Existence of financial market equilibria with transaction costs

The purpose of this paper is to give an existence proof of equilibria in a two-period exchange economy with incomplete markets and transaction costs. When tradings on financial markets incur real transaction costs —interpreted as costs of enforcement of financial contracts or real taxation of financial revenues —the set of individual portfolios is bounded by the limited resources of the economy. Existence of equilibria then follows from Kakutani 's fixed point theorem.     

Caste discrimination and transaction costs in the labor market: Evidence from rural North India

This paper is an empirical attempt to quantify caste-based discrimination in the labor market using household data taken from rural North India. In the regression analysis, transaction costs associated with entry into the labor market and reservation wages are estimated simultaneously along with market wages. The estimation results provide evidence of the existence of transaction costs in the labor market and discrimination against backward classes with regard to access to regular employment. In line with previous studies, the results suggest that the achievements of India's reservation policy so far have at best been limited. In addition, a comparison between the estimates from the model employed in this paper and conventional (reduced-form) approaches shows that discrimination in labor market entry is likely to be underestimated in the conventional reduced-form approaches.     

Incentive mechanisms for environmental protection under asymmetric information: a case study

The purpose of this paper is to compare the performance of some instruments of environmental policy, using data for a coal-fired power plant. Each decentralized scheme coverages towards the social optimum, chosen by a regulator. We look at the performance of a changing tax rate on emission, of an announcement of the tax formula, of an announcement of the tax formula with a tax refund possibility, and of a tax-cum subsidy scheme. Our emphasis is on full information concerning the tax and subsidy formulas and on the opportunity for the firm to optimize intertemporally. We also test two performance schemes which combine social optimal pricing with optimal abatement decisions. Our interest is to compare the speed of convergence of the schemes, the monetary side payments (subsidy, bonus) required, and to look for self-financing schemes.     

An environmental performance index for products reflecting damage costs

Several studies have demonstrated how to use DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) based techniques to estimate environmental performance indices. None of these studies, however, are taking information on the environmental damage costs of the pressure types considered into account. This study is bridging a gap between environmental indices founded in physical pressures and damage costs founded in welfare economics. The aim of the paper is twofold: first, to demonstrate how to implement the information on environmental damage costs within a DEA based environmental performance index, and second, to estimate these indices at product level by using Danish input-output data and environmental data from 1997.     

Community-based incentives for environmental protection: the case of green electricity

This paper examines the effectiveness of using community-level rewards to subsidize environmental protection. Specifically, we study the Connecticut Clean Energy Communities (CCEC) program that provides mostly symbolic rewards in the form of municipal photovoltaic installations in proportion to the number of households that voluntarily purchase green electricity. We find that the program causes a 22 % increase in the number of households purchasing green electricity in CCEC municipalities. The pattern of results suggests that the CCEC leads to the mobilization of community-based recruitment campaigns that increase signup rates by up to 700 % around the period of initial qualification. We also find that a change in the marginal incentive created by the program has little consequence on signup behavior. The implication for policy is that community-based incentives can be effective, but the size of the subsidy itself appears less important. Finally, simple calculations based on CCEC up-front costs reveal upper-bound, cost-effectiveness measures of $570 per household signup, 6.7 $\not {c} $ per kilowatt-hour of annual green-electricity demand, and $113 per ton of annual carbon-dioxide emission reductions.     

The linkage between life insurer spread behaviour and credit swap transaction: policyholder protection analysis

ABSTRACT

The paper develops a contingent claim model to evaluate the equity of a life insurer when the insurer could act as a protection buyer or a protection seller in a credit swap transaction market. The investment market and the life insurance market faced by the insurer are assumed to be imperfectly competitive in order to capture the insurer’s asset-leading or liability-reducing spread behaviour. This paper complements the insurance literature by analysing how the effects of credit swap transactions on insurer spread behaviour and policyholder protection, and how they might differ across various degrees of capital regulation, premature default risk, and profit-sharing participation. Our findings offer some useful insights for achieving the stability of the insurance system.     

Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency

Summary. A service is produced for a set of agents. The service is binary, each agent either receives service or not, and the total cost of service is a submodular function of the set receiving service. We investigate strategyproof mechanisms that elicit individual willingness to pay, decide who is served, and then share the cost among them. If such a mechanism is budget balanced (covers cost exactly), it cannot be efficient (serve the surplus maximizing set of users) and vice-versa. We characterize the rich family of budget balanced and group strategyproof mechanisms and find that the mechanism associated with the Shapley value cost sharing formula is characterized by the property that its worst welfare loss is minimal. When we require efficiency rather than budget balance – the more common route in the literature – we find that there is a single Clarke-Groves mechanism that satisfies certain reasonable conditions: we call this the marginal cost pricing mechanism. We compare the size of the marginal cost pricing mechanism's worst budget surplus with the worst welfare loss of the Shapley value mechanism. Received: October 26, 1998; revised version: December 3, 1999     

商业诚信:从经济理性与预期效益角度考察

随着经济改革的深入,社会信用秩序混乱的状况日益引起人们的关注,诚信的缺失已成为一个严重的社会问题,它严重的影响着社会稀缺性资源合理配置的效率,使得社会交易成本不断提高,本认为,在理性人假设和信息不对称条件下,个体的诚信缺失是在既定偏好,既定制度约束下的个人理性选择的结果,章过用预期效用理论在理性人假设的条件下对失信行为进行收益－成本分析,并依此提出了提高失信成本从而抑制失信行为的具体思路。     

Testing for adjustment costs and regime shifts in BRENT crude futures market

This paper, using a threshold vector error-correction (TVECM) model, examines whether BRENT crude spot and futures oil prices are cointegrated. By employing this methodology we are able to evaluate the degree and dynamics of transaction costs resulting from various market imperfections. TVECM model is applied on daily spot and futures oil prices covering the period 1990-2009. The hypothesis we test is to what extent BRENT crude is indeed an integrated oil market in terms of threshold effects and adjustment costs. Our findings support that market follows a gradual integration path. We find that BRENT crude spot and futures are cointegrated, though two regimes are clearly identified. This implies that a threshold exists and it is indeed significant. Adjustment costs in the error correction are present, and they are valid at the typical regime that is the dominant, and as a result should not be ignored.     

The market for protection and the origin of the state

We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governing groups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats, or mafia dons). Although self-governance is best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, in providing security, the equilibrium market structure involves competing lords, a condition that leads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection are dissipated and welfare can be as low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state. Thus, we explain the tendency towards autocracy both in history, before the appearance of modern representative governance, and in many low-income countries in modern times.     

Choice modeling at the “market stall”: Individual versus collective interest in environmental valuation

The market stall, or valuation workshop, has recently been proposed as a way of addressing some of the limitations of conventional stated preference analysis. In this paper, we attempt to combine a participatory technique similar to the “citizens' jury” with choice modelling, a stated preference technique increasingly being applied in environmental economics. Our focus is on how changes in the context of decision-making (between choices made in isolation and those made in a group setting, and between choices made on individual well being versus collective criteria) produce differences in estimated welfare measures. The empirical context used is that of water quality improvements under the Water Framework Directive, the most significant reform in water legislation in the European Union for many years. We find that the choice experiment format can be successfully implemented in a valuation workshop and that moving from individual to collective choice produces, in this instance, a rather interesting change in both values and preferences which depends on the respondent's interests.     

The role of transaction costs and risk aversion when selecting between one and two regimes for portfolio models

Estimation of the inputs is the main problem when applying portfolio analysis, and Markov regime-switching models have been shown to improve these estimates. We investigate whether the use of two-regime models remains superior across a range of values of risk aversion and transaction costs, in the presence of skewness and kurtosis and no short sales. Our results for US data suggest that, due to differences in their risk preferences and transactions costs, most retail investors may prefer to use one-regime models, while investment banks may prefer to use two-regime models.     

The overlooked costs of the permanent war economy: A market process approach

How does the permanent war economy interact, and subsume, the private, non-military economy? Can the two remain at a distance while sharing resource pools? This paper argues that they cannot. Once the U.S. embarked upon the path of permanent war, starting with World War II, the result was a permanent war economy. The permanent war economy continuously draws resources into the military sector at the expense of the private economy, even in times of peace. We explore the overlooked costs of this process. The permanent war economy does not just transfer resources from the private economy, but also distorts and undermines the market process which is ultimately responsible for improvements in standards of living.     

Economists versus engineers: Two approaches to environmental problems

The Review of Austrian Economics - There are two distinct and partly irreconcilable approaches to analyzing environmental problems. The first, we call the engineering approach and the other the...     

Prices versus quantities: environmental regulation and imperfect competition

By exercising market power, a firm will distort the production, and therefore the emissions decisions, of all firms in the market. This paper examines how the welfare implications of strategic behavior depend on how pollution is regulated. Under an emissions tax, aggregate emissions do not affect the marginal cost of polluting. In contrast, the price of tradable permits is endogenous. I show when this feedback effect increases strategic firms’ output. Relative to a tax, tradable permits may improve welfare in a market with imperfect competition. As an application, I model strategic and competitive behavior of wholesalers in a Mid-Atlantic electricity market. Simulations suggest that exercising market power decreased emissions locally, thereby substantially reducing the regional tradable permit price. Furthermore, I find that had regulators opted to use a tax instead of permits, the deadweight loss from imperfect competition would have been even greater.