Ownership Differences,Auditor Reputation,and Debt Financing: Evidence from China

This research examines whether “the paradox of auditor reputation” exists in China’s private debt market. Two types of hypotheses are developed to explain the “paradox” in terms of ownership differences. Our findings suggest: (1) by retaining big name auditors, non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) significantly reduce the cost of debt and lower financial constraints; (2) For the non-SOEs, the effect of auditor reputation on the cost of debt and financial constraints declines over time due to the accumulation of these firms’ own reputation; (3) SOEs are more sensitive to the interest rate of bank loans than their counterparts, implying their stronger bargaining power when negotiating with potential creditors than non-SOEs due to their government connections. However, SOEs’ government connections weaken the informational role of auditors and firm reputation on signaling debt market; and (4) Corporate governance is taken into consideration by creditors as an important indicator of solvency. Further investigation demonstrates that after controlling for firm size, operating cash flow, profitability and leverage ratio, the possibility of hiring big name auditors by the younger and median-aged group of non-SOEs is considerably higher than “elder” non-SOEs. Moreover, poor-performing SOEs have greater incentives to make use of their government connections in their bargaining for lower debt cost, as compared with their well-performing peers.     

Political uncertainty and investments by private and state-owned enterprises

We study corporate investments around national elections in India. Investment rates drop by a nonsignificant 2.2% for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in election years. The decrease is significantly larger for private firms, which record an investment drop of 7.4%. The decrease in investment for private firms is likely attributable to political uncertainty. SOEs balance political uncertainty with the desire to woo voters who want government investments. Investments in election years are perceived positively for both private firms and for SOEs. Increased investment by SOEs and reduction in investment by private firms during election years are associated with improved investment efficiency.     

Decentralization and Firm Investments: Evidence from China

Taking advantage of decentralization reform that enlarges the authority of county government in China, we construct a quasi‐experiment. Using a large sample of Chinese firms, we show that after the implementation of decentralization reform, firms located in decentralized counties experienced a significant increase in investment expenditure compared with other firms. We also find that after the decentralization reform, state owned enterprises (SOEs) experienced greater increase in investment expenditure on average compared with non‐SOEs, and that, within non‐SOEs, collective firms have an even larger increase in investments, followed by foreign firms and private firms. Further analysis shows that the influence of decentralization reform was more significant in more developed markets, and that the increased investment was associated with improved productivity, which was more pronounced in SOEs. These results are robust to an alternative sample and endogeneity issues. Overall, these findings support the view that decentralization reform improves government efficiency and creates positive externalities, thereby encouraging firms to invest.     

Origin matters: Institutional imprinting and family firm innovation in China

During the early 1990s, a swathe of small state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was privatized as family businesses in China. This paper examines whether and how the origin (i.e., restructured vs. entrepreneurial) of family firms affects corporate innovation. Using the data of Chinese family firms from 2009 to 2018, we find that restructured family firms generate fewer patents generally than entrepreneurial family firms, but create more high-quality patents than their entrepreneurial counterparts. This effect is more pronounced for those family firms which had formerly been SOEs for a more extended period, without generational succession, and previously controlled by governments entirely. Further mechanism tests show that restructured family firms have a higher likelihood of hiring professional managers, are subject to less intervention from family members, and have fewer informal hierarchies, providing direct evidence for the institutional imprinting channel. Our findings suggest that the institutional imprint underlying the origin of family firms can be critical to their innovation decisions.     

Venture capitalists at work: A diff-in-diff approach at late-stages of the screening process

In this paper we use a new methodology aimed at identifying only the venture capitalists (VC) treatment effect: we compare a representative sample of firms financed by private VC in the period 2004–2014 with a sample of firms rejected by VC at the very late-stages of the screening process. These firms narrowly lost the contest and are hence very similar, before VC financing, to the VC backed firms; self-selection is specifically taken into account. In line with previous results, Italian startups financed by VC reach a larger size and become more innovative than other startups. On the contrary, sales growth is similar and profitability is worse than firms in the control group. VC-backed companies experience larger rise in labor costs, while the commercialization of their innovative projects takes longer: this explains their worse profitability and the deterioration in their credit score. Both effects tend to disappear after four years from VC financing, when sales increase for VC-backed firms at the same pace as for the control group. Unlike other studies, no differences are detected for the survivorship rates of VC-backed firms in Italy. We also provide new evidence on the impact of VC on firms’ financial structures: VC-backed firms show a much larger increase in equity; this rise is however only half the increase in total assets that is hence not only explained by the injection of VC equity. Another result in this direction is that the effects on firms’ size and innovation hold when we restrict the control group to firms that also increase their equity from investors different from VC; this suggests that VC effects on size and innovation might also be linked to their managerial expertise and network connections. Finally, in line with previous evidence, the effects found in the paper are exclusively driven by independent VC investors compared with captive VC.     

控股股东所有权结构、产权性质与高管薪酬决定的掏空效应

本文基于股东间代理问题视角,利用2007~2011年我国A股上市公司数据,实证考察了高管薪酬的过度支付是否会成为控股股东实现控制权私利的一种路径。研究发现：在地方国企中,高管薪酬水平与控股股东的现金流权显著负相关,与控股股东控制权与现金流权的两权分离度显著正相关,但这一结论在央企和民营企业中均不成立。这表明地方国企高管薪酬决定存在明显的掏空效应。本文的研究结论对于深化国企高管薪酬管理制度改革具有政策启示涵义。     

Political patronage and firm performance: Further evidence from Malaysia

This paper investigates the characteristics, performance, and share price reaction of politically connected firms versus a control sample of independent firms in Malaysia. Politically connected firms had higher level of leverage, lower profitability, and lower sales to profitability, and paid lower taxes and lower dividends compared to independent firms. Their share prices increase with the announcement of favorable political events. In terms of performance, the active rent‐seeking activities in return for preferential treatment produce comparable performance to independent firms during an economic upturn. However, their performance deteriorates more than independent firms during an economic downturn. The percentage of ownership of government institutions in politically connected firms is also much lower, and these firms use more Tier 1 auditors than the independent firms. Overall, the findings are consistent with expectations and evidence from similar studies in developed and developing economies. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Philanthropic disaster relief giving as a response to institutional pressure: Evidence from China

This paper investigates if firms under high institutional pressure donate more to disaster relief than firms under lower institutional pressure. By taking Chinese listed companies' donations to May 12, 2008 Wenchuan earthquake as the sample, this research finds that large firms and firms who have political ties donate a significant more to disaster relief than smaller firms and firms who do not have political ties. But the findings indicate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) donate no more than non SOEs, and service companies donate significantly less than non-service companies. The results of this research partly support the institutional point of view of corporate philanthropy. Firms under high institutional pressure are more likely to donate more than firms facing lower institutional pressure.     

Performance of domestic and foreign-invested enterprises in China

Despite increasing attention paid to China's enterprise reform since the late 1970s, relatively little is known about the performance of reformed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and newly formed private firms vis-à-vis foreign firms in China. In this study, we examine the performance of domestic Chinese firms in various ownership categories versus foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) based on two nation-wide surveys conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics in 1998 and 2002. We found that both domestic non-state-owned firms and foreign-invested enterprises performed better than state-owned enterprises. Meanwhile, three categories of Chinese firms—privately owned, collectively owned, and shareholding—had higher performance levels than the foreign-invested enterprises.     

Bank Work Experience Versus Political Connections: Which Matters for Bank Loan Financing?

This paper examines how bank lending decisions are affected either by executives’ connections with banks, through their former banking experience, or by their political connections with governments, using a sample of bank loans granted to Chinese listed non‐state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2003 to 2010. We find that bank loans are more closely related to profitability for firms with bank connections, while firms’ political connections weaken this relationship. We further find that the influence of bank connections is more significant for firms from less supported industries or less developed regions. Furthermore, firms with bank connections are less likely to become financially distressed after the initiation of their bank loans and experience higher future stock returns, while firms with political connections experience the opposite outcome. Overall, our results indicate that in the context of a relationship‐based economy like China, firms’ connections with banks create value by alleviating information asymmetry and improving banks’ lending decisions, while political connections result in capital misallocation and subsequent deterioration in performance.     

Share Repurchase Reasons and the Market Reaction to Actual Share Repurchases: Evidence from Australia

Using repurchase reasons provided by Australian companies for their stock repurchase programs, we ask if the market's response is different across repurchase motivations by examining actual daily share repurchases. We find that firms with the undervaluation motive experience a more positive stock price reaction when they report their repurchases to the market. We show that undervaluation motive firms repurchase fewer shares and have a lower program completion rate than other motives firms. During the 1‐year period following the repurchases, undervaluation motive firms do better than their control sample firms whereas other motive firms do not perform better or worse than their control sample firms. Overall, our results suggest that the undervaluation motive is a stronger signal than other repurchase motives, and contrary to the predictions of the standard signaling theories, management statements carry some value for the market. We also present some evidence suggesting that a costly action may not be needed for a signal to be credible.     

Is ‘Good’ governance good for business? A cross-national analysis of firms in African countries

Good governance can reduce uncertainty, transaction, search and production costs, and ultimately affect firm performance. In this paper, we explore the link between good governance and the profitability of individual firms in African countries. We employ the governance indices developed at the World Bank and assemble a sample of companies from 21 countries over four years. Contrary to prior research that found a negative association between institutional development and profitability, our evidence shows that an improvement of good governance in countries currently with low levels of governance ratings has greater positive effects on the firm profitability than a similar improvement in countries with relatively higher ratings of good governance. Good governance reduces the variability of the company's profitability, leading to high-return and low-risk investments. Finally, we find that the role of good governance depends upon the country's income level. When the income level is lower, an improvement in public governance is more likely to impact firm performance than when the income level is relatively higher. Good governance is more important for the stability of the profitability of firms in countries with higher levels of good governance ratings than lower ratings.     

Financing patterns in transition economies: Privatized former SOEs versus ab initio private firms

We employ 37,987 firms in 30 transition economies to investigate the relation between the origins of private firms and their financing patterns. We find that relative to ab initio (from the beginning) private firms, privatized former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) finance a higher proportion of their fixed assets from bank finance (especially from state-owned banks) and supplier credit. We argue that privatized former SOEs continue to benefit from the political and financial connections established during their SOE era. We document that country governance, financial development and legal origins play an important role in the financing patterns of privatized versus private firms.     

China’s WTO Accession and Long-Term Profitability of Chinese Firms

As emerging economies integrate their markets with the rest of the world, competition-driven changes in profitability are increasingly affected by shocks of various types from the business environment. We examine the dynamics of profitability distributions under such conditions using China’s WTO accession as a natural experiment to carry out before and after comparisons. Our results suggest that after WTO accession, the long-run (ergodic) distribution of conditional profitability rates of Chinese firms has become more dispersed. Due to the large proportion of firms at the poor performance end, this suggests that the financial stability of the Chinese economy will be endangered if the business environment were to deteriorate. There is an urgent need to reduce the widening span of the distribution of profitability at the lower end by accelerating the restructuring of Chinese companies.     

Formal and informal influences of the state on OFDI of hybrid state-owned enterprises in China

This study investigates how the state influences the outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) of hybrid state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. Previous studies have provided conflicting arguments and empirical findings on the internationalization of SOEs, with some studies proposing a positive relationship between state ownership and OFDI, while others propose a negative relationship. In this paper, we argue that the mixed effects are due to different influences of different levels of state ownership and different types of political connections. We investigate our proposed hypotheses based on a sample of publicly listed hybrid Chinese SOEs between 2009 and 2016. We find an S-shaped relationship between state ownership and OFDI such that at low levels of state ownership, OFDI increases as state ownership increases; at medium levels of state ownership, OFDI decreases as state ownership increases; at high levels of state ownership, OFDI increases again as state ownership increases. We further find that executive-branch political connections between boards and top management teams of firms and the government have a negative effect on OFDI, while legislative-branch political connections have no significant effect on OFDI.     

Foreign acquisition and post-privatization exit of state-owned firms

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign and domestic ownership on the exit rates of privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in transitional countries. The exit of privatized SOEs can have a profound impact on employment and on the development of local economies of transitional countries. An oligopoly model that incorporates country-level trade costs and individual SOE's productivity is developed to assess the exit of SOEs under either foreign or domestic ownership. The model shows that market competition between firms can lead to liquidation of the SOE by a domestic firm when trade costs increase. When the productivity of SOE is high, neither foreign nor domestic firm will liquidate. The predictions of the model are tested using firm-level privatization data from Central and Eastern Europe. By controlling for productivity, trade costs, and other attributes of SOEs after privatization, it is found that foreign ownership significantly reduces the probability of SOE's exit as compared to domestic ownership. Furthermore, there is evidence that as trade costs increase, the exit probability of domestically owned SOEs increases and the exit probability of foreign-owned SOEs declines.     

How Does Corporate Governance Affect Loan Collateral? Evidence from Chinese SOEs and Non‐SOEs

We examine the effect of corporate governance on the collateral requirements for firms' bank loans in China. We find that firms with lower excess control rights and other large shareholders face lower collateral requirements, which is more pronounced in non‐state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) than in SOEs. Regarding board characteristics, we find that smaller board size, more independent directors, separation of the positions of CEO and chairman, and larger supervisory board size can reduce a firm's use of collateral; the effect of all the preceding characteristics is more pronounced in SOEs. Overall, our research suggests that, in China, corporate governance structures are able to affect bank‐lending decisions in respect of collateral requirements and that the influence depends on the controlling shareholder type and associated agency problems.     

Global strategies,differing experiences. Electricity companies in two late-industrialising countries: Spain and Argentina, 1890–1950

The article compares the performance and profitability rates of electric utility firms in Spain and Argentina from the early period of global electrification to the period following World War 2. It aims to analyse the relationship between the investment strategies of international electricity companies and local conditions in two late-industrialising countries, and evaluate its impact on the structure and development of both electric utility systems. The study finds similar long-term trends in profitability as a result of the global strategies of multinational holding companies; nonetheless profitability rates varied greatly from one country to another. Rates were higher in Argentina as foreign firms controlled large systems in most dynamic urban areas. In contrast, the increasing investment of local firms in electric utilities paved the way to a less profitable but more equitable electricity system in Spain.     

Analysis of Relative Growth Rates Between Domestic and International Earnings of U.S. Based Publicly Traded Restaurant Firms

ABSTRACT

This study explores the relative growth rates in earnings of public restaurant firms for a 20-year period from 1981-2000. No significant differences were found in sales growth between multinational and domestic restaurant firms. However, multinational firms significantly outperformed domestic firms in growth of operating income and pre-tax profitability. Multinational restaurant firms also had significantly lower negative growth in domestic earnings when compared to domestic firms. The results imply that multinational restaurant firms are more efficient than domestic firms in converting sales into profits.