Transparency and trust: the case of the European Central Bank

We examine how the transparency of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy affects the amount of trust that the citizens of the European Union have in this institution. We use nearly half a million individual responses from the European Commission’s Eurobarometer survey from 2000 to 2011 and estimate probit regressions with sample selection. We find that transparency exerts a non-linear effect on trust. Transparency increases trust, but only up to a certain point; too much transparency harms trust. This result is robust to controlling for a number of macroeconomic conditions, financial stability transparency measures, and economic and socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, including examining respondents in European Union countries that do not use the euro and addressing clustering issues.     

Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design

Abstract. The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two‐stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is taken into account, there is a continuum of combinations of central bank independence and conservatism that produce optimal outcomes. This indeterminacy is resolved by appealing to practical considerations. In particular, it is argued that full central bank independence facilitates the greatest degree of policy transparency and political coherence.     

货币政策有效性与货币政策透明制度的兴起

本文着重探讨货币政策透明性与货币政策有效性之间的关系,目的在于说明货币政策透明制度能够兴起的一个关键因素在于货币政策的透明性有利于提高货币政策的有效性。在标准的“时间不一致性”理论里面,货币政策是否透明对货币政策的效应是没有影响的,因为在这类理论里面,经济主体能够使用所有可获得的信息形成与经济系统相一致的、无偏的估计。但问题的关键在于,这种假设的基本前提在实践中并不完全成立。当考虑到经济主体对经济运行结果和经济运行过程的不完全认知时,货币政策透明性对于促进经济主体的学习过程,稳定和引导公众的通胀预期,进而提高货币政策的有效性就起着至关重要的作用。     

Learning from Japan: The European Central Bank and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

What shapes central banks’ learning from the policy experiments of their peers? Both economic ideas and organizational interests play important roles. Thus, New Keynesian ideas led central banks to interpret Japan's experience with quantitative easing (2001–2006) through the impact on risk spreads, although the Japanese central bank never intended such effects. In turn, scholars and policy-makers alike ignored one critical lesson: successful policy innovations depend on banks’ funding models. It is argued here that this was a crucial omission because the shift to market-based funding impairs the effectiveness of the traditional crisis toolkit. Central banks must intervene directly in asset markets of systemic importance for funding conditions, as the Bank of Japan did by buying government bonds. Hence, market-based finance engenders a trade-off between financial stability and institutional stability defined through central bank independence. During critical periods, central banks cannot preserve both. The ECB illustrates this trade-off well. Early in the crisis, it outsourced financial stability to a (largely) market-dependent banking system to protect its independence. With the introduction of Outright Monetary Transactions in September 2012, the Bank recognized that the market-based nature of European banking required outright purchases of sovereign bonds. This new instrument gave the ECB additional powers to shape national fiscal decisions in the name of an independence that no longer has theoretical justifications.     

Interests and 'Independence': The European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy

The European Central Bank has an unprecedented degree of statutory independence. This is presumably attributable to the view that central banks, unimpeded by external forces, pursue the public interest. That presumption has not always been common in the economics literature, even in the discussion of central banking. The theory of bureaucracy suggests that such institutions pursue their own interests. It is here applied to the European central bank as it was in the past to other central banks. First, consideration is given to what is today implied by the view that central banks are primarily interested in maintaining their independence, maximising their discretion, and avoiding blame for poor outcomes. Second, the ECB's explanations of how it sees its role and status and its presentation of its strategy are considered. Certain limitations in the form of obscure explanation, confused analysis and selective referencing are identified. These appear to suggest that the ECB is concerned with the pursuit of its own agenda. Particular attention is drawn to the danger of paying too much attention to what it says about its own 'accountability'.     

National representation in supranational institutions: The case of the European Central Bank

Supranational institutions face an important trade-off when hiring personnel. On the one hand, hiring decisions are based, as in most organizations, on a candidate’s professional qualifications. On the other hand, supranational institutions often aim for broad national representation. Reviewing evidence from the European Central Bank, we show that nationality is indeed relevant for both hiring and decision-making. Specifically, we find a disproportionately narrow spread of national representation in the top management of the ECB. Further, there is evidence for the existence of national networks between adjacent management layers. Finally, monetary policy decisions seem to be linked to national representation in the core business areas of the ECB. Examining a sample of 27 European countries over the period from 1999 to 2008, we estimate Taylor rules for alternative sets of euro area aggregates derived from different weighting schemes of national macroeconomic data. Our results indicate that weights based on national representation in the mid-level management of the ECB’s core business areas best describe the central bank’s interest-rate setting behavior.     

Bashing and supporting central banks: the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank

In this paper, we analyse the influences leading to external pressure on or public support for German and European monetary policy. Based upon the findings for the Deutsche Bundesbank, lessons are drawn for the European Central Bank (ECB). We show that external pressure on the ECB stems mainly from politicians or from international organisations (such as the IMF). In contrast with evidence for the Bundesbank, interest groups (such as commercial banks) hardly attempt to influence European monetary policy. German data show that factors leading to external pressure on the central bank are rising unemployment and the threat that governments will lose their majority in the next election. Evidence for the latter is, however, weak, and we show that in any case this source of pressure is likely to be of minor importance for the ECB.     

The Evolution of European Central Bank Independence: An Updating of the Masciandaro and Spinelli Index

In an earlier paper in this journal, Masciandaro and Spinelli computed an index of central bank independence for a number of countries on the basis of the institutional arrangements in place in 1990. Since then the situation has changed and therefore that work needs an updating. This shows that the Bundesbank remains the most independent central bank, but several other central banks have increased their independence: see the cases of Spain, Italy, France, the Netherlands and Great Britain. The Bank of Spain has registered the biggest improvement and the Bank of Portugal remains the least independent.     

Spillovers of volatility index: evidence from U.S., European,and Asian stock markets

We investigated the cross-market relations of volatility indexes with U.S. and non-U.S. stock market returns. We found that the pervasive VIX influence at both U.S. and non-U.S. stock markets. The VSTOXX and VKOSPI capture the major shocks to the global economy and show movements similar to the VIX. The empirical findings indicate that volatility index changes are important in explaining stock returns. We also examined spillover effects across volatility indexes. The VIX is a main transmitter, and the VKOSPI the main receiver, of these spillovers. The results point to a leading role for the VIX in the international market.     

The Repo Auctions of the European Central Bank and the Vanishing Quota Puzzle*

Until June 2000 the European Central Bank (ECB) used fixed rate tenders for its weekly repo auctions. A switch to variable rate tenders became necessary due to massive overbidding by banks. In this paper we introduce a stylized game among banks to investigate this overbidding phenomenon. Our results confirm the weakness of the fixed rate tender format and indicate that the ECB's liquidity management has significantly improved since the switch to the variable rate system. Yet recent episodes of rate cut expectations suggest that the ECB's practice of setting a minimum bid rate should be abandoned in favor of a more symmetric interest rate target.     

Baland,J.-M., Bourguignon,F., Platteau,J.-P. and T. Verdier,The Handbook of Economic Development and Institutions

Journal of Economics -     

Central Bank Independence,Inflation and Uncertainty: The Case of Colombia

Colombia undertook reform of its central bank in 1991, pushing it in the direction of greater independence. We find that this reform led to a significant decrease in the level of inflation, as well as inflation uncertainty, suggesting an increase in credibility. However, there has also been an increase in inflation persistence since reform. The lower mean but greater persistence of inflation indicates that central bank independence has shifted the Phillips curve inward but also flattened it, a result consistent with recent research for the Euro-zone and the United States. Finally, further analysis reveals that, in accordance with the Friedman-Ball hypothesis, higher inflation raises uncertainty in Colombia, but that uncertainty does not increase inflation.     

The Monetary Policies of the European Central Bank and the Euro's (Mal-)Performance: A stability-oriented assessment

The stability-oriented macroeconomic framework established in the Treaties on European Union, especially the unparalleled status of independence and peculiar mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB), were promised virtually to guarantee price stability and a strong euro. Shattering these hopes and promises in a rather drastic way, the euro's external value has declined markedly while consumer price inflation has quadrupled since the new currency's inception. This paper assesses the ECB's role in relation to the euro's (mal-)performance. It challenges the truly odd conventional wisdom that, despite these dismal monetary developments, neither the Maastricht regime nor the ECB might possibly be at fault. Reviewing the ECB's interest rate policies and scrutinising its rationale, a conspicuous anti-growth bias is diagnosed that has produced rather perverse consequences.This stability-oriented assessment concludes that the ECB has been key to the 'euro puzzle', propagating euro weakness and pushing up inflation. Euroland's democratically elected representatives are therefore urged to reform Europe's key structural problem, namely, the ECB, an independent monetary policymaker whose unbounded discretion allows it to pursue ill-guided and thoroughly idiosyncratic policies without being held to account for the consequences.