Random Price Discrimination

When a monopolist randomly sorts customers, price discrimination “concavifies” the revenue function of the firm, so that it may be optimal for a monopolist to divide customers into groups that have the same demand function and charge them different prices. It is impossible to rule out this type of result whenever the revenue function is somewhere convex in the “economically relevant” set of quantities, because there always exists a non-decreasing cost function that leads to that conclusion. It is also impossible to rule out the case where, with respect to monopoly, the firm raises or lowers price to all classes and, accordingly, the case where the social welfare decreases or increases. Received December 13, 2001; revised version received June 3, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003 I am indebted to Carlo Beretta, Giuseppe Colangelo, Umberto Galmarini, Guido Merzoni, Gerd Weinrich and especially to Carla Peri for helpful discussions and comments. I have also benefited from insightful suggestions of three anonymous referees. Finally, I wish to thank participants to seminars at the Catholic University of Milan and University of Bologna. The usual disclaimer applies. Funds from MIUR are gratefully acknowledged.     

价格歧视理论中的若干问题

价格歧视理论在传播和应用中存在着含糊不清甚至是谬误的问题,文中重新界定了价格歧视的概念,规范了实施价格歧视的前提条件,对价格歧视中的社会利问题进行了分析,同时指出了价格歧视理论中的两个常见错误。     

价格歧视和网络营销

本文运用经济学理论对价格歧视的种类、必要条件和依据进行了分析 ,并在此基础上论证了网络营销中也能对消费者实行价格歧视。最后阐述了网络营销中的二部定价方法。     

网络外部性与基于行为的区别定价

近年来,基于行为的区别定价成为区别定价领域研究的热点,但是这方面的文献却鲜有涉及到市场中存在着网络外部性的情形。在理性预期的假设下,本文通过一个两阶段双寡头博弈模型分析了网络外部性与基于行为的区别定价对子博弈精炼纳什均衡的影响。在成熟市场上,网络外部性会对具有不同初始市场份额的厂商产生不同影响;在新兴市场上,无论厂商采取何种定价策略,网络外部性都会加剧市场上的竞争,导致厂商利润下降。与统一定价下的子博弈精炼纳什均衡相比,基于行为的区别定价会加剧竞争从而导致厂商利润的下降,但是会造成较多社会福利的无谓损失。     

Export Price Discrimination in Europe and Exchange Rates

The paper studies pricing-to-market behavior on a wide range of disaggregated European Union exports to OECD countries. The sample allows better identification of products for which such behavior is pervasive. The results suggest that the degree of markup adjustment in response to exchange rate changes is similar across destination markets. The evidence of pricing-to-market across source countries ranges from 40% (Netherlands) to 63% (Germany) of the products in the sample, except for the United Kingdom, where there is remarkably little evidence of it. However, formal comparisons across source countries by product do not usually reveal differences in behavior.     

Third-Degree Price Discrimination in the Presence of Subsidies

Abstract. According to a classical result, a move from uniform pricing to third-degree price discrimination only improves welfare if total output increases. In this paper I show that the classical result fails in the presence of subsidies. This finding appears to be relevant for the pharmaceutical sector where a consumer pays a fraction of the actual drug price due to health insurance coverage.     

价格歧视下的不可再生资源的开采问题研究

自Hotelling开始,不可再生资源开采问题引起了经济学家们的注意,在此过程中,产业组织理论被应用于不可再生资源的研究.文章分析了价格歧视对不可再生资源开采的影响,结果发现,当资源的垄断开采者面向多个市场时,价格歧视因素可能使资源开采偏离最优路径.     

分行业能源差别定价促进节能模型研究

促进节能减排是当前建设环境友好型社会以及促进经济又快又好发展的重要措施。如何完成"十一五"规划提出的节能减排的两个约束性指标是亟待解决的重大课题。笔者根据能源价格由市场调节与政府调控相结合形成的原则,根据不同行业节能情况的差异性,对不同行业能源消费价格进行差别定价,建立了分行业能源差别定价促进节能模型,以期对政府制定节能减排政策具有一定的借鉴意义。     

转移成本、价格歧视和非对称寡头竞争

通过在Hotelling空间差异模型的基础上结合转移成本构建非对称企业竞争博弈模型.主要研究在非对称情况下,两企业在一致定价与价格歧视下竞争的均衡结果.还对两种不同定价体制下的均衡结果进行了比较,分析价格歧视是否强化竞争.研究发现价格歧视对竞争的效应是不确定的,很大程度受到两企业不对称程度的影响.     

市场经济条件下的“价格大战”辨析

价格大战是市场竞争条件下的必然产物。本文以上海“明牌银楼”13家黄金饰品企业联合限价为案例,研究表明,政府应当制裁企业为避免价格大战而采取的价格串通行为,进而探讨了价格竞争中行业协会的功能定位问题。     

论三个级别价格歧视间的关系

本文尝试着从联合需求曲线中裂变出三个级别的价格歧视,以此揭示出其间的内在联系。个别需求曲线的加总构成了联合需求曲线,它是就每单位的消费择优录取所有消费者的保留价格,将其从高到低依次排列的,因而它既反映了“不同的人”——高端客户与低端客户的需求强度的差异,也反映了“不同的量”——高端需求与低端需求的需求强度的差异。只要能成功地将联合需求曲线按“量”与按“人”进行拆分,就可以在不同的子市场依照不同的需求价格弹性对高端客户与高端需求定高价、对低端客户与低端需求定低价。     

Entry Deterrence and Entry Accommodation Strategies of a Multiproduct Firm Regulated with Dynamic Price Cap

In this paper we study the way a multiproduct firm, regulated through a dynamic price cap, can develop a price strategy that uses the regulatory policy to deter entry. We consider a firm that initially operates as a monopolist in two markets but faces potential entry in one of the markets. We conclude that the regulated firm can have the incentive to block the entry. This strategy leads to the reduction of the price in both markets. However, the final effect of the entry deterrence strategy on total consumer surplus is not always positive.     

How Applicable is the Dominant Firm Model of Price Leadership?

In this paper, we examine the usefulness of the dominant firm model of price leadership to serve as a benchmark for organizing behavior in laboratory markets. This well established model, whose origins can be traced back over a hundred years, has been recently applied to such landmark antitrust cases as Standard Oil and Alcoa and more recently to the analysis of deregulated markets for electric power. Our results indicate that in posted offer markets the dominant firm quite often produces more than the model's benchmark and sometimes at much greater prices. With sealed offer auction rules and a low elasticity of fringe supply, the dominant firm produces the theoretical output at a price greater than the prediction. However, with a high elasticity of fringe supply, the dominant firm produces more output over a wide range of prices that includes the predicted price.     

Asymmetric Regulation of Access and Price Discrimination in Telecommunications*

Suppose that a strong and a weak operator compete in a telecommunications market. To terminate a call operators need access to the competitor’s network if the call is off-net. Operators set two-part tariffs and price-discriminate according to termination of a call. Suppose as a benchmark that access prices are regulated at costs. I show that the weak operator’s profit and consumer welfare increase if the regulator sets a higher price to access the weak operator’s network. However, total surplus decreases even locally. *I received helpful comments from Mark Armstrong, Toker Doganoglu, Tommaso Valletti, Julian Wright, and, in particular, two referees and the editor Michael Crew. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Heisenberg Fellowship).     

Household Demand, Network Externality Effects and Intertemporal Price Discrimination

This paper examines the optimality of intertemporal price discrimination when network externality effects are present in the consumption of a durable good. We conduct our study in two settings. In a model with two household types, utilities are dependent on the cumulative proportion of households that have purchased the durable good. Next, in a model with a continuum of household types, we extend the analysis to the case where households consume both a durable good and a stream of non-durable goods. We show that in both settings, the presence of network externalities facilitates a sales strategy with intertemporal price discrimination.     

内部控制信息披露与股价崩盘风险

本文利用我国A股上市公司2011~2015年数据,研究了内部控制信息披露与股价崩盘风险之间的关系,研究发现:风险评估信息披露显著增加了企业股价崩盘风险,内部监督信息披露与内部控制质量的提升显著降低了企业股价崩盘风险,而且这些结论主要存在于业绩较差、公司治理较差以及信息透明度较低的公司,未发现其他内部控制信息披露与股价崩盘风险相关。进一步分析表明,审计质量具有调节效应,而公司规模与上市时长的调节效应并不明显。     

房价上涨对企业规模分布的影响研究

企业规模分布不仅可以反映某一产业的竞争状况和发展模式,还会对一国经济增长产生重要影响,如企业规模分布 、创新与全要素生产率等.文章以1999-2007年中国房价快速上涨为背景,利用工业企业微观数据,实证考察了省级层面房价上涨对企业规模分布的影响.研究结果显示:总体来看,房价上涨更不利于中小企业成长,并使企业规模分布进一步趋于不均匀.中介效应模型的进一步研究显示:成本效应 、信贷效应和挤出效应是房价上涨影响企业规模分布的三条作用路径.文章的研究不仅对企业规模分布理论研究形成了有益补充,也为认识房价上涨对实体经济的影响提供了新的视角,更为政府制定政策以减缓房价上涨对实体经济的冲击提供了科学依据.