The effect of framing and negotiation partner’s objective on judgments about negotiated transfer prices

A common approach to set transfer prices is via intra-firm negotiation. However, Luft and Libby [Luft, J. L., & Libby, R. (1997). Profit comparisons, market prices and managers’ judgments about negotiated transfer prices. The Accounting Review, 72(2), 217–229] found that because of the existence of self-serving biases, negotiating managers have different expectations regarding what constitutes a ‘fair’ transfer price, leading to a less efficient negotiation process. In this study, we examine two factors that are expected to affect managers’ transfer price negotiation judgments, namely, framing as a gain or as a loss and the negotiation partner’s objective (whether the partner’s objective involves high or low concern-for-others). We propose that these two factors affect managers’ perceptions of the negotiation context, and thus the way they interpret the economic and social consequences of accounting information. Our results show that a loss frame (compared to a gain frame) exacerbates managers’ self-serving biases and increases the ‘transfer price expectation gap’ between buyers and sellers. Further, in our experiment where market price is higher than equal-profit price, we find that managers’ transfer price expectations are lower (and deviate more from the prevailing market price) when they are negotiating with a partner with high concern-for-others than with a partner with low concern-for-others. We discuss the broader implications of these results for the design of management accounting systems.     

Equity grants to target CEOs during deal negotiations

I investigate the determinants and consequences of granting equity to the target's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) during deal negotiations. These negotiation grants likely reflect information about the acquisition, benefit from the deal premium, and provide more timely bargaining incentives. I find that CEOs are more likely to receive equity during negotiations when they negotiate for the target, particularly when the target has more bargaining power. This suggests that boards use equity to enhance bargaining incentives for CEOs with the most influence over deal price. I find limited evidence that negotiation grants are used as compensation and no evidence that they have a material adverse effect on shareholders.     

Transfer Price Negotiation in the Presence of Unequal Bargaining Power: The Effect of a Peer Evaluation Scheme on Inter-divisional Profit Distribution

This study examines how managers balance economic incentives and inter-divisional equity considerations during transfer price negotiations. Our experiment shows that both buyers and sellers are willing to give up a significant amount of their profits to pursue a more equitable outcome (one that results in greater inter-divisional profit equalisation). We also find that incorporating peer evaluation schemes into negotiators' formal incentive plans has both economic and social-psychological impacts on negotiation behaviour, resulting in even greater inter-divisional profit equalisation. While this outcome may seem 'fairer' to the individual managers, from the firms' perspective profit equalisation can obscure divisional performance, potentially leading to resource allocation inefficiencies.     

医疗保险谈判机制探析

医疗保险谈判机制是医疗服务的购买方和提供方通过对话和谈判达成协议,就医疗服务的范围、价格、质量等进行规范,以明确双方责、权、利的一种制度安排。本文对医疗保险谈判机制的理论基础进行了剖析,明确了医疗保险谈判机制的制度框架;对医疗保险谈判机制的国际经验进行了总结,划分了医疗保险谈判机制的基本模式;对我国医疗保险谈判机制探索实践中的现实困境进行了分析,目的在于寻求我国医疗保险谈判机制的发展之道。     

The effect of outcome and process accountability on customer–supplier negotiations

Prior studies on customer–supplier negotiations ( and ) find that negotiators who have access to relevant activity-based cost information are not always able to use this information to improve joint outcomes. Our study extends this literature by examining how the type of accountability (process and outcome accountability) influences the extent to which negotiators can obtain lower joint costs. We hypothesize and test a model that predicts that the type of accountability affects negotiated outcomes through its effect on negotiators’ fixed-pie bias revisions and the negotiation tactics they employ during customer-supplier negotiations. Results from an experiment show that negotiators held accountable for their negotiation processes are better able to reduce their fixed-pie biases and achieve lower joint costs compared to those who are held accountable for their negotiation outcomes. Using rich data based on taped negotiations, we demonstrate that the effect of accountability on joint costs is indirect through its effect on negotiators’ choice of negotiation tactics and the extent to which negotiators can reduce their fixed-pie biases.     

Goliath Corporation: An instructional case in transfer pricing policy

This case illustrates some of the issues associated with setting firms’ transfer pricing policies. The simulation requires students to assume the roles of top management and divisional management for Goliath Corporation in negotiating transfer prices. The student playing the role of top management first selects a transfer pricing policy from four possible mechanisms: market-based, cost-based, negotiated, and dual-pricing. Given the top manager’s policy choice, divisional managers are then constrained to use that policy as they decide whether to purchase internally or externally based on their respective negotiations. In each negotiation, there is an ex ante best decision for Goliath as a whole. The case is thus useful in demonstrating how managers’ transfer price policy choices can lead to bad sourcing decisions.     

The effect of cost information on buyer–supplier negotiations in different power settings

We investigate the influence of total cost of ownership (TCO) information on buyer–supplier negotiations in different power settings. Based on social exchange theory and recent literature on information processing, we expect that buyers with detailed TCO information and less power than their negotiation partners may try to (re)gain control over their own outcomes by sharing information. The results of our experiment indicate that the performance disadvantage of less powerful buyers is less pronounced when the buyer has detailed TCO information, whereas more powerful buyers do not seem to be able to profit from TCO information. These somewhat counterintuitive findings are explained through detailed analysis of the buyer’s negotiation behavior, which shows that less powerful buyers who have access to TCO data use problem solving techniques more frequently than powerful buyers, who tend to rely on distributive bargaining techniques instead. We conclude that power can motivate a failure to share TCO information, resulting in less effective interfirm negotiation outcomes.     

Auctions vs. negotiations in takeovers with initial stakes

Takeover attempts from raiders with prior stakes in the target company (toeholds) are frequent in the market for corporate control. In this context, we propose a simple and realistic selling mechanism with an agenda of exclusive negotiations that discriminates against larger-toehold raiders. When a reserve price is absent, it is shown that this negotiation procedure outperforms, in terms of expected target price, conventional auctions frequently used to model takeover battles. However, when standard auctions can be improved with an optimal reserve price, our results indicate that this target price superiority is sensitive to the degree of toehold asymmetry.     

Neighborhood Diversity and House-Price Appreciation

This study examines changes in house prices relative to the level of and change in percent racial/ethnic composition for certain counties in Tampa and Orlando, Florida. Repeat-sales transactions between 1971 and 1997 are used to create a constant quality price index for each city. The index for Tampa shows that the average annual house price appreciation was 5.89 percent over the period 1970 through 1997. The index for Orlando shows that the average annual house price appreciation was 5.25 percent over the 1970 through 1997 period. When the Tampa index model is expanded to account for race/ethnicity, household factors, and economic factors, the level of African American population has no significant effect on house-price appreciation; however, the change in percent African American has a negative effect. The level of percent Hispanic population has a positive effect, and the change in percent Hispanic has a positive effect. The expanded Orlando model shows that the level of percent African American population has no significant effect on price appreciation, while the change in percent African American has a negative effect. The level of Hispanic population has a positive effect, while the change in percent in Hispanic has a negative effect.     

Price reaction to rights issues in the Indian capital market

This study examines securities price reaction to announcements of rights issues by listed Indian firms during the period 1997–2005. We document a positive but statistically insignificant price reaction to such announcements. The price reaction is significantly more negative for firms with a family group affiliation compared to firms with no family group affiliation. The notable differential price reaction between firms with and without a family group affiliation can be explained by the “tunneling hypothesis.” For firms affiliated with a family group, we surmise that investors perceive that the proceeds of the rights issue may be misused for the benefit of the controlling shareholder. We also find that higher levels of individual shareholding in the firm are associated with a more positive price reaction to the announcement.     

The hidden challenge of cross-border negotiations

Cultural differences can influence business negotiations in unexpected ways, as many a hapless deal maker has learned. But the differences extend well beyond surface behaviors, such as proper table manners and the exchange of business cards--and even beyond deeper cultural characteristics, such as attitudes about relationships and deadlines. Indeed, there's another, equally treacherous aspect to cross-border negotiation: the ways that people from different regions come to agreement, or the processes involved in negotiations. Decision-making and governance processes can vary widely from culture to culture, not only in terms of legal technicalities but also in terms of the behaviors and core beliefs that drive them. Numerous promising deals have failed because people ignored or underestimated the powerful differences in process across cultures. In this article, James Sebenius offers ways in which negotiators can prepare for such cultural differences. A useful approach, he says, is to map out the decision-making process--including who's involved, what formal and informal roles people play, and how a resolution is actually reached. With that knowledge, you can design a strategy that anticipates obstacles before they arise. Governance and decision-making processes can take devilishly unexpected forms as you cross borders. But by designing your strategy and tactics so that you're reaching all the right people, you increase your chances of striking a sustainable deal. Those negotiations that might otherwise have failed because people ignored or underestimated powerful disparities in process will, in the end, yield a meaningful yes.     

American option valuation under stochastic interest rates

By applying Ho, Stapleton and Subrahmanyam's (1997, hereafter HSS) generalised Geske–Johnson (1984, hereafter GJ) method, this paper provides analytic solutions for the valuation and hedging of American options in a stochastic interest rate economy. The proposed method simplifies HSS's three-dimensional solution to a one-dimensional solution. The simulations verify that the proposed method is more efficient and accurate than the HSS (1997) method. We illustrate how the price, the delta, and the rho of an American option vary between the stochastic and non-stochastic interest rate models. The magnitude of this effect depends on the moneyness of the option, interest rates, volatilities of the underlying asset price and the bond price, as well as the correlation between them. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Breakthrough bargaining

Unspoken, subtle parts of a bargaining process--also known as the shadow negotiation--can set the tone for a successful negotiation. Deborah Kolb and Judith Williams, whose book The Shadow Negotiation was the starting point for this article, say there are three strategies businesspeople can use to guide these hidden interactions. Power moves are used when two negotiating parties hold unequal power--for instance, subordinates and bosses; new and existing employees; and people of different races, ages, or genders. These strategies, such as casting the status quo in an unfavorable light, can help parties realize that they must negotiate: they will be better off if they do and worse off if they don't. Process moves affect how negotiation issues are received by both sides in the process, even though they do not address substantive issues. Working outside of the actual bargaining process, one party can suggest ideas or marshal support that can shape the agenda and influence how others view the negotiation. Appreciative moves alter the tone or atmosphere so that a more collaborative exchange is possible. They shift the dynamics of the shadow negotiation away from the adversarial--helping parties to save face--and thus build trust and encourage dialogue. These strategic moves don't guarantee that all bargainers will walk away winners, but they help to get stalled negotiations moving--out of the dark of unspoken power plays and into the light of true dialogue.     

The effect of gender and firm identification on auditor pre-negotiation judgments

This paper extends current auditor negotiation research by considering the effects of two dimensions of auditors' identity that are posited to be relevant to auditors' negotiation: gender and audit firm identification. Women earn over half of college degrees in accounting, and hold more than half of accounting and auditing positions in the US, yet the balance of the gender of partners at audit firms is currently not equal (AICPA, 2017). However, as more women advance into partnership positions in firms, it is increasingly important to have an understanding of how gender affects the behaviors, processes and outcomes of negotiation, and thus the quality of financial statements. The auditor-client negotiation context has features, such as ambiguity and representation of others that can “trigger” the salience of auditors' gender and firm identity. Once salient, these two dimensions of auditors' identity shape auditors' motivational orientation towards negotiations, which, in turn, affects the auditors' negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes.The study finds that male and female auditors approach the negotiation over audit adjustments differently. Although many negotiation studies find that males negotiate more aggressively than do females, auditor-client negotiation offers a unique setting that has been found to reverse this common trend. We hypothesize and find that female auditors recommend higher audit adjustments than males. However, the level of firm identification moderates female's recommended audit adjustments such that at higher levels of firm identification, the larger audit adjustments recommended by females decrease. This finding is consistent with the growing research on gender differences in auditing and the research on gender and risk tolerance, which find females to be more risk averse, but contrary to much of the negotiation research which shows males as more aggressive and achieving higher negotiated outcomes. In supplemental analysis, we find that our results hold in the senior manager subsample but not in the partner subsample. This result is consistent with theory on gender differences which suggests that the differences will disappear with increased occupational socialization (Smith & Rogers, 2000). Practical implications are discussed.     

Unobservable transfer price exceeds marginal cost when the manager is evaluated using a balanced scorecard

This study investigates the optimal level of transfer prices chosen by managers in a divisionalized firm when they are evaluated based on a balanced scorecard. A unique assumption of our model is that transfer prices are unobservable to a competing firm's managers. In contrast to the findings in several studies that examine strategic transfer pricing, this research shows that a manager who is evaluated using a balanced scorecard chooses a transfer price that exceeds marginal cost given a market competitor in a specific economic environment. This result is caused mainly by our model's assumption that a manager considers the competitor's profit in his/her in decision-making when the objective is to maximize long-term profit. This study makes a significant contribution to the strategic transfer pricing literature by showing that even if the transfer price is unobservable to rivals, the optimal transfer price exceeds marginal cost when the final product market is characterized by price competition, something not shown in previous analytical accounting research.     

The impact of auditor rotation on auditor–client negotiation

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate how mandatory audit firm rotation affects auditor–client negotiations. Drawing upon process theories of negotiation, we examine the strategies used by auditors and clients as well as the outcomes of their negotiations in alternative settings in which mandatory rotation is imposed or is not imposed. We posit that mandatory rotation changes (1) the dynamics of the audit market by increasing the number of clients who are in the market for a new auditor, and (2) the political costs to a client who switches auditors. These changes, in turn, alter the willingness of the auditor and the client to cooperate during negotiation. The results suggest that with mandatory rotation auditors adopt less cooperative negotiation strategies, producing asset values that are more in line with the auditor’s preferences than with the client’s preferences and more negotiation impasses.     

The Chinese negotiation

Most Westerners preparing for a business trip to China like to arm themselves with a list of etiquette how-tos. "Carry a boatload of business cards," tipsters say. "Bring your own interpreter." "Speak in short sentences." "Wear a conservative suit." Such advice can help get companies in the door and even through the first series of business transactions. But it won't sustain the prolonged, year-in, year-out associations Chinese and Western businesses can now achieve. The authors' work with dozens of companies and thousands of American and Chinese executives over the past 20 years has demonstrated that a superficial adherence to etiquette rules gets executives only so far. They have witnessed communication breakdowns between American and Chinese businesspeople time and time again. The root cause: the American side's failure to understand the much broader context of Chinese culture and values, a problem that too often leaves Western negotiators flummoxed and flailing. American and Chinese approaches often appear incompatible. Americans see Chinese negotiators as inefficient, indirect, and even dishonest, while the Chinese see American negotiators as aggressive, impersonal, and excitable. Such perceptions have deep cultural origins. Yet those who know how to navigate these differences can develop thriving, mutually profitable, and satisfying business relationships. Four cultural threads have bound the Chinese people together for some 5,000 years, and these show through in Chinese business negotiations. They are agrarianism, morality, the Chinese pictographic language, and wariness of strangers. Most Western businesspeople often find those elements mysterious and confusing. But ignore them at any time during the negotiation process, and the deal can easily fall apart.     

The effect of information asymmetry on negotiated budgets: an empirical investigation

This study examines three issues: (1) the effect of information asymmetry on the budget negotiation process, (2) the effect of information asymmetry on budgetary slack when budgets are set through a negotiation process, and (3) whether subordinates consider superiors imposing a budget following a failed negotiation as being low in procedural justice, which in turn causes low subordinate performance. The results suggest that smaller differences in initial negotiation positions do not indicate a higher likelihood of agreement when initial differences are due to differential information symmetry. Further, information asymmetry affects the relationship between negotiation agreement and budgetary slack. Last, inconsistent with a pure economic perspective, having superiors impose a budget after a failed negotiation causes justice or fairness considerations to demotivate subordinates.     

Extreme negotiations

CEOs and other senior executives must make countless complex, high-stakes deals across functional areas and divisions, with alliance partners and critical suppliers, and with customers and regulators. The pressure of such negotiations may make them feel a lot like U.S. military officers in an Afghan village, fending off enemy fire while trying to win trust and get intelligence from the local populace. Both civilian and military leaders face what the authors call "dangerous negotiations," in which the traps are many and good advice is scarce. Although the sources of danger are quite different for executives and officers, they resort to the same kinds of behaviors. Both feel pressure to make quick progress, project strength and control (particularly when they have neither), rely on force rather than collaboration, trade resources for cooperation rather than build trust, and make unwanted compromises to minimize potential damage. The authors outline five core strategies that "in extremis" military negotiators use to resolve conflicts and influence others: maintaining a big-picture perspective; uncovering hidden agendas to improve collaboration; using facts and fairness to get buy-in; building trust; and focusing on process as well as outcomes. These strategies provide an effective framework that business executives can use to prepare for a negotiation and guide their moves at the bargaining table.