论西方发达国家的国际经济政策协调

国际经济政策协调对于促进国家间经济贸易的相互依存、合作发展,发挥着越来越重要的作用,对此问题的研究也日益受到重视。作者对国际经济政策协调的含义、原因,西方发达国家在国际经济政策协调过程中所遇到的障碍以及协调的形式和方案等有关基本问题,进行了较为理性的分析与思考。     

国际货币政策协调理论研究的新进展北大核心CSSCISSCI

国际货币政策协调是国际经济政策研究的核心。目前,理论界关于国际货币政策协调的研究大多是在新宏观经济学的框架内展开的,重点包括国际货币政策协调的效果、协调收益与成本的来源以及提高协调效果的途径等。美国金融危机爆发以来,理论界进一步分析了危机对已有协调政策的冲击和危机中所采取应急性协调政策的效果,并探讨了金融危机后国际货币政策协调的方向。     

中国货币政策与汇率政策冲突的成因及对策——基于国际协调的视角

探究开放经济条件下我国货币政策和汇率政策形成冲突的原因并寻求二者之间更好的协调机制是当前理论界的研究热点,也是我国货币当局迫切需要解决的一个重大现实问题。本文通过四个典型化事实证明,由于美元霸权的渗透和影响以及政策国际协调机制的不完善,导致我国在一系列政策国际协调中处于不利地位,并由此造成我国汇率政策和货币政策的经常性冲突,其中美元霸权的渗透和影响是关键性的。据此,本文提出了若干有针对性的政策建议。     

货币政策、财政政策、产业政策、贸易政策、汇率政策协调配合问题研究(下)

在我国经济转轨时期,政府通过判定经济政策对经济运行加以调控是十分必要的。开放经济条件下,宏观经济调控面临着更加复杂的环境,只依靠一项或两项经济政策不可能实现调控目标,也不可能取得良好的效果。本文从有关经济政策协调的理论研究出发,系统论述了经济政策协调的理论及其前沿,对当今国际上经济发达国家和经济转轨国家政策协调问题进行了对比分析,在此基础上,对我国货币政策、财政政策、产业政策、贸易政策、汇率政策协调配合中的问题进行了分析,并提出了加强政策协调的相关建议。     

货币政策、财政政策、产业政策、贸易政策、汇率政策协调配合问题研究(中)

在我国经济转轨时期,政府通过判定经济政策对经济运行加以调控是十分必要的。开放经济条件下,宏观经济调控面临着更加复杂的环境,只依靠一项或两项经济政策不可能实现调控目标,也不可能取得良好的效果。本文从有关经济政策协调的理论研究出发,系统论述了经济政策协调的理论及其前沿,对当今国际上经济发达国家和经济转轨国家政策协调问题进行了对比分析,在此基础上,对我国货币政策、财政政策、产业政策、贸易政策、汇率政策协调配合中的问题进行了分析,并提出了加强政策协调的相关建议。     

货币政策、财政政策、产业政策、贸易政策、汇率政策协调配合问题研究(上)

在我国经济转轨时期,政府通过判定经济政策对经济运行加以调控,是十分必要的。开放经济条件下,宏观经济调控面临着更加复杂的环境,只依靠一项或两项经济政策不可能实现调控目标,也不可能取得良好的效果。本文从有关经济政策协调的理论研究出发系统论述了经济政策协调的理论及其前言,对当今国际上经济发达国家和经济转轨国家政策协调问题进行了对比分析,在此基础上,对我国货币政策;财政政策;产业政策;贸易政策;汇率政策协调配合中的问题进行了分析,并提出了加强政策协调的相关建议。     

国际银行卡成员遵循的限制性规则

银行卡支付网络有时被认为是银行间合营,银行卡支付网络中的反托拉斯问题在银行间协作的反托拉斯问题中很有代表性,比如银行卡网络成员规则中的限制性条款受到频繁质疑问题,又如交换费问题。其中限制性规则问题包括:排他性规则、承兑所有银行卡规则、无附加费规则或不歧视规则等方面。     

应对气候变化的税收挑战与政策建议——基于全球公共品融资的视角北大核心

应对气候变化是一项全球公共品,其供给和融资需要不同于国内公共品的国际合作模式。税收政策作为碳定价机制的核心工具之一,是应对气候变化的重要内容。当前,应对全球气候变化的税收政策在政策设计、与其他政策之间的协调以及国际协调等方面还存在问题与挑战,因此应对气候变化的税收政策制定应加强全球层面的碳定价机制建设、充分挖掘应对全球气候变化的国际合作潜力。     

全球金融危机背景下的国际经济政策协调

愈演愈烈的经济金融危机引发的国际范围内大规模的经济政策协调行动。协调措施包括降息、政府注资、银行的国有化及国际论坛的政策协商和共识的达成等。金融危机背景下的国际经济政策协调支持了金融机构的流动性，在一定程度上稳定了恶化的金融局势，增强了人们对抗危机的信心。但政策协调的不和谐音符也同时存在。展望未来，经济大国的大规模干预活动对经济增长的推动效果会逐渐显现，但投资者信心的恢复将是一个长期的过程。     

中美货币政策协调可实现帕累托改进——基于博弈论框架的分析

2023年中美货币政策周期深度错位,在本轮货币政策周期下,美联储为解决美国高通胀问题,从量化宽松货币政策急转为紧缩性货币政策,处于加息周期;对比之下,我国央行坚持稳健的货币政策,当前整体处于降息周期。国际货币政策协调是指在经济全球化日益加深、各国经济政策溢出效应不断加大的背景下,各国货币当局为实现利益最大化或损失最小化,就货币政策以及相应措施进行商讨与制定。通过简化卡尔·瓦什政策协调模型构建两国货币政策的博弈论分析框架,发现进行货币政策协调的损失函数小于不进行货币政策协调的损失函数,即两国进行货币政策协调可以实现帕累托改进。中国与美国可以通过充分利用现行国际货币政策协调机制进行货币政策协调,同时可以推进现行国际合作机制改革,减小在现行国际合作平台进行中美货币政策协调的阻力。此外,中美还可以与其他大国携手设立非常规货币政策协调机制。在非常规货币政策越来越常态化的背景下,设立这一协调机制具有重要意义。     

Playing by the rules. How Intel avoids antitrust litigation.

Microsoft and Intel are both obvious targets for antitrust litigation; both wield considerable control in their respective segments of the computer industry. But while Mircrosoft has been mired in court for years now--its name and business practices dragged through the mud, and its very future as a single company thrown into doubt--Intel has avoided a prolonged, high-profile antitrust case. Intel's success is not a matter of luck. The company's antitrust compliance program, refined over many years, has been an integral element in the chip maker's business strategy. In this article, the authors suggest that Intel's approach to compliance provides a valuable model for any enterprise that may come under regulators' scrutiny. They describe how Intel created extremely conservative antitrust compliance standards and then instituted a series of unique training events that had active support from then--CEO Andy Grove and others in senior management. First, live training -- not just instructional pamphlets or videos -- was given to all affected employees. Those classes were followed by customized training programs for different parts of the company. Then, to drive antitrust awareness deeper into the company's memory, Intel carried out random audits of employees' files and conducted mock depositions. "It's fascinating to see," Grove says. "A memo is introduced into evidence and you shrug. You fully understand how that memo could be written. Moreover, you could have written it yourself. And then you see that memo turned into a tool and a weapon against you, in front of your eyes." Intel recognizes that no matter how cautious it is, it will always face extraordinary scrutiny as a market leader. But "since antitrust is embedded in everything we do," Grove says, "we can control our destiny."     

Stock Returns,Real Activity,and the Trust Question

Periodic antitrust attacks on corporations may have influenced stock prices. For the period 1904 to 1944, each antitrust case filed is associated with a 0.5 to 1.9 percent drop of the Dow, and each unexpected case with even larger drops. Other aspects of antitrust besides actual filings may help account for other movements, in particular the 1929 Crash. Historical evidence bears on the question of whether antitrust is exogenous and also links antitrust and the “corporation problem.” These results illustrate the sorts of real factors aside from changes in concurrent output that may account for stock price volatility.     

The Politics of M&A Antitrust

Antitrust regulators play a critical role in protecting market competition. We examine whether the political process affects antitrust reviews of merger transactions. We find that acquirers and targets located in the political districts of powerful U.S. congressional members who serve on committees with antitrust regulatory oversight receive relatively favorable antitrust review outcomes. To establish causality, we use plausibly exogenous shocks to firm–politician links and a falsification test. Additional findings suggest congressional members’ incentives to influence antitrust reviews are affected by three channels: special interests, voter and constituent interests, and ideology. In aggregate, our findings suggest that the political process adversely interferes with the ability of antitrust regulators to provide independent recommendations about anticompetitive mergers.     

Stealth Acquisitions and Product Market Competition

We examine whether and how firms structure their merger and acquisition deals to avoid antitrust scrutiny. There are approximately 40% more mergers and acquisitions (M&As) than expected just below deal value thresholds that trigger antitrust review. These “stealth acquisitions” tend to involve financial and governance contract terms that afford greater scope for negotiating and assigning lower deal values. We also show that the equity values, gross margins, and product prices of acquiring firms and their competitors increase following such acquisitions. Our results suggest that acquirers manipulate M&As to avoid antitrust scrutiny, thereby benefiting their own shareholders but potentially harming other corporate stakeholders.     

Bank mergers: What should policymakers do?

These remarks discuss why the “cluster” of financial services and local banking markets are still relevant for antitrust analysis in banking. A key portion of the Federal Reserve’s Order approving the NationsBank–Barnett merger is interpreted, and the extent to which antitrust is a practical constraint on the development of a nationwide banking structure is commented upon.     

出版物转售价格维持的逻辑思辨与适用——基于反垄断法视角

是否维持出版物转售价格,一直是个颇有争议的话题。各国的基本态度是以反垄断法予以规制,赞成出版物转售价格维持者认为它可促进出版物的多样性发展,出版物的多样性必须依靠转售价格维持。虽然出版物转售价格维持在一定程度上有利于保护出版物多样性,但基本原则还必须尊重市场规律,利用竞争促进出版物的多样性。竞争也是最有效的方式,总体上讲,我国出版物转售价格应受我国反垄断法的规制,但在具体规则适用上则应区别对待。对于构成反垄断法中纵向限制竞争的行为,若涉及到国家基础政策且存在公共利益可根据相关法律予以豁免,否则,应坚决予以规制。     

Illinois Walls: how barring indirect purchaser suits facilitates collusion

In its landmark ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted standing to sue for recovery of antitrust damages to direct purchasers. However, antitrust damages are typically (in part) passed on to intermediaries lower in the chain of production and ultimately to consumers. We show that the Illinois Brick rule facilitates collusion. It allows an upstream cartel to shield itself from private damage claims by forwarding a share of cartel profits to its direct purchasers. These benefits dissuade the direct purchasers from exercising their exclusive right to sue for private damages. The cartel can achieve this by rationing inputs at low prices. Several U.S. antitrust cases show symptoms of “Illinois Walls.”     

Mergers and the Value of Antitrust Deterrence

While the U.S. has pursued a vigorous antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers over the past four decades, mergers in Canada have until recently been permitted to take place in a virtually unrestricted antitrust environment. The absence of an antitrust overhang in Canada presents an interesting opportunity to test the conjecture that the rigid market share and concentration criteria of the U.S. policy effectively deters a significant number of potentially collusive mergers. The effective deterrence hypothesis implies that the probability of a horizontal merger being anticompetitive is higher in Canada than in the U.S. However, parameters in cross-sectional regressions reject the market power hypothesis on samples of both U.S. and Canadian mergers. Judging from the Canadian evidence, there simply isn't much to deter.     

反垄断监管与事前监管——互联网平台监管模式的二元建构

反垄断监管是一种典型的事后监管,表现为禁止性规范为主的立法模式、合理原则为主的分析模式和消极性义务为主的救济措施,应用于平台监管中存在滞后性、威慑效果不佳等不足,反垄断法内部变革举措的实际效果也较为有限。相较反垄断监管的事后属性,事前监管通过创设积极性法律义务,实现对垄断结构引致不可逆损害的风险预防。为避免“假阳性”错误,引入事前监管须证明细分市场存在高而持续性的进入壁垒、欠缺有效竞争的动态趋势、事前监管收益大于成本三个累积性标准。平台事前监管的总体目标是推动市场从封闭到开放的回归,监管主体上成立专门事前监管机构并且采取合作制监管架构,监管对象的选取遵循“相关市场分析+显著市场力量确定”的基本框架,监管措施包括服务互操作、开放特定数据、平等对待不同主体提供的服务等。与反垄断监管的衔接包括建立分工监管的机制和可反驳的违法推定规则。     

Establishing banking market definitions through estimation of residual deposit supply equations

We employ a procedure suggested by the Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines (but never before applied to banking) to determine whether nonbank financial institutions should be included as participants in defining the product market relevant to antitrust analyses of proposed bank mergers. We estimate bank “residual supply” relationships indicating the responsiveness of small-scale deposit funds supplied by consumers to the level of interest rates offered for such deposits. Estimated elasticities of residual deposit supply are quite small, implying that only commercial banks should be included as participants in the “antitrust market” relevant to proposed bank mergers.