. The production costs of the divisions are their respective private information. The objective of headquarters is to determine the transfer pricing method that maximizes total profit less managers' compensation. Managers are interested in their current compensation and in the market evaluation of their experience. In this setting, the paper discusses why particular transfer pricing methods found in practice and literature may induce-inefficiencies, and it identifies conditions under which each method is preferable. Major results are: a market-based transfer price does not implement the first-best solution if there are benefits from internal trade; cost-based transfer,prices may achieve first-best, and they are preferable to negotiated transfer prices if communication is cost-less; dual transfer prices do not implement the first-best solution, as long as collusion cannot be discouraged.

‘There are two truisms in business. Transfer prices are wrong and charges for corporate overhead are too high.‘¹     

Spatial competition,concentration and welfare

This paper gives the general conditions under which the firm's f.o.b. mill price may rise or fall due to spatial separation of buyers and/or spatial entry of rival firms. Several theorems are proposed concerning the fundamental mechanism underlying certain paradoxical implications of two orthodox spatial competition models. A third alternative model of competition set forth elsewhere is reexamined, and is shown to generate the largest market areas for individual firms, the lowest product prices, and the greatest industry supply — the greatest consumer welfare.     

Tax competition,uniform assessment,and the benefit principle

In previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents. However, this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment. Here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas, with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods, one for residents and one for business. For “plausible” parameter values, numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm.     

Endogenous mergers under multi-market competition

This paper examines a simple model of strategic interactions among firms that face at least some of the same rivals in two related markets (for goods 1 and 2). It shows that when firms compete in quantity, market prices increase as the degree of multi-market contact increases. However, the welfare consequences of multi-market contact are more complex and depend on how two fundamental forces play out. The first is the selection effect, which acts to increase welfare, as shutting down the relatively more inefficient firm is beneficial. The second opposing effect is the internalisation of the Cournot externality effect; reducing the production of good 2 allows firms to sustain a higher price for good 1. This works to increase prices and, therefore, decrease consumer surplus (but increase producer surplus). These two effects are influenced by the degree of asymmetry between markets 1 and 2 and the degree of substitutability between goods 1 and 2.     

Data-driven manufacturer-retailer collaboration under competition

This research employs game theoretic models to investigate how and when data-driven collaborations between manufacturers and retailers are beneficial. In the models, two symmetric retailers each offer two products from two different manufacturers. Each manufacturer may choose to collaborate with one or both retailers through data-driven initiatives in providing retail value to the consumers. The results show that the main incentive behind these collaborations arise from the efficient allocation of resources. Surprisingly, greater brand differentiation reduces profit margins and the incentive to collaborate. We also find that market leaders can endogenously arise through data-driven collaborations.     

Equal risk pricing under convex trading constraints

In an incomplete market model where convex trading constraints are imposed upon the underlying assets, it is no longer possible to obtain unique arbitrage-free prices for derivatives using standard replication arguments. Most existing derivative pricing approaches involve the selection of a suitable martingale measure or the optimisation of utility functions as well as risk measures from the perspective of a single trader.We propose a new and effective derivative pricing method, referred to as the equal risk pricing approach, for markets with convex trading constraints. The approach analyses the risk exposure of both the buyer and seller of the derivative, and seeks an equal risk price which evenly distributes the expected loss for both parties under optimal hedging. The existence and uniqueness of the equal risk price are established for both European and American options. Furthermore, if the trading constraints are removed, the equal risk price agrees with the standard arbitrage-free price.Finally, the equal risk pricing approach is applied to a constrained Black–Scholes market model where short-selling is banned. In particular, simple pricing formulas are derived for European calls, European puts and American puts.     

Spatial Cournot competition and economic welfare: a note

We investigated welfare implications in location-quantity models in a symmetric linear city. We found that when firms are not agglomerated in equilibrium, increasing the distance between firms raises (reduces) producer surplus and social welfare (consumer surplus). Moreover, central agglomeration is always optimal for consumers among symmetric locations, but not necessarily for producers. Central agglomeration can be inefficient even if it is the unique equilibrium outcome. In short, the firms are more likely to agglomerate or locate closer than what welfare maximizers would dictate, whereas they locate farther apart than what consumer surplus maximizers would recommend.     

Innovation speed under uncertainty and competition

Innovation speed is widely considered to be a key factor for a firm's ability to maintain competitive advantage. Primarily, empirical evidence has found contradictory interdependencies regarding the role of innovation speed. The prevailing proposition of “the faster the better” has been challenged by results of empirical studies heavily depending on the methodological setup used. In contrast, we propose a model of the complete innovation process to study innovation speed under uncertainty and competition. We find that higher market uncertainty speeds up innovation and encourages firms to innovate incrementally. Strong competition tends to reduce innovation speed and encourages rather radical innovation.     

Spatial competition with demand uncertainty: A laboratory experiment

Motivated by recent research on product differentiation, we conduct laboratory experiments to study how demand uncertainty influences firms' incentives to differentiate. We ground our experiment on a discrete version of the standard location-then-price game introduced by Hotelling (1929), and we consider different levels of demand uncertainty. We first derive the game equilibrium assuming risk-neutral firms, and obtain the standard prediction that a high level of demand uncertainty generates more differentiation. Second, we extend the analysis to consider non-risk neutral firms and markets with asymmetric risk profiles. We show that the game equilibrium can differ substantially according to the attitude to risk. Third, we compare our predictions with the experimental data and find that demand uncertainty acts as a differentiation force in the context of both symmetric markets composed of risk-neutral or risk-lover subjects and asymmetric markets. We find support also for the agglomeration effect arising from demand uncertainty for sufficiently risk-averse subjects. Overall, these results might explain the opposite product differentiation strategies frequently observed in markets with fast-evolving tastes (i.e., minimum or maximum differentiation). Finally, the data confirm that subjects differentiate to relax price competition and provide evidence of a strong positive relationship between differentiation and prices.     

Approximate arbitrage-free option pricing under the SABR model

The stochastic-alpha-beta-rho (SABR) model introduced by Hagan et al. (2002) provides a popular vehicle to model the implied volatilities in the interest rate and foreign exchange markets. To exclude arbitrage opportunities, we need to specify an absorbing boundary at zero for this model, which the existing analytical approaches to pricing derivatives under the SABR model typically ignore. This paper develops closed-form approximations to the prices of vanilla options to incorporate the effect of such a boundary condition. Different from the traditional normal distribution-based approximations, our method stems from an expansion around a one-dimensional Bessel process. Extensive numerical experiments demonstrate its accuracy and efficiency. Furthermore, the explicit expression yielded from our method is appealing from the practical perspective because it can lead to fast calibration, pricing, and hedging.     

On pricing lookback options under the CEV process

Abstract We consider the problem of pricing European lookback options when the underlying asset price is driven by a constant elasticity of variance (CEV) process. The evaluation model is based on the binomial approximation developed by Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990) and we show how to apply it in the case of such options. We develop simple pricing algorithms that compute accurate estimates of the option prices.     

Redistribution and regional development under tax competition

This paper considers how capital tax competition affects transfer and development policies in the presence of regional income disparity. In each country, development policies determine the number of rich (poor) regions that (do not) engage in production activities, while transfer policies redistribute income between rich and poor regions. The mix of transfer and development policies is inefficient under tax competition: conditional on the equilibrium tax rate, too much revenue is spent on development policies and too little on transfer policies. This analysis of the expenditure mix implies that development policies are used as a means of regional redistribution even if transfer policies are efficient instruments for this purpose. Moreover, it is shown that the overall level of public expenditure may be too high because of the possibility of over-development.     

Optimal highway design and user welfare under value pricing

This paper investigates the optimal design of highways operated under a form of congestion pricing called value pricing. Value pricing involves dividing a highway into free and priced lanes so that in equilibrium the highway effectively operates at two levels of service, with those users placing a higher value on travel time savings selecting the faster, priced route. A tractable analytical framework is developed which allows analysis of equilibrium and welfare on value priced highways when users vary in their value of time. The model is used to characterize optimal toll and capacity policies, as well as investigate the fiscal implications of value pricing. The analysis concludes with results on how welfare changes induced by value pricing are distributed over the population of users when the government finances any funding shortfall through a non-discriminatory taxing mechanism. A realistic numeric example is used to illustrate how the model can be applied to evaluation of actual and proposed value pricing implementations.     

The industrial and commercial demand for electricity under time-of-use pricing

In this paper we have developed and estimated the demand for electricity by an industrial (commercial) firm subject to time-of-use (TOU) pricing of electric power. In the application we use a quadratic production function and directly incorporate into the production process the restrictions that some inputs cannot vary over the day. We show that the TOU structure implies a unique set of parameter restrictions across the demand functions for inputs.