On the Edgeworth conjecture for production economies with public goods: A contract-based approach

The paper applies and elaborates a contractual approach to study economies with a production of public goods. The barter contractual approach was developed in  and  for exchange economies; it is now modified and extended to the production economy. This includes hereby the introduction of a production contract and the adoption of known earlier notions: a web of contracts, coalitional domination for webs, a partial breaking of contracts, and so on. Thus specific notions of properly contractual and fuzzy contractual allocations for an economy with public goods are introduced and their equivalence with Lindahl equilibria is stated. These theorems can be interpreted as a new way of perfect competition presentation.     

Public spending and economies of scale in partial fiscal decentralized governments: The case of Chile

This article evaluates economies of scale in local public spending in Chile, emphasizing the country's geographical features and high fiscal heterogeneity. We leverage balanced panel data for ten years and 307 municipalities in order to estimate the population level at which a reduction in the average cost of local public goods provision occurs and to differentiate between levels of market potential. We follow a theoretical model of cost efficiency that considers spatial interactions and spillover effects among neighboring jurisdictions. Our findings suggest that Chilean municipalities reach an optimum population level at around 700,000 inhabitants, which is high considering that only two cities qualify. When differentiating for levels of economies of scale according to levels of market potential, municipalities with a low potential reach their optimum at around 28,000 inhabitants, those with a medium potential reach it at approximately 124,000, and those with a high potential reach it at approximately 680,000.     

Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies

In a public good economy where agents' preferences are known but endowments are private information, instituting an allocation rule and asking the agents their initial endowments induces an endowment-pretension game. We analyse the Nash equilibrium allocations of this game and discuss its welfare properties with reference to voluntary contributions allocations. Received: 30 May 2001, Accepted: 23 September 2005 JEL Classification: H41 I am grateful to Murat Sertel for his continuous support and encouragement; to G?ksel Asan and Arunava Sen for their invaluable help. I would also like to thank Fikret Adaman, Ahmet Alkan, Salvador Barberá, Semih Koray, Andrei Ratiu, Muhamet Yíldíz, ünal Zenginobuz, an Associate Editor and two referees of the Review of Economic Design for their enlightening comments on previous drafts. Earlier versions of this paper were written during my stay at Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona and at the Indian Statistical Institute. Both visits have been possible by the kindness of the host institutions and the financial support of the Turkish Academy of Sciences and Serem Ltd. It is a pleasure for me to express my gratitude to all these institutions. Of course, all possible errors are mine.     

Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear

In this paper, we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no mechanism which is efficient, strategy-proof and where consumption of both goods is positive for all agents. For the case of two or more agents the same result occurs when nondictatorship is replaced by Individual Rationality. We are very grateful to Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Carmen Beviá, Xavier Calsamiglia, Marco Celentani, Bernardo Moreno, Antonio Romero-Medina, William Thomson, Walter Trockel, an associate editor, three anonymous referees and participants at seminars at Universities of Alicante, Autónoma de Barcelona and Rochester and the Spanish Economic Association meeting in Sevilla for very helpful comments and suggestions.     

Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy

This paper explores the implications of the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy à la (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996) and (Besley and Coate, 1997). As an extension of Hoyt’s (1991) finding that intensified tax competition is always harmful and aggravates the extent to which public goods are undersupplied in a region, we show that intensified tax competition can be beneficial if political as well as tax competition is considered. In particular, we identify plausible conditions under which (i) there is an optimal intensity of tax competition such that the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition will result in the optimal provision of public goods and (ii) intensified tax competition will be beneficial if and only if the degree of tax competition is less than this optimal intensity.     

区域经济合作推动公共产品供给的机理及对策

市场经济存在着市场失灵,因此需要政府提供公共产品,同时,由于存在着区域间发展不均衡和地方利益保护,公共产品的供给也存在着严重的不均衡,反过来限制了区域经济一体化的发展和进程。文章研究根据区域经济一体化理论,提出了构建区域经济一体化推动的横向公共产品供给模式,以此更好地推动区域经济合作的思路。     

Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling

Hurwicz (1979) and Otani and Sicilian (1982, 1990) characterized the Nash equilibrium allocations of the Walrasian demand manipulation game in successively more general exchange environments. In this paper, I extend the analysis to production economies with short-selling. First, I generalize Hurwicz’s and Otani and Sicilian’s theorem that any allocation at which each agent’s consumption bundle lies above her true offer curve can be supported in Nash equilibrium. I then show that for finite economies of any size the set of such allocations is often topologically large.Received: 17 January 2003, Accepted: 4 April 2005, JEL Classification: D51, D82For comments on this and earlier versions of the paper, I wish to thank Rick Bond, Bhaskar Chakravorti, Tom Gresik, Costas Syropoulos and William Thomson. I would especially like to thank Mike Jerison for helping to overcome a difficulty with a previous version. Also, the comments of the anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged.     

Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods

We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making contributions to the public good. The Stackelberg leader is willing to accept such transfers if the actual contribution game is fully non-cooperative because the transfer generates a Pareto superior outcome. If the contributions in the Stackelberg equilibrium is the threat point of a possible cooperative Nash bargaining game, the Stackelberg leader will refuse to accept the transfer if she can. Received: 30 June 1995 / Accepted: 18 February 1997     

Green Online vs Green Offline preferences on local public goods trade-offs and house prices

This paper focuses on the relationship between (i) house prices and (ii) local green public goods. The main objective of the paper is to analyse a specific house-pricing mechanism which reflects the utility of being Green Offline, i.e. having access to green areas, versus the utility derived from the ability to be Green Online. The focus will be on data from European Union countries, and in particular Germany. Our results show that on an aggregate level for the EU there appears to be a clear indication for an irrational house-pricing mechanism, ignoring the negative trade-off effect from Green Online and Green Offline public investments (goods and assets). Meanwhile, on an individual level, for the case of Germany, more detailed bounded rationality effects of fashion-driven supply on house pricing are observed, positively related to Green Online values but negatively related to high Green Offline preferences. In conclusion, we find that house prices throughout Europe do not reflect a rational social change in green preferences, but tend to irrationally overprice Green Online values, which may create instability on the local housing market in the long run.     

城市公共品供给中各级政府事权与财权的划分

政府在城市公共品供给中需要考虑如何合理划分各级政府的事权与财权.城市公共品的特性是各级政府事权划分的基础,而事权与财权相统一的原则是各级政府财权划分的理论依据.通过对我国城市公共品供给中各级政府间财政关系进行实证研究发现,各级政府在事权划分上存在模糊、重复、越位和缺位的情况,而财权的划分则没有能够实现与相应事权的匹配.因此,需要重新界定各级政府的事权与财权,从而完善政府的城市公共品供给职能.     

Price and quantity competition among heterogeneous suppliers with two-part pricing: applications to clubs, local public goods, networks, and growth controls

Models of club goods, local public goods, and growth controls appear to have theoretical structures distinct from usual oligopoly models. This article shows, however, that they are special cases of a generalized oligopoly model that incorporates the possibility of two-part pricing and externalities between consumers (either congestion or network externalities). Our generalized two-part pricing model not only serves as a synthesis of a wide range of models but also allows us to obtain several new results on equilibrium prices. Another advantage of our model is that it can be interpreted as a reduced form of more complicated models that have spatial structures. This facilitates extension to the case where firms are heterogeneous and the number of firms is arbitrary.     

Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types

In this paper, we consider the possibility of identifying peaceful mechanisms such as bargaining protocols, international institutions, or norms that can enable countries to settle disputes in the absence of binding contracts. In particular, we are interested in the existence of mechanisms with zero probability of war. Here, we focus on situations where the countries’ payoffs to war are interdependent or correlated and where efficient settlements are not required but subsidies are unavailable. Most importantly, countries can choose to go to war at any time and can use information learned from the negotiation process in making this choice. We characterize the conditions under which no peaceful mechanisms exist and discuss how weakening our war consistency condition can change this result. We thank Massimo Morelli, Adam Meirowitz, Hein Goemans and two anonymous reviewers for helpful advice and comments and John Duggan and Dan Bernhardt for encouraging this direction of inquiry.     

Population ageing and pension reform in a small open economy with non-traded goods

In this paper we study the implications of population ageing in an economy with a sizeable non-traded goods sector. To this effect a highly stylized micro-founded macro model is constructed in which the age structure of the population plays a non-trivial role. The model distinguishes separate birth and death probabilities (thus allowing for net population change), allows for age-dependent labour productivity (thus mimicing life-cycle saving), and includes a rudimentary pension system (thus allowing for intergenerational redistribution). The model is used to analytically study demographic and pension shocks.     

Resource-envy-free and efficient allocations: A new solution for production economies with dedicated factors

I consider the problem of determining an equitable and efficient allocation of resources in production economies with factors which must be dedicated to production and cannot be consumed directly. First, I show that in such economies envy-free and efficient allocations exist under standard assumptions. However, I argue this notion of fairness is unsuitable for the present context. I then introduce a new notion of fairness, which I call resource-envy-freeness. First, I associate with each consumption bundle its resource footprint consisting of the vector of factors used to produce it. I then show that preferences over consumption bundles can be extended to preferences over factor bundles. An allocation is resource-envy-free if no agent prefers another agent’s resource footprint to its own. The analysis of resource-envy-free allocations in production is exactly analogous to the analysis of envy-free allocations in exchange. I establish that resource-envy-free and efficient allocations exist under standard assumptions, and I demonstrate that such allocations are intuitively appealing.     

A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information

This paper applies a mechanism design approach to the problem of an optimal contract when one party has both ex ante and ex post private information. With ex ante private information added to the costly state verification environment, the timing of the contract is important in achieving the first-best investment decision. It is shown that an optimal contract involves precommitment, a feature often observed in many bank loan contracts. An optimal contract thus obtained is interpreted as t he golden parachute, a device providing incentives to managers not to distort the running of a firm to fight takeover bids. In the process of characterizing an optimal contract, the revelation principle is re-examined. Received: 12 April 1996 / Accepted: 3 December 1997     

Water use efficiency and public goods conservation: A spatial stochastic frontier model applied to irrigation in Southern Italy

Water used for irrigation is essential for global food production. Increased water scarcity, due to climate change, is a constraint to agricultural development, especially in arid and semi-arid areas. This increases pressure on agriculture which often manages water inefficiently and competes with other sectors for water use. Enhancing farmers’ production efficiency may lead to substantial water savings and conservation. Public sector is called to play a role in water governance and to introduce appropriate multilevel regulatory and incentive measures for better water management. This work applies a spatial stochastic frontier model to the case of high water-demanding fruit and vegetable crops in the Apulia region of Southern Italy, where water is scarce due to semi-arid climate and erratic rainfall. Using cross-sectional data from the EU Farm Accountancy Data Network, this work incorporates firm specific heterogeneity into technical efficiency analysis and implements an autoregressive specification of the inefficiency component. Results support the hypothesis that spatial heterogeneity exists in on-farm efficiency of irrigated crop production and is adequately captured by the spatial stochastic frontier model approach. Technical efficiency of farms with similar structural and management characteristics greatly varies across crops and geographical areas, because of the different natural resource endowment and agro-climatic factors. Policies providing incentives to on-farm adoption of modern water-saving technologies and measures to promote small family farm activities could effectively contribute to water conservation goal, but they should be well-articulated to account for agriculture spatial diverseness.     

A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology

Abstract. Studying one-input one-output economies, we say that an allocation is proportional if the input-output ratio is identical among agents and if each agent maximizes her welfare given this ratio. We propose three equity axioms based on this definition, and we use them to compare the main solutions to this simple equity problem. We also combine efficiency, robustness axioms and our proportionality axioms to characterize two solutions. Received: 11 June 1997 / Accepted: 26 May 2000     

Complexity of Innovation in the public sector: A workgroup-level analysis of related factors and outcomes

Complex innovation incorporates more than one innovation type. Using the number of dimensions of the ‘most significant innovation’ implemented by each public employee’s workgroup as a proxy for innovation complexity, this study explores factors that are associated with complexity and examines how complexity affects innovation outcomes. Employing a sample of 4,369 Australian Government employees, we find that the more complex the innovation, the greater the number of barriers a workgroup has to face in its implementation. A broader (but selective) range of idea sources and a more decentralized workplace where both individual and team creativity is encouraged increase the likelihood of implementing complex innovations. Innovation complexity is positively correlated with the variety of beneficial outcomes, suggesting both policy and management interest in supporting complex innovation in the public sector.     

Trading equilibrium in a public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers

Lindahl and Nash equilibria are often used in the theory of public good. Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998) present an example of 2-person economy with one private good and one pure public good, where the core efficient Lindahl allocation does not Pareto dominate the (inefficient) Nash allocation. In this paper we introduce the new concept of Trading equilibrium for a general public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers. We obtain that this economy admits a unique Trading equilibrium. Moreover, the Trading equilibrium induces a core allocation that strictly Pareto dominates the Nash allocation.