Conflicts of interest,intra‐group financing and procedural coordination of group insolvencies

Modern insolvency law instruments recognise the specificity of enterprise group insolvencies, premised on the existence of close operational and financial links between group members. It is widely accepted that maximisation of insolvency estate value and procedural efficiency depend on coordination of insolvency proceedings opened with respect to group entities. Such coordination is prescribed in the European Insolvency Regulation (recast), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency and the recently reformed German insolvency law. Yet in insolvency, group members retain their own insolvency estates and pools of creditors. This is based on the traditional company law principle of entity shielding. Active communication and cooperation between insolvency practitioners and courts do not sit well with the separate (atomistic) nature of insolvency proceedings, as well as different and oftentimes conflicting interests of creditors in such proceedings. As a result, communication and cooperation may be restricted in a situation of conflicts of interest. This article explores how in the context of group distress the risks arising from conflicts of interest can be controlled and mitigated, while ensuring efficient cross‐border cooperation and communication to the maximum extent possible. It analyses three cutting‐edge coordination mechanisms, namely (a) cross‐border insolvency agreements or protocols, (b) special (group coordination and planning) proceedings and (c) the appointment of a single insolvency practitioner. It concludes that both the likelihood and significance of conflicts of interest correlate with the degree of procedural coordination. Therefore, conflict mitigation tools and strategies need to be tailor‐made and targeted at a specific level and coordination mechanism.     

Reconsidering Procedural Consolidation for Multinational Corporate Groups in the Context of the Recast European Insolvency Regulation

Procedural consolidation, as a solution to the rescue of insolvent multinational corporate groups (‘MCGs’), is said to be able to preserve group value for creditors. This article explores the desirability of procedural consolidation in the EU in the light of theories of corporate rescue law, cross‐border insolvency law, multinational enterprises and relevant EU cases with reference to the European Insolvency Regulation. It argues that, based on current cross‐border insolvency rules in the EU, there is an inherent difficulty for procedural consolidation in balancing the goal of preservation of group value and the goal of certainty. The article also considers the new ‘group procedural coordination proceedings’ offered by the Recast European Insolvency Regulation and argues that it may help to supplement the gap left by the procedural consolidation in the EU. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cross-border insolvency law in India: Are the principles of comity of courts and inherent common law jurisdiction relevant?

Deliberations are in the final stages for enacting a cross-border insolvency law in India based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency 1997 (‘Model Law’). The cross-border insolvency regime in India will provide an avenue for recognising foreign insolvency proceedings in India. Although it is a matter of time before India adopts the Model Law, it is important to examine whether there remains an independent basis in addition to the Model Law for recognising and providing assistance to cross-border insolvency proceedings in India. This is crucial on account of the following reasons: first, the Model Law does not provide that it is the exclusive pathway for foreign creditors to seek remedies under domestic law. The Model Law, as reflected in Article 7, was intended by its drafters to be an additional gateway to those provided under local laws. The proposed Indian law in Article 5 of Draft Part Z of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 also does not depart expressly from this principle. Second, there may be instances where neither the ‘Centre of Main Interests’ nor an establishment of a corporate debtor is situated in India; therefore, assistance and cooperation in respect of such cross-border insolvency proceeding can only be based on the inherent common law jurisdiction, if available. Third, the cross-border insolvency framework in India will be premised on the requirement for reciprocity and, therefore, countries that do not meet the reciprocity requirement may find it beneficial if such an independent basis for recognition exists in India. This article argues that foreign representatives should be encouraged to explore the possibility of seeking assistance from the commercial courts in India under the common law principles governing cross-border insolvency and that the courts in India should be open to this possibility.     

Treatment of a Debtor's Home in Insolvency: Comparative Perspectives and Potential Developments in South Africa

A debtor's home is frequently a source of conflict between the debtor and his family members and his creditors. Treatment of forced sale of a debtor's home is not uniform. Some legal systems provide for formal, statutory ‘homestead exemptions’ the monetary limits of which are in many cases capped. In a number of jurisdictions, statutory provisions regulating, inter alia, the civil process, family law, bankruptcy law, or the recognition of human rights afford a measure of protection to the debtor and his family. This occurs either through the imposition of procedural requirements before forced sale is allowed or protecting the interest in the home or the occupational rights of a spouse or partner of the debtor against creditors' claims, or by delaying the forced sale of the home in certain circumstances. Recently, in South Africa, recognition by the courts of every person's constitutional right to have access to adequate housing has impacted upon the substantive and procedural requirements for execution against a debtor's home. However, no consideration has been given to whether realisation of an insolvent debtor's home by the trustee of an insolvent estate in terms of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 involves similar constitutional imperatives. Consideration of the treatment of a debtor's home, especially in the context of insolvency, in various jurisdictions may provide valuable guidance for future developments in South Africa. Copyright © 2013 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Set‐off under the European insolvency regulation (and English law)

This paper addresses critically the meaning and effect of the set‐off provisions in the European Insolvency Regulation. The Regulation sets out the authority of EU Member States to open insolvency proceedings and provides that, subject to exceptions, the law of the State that opens insolvency proceedings shall apply to those proceedings. Setoff is one such exception for the opening of insolvency proceedings does not affect the rights of creditors to demand the set‐off of their claims against the insolvent debtor. Set‐off is intended to perform a guarantee type function for creditor claims. Nevertheless, the Regulation does not define what is meant by set‐off nor clarify whether set‐off rights under the law of a third country (such as English law) may be relied upon. The paper provides valuable clarification and critical analysis.     

A case of constitutional apples and oranges: a functional comparison of pension priority and benefit guarantees in U.S., U.K. and Canadian insolvency and pension law regimes

Canada's insolvency law reform increased the priority granted to employer‐sponsored pension claims. The article compares the treatment of such claims in the U.S., the U.K. and Canada. A comparison of the legislative provisions concerning pension funding shortfalls from contribution arrears or economic underperformance in relation to the assumptions used for investment income or liability valuations finds that insolvency law has been used to address contribution arrears, but risks from economic underperformance have been addressed by pension benefit insurance. Post‐insolvency priority for contribution arrears provides appropriate incentives to discourage pre‐insolvency preferences for payments to other creditors, while shortfalls from economic underperformance do not involve issues of preference between creditors. The absence of any insolvency rationale for changing priority for shortfalls from economic underperformance and the likely disparity between the assets available to satisfy clams and the much larger amounts of such shortfalls makes the use of insolvency law to address this risk much less effective than insurance. Canada, however, has not adopted the insurance policy instrument used in the U.S. and U.K. to mitigate the impact of pension funding shortfalls. The constitutional inability of Canada to legislate in respect of matters of pension regulation that would allow it to control the well‐known insurance problems of moral hazard and adverse selection may explain why it has only chosen to adopt an insolvency policy instrument. However, a change in priorities in insolvency may generate incentives for secured creditors that either undermine or reinforce this policy choice. Secured creditors could attempt to circumvent the new priority scheme through private arrangements with the debtor or to increase their monitoring activities to ensure the debtor is current in its pension contributions. Secured creditors choices will be influenced by the bankruptcy courts' interpretation of the preference provisions in the insolvency legislation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rights in rem,Article 5 and the EC Insolvency Regulation: an English perspective

The treatment of security interests is central to any insolvency régime, national or transnational. Under Article 5 of the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (E.C. 1346/2000) extensive protection is given to a security interest—or right in rem—over assets of the debtor situate in a Member State other than one in which insolvency proceedings have been opened. The absence, thus far, of any significant body of European case law on Article 5, allows commentators to put forward a range of views on how Article 5 ought to be applied. This article aims to examine the scope of Article 5 protection both conceptually and in terms of illustrations drawn largely from English insolvency law and practice. Particular attention is given to the following issues: what is meant by the ‘opening of insolvency proceedings’ with reference to Article 5; when a liquidator may pay off the holder of a right in rem; whether the rules under the Regulation for determining the situs of an asset alter the English common law position; whether Article 5 prohibits the discharge of an underlying debt by way of a restructuring plan; the position of unsecured creditors who attempt to acquire rights in rem prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings; and whether the English court's equitable jurisdiction to enforce a charge which does not comply with the lex situs, survives the coming into force of the Regulation. Through the discussion of these topics, this article seeks to identify an approach to the interpretation of Article 5 which is consistent not only across the wide range of issues identified but also with the broad policy objectives underlying the treatment of in rem rights in the Regulation. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cross‐Border Debt Adjustment – Open Questions in European Insolvency Proceedings

At present, 18 European Union member states have some form of legislation on adjustment of the debts of a private individual. Only half of these debt adjustment proceedings are mentioned in Annex A of the European Insolvency Regulation (EIR) and therefore fall within the scope of it. As most of the debt adjustment proceedings are not included in the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, there is a regulatory gap in the European insolvency proceedings with unpleasant impacts on the free movement of labour. Fortunately, changes are coming, in the form of the EIR reform. In order to bring debt adjustment within the scope of the EIR, the Commission proposes to loosen the prerequisite concerning the legal effects, which the opening of the proceedings has on the debtor. Regarding the jurisdiction to open main proceedings, the Commission proposes that COMI (the debtor's centre of main interests) would be the place of habitual residence. The open question is, whether residency requires a certain continuity or stability. This issue is discussed in the paper taking into account recent Court of Justice of the European Union case law. The challenge of the EIR reform is that only provisions on scope and jurisdiction have been modified as to debt adjustment. One may ask, e.g. when the prerequisites concerning the opening of secondary proceedings are fulfilled if the debtor is a private individual. Copyright © 2013 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

What is in a Name? Group Coordination or Consolidation Plan—What is Allowed Under the EIR Recast?

The European Insolvency Regulation Recast allows for group coordination proceedings if insolvency proceedings have been opened against different companies belonging to a single group. Group coordination proceedings imply the drafting of a group coordination plan in order to define an integrated solution to the group's problems. This plan shall not include recommendations as to any consolidation of proceedings or insolvency estates. Against the backdrop of the evolving notion of ‘procedural consolidation’ and the fact the insolvency practitioners and courts concerned have to cooperate and communicate with each other, this prohibition is misplaced and should be interpreted to mean only that main or secondary proceedings opened in a member state cannot be transferred to another jurisdiction. The effective administration of insolvency proceedings of related group companies often demands an integrated solution to the group's problems, which will inevitably lead to some form of consolidation. Copyright © 2016 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effectiveness and efficiency of corporate insolvency law—part two

Little empirical research has been done in the Netherlands (or internationally) into the effect of corporate insolvency proceedings. The Dutch legislature has made several attempts in the past decades to revise the current Dutch Bankruptcy Act (Faillissementswet) of 1893, while almost nothing is known about the effectiveness and efficiency of the Dutch corporate insolvency law. I have studied the effectiveness of the current Dutch insolvency law and of European Directive 2001/23/EC which is incorporated in this law, on the basis of theoretical and large‐scale empirical research. The study concerned all 4167 of the corporate insolvencies that ended in 2004. In the first part of this Article (International Insolvency Review, Volume 17, 3, Winter 2008, pp. 189–209), the research results showed that the Dutch Bankruptcy Act achieved the goals set on it only to a limited degree and that the informal restructuring procedure is of great social importance. In this second part, I concentrate on the conditions imposed by European Directive 2001/23/EC on the European national legislatures to protect employees' rights: automatic transfer of employment contracts in the event of transfers as part of insolvency proceedings, together with measures to prevent misuse of insolvency proceedings in such a way as to deprive employees of the rights provided for in this European Directive. The study shows that, in the Netherlands, not applying automatic transfer of employment contracts when an undertaking or business is transferred as part of an insolvency proceeding does not result in large‐scale misuse of insolvency law. It appears that automatic transfer of employment contracts outside insolvency proceedings can actually impede the informal restructuring of financially unsound companies. These surprising results are interesting for corporate insolvency proceedings worldwide. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Business Rescue in Insolvency Law in Europe: Introducing the ELI Business Rescue Report

In a European study, written under the auspices of the European Law Institute, the authors have designed elements of a legal framework that will enable the further development of coherent and functional rules for business rescue in Europe. Based on the recommendations of international organisations, such as UNCITRAL and the World Bank, as well as the insolvency laws of EU Member States, comparative research has led to a lengthy report of 10 chapters and more than 100 recommendations which are described in this article. They range from the need for professional and honest parties involved in the process (insolvency practitioners, turnaround managers, courts and company directors) to the evaluation of specific tools (such as a stay on enforcement actions of creditors and forms of available finance) and procedural safeguards to enable serious rescue efforts of viable businesses, while protecting justified interests. Copyright © 2018 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Chapter 15 Recognition in the United States: Is a Debtor “Presence” Required?

A recent appellate decision in the USA (In re Barnet) confuses the foreign debtor with the foreign insolvency representative. Notwithstanding the focus of US bankruptcy law on a foreign proceeding as the object of an ancillary case under Chapter 15, with the foreign representative as its emissary, the decision dismayed the international insolvency community by ruling that section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code applies to recognition under Chapter 15. The result is to require that the debtor in a foreign proceeding has some minimum jurisdictional presence in the USA as a condition of Chapter 15 recognition. Such a presence might include a domicile, a place of business, or property. While there might be a “backdoor” device avoiding this result, the decision creates serious confusion and a potential obstacle to full international recognition. Copyright © 2015 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

A Glimpse into the Future: Cross‐border Judicial Cooperation in Insolvency Cases in the European Union

After 2 years of study, discussion and consultation, in February 2015, the EU Cross‐Border Insolvency Court‐to‐Court Cooperation Principles were published. The EU Cross‐Border Insolvency Court‐to‐Court Cooperation Principles (‘EU JudgeCo Principles’) contain 26 principles. The EU JudgeCo Principles aim to strengthen efficient and effective communication between courts in EU Member States in insolvency cases with cross‐border effects. The EU JudgeCo Principles, in short, include principles on their non‐binding status and their objectives, case management of courts and the equal treatment of creditors, and principles about the judicial decisions itself, on the reasoning and for instance on providing a stay or moratorium. Several principles relate to the course of the proceedings, such as notifications and authentication of documents, and the last principles concern the outcome of judicial cooperation, for instance, cross‐border sales, assistance to a reorganisation or rules for binding creditors to an international reorganisation plan. The Principles include 18 EU Cross‐Border Insolvency Court‐to‐Court Communications Guidelines (‘EU JudgeCo Guidelines’). These EU JudgeCo Guidelines aim to facilitate communications in practice, in individual cross‐border cases. The EU JudgeCo Principles try to overcome present obstacles for courts in EU Member States such as formalistic and detailed national procedural law, concerns about a judge's impartiality, uneasiness with the use of certain legal concepts and terms, and, evidently, language. Presently, court‐to‐court communication between judges in insolvency matters in the EU, especially on the continent, is limited to only a few cases. In the near future, judicial cooperation and communication will be a cornerstone in the efficient and effective administration of insolvency cases within the EU. The EU JudgeCo Principles will then certainly serve as a significant guide. Copyright © 2015 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Dutch corporate insolvency law: On the brink of a revolution?

The Dutch Bankruptcy Code (DBC) has not changed fundamentally over the more than 110 years of its existence, at least as far as corporate insolvency proceedings are concerned. On 1 November 2007, however, a committee of insolvency experts presented a draft for an entirely new code to the Ministry of Justice. Whether this new code will gain the force of law and whether this will happen within the near future remains uncertain but the proposals will in any event dominate discussions on insolvency law in the Netherlands for the foreseeable future. The main goal behind many of the proposals is improving the ability to successfully restructure companies that experience financial difficulties. To this end the proposals include various measures that would weaken the position of (secured) creditors. The proposals include widening the scope of the cooling-off period during which secured creditors are unable to enforce their security by granting the administrator a right of use of assets subject to security interests. The ability to rely on early termination clauses in contracts is also reduced during the cooling-off period. The position of secured creditors is further weakened by a proposal to grant the right to sell assets that are subject to security interests to the administrator if he continues the business. Under the current bankruptcy code, secured creditors can largely ignore insolvency proceedings, there is no general stay on enforcement and, early termination clauses in contracts are generally thought to be valid and enforceable during insolvency proceedings. Although banks have already argued that weakening the position of secured creditors will limit the ability to restructure companies, it seems safe to assume that the relatively comfortable position that secured creditors currently enjoy during insolvency proceedings in the Netherlands will be under fire due to the proposals for a new bankruptcy code. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Maidum's challenge,legal and governance issues in dealing with cross-border business enterprise group insolvencies

Maidum was an early Egyptian pyramid, the first attempt to build a true pyramid; but it suffered a spectacular collapse. In many jurisdictions, corporate structures are pyramidal in shape, with related enterprises conducting business in multiple jurisdictions. Where such structures financially collapse, creditors of different entities within a business enterprise group compete for limited assets that may or may not be located in the entity in which they have advanced credit and thus have claims. This article discusses the challenges posed by cross-border business enterprise group insolvency and the range of procedural mechanisms that may be available to protect creditors' claims, articulating broad principles that should be considered in such cases. The choice of cooperation and coordination mechanism is driven in part by whether the particular jurisdiction emphasizes liquidation or restructuring as the objective of the insolvency proceeding. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Tripping the Light Fantastic: A Comparative Analysis of the European Commission's Proposals for New and Interim Financing of Insolvent Businesses

The European Commission published a Draft Directive in November 2016, with the aim of ensuring that all Member States have in place an effective mechanism for dealing with viable, but financially distressed, businesses. The Draft Directive includes provisions designed to encourage financing for the debtor company, both interim financing to ‘keep the lights on’ for a brief period while the debtor negotiates with its creditors for a resolution to its financial distress, and, where possible, to finance implementation of a restructuring plan, called ‘new financing’ in the Draft Directive. Creating such a financing regime is a complex and difficult issue, as the law's intervention in this area often involves constraints on the rights of existing creditors, requiring that a careful balance is maintained between existing creditors' rights and the rights of the interim financier. This article examines the underlying policy rationale and benefits of having new and interim financing available to financially distressed debtor companies and discusses the risks involved. It examines the EU Commission's proposals in light of the experience of jurisdictions that have already tackled these issues, notably the USA and Canada, or have developed a market‐based solution to this problem, such as the UK. While the European Commission's wish to include such measures in its restructuring proposals is laudable, the measures as drafted raise concerns, particularly regarding risks associated with priority for the grantors of such finance. The authors suggest that there are four fundamental aspects of such financing on which the Directive could give guidance to Member States, namely, effective notice to pre‐filing creditors, thresholds for the debtor to qualify, a menu of relevant criteria to balance benefit and prejudice, and a role for the court in resolving disputes, ensuring fairness to stakeholders, and serving as an accountability check on interim financing arrangements, all aimed at maintaining the integrity of the insolvency process. Copyright © 2018 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Comparative Analysis of the Informal Pre‐Insolvency Procedures of the UK and France

The aim of this paper is to provide a brief overview of the informal pre‐insolvency proceedings available in the UK and France. In addition, the aim is to provide a comparative analysis of the approach taken towards corporate rescue at this early stage by the ‘key players’ in insolvency. In particular, emphasis will be placed on the role of insolvency practitioners and creditors as well as the involvement of the courts in pre‐insolvency restructurings. Finally, the paper considers the effectiveness of the pre‐insolvency mechanisms available in the two jurisdictions and assesses whether or not these promote and encourage a corporate rescue culture. Copyright © 2016 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Copyright © 2016 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Public or private gatekeepers in non-consensual debt restructurings in emerging jurisdictions

In advanced jurisdictions, the choice of a non-consensual debt restructuring is between a public or a private gatekeeper model where either the court or the licensed insolvency professional respectively approves a restructuring plan that binds dissenting creditors. In the United States, the only gateway is found in Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 1978, which requires court approval and gives the debtor a significant say in the outcome. In contrast, in the United Kingdom, there exist four gateways, only two of which require court approval (scheme of arrangement and restructuring plan), while the remaining two (administration and company voluntary arrangement) give significant powers to the insolvency practitioner to decide on the outcome. In emerging jurisdictions such as Mainland China and India, due to path dependency and lack of institutional capacity, the court-supervised model is chosen as the only or primary gateway to legitimise non-consensual restructurings though the insolvency practitioner has an important statutory role. Using the two jurisdictions as case studies, this article argues that such a choice has several initial benefits but also leads to several problems, including delays in the restructuring, does not necessarily improve substantive outcomes and does not adequately address the shareholder–creditor and creditor–creditor agency costs. This article proposes that for debt restructuring that involves the sale of the business as a going concern, the private gatekeeper should be able to decide on the sale and the distributions following pre-bankruptcy entitlements. Recourse to the court as a public gatekeeper should only be used for reorganisation proceedings.     

Universalism and the recognition of group proceedings under the UNCITRAL Model Law in Montenegro

Among the most topical insolvency issues in 2017 was the Croatian “Lex Agrokor”—a controversial “tailor‐made” law providing a unique restructuring opportunity for the largest Croatian conglomerate, the parent company of which was otherwise facing bankruptcy. Soon after the “extraordinary administration procedure” began, the appointed administrator started filing motions for the recognition of the alleged group insolvency as foreign insolvency proceedings in a number of neighbouring and other European countries, most of which have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency. It was an attempt to save the conglomerate's property from being seized in a disorderly fashion by various secured creditors, most noticeably, the largest Russian financial institution Sberbank, which contested these motions with varying success. This article, however, does not present an effort to comprehensively analyse the ongoing legal battle but rather adopts a broader approach to examining the Lex Agrokor to establish grounds for more general conclusions. More precisely, the purpose of this article is twofold. First, to offer strong arguments that, from the standpoint of typical insolvency legislation based on the Model Law, such as that of Montenegro, both the actual and future group proceedings initiated under the Lex Agrokor should fail to meet recognition requirements. Second, based on the preceding case study, to offer conclusions on how to further promote universal approach regarding group insolvencies by emphasizing exactly what the national laws regulating group insolvency should not feature so as to have the proceedings introduced therewith recognized in countries adopting the Model Law.     

Recognition of Debt Restructuring and Resolution Measures under the European Union Regulatory Framework

Under the proposed Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), member states will be required to provide for bail‐in powers to restructure failing financial institutions. At this moment, the Dutch, French, UK and German legislator already provide public authorities with resolution powers. In order to be effective in debt restructuring of failing (non‐)financial institutions, the measures taken by the resolution authorities need to be enforceable (before all courts) and effective in the entire European Union. Given the fact that not all the firm's debt is issued in the home jurisdiction, the question of recognition is critically important. In regard of non‐financial firms, the Dutch, UK, French and German jurisdictions provide for court proceedings to impose a collective settlement reached by the debtor and the majority of its creditors binding on the opposing minority. Out‐of‐insolvency plans approved by the court are recognised under the Brussels I Regulation. If the EU Insolvency Regulation reform proposal is adopted, these court‐approved debt restructuring plans in insolvency situations will be subject to the recognition regime of this regulation. Credit institutions, insurance undertakings, investment undertakings holding funds or securities for third parties and collective investment undertakings are excluded from the scope of the Insolvency Regulation whereas the scope of application of the Reorganisation and Winding Up Directive is limited to credit institutions. The regime under the future BRRD and the Single Resolution Mechanism is limited to credit institutions. National (private international) law determines the recognition of resolution measures taken by the authorities of another member state. Copyright © 2014 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd