EMU, MAASTRICHT, AND THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE

This paper presents various economic approaches to achieving monetary union, particularly in the context of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as envisaged in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. It evaluates the implications of Maastricht, given the economic convergence criteria embodied in the Treaty, in terms of economic policy for individual Member States and for the European Union (EU) as a whole. The paper assesses the EU's options for amending the Maastricht Treaty at its scheduled inter-governmental conference (IGC).     

FISCAL INDULGENCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE: LOSS OF THE EXTERNAL ANCHOR?

In recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries on the path to European Union (EU) accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game‐theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimes – allowing for regime shifts – depending on country characteristics and EU policies.     

Monetary integration strategies and perspectives of new EU countries

The poor record of economic convergence between the euro area and those countries that joined the European Union (EU) in May 2004 raises serious doubts about the possibility for the latter countries to adopt the European single currency in the not too distant future. In fact, many new EU countries would have to make considerable efforts in order to fulfil all EMU criteria by the end of the present decade. These efforts could lead to output and growth losses in these countries, which would run counter to their catching‐up process with respect to the rest of the EU. To avoid a number of shortcomings elicited by the obligation to respect the convergence criteria in the short term, and also to avoid the financial instability risks implied by participation in the ERM II, this paper suggests an alternative plan for integrating the new EU countries monetarily. The plan consists in creating a European settlement agent in charge of the final payment of the new EU countries’ international transactions. These transactions would be settled using an international monetary standard whose creation would eliminate instability on the foreign exchange market by its being the yardstick that the current international monetary system lacks.     

Voting requirements, concessions, international side payments and the European Monetary Union

This paper addresses the question of criteria for selection of EMU members. We identify two factors in the decision process: (1) The costs and benefits which the individual countries attribute to alternative EMU arrangements (`hard-core', medium-sized, all EU members), and (2) the binding institutional restrictions, i.e., the distribution of votes in the European Council and the minimum vote requirements. Within this framework the EU countries are assigned to different groups according to their degree of convergence. Based on stability concessions and side payments these groups decide on the final EMU composition. We show that minimum vote requirements can lead to a suboptimal size of the EMU and can threaten the feasibility of a multi-speed monetary union.     

Monetary integration,soft budget constraints,and the EMU sovereign debt crises

One possible explanation for the European sovereign debt crises is that the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) gave rise to consolidation fatigue or even deliberate over‐borrowing. This paper explores the validity of this explanation by studying how three decisive stages in the history of the EMU affected public borrowing in EU member states: the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the introduction of the Euro, and the suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The methodology relies on difference‐in‐difference regressions for 26 OECD countries over the 1975–2009 period. The findings indicate that the Maastricht treaty reduced deficits especially in traditionally high‐deficit countries. In contrast, the introduction of the Euro and the watering down of the original SGP led on average to higher borrowing. These results indicate that the introduction of the Euro and the suspension of the SGP led to soft budget constraints in the EMU.     

The bank lending channel of monetary policy in EU countries during the global financial crisis

The study examines the existence of the bank lending channel of monetary policy in European Union (EU) countries. The paper advances current research on the monetary transmission mechanism in the following ways: Firstly, we analyze the differences between ‘old’ Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and ‘new’ EU countries. Secondly, we examine the key bank characteristics and monetary policy indicators that may have an impact on the bank lending channel. We assume that short-term market interest rates and monetary aggregate M2 affect banks' activities. We apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) with pooled data from 1999 to 2012. We show that in the pre-crisis period the effect of changing the short-term market interest rates on the bank lending channel of monetary policy is more pronounced among ‘old’ EMU countries, whereas the effect of M2 is significant during the period of the global financial crisis (GFC) among ‘old’ EMU countries. Last but not least the important finding is that banks in ‘new’ EU countries react differently to monetary shocks.     

Is There a Trade‐Off Between Inflation Variability and Output‐Gap Variability in the EMU Countries?

This paper examines the performance of monetary policy in eleven EMU countries for the whole period of the EMS. This is based on the trade‐off between inflation variability and output‐gap variability. To this end, we examine whether the introduction of an implicit inflation targeting by the EMU member countries after the Maastricht Treaty, changed the trade‐off between inflation variability and output‐gap variability. We employ a stochastic volatility model for two sub‐periods of the EMS (i.e. before and after the Maastricht Treaty). We find that the trade‐off varies amongst EMU countries. The implication of these findings is that there are asymmetries in the euro area, due to different economic structures among the member countries of the EMU.     

Fiscal restrictions and monetary union: Rationales,repercussions, reforms

We offer a critique of the fiscal preconditions for participation in Stage III of EMU and the Excessive Deficit Procedure of the Maastricht Treaty. We show that the high output costs associated with meeting the fiscal preconditions in Stage II and the incompatibility of the reference values for fiscal policy with other convergence criteria make it unlikely that a mechanical interpretation of those conditions will govern admission to Stage III. Knowledge of this fact will deter governments from undertaking major fiscal adjustments in the first place. Hence, the fiscal criteria of the treaty will not function as an efficient filter for distinguishing countries that are and are not prepared to live with the fiscal consequences of EMU.In Stage III, the function of the Excessive Deficit Procedure is to buttress the European Central Bank's protection from demands for a central bank bailout in the event of a debt crisis in a participating state. We show that other aspects of EU fiscal structure, namely the retention by member states of the bulk of their own revenue-raising capacity, should suffice to restrain the demand for a central bank bailout and the pressure on the ECB to supply it. Until political union follows monetary union, leading to the centralization of fiscal functions and revenu-raising capacity in the EU itself, the Excessive Deficit Procedure will be redundant. If there remains any reason to doubt the credibility of the no-bailout rule, then the best way to buttress it is directly, by further insulating the ECB from pressure to extend a bailout.If it is felt that policy in EU member states is biased toward excessive deficits, then the appropriate place to address this problem is at the national level. A limited approach would involve steps to insure that negotiations over the budget occur in the context of a firm general constraint on the overall level of spending. A more far-reaching reform would involve the creation of National Debt Boards to offset the prevailing bias.     

Restrictive Macroeconomic Policies and Unemployment in the European Union

This paper looks at the impact the European integration process has had on the unemployment level of European Union member countries. While the persistence of relatively high unemployment in Europe is often attributed to supply-side factors, such as the rigidities of the labour market, this study contends that the major cause for the rise of unemployment in the EU has been the very macroeconomic policies of the EU itself. The paper argues that the continuous pursuit of deflationary policies and the macroeconomic constraint imposed first by the membership of the European Monetary System and, secondly, by the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, have been the real impediments to reducing unemployment.     

THE TRANSITION TO EMU

This paper examines the problems of the transition to EMU, on the assumption that stage 3 of the EMU process begins in 1999. A number of issues are addressed, ranging from the attachment to national countries to problems of fiscal adjustment in the final path to EMU, and I suggest that the Maastricht fiscal criteria may turn out to be more flexible than many commentators suggest. Other problems relate to the possibility of a final parity realignment between the participants of EMU, and the relationship between those countries joining EMU, and the excluded countries. Finally, the paper concludes that there is no need to rush quickly from stage 3A to stage 3A to stage 3B of the EMU process until public and political support for the introduction of the Euro is built up.     

The maastricht fiscal criteria: Required but ineffective?

The paper investigates the rationale for, and the effectiveness of the fiscal criteria in the Maastricht treaty against the background of two questions: What are the incentives for an unsound fiscal policy in EMU, and what are the (potential) negative externalities if such a policy were to occur. The paper argues that EMU creates both incentives for a higher fiscal deficit while respecting solvency, and incentives for not rectifying a potentially unsustainable debt level once one is a member. Unsound fiscal policy could trigger important negative extermalities for the other member countries. The paper concludes that the current fiscal provisions of the Maastricht treaty are not sufficiently well defined and the envisaged sanctions not strong enough to enforce a disciplined fiscal stance. This leads to proposals of supplementary measures for surveillance and alternative sanctions. Staying within the framework of the Maastricht treaty, it is strongly suggested that both debt and deficit criteria should be strictly surveyed, but in view of their conceptual and operational deficiencies they should be supplemented by additional indicators. Based on this broader measurement concept, it is proposed to use semi-automatic and market-led sanctions to enforce a disciplined fiscal stance.     

THE POLITICS OF MAASTRICHT

The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) treaty signed at Maastricht does not guarantee the recreation of German-style economic policies and outcomes at the European Community (EC) level. Membership was not limited to countries that mimic the German commitment to price stability. National representatives may outvote inflation-averse EC central bankers in monetary policy decisions. The Council of Ministers has the power to set exchange rate policy vis-à-vis third currencies. The treaty does not provide binding constraints against fiscal profligacy in member states. The German government agreed to this suboptimal outcome because in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union and German unification it had broader political interests in maintaining the pace of European integration at Maastricht. The Bundesbank's policy of high interest rates in 1992, however, has effectively guaranteed a two-speed monetary union, in which the first group of members will be limited to a narrow deutschemark zone. Given the waning enthusiasm for integration across the EC, the German government has no incentive to alter this outcome.     

Convergence,divergence, or multiple steady states? New evidence on the institutional development within the European Union

Convergence in institutions and in per capita income across the European Union (EU) Member States are key goals of the European integrations process. Especially in the course of the various EU enlargement waves starting in 2004, it was intensively discussed whether institutional and structural homogeneity are necessary preconditions for real convergence and the smooth functioning of the EU or whether a (further) catching up in the institutional and economic development will endogenously occur after the EU accession. Our paper is dedicated to the analysis of these institutional dynamics within the EU. In particular, we analyze the formation of institutional convergence clusters using Phillips and Sul's (2007, 2009) log t-test over the period 2002 to 2018. Our results indicate the existence of multiple institutional clubs with various countries being stuck in a poor institutional trap. Moreover, we find that institutional convergence clubs are formed mainly on the basis of geographic region; in particular, we identify a northwest-southeast divide. When analyzing per capita income clubs, a rather similar picture emerges, suggesting that the underlying institutional clusters might drive the formation of income clubs. We also study the factors that determine institutional club membership by using an ordered probit model. Most importantly, we find that the initial levels of human capital and institutional quality are decisive for determining whether a country is on a high or low institutional growth path.     

Relative inflation dynamics in the new EU member countries of Central and Eastern Europe

Following their EU accession, the new member countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) must achieve sustainable price stability as one of the pre-conditions for joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and adopting the euro. This article examines the distribution dynamics of inflation rates in ten new EU members from CEE relative to the EMU accession benchmark inflation over the period 1990–2009. In contrast to previous studies, we use nonparametric methods to test for convergence in inflation rates between CEE and the EMU benchmark as well as within the CEE sample. Over the entire sample period, we detect a general shift in the CEE inflation distribution toward the EMU benchmark along with intradistributional convergence. However, this process is not uniform. In the early years, it was equally likely for CEE inflation rates to move toward or away from the benchmark. The resulting multimodal distribution gave way to a unimodal distribution in the years leading up to the EU accession, accompanied by a marked shift toward the EMU benchmark. In more recent years, emergence of a bimodal distribution signaled the stratification of relative inflation in CEE into two convergence clubs, which has intensified since the start of the global economic crisis.     

Reducing CO2-Emissions Under Fiscal Retrenchment: A Multi-Cohort CGE-Model for Austria

The stabilization of budget deficit and budget debt ratios by fiscal retrenchment in order to fulfill the Maastricht criteria for the EMU is of central focus in most EU countries. At the same time the national policy dimension of acute environmental problems such as global warming has receded in the public eye. The environmental dimension nonetheless remains urgent, and a re-evaluation of the prospects of CO2-policy is needed against the background of fiscal retrenchment required by supranational obligations. We shall do this for the small, open, Austrian economy by constructing a dynamic multi-cohort CGE model enabling us to assess quantitatively the lifetime welfare impacts on the cohorts affected by three different options for using CO2-permit revenues. The distribution of welfare costs of (Toronto-) CO2-policy across cohorts significantly differs with use. This is explained by income, inheritance and price effects.     

Macroeconomic variables and the sovereign risk premia in EMU,non-EMU EU,and developed countries

This project studies and models key macroeconomic variables and their impact on sovereign risk premia across select European economies and developed countries. The sample is divided into three groups of countries: those in the European Monetary Union (EMU); the standalone economies outside the EMU but members of the broader European Union (EU); and other developed economies. The main subject of examination across all three groups is the impact of macroeconomic variables on sovereign borrowing costs. EU countries have experienced high financial stress and a rapid rise in the credit default swaps (CDS) spreads during the EMU debt crisis. A nonlinear vector smooth transition autoregressive model is applied to investigate such a regime change in the finance-output link using sovereign CDS and industrial production index. The paper finds that regime-switching takes place rather suddenly in most EMU countries. The study concludes that due to the potential spillover effects in the EU as a whole, the individual country macroeconomic indicators were less reflected in the financial stress and spillover and contagion effects became dominant.     

The New Member States and the Process towards EMU

The authors apply two complementary empirical criteria to eight new member states (NMSs) of the European Union to assess how ready they are to adopt the euro. As a first step, they recover demand and supply shocks and calculate the social losses implied by the two relevant exchange rate regimes: flexible rates and currency board. As a second step, the authors calculate the real exchange rates variability that these countries are currently experiencing and compare it to that of three Mediterranean countries during a similar period before they joined the EMU. The combination of the results of both tests shows that Estonia and Slovenia are the only countries that seem ready to adopt the euro within the shortest period of time foreseen by the Maastricht criteria; that is, after the two mandatory years in the ERM2. The rest of the countries will probably still need some exchange rate flexibility to absorb external shocks in the coming years.     

European integration, productivity growth and real convergence

This paper derives a stochastic endogenous growth model to investigate the impact of European Union (EU) integration on convergence and productivity growth. The theoretical model implies both temporary and permanent positive effects of the integration process. The empirical part of the analysis uses structural break tests and data envelopment analysis to examine the accession process of five recent members to the EU15. The results show (i) endogenously identified accession dates as structural breaks, (ii) improved rates of productivity growth after accession over and above the Union benchmark level, and (iii) increased pace of overall growth due to capital accumulation as a result of institutional features of the Union such as Structural and Cohesion Funds. These findings support the theoretical model, implying that economic integration is beneficial for member countries, especially from a long-run perspective, and Cohesion and Structural funds help the new members catch up with the core-EU members’ standard of living.     

The impact of the European Union fiscal rules on economic growth

This paper analyses whether Maastricht and Stability and Growth Pact fiscal rules have affected growth in the European Union negatively. A growth equation is specified for a group of 15 European Union countries (and 8 OECD countries) over the period 1970-2005 to analyse this issue. Panel estimations using fixed-effects, pooled mean group and system-GMM estimators show that the institutional changes that occurred in the European Union after 1992 were not harmful to growth. Moreover, results show that growth is slightly higher in the period in which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the deficit started to be officially assessed, i.e. after 1997.     

Productivity growth and inflation in Europe: Evidence from panel cointegration tests

In this paper we investigate the productivity growth – inflation nexus in fifteen European countries over the period 1961–1999 using panel unit root and panel cointegration tests. Emphasis is placed on the distinction between long-run and short-run causality using recently developed tests appropriate for heterogeneous panel. The empirical results are relevant for the role of the EMU and the Treaty of Maastricht in catching up, real convergence, and the future growth prospects of Europe. The policy implications of the findings are discussed in detail.