基于生存分析的腐败潜伏时间研究

工程建设领域腐败现象丛生,腐败问题引起了全社会的高度关注。文章将工程领域腐败分为工程腐败、房地产腐败和复合腐败三类,发现三类中房地产腐败的腐败金额最高,工程腐败是当前工程建设领域最主要的腐败形式,在腐败潜伏时间方面,三个类型的潜伏时间都较长,大于5年的生存率均大于50%,工程腐败生存率相对其他两类较低。     

国企腐败发生的机理．危害与治理策略

国有企业腐败的发生有其内在机理，只有同时具备腐败动机、腐败条件和腐败机会这三个因素，腐败行为才会发生。而任由国有企业腐败的肆意蔓延却不加以遏制，必将会严重威胁到经济、社会、政治等各方面的稳定发展。本研究在准确把握国有企业腐败发生的机理、深刻认识其严重危害的基础上，结合国有企业的特殊性，从五方面提出了治理国有企业腐败的具体对策。     

产权性质、高管薪酬与高管腐败——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

文章以2007-2012年A股上市公司作为研究样本,根据腐败行为发现的可能性将上市公司高管腐败分为显性腐败和隐性腐败。实证研究发现:(1)对于显性腐败,高管高薪可以起到抑制腐败的作用,但是由于国有企业天生与政府存在亲属关系,这种抑制作用要弱于非国有企业;(2)对于隐性腐败,高薪并不能起到抑制腐败的功效,并且高管薪酬与隐性腐败存在正相关关系,支持了管理层权力理论。相对于国有企业,非国有企业高管薪酬与隐性腐败的正相关关系更为显著。     

论权力腐败与会计造假

透视以往的重大权力腐败案件,我们可以看到许多权力腐败行为与总会计师（会计负责人）直接造假密不可分,贪腐所涉及到的钱财物或明或暗地潜伏在会计记录之中,当权者与总会计师（会计负责人）的“结盟式”腐败使大量的腐败活动顺利通过了会计这一“关卡”。为什么会计人员会成为权力腐败的帮凶？会计人员为权力腐败提供了哪些便利条件？会计人员怎样才能顶住腐败主体要求会计造假的压力？本文将就这些问题展开探讨。     

审计机关与监察委协同治理腐败机制研究——基于无影灯效应

腐败治理一直以来是社会热点话题,近年来关于反腐机制构建的创新理论层出不穷。在腐败治理中,单一监管机构的力量难以对腐败形成有效遏制,而协同治理腐败是必然趋势。在我国,协同治理腐败的态势已经形成,但其效果还有待提高。无影灯效应理论,其为腐败协同机制的构建提供了重要思路。本文在无影灯效应与协同理论分析的基础上,根据无影灯效应四要素——数量、强度、角度、平台初步构建了腐败协同治理的机制,并提出了相应的保障措施。     

采购腐败控制方法研究综述

基于近年来有关采购腐败控制方法研究的文献,将采购腐败控制方法归纳为四大类,即:基于采购参与人员本身;基于采购流程;基于监督体制以及基于收益、成本分析的采购腐败控制方法,详细阐述分析了这些采购腐败控制防治方法,最后展望了采购腐败控制方法的研究前景.     

采购腐败控制方法研究综述

基于近年来有关采购腐败控制方法研究的文献，将采购腐败控制方法归纳为四大类，即：基于采购参与人员本身；基于采购流程；基于监督体制以及基于收益、成本分析的采购腐败控制方法，详细阐述分析了这些采购腐败控制防治方法，最后展望了采购腐败控制方法的研究前景。     

国有企业腐败治理策略研究

随着反腐败力度的加大,国有企业腐败呈现出新的发展特点,如涉案金额巨大、腐败行为集团化、＂59岁现象＂突出等。如今,国有企业腐败有进一步扩大和蔓延的趋势,国有企业腐败问题已引起社会各界的广泛关注和高度重视。因此,本研究在分析国有企业腐败表现特点的基础上,结合国有企业的特殊性,提出了治理国有企业腐败的四项原则,并在这四项原则的框架下提出了治理国有企业腐败的具体策略。     

官本位下的金融腐败

2005年,两家进行股份制改造试点的国有银行--中国银 行和建设银行相继发生了令人震惊的金融腐败案件:中行河松 街支行10亿元大案和建行董事长张恩照因涉嫌贪污腐败而被 "双规"。为何中国屡屡发生大的金融腐败案件?《中国金融腐 败的经济学分析》一书对中国的金融腐败进行了全方位的探索, 试图从理论上对中国的金融腐败进行全面的解释。 关于中国的金融腐败,有两个问题可以继续深入思考。 第一个问题,银行腐败大案带给银行本身的成本有多大? 该书的作者认为,银行业与证券业的腐败直接导致了两个市场 不良资产的攀升。其实,对于中行和建行来说,金融腐败的成     

浅谈“非传统腐败”——新时期“非传统腐败”的特点及治理途径

随着公国经济的快速发展,城市化、工业化、现代化进程的推进,掌握者特定权利的国家公务人员为了获取更大的个人利益,催生着腐败问题不断地升级,并逐渐地由传统腐败向着非传统腐败演变,让腐败具有了"权钱合作"、"温和腐败"和"跨国腐败"等等特点,隐蔽性越来越高,危害性越来越大,对国家经济的持续发展和政治的长治久安有很大的负面影响,本文首先分析非传统腐败形成及特点,接着就如何治理非传统腐败献计献策。     

Measures of corruption and determinants of US corruption

This paper contributes to the literature by examining whether conclusions from empirical models of corruption determinants are robust with respect to three alternative measures of corrupt activity for the US states. Are the determinants of US corruption sensitive to the choice of the measure of corruption? Overall, the answer to this question is that the choice of the measure of corruption matters in explaining corruption. However, some findings are robust across measures. For instance, greater educational attainment lowers corruption, while greater judicial employment adds to corruption. Southern states were found to be more corrupt, ceteris paribus. We also provide evidence that it is important to control for enforcement efforts in empirical modeling using convictions as a measure of corruption. Significant differences, however, across corruption measures occur in a number of other instances. Specifically, the effects of urbanization, economic prosperity, population size, media, government spending, and enforcement are sensitive to the measure of corruption. Further, the influences of the nation’s foreign neighbors and of the location of the state relative to the nation’s capital remain unclear.     

充分发挥跟踪审计在预防高校基建工程腐败中的作用

在高校的基建工程中要充分发挥跟踪审计的事前预警作用、过程监督作用、违规查处作用和免疫系统作用,达到有效预防腐败、主动发现腐败、严厉惩治腐败、有力遏制腐败的效果,把跟踪审计作为预防高校基建腐败的一条有效途径。     

跨国公司与东道国腐败程度相互影响机制研究

本文对于跨国公司所面临的腐败问题做了一个探索性的研究,首先指出发展中国家普遍存在的腐败问题会对进入该国的跨国公司产生影响;然后给出跨国公司与东道国制度环境(腐败)相互影响的机制;接着论述跨国公司在东道国的分公司的特殊角色,指出在应对腐败现象时它同时受到多方面的影响;第四部分论述东道国的腐败现象通过哪些方式会给跨国公司造成影响,产生成本;最后论述跨国公司又是通过怎样的途径反过来影响东道国的腐败商务环境的。     

Strategic location of firms: Does it empower bribe givers or bribe takers?

This paper uses survey data on the corruption experience (rather than corruption perceptions) of firms located in different types of cities in more than one hundred countries to analyze the impact of firms’ strategic location on corruption. In a corrupt economy, location might influence the ability of bureaucrats/politicians and firms to extract and dodge rents. Placing the analysis in the literature on determinants of corruption, our results reveal that the corruption experiences of firms located in nations’ capital cities are qualitatively different from firms located elsewhere: they do not experience greater corruption, while firms in large cities and main business cities do. However, when manufacturing and service firms are considered separately, their corruption experience and perceptions differ.     

Privilege and Corruption: The Problems of China's Socialist Market Economy

It is well known that China's corruption problem has become more and more serious during the period of economic reform. This paper examines China's corruption problem with the help of several simple economic models. The author proposes the concepts of implicit corruption and explicit corruption. We explain how the granting of privileges has directly created implicit corruption in China's socialist market economy. We argue that the long-term existence of the same privileged group in Chinese society has led to widespread collusion among its members, and as a result, these privileged group members, by utilizing their monopoly power, are able to seize almost all the wealth created by the ordinary Chinese people. This seizure is accomplished by means of a two-part tariff in pricing their administrative service, which is the essence of the explicit corruption. Finally, we point out that, because both implicit corruption and explicit corruption are generated by China's political system, which grants and protects privileges, unless a political reform is initiated and privileges are eliminated, China's problem of corruption will never be solved.     

Exports and cross-national corruption: A disaggregated examination

This paper empirically examines the relation between categories of exports and corruption across countries. Aggregate exports and agricultural exports tend to decrease corruption, while fuel exports increase corruption. The influence of agricultural exports in more pronounced in more corrupt nations, while fuel exports contribute to corruption in least corrupt nations. Manufacturing and ore exports, on the other hand, generally fail to show significant impacts on corruption. Our findings demonstrate that the resource curse is sensitive to prevailing corruption levels, and this finding is novel in the literature. Consistent with the extant literature, corruption decreases with income, and (at some corruption levels) as political freedom increases, and with larger government size. The findings are fairly robust to an alternate corruption measure.     

How corruption affects bank lending in Russia

The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of corruption on bank lending in Russia. This issue is of major interest in order to understand the causes of financial underdevelopment and the effects of corruption in Russia. We use regional measures of corruption and bank-level data to perform this investigation. Our main estimations show that corruption hampers bank lending in Russia. We investigate whether this negative role of corruption is influenced by the degree of bank risk aversion, but find no effect. The detrimental effect of corruption is only observed for loans to households and firms, in opposition to loans to government. Additional controls confirm the detrimental impact of corruption on bank lending. Therefore, our results provide motivations to fight corruption to favor bank lending in Russia.     

Causes of corruption: a survey of cross-country analyses and extended results

We survey and assess the empirical literature on the sources of corruption Thanks to the improved availability of data, we are able to produce an improved cross-country econometric model to test well-established and more recent hypotheses jointly. We do not find that the common law system, or a past as a British colony predicts corruption. Our results support cultural theories on the causes of corruption, and suggest that a medium-long exposure to uninterrupted democracy is associated with lower corruption levels, while political instability tends to raise corruption. Our results also suggest that the diffusion of newspapers helps to lower corruption levels.      

Growth and welfare effects of corruption penalties

This paper analyses the steady-state effect of business corruption penalties on economic growth, corruption and welfare. To that end, the baseline horizontal R&D growth model is extended to include corruption, which is generated in intermediate goods production. Taxation on corruption depresses profits in production but also wages, leading to labor being reallocated from production to R&D, and, therefore, to a higher economic growth rate. Moreover, it also reduces corruption and increases welfare if preferences towards a corruption-free environment are strong enough. The results are in line with the data observed for 15 EU countries.     

The effect of corruption on the manufacturing sector in India

This article investigates the effects of corruption on the performance of the manufacturing sector at the state level in India. We employ conviction rates of corruption-related cases as an instrument for the extent of corruption, address the underreporting problem, and examine the impact of corruption on the gross value added per worker, total factor productivity, and capital-labor ratio of three-digit manufacturing industries in each state. Our estimation results show that corruption reduces gross value added per worker and total factor productivity. Furthermore, we show that the adverse effects of corruption are more salient in industries with smaller average firm size.