Market share and price determination in the contemporary airline industry

This paper examines airline pricing and market structure determination for domestic airport-pair routes. The model includes variables to control for the effects of congestion, consumer brand preferences, barriers to entry into airports, and multiple airport availability within a city. The results indicate the noncontestability of airline markets, but certain factors can mitigate a carrier's endpoint dominance. Additionally, the need for policies addressing airport congestion is indicated by several aspects of model results.     

Price wars and price collusion in China's airline markets

In the absence of an effective antitrust law, both fare wars and price collusion have been pervasive in China's airline markets, causing concern for both airlines and consumers. A study of monthly airfare data from 2002 to 2004 confirms that fare wars occur periodically, as well as price collusion. Both tend to be short-lived. The fact that collusion is more likely to occur in January and April when demand is high, as revealed by China Eastern's and China Southern's price-war and collusion models, has been confirmed by interview information obtained from the airlines' sales managers. However, there is also evidence in these models suggesting that collusion can be more easily formed when demand is low. High airport concentration measured by the HHI may facilitate collusion in certain circumstances, but it may also lead to more price wars under other conditions. Concentration in both airports and routes does not appear to systematically affect the occurrence of fare wars and collusion in all the models estimated. We also reject the possibility that mutual forbearance due to multimarket contact plays any important anti-competitive role in China's airline markets.     

City-Pairs Versus Airport-Pairs: A Market-Definition Methodology for the Airline Industry

This paper provides a methodology for deciding which airports warrant grouping in multi-airport metropolitan areas. The methodology is based on the comparability of incremental competition effects from nearby airports on average fares at a metropolitan area’s primary airport. Results from a quarterly panel data set for the period 2003–2009 provide strong evidence that city-pairs, rather than airport-pairs, are the appropriate market definition for analyses of passenger air transportation involving many (but not all) large metropolitan areas. Based on the proposed method, we offer a recommended list of airports that should be grouped when creating city-pairs for the analysis of competition in the US domestic airline industry.     

Airport capacity and inefficiency in slot allocation

This paper studies the time slot allocation of flight departures when travelers have a preference for departing on peak times and the number of available peak-time slots is constrained by airport capacities. We show that, compared to public airports, private airports may restrain their supply of peak slots strictly below their capacity levels when they serve airlines that compete to the same destinations. Such an inefficiency takes place in airports that have low per-passenger charges and are not too busy. It does not occur in the absence of competition in destination markets.     

Airline fleet composition and deregulation

Airline responses to deregulation have been analyzed using a variety of models. This paper presents and empirically tests a model of airline behavior which explicitly treats hub-and-spoke route structures which emerged after deregulation. The change to hub-and-spoke route structure implies an alteration of airline fleet use and acquisition of aircraft after deregulation. The empirical section of this paper investigates the nature of these changes using a data panel for airlines from 1970 to 1989. The changes observed in airline fleet use and composition indicate that the primary distortion of regulation on aircraft was inhibiting their use over efficient networks.This paper has benefited from the suggestions of Kenneth Boyer, Bruce Allen, Charles Ballard, and Stephen Martin at MSU, my colleagues Djeto Assane and Bernard Malamud at UNLV, and an anonymous referee. Any errors remaining are my own.     

The Effects of Market Structure and Technology on Airline Fleet Composition after Deregulation

The present study examines the effects of market structure and technology on airline fleet composition in the deregulated airline industry. To capture the effects of market structure and technology on airline fleet acquisition and use, a profit function which allows airline fleet in its specification is applied to derive the fleet composition function of an airline. The results show a steady pattern in airlines' adoption of two-engine wide-bodied aircraft during the post-deregulation era, providing evidence that the airlines have responded consistently to changes in market structure and technology in acquiring two-engine wide-bodied aircraft after deregulation.     

The Determinants of Pricing in the Mexican Domestic Airline Sector: The Impact of Competition and Airport Congestion

Low-cost airlines in Mexico affect the lowest-quoted fares of one of the two principal incumbent carriers, but have no effect on the lowest-quoted fares of the other incumbent carrier. The same conclusion holds for competition between incumbent carriers where the lowest-quoted fares of one of the incumbent carriers is lower when incumbents compete. Congestion at the Mexico City airport is limiting potential competition, with carriers being able to charge a significant price premium. This suggests that the societal costs of airport congestion can go well beyond the negative congestion externality and should also include the effects of reduced competition. These findings raise important public policy issues.     

Airport congestion and capacity when carriers are asymmetric

This study investigates pricing and capacity investment for a congested airport served by multiple carriers. Removing the symmetric carrier assumption, when airlines’ market shares are potentially asymmetric, the socially non-discriminatory optimal charge rule should include an additional term that corrects the distortion caused by pricing itself. The first-best outcome cannot be achieved, and the airport overinvests under the non-discriminatory optimal charge. However, if the airport levies discriminatory charges respective to carriers, the first-best outcome can be achieved and capacity investment is socially efficient under discriminatory optimal charges. In addition, the discriminatory optimal charges levied on a carrier with a larger (smaller) market share are lower (higher).     

Does competition increase quality? Evidence from the US airline industry

This paper studies the impact of competition on quality provision in the US airline industry exploiting a novel source of exogenous variation in competition. While mergers among market incumbents may stifle competition, a merger may increase the probability of entry if the merging airlines were not operating prior to merger in the market but each of them had presence at different route endpoints. We find non-merging incumbent airlines increase their flight frequency upon entry threat and accommodate entry of the newly merged airline by lowering flight frequency upon entry. While non-merging incumbents reduced arrival delays only upon entry of the newly merged airline, we find that incumbents decrease their cancelation rates and departure delays both upon merger announcement and entry of the newly merged airline. Our evidence suggests an increase in competition may increase consumer surplus, because non-merging incumbents increase quality and convenience, while keeping their prices unchanged.     

Operational performance of airlines: An extension of traditional measurement paradigms

This study presents a new approach for measuring operational performance, an important facet of performance missing in the current literature concerned with international airline strategy. International performance assessments of airlines from published financial information are difficult, because (1) most airlines lease a substantial fraction of their aircraft, and (2) different accounting and taxation rules in various countries result in different impacts of leased assets on profit and balance-sheet information. A possible solution are nonfinancial data. For example, the number of available ton kilometers may reflect aircraft capacity more accurately than flight equipment depreciation. However, different units of measurement introduce new difficulties. Drawing on data from 15 airlines, this study utilizes 'Data Envelopment Analysis' as a technique to analyze and compare operational performance of airlines. The study concludes with an analysis of strategic factors of high profitability and performance in the airline industry.     

Convenient flight connections vs. airport congestion: Modeling the ‘rolling hub’

This paper provides the first analysis of the trade-off between convenient flight connections and airport congestion, a fundamental but untreated element in the economics of hub-and-spoke networks. A continuous spatial model illustrates this trade-off in a framework where a small gap between flight operating times raises congestion while also shortening a connecting passenger’s layover time. When the passenger’s cost per unit of layover time rises, the monopoly airline chooses to narrow the gap between its flights, yielding shorter layovers but more congestion. A discrete spatial model, where flights congest one another only if they operate in the same discrete period, makes this layover-cost effect discontinuous: the monopoly carrier concentrates (deconcentrates) its flights when this cost is high (low) relative to the costs of congestion. When fringe carriers are present, however, the hub carrier always concentrates its flights, either partially or fully. But the presence of a second hub carrier leads to an equilibrium mirroring the monopoly outcome: the carriers concentrate their flights in different periods when the layover cost is high and deconcentrate them otherwise. The paper also presents a welfare analysis, showing that movement from the equilibrium to the social optimum typically requires greater carrier separation.     

Quality disclosure when firms set their own quality targets

We investigate how firms adjust their target quality levels when they - or their competitors - become subject to an information disclosure requirement. Our setting is the U.S. airline industry, where all large domestic carriers are required to report their on-time performance (OTP). OTP is measured by comparing a flight’s actual arrival time to its scheduled arrival time, which is chosen by the airline. Therefore, airlines can improve their OTP by simply increasing their scheduled flight times. We study three airlines which become subject to the disclosure requirement and find that they lengthen their schedule times by 1.4 min on average. Moreover, other airlines also increase their schedule times on routes where they compete with newly reporting airlines, by about 2.3 min, while actual flight times remain unchanged. While these numbers are small, the longer schedule times translate into a 15% improvement in OTP for previously reporting airlines. We conclude that newly reporting airlines and their direct competitors adjust their quality targets when they become subject to quality disclosure, which improves their reported quality without improving the actual time that it takes to travel from gate to gate.     

Deregulation, Business Strategy, and Wages in the Airline Industry

This study assesses empirically the relationship between business strategy and wages within the context of a significant environmental change—deregulation of the airline industry. Regression results provide limited support for the hypotheses that firms' business strategies would lead to systematic differences in average earnings levels of airline carriers, depending on whether or not the industry was regulated, and that these strategies would operate over and above firms' ability to pay higher wages. It appears that business strategies may be linked to their human resource outcomes even in a heavily unionized environment.     

Measuring Conduct and Cost Parameters in the Spanish Airline Market

This paper examines airline competition through an empirical specification of a demand and pricing equation system. The system is estimated for the Spanish airline market using a simultaneous procedure. The suitability of the Cournot assumption is tested in a competitive scenario characterized by an asymmetric oligopoly with capacity constraints. In addition, the degree of density economies is analyzed. Results show that Spanish airlines behave in a less competitive way than is implied by the Cournot solution. Finally, some evidence on the fact that thin routes can be considered as natural monopolies is found.     

Bootstrapping the Malmquist indexes for Italian airports

This paper uses data envelopment analysis to assess the operational performance of 28 Italian airports during the period of 2000 through 2006. Recent developments in bootstrapping techniques are used to correct total factor productivity estimates for bias and to assess the uncertainty surrounding such estimates. This study found that the Italian airport industry experienced a significant technological regress, with few airports achieving an increase in productivity led by improvements in efficiency. Moreover, the paper shows that the form of ownership (public majority vs. private majority) of an airport management company does not significantly affect performance. In contrast, this type of the concession agreement has positive and significant effects on airport productivity. Finally, the paper highlights the existence of a productivity gap between airports located in the North-Central part of the country and those located in the south.     

Do low-quality products affect high-quality entry? Multiproduct firms and nonstop entry in airline markets

This paper studies the effect of product ownership and quality on nonstop entry in the airline industry. Specifically, this paper empirically examines the decision of an airline to offer high-quality nonstop service between cities given that the airline may or may not be offering lower quality one-stop service. I find that airlines that offer one-stop service through a hub are less likely to enter that same market with nonstop service than those that do not. In addition, the quality of the one-stop service is an important determinant of entry. Airlines are more likely to enter a market with nonstop service if their own or their rival's one-stop service in the market is of lower quality. Estimates suggest that the entry of a rival nonstop carrier diminishes the probability a carrier enters the market with nonstop service. However, airlines offering one-stop service respond differently to nonstop rivals. In particular, relative to other carriers, those offering one-stop service are more likely to enter markets if there are nonstop rivals, suggesting that cannibalization effects are diminished in the presence of nonstop competition.     

The Impact of Mergers on Quality Provision: Evidence from the Airline Industry

We examine how mergers affect quality provision by analyzing five U.S. airline mergers, focusing on on‐time performance (OTP). We find that airline mergers have minimal negative impacts on OTP, and likely result in long‐run improvements due to efficiencies. Importantly, we show that this finding is not driven by post‐merger changes in price that could affect OTP. Consequently, at least in the case of airlines, policymakers should not, as a rule, fear the negative quality effects of mergers.     

Airports and Economic Development

This article tests whether the activity at a metropolitan area's airport helps predict population and employment growth. In regression equations explaining employment and population growth, the article uses various measures of airport activity, including boardings, originations, hub status and cargo volume. Because airports may be a function of, as well as a cause of, growth, the article instruments for airports by using geographical and lagged variables. It finds that, under a variety of specifications, passenger activity is a powerful predictor of growth; cargo activity is not.     

On the relation between multimarket contact and service quality: Mutual forbearance or network coordination?

Research summary : We reconsider the relationship between multimarket contact and product quality in the airline industry by arguing that multimarket contact has both a negative mutual forbearance effect on quality and a positive network coordination effect on quality. Multimarket contact increases the frequency of contact between firms, and this anticipated future interaction promotes cooperation. In network industries, especially small firms may want to cooperate in order to increase the attractiveness of the composite product. By using size as a moderating variable, we indeed find a consistent positive effect of multimarket contact on product quality for small airlines. We show that this effect can be attributed to network coordination and that this effect generally dominates the negative mutual forbearance effect in a recent period. Managerial summary : Firms with sales in multiple geographical markets likely encounter each other with mutual respect (i.e., live and let live) because aggressive behavior in one market may lead to retaliatory responses in other markets. Such responses weaken competitive pressures on price and quality. Insofar these firms sell complementary products, they may however also coordinate and improve their joint product offering, resulting in better quality for the consumer. This paper shows that this positive effect of cooperation may dominate the negative competition‐reducing effect, depending on the size distribution of firms. The reason is that small or nondominant firms have a stronger incentive to produce compatible products than large or dominant firms with already a strong position in the (global) market. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The economics of international codesharing: an analysis of airline alliances

International airline alliances allow airlines to coordinate their operations in providing international service. This paper analyzes the effect of such alliances on traffic levels, fares, and welfare. In the model, the benefits of alliances arise because cooperative pricing of trips by the partners puts downward pressure on fares in the interline city-pair markets (these are markets where travel on both carriers is necessary). The loss of competition in the interhub market, which connects the hub cites of the partners, generates a countervailing effect, tending to raise the fare in that market. While the presence of economies of traffic density complicates these impacts by generating cost links across markets, simulation analysis shows that the above tendencies typically prevail. Welfare analysis shows that both consumer and total surplus typically rise following formation of an alliance despite the harm to interhub passengers, suggesting that the positive effects of alliances may outweigh any negative impacts.