Stretch Goals,Factual/Counterfactual Reflection Strategies,and Firm Performance

Popular business press and academic publications have advocated for stretch goals, particularly to enhance firm performance. The general assumption is that stretch goals can create a more challenging task environment that upsets complacency, inspires motivation, encourages outside-the-box thinking, stimulates search and innovation, and guides efforts and persistence. Surprisingly few systematic empirical studies have been conducted to support stretch goal deployment, such as when and how to use them. This study introduces two reflection strategies – counterfactual reflection (managers confront performance feedback and create possible alternatives) and factual reflection (managers analyse their own decisions and explain performance feedback) – and uses two experimental laboratory studies to test how different reflection strategies contribute to the stretch goal-performance relationship. The results indicated that using stretch goals does not affect firm performance, although theoretically, using stretch goals can create a more challenging task environment and enhance performance. Rather, it is the combination of the type of goal and reflection strategy that affects performance. I suspect that under stretch goals, managers may be unable to implement new ideas as expected, leading to growing performance gaps and perceived continuous failures over time. Consequently, their motivation to search for alternative solutions declines, and they may fall into a spiral of self-constrained thinking. The results demonstrate that under stretch goals, managers use factual reflection strategies to deliberately reflect on performance feedback to achieve higher performance. In contrast, managers who are assigned moderate goals perform better if they use a counterfactual reflection strategy. I suggest that by using a different reflection strategy, managers can further improve performance by encouraging directed search behaviour and avoiding self-constrained thinking spirals. My study provides a richer theoretical and empirical appreciation of the effect of reflection strategy depending on the task environment and goal-setting.     

Causality Rules: Performance Feedback on Hierarchically Related Goals and Capital Investment Variability

We extend March and Simon’s (1958) analysis of strategic decisions by distinguishing between two rules for allocating attention – priority versus causality. We develop theory concerning causality rules which have been largely overlooked in prior literature. Specifically, we examine how performance feedback on the intermediate productivity goal and the higher‐order profitability goal independently and jointly influence the variability of firm capital investments. Panel analysis of 2,477 Spanish manufacturing firms reveals that these goals jointly affect the variability of capital investments through both priority and causality attention rules. Our study provides new insights on how firms handle multiple goals, deconstruct performance feedback, and cope with the attentional constraints of bounded rationality.     

Current production targets and strategic decisions by corporate managers

This article considers the potential role of current production targets in providing corporate managers with incentives for allocating their efforts toward operational and strategic decisions. Operational decisions relate to current production, while strategic decisions affect both current production and future profitability. A moral hazard exists to the extent that manager effort allocations are not observable. Of interest is the design of compensation contracts which efficiently resolve that hazard. Attention is mainly focused on distortions in current production away from targets which would be optimal if manager effort allocations were observable. The principal insight is that an increase in current production targets may, paradoxically, be motivated by a desire to induce a greater allocation of effort to strategic decisions.     

Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real‐Effort Experiment

This paper analyzes the consequences of allowing for punishment in a real‐effort pair production experiment. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs on whether he or she can impose a sanction on the less performing partner. When sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a sanction mechanism allows good performers to focus on their own performance. In the case of costless sanctions, not sanctioning a partner who under‐performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his or her performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger push effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Goals and Feedback in Incentivizing Performance

In this paper, we experimentally investigate how goal setting and feedback policies affect work performance. In particular, we study the effects of (i) absolute performance feedback, (ii) self‐specified goals, and (iii) exogenous goals and relative performance feedback. Our results show that the average performance of the subjects who are provided self‐performance feedback is 11% lower than the ones who obtain no feedback. Moreover, setting a non‐binding personal goal does not affect performance. Finally, assigning an exogenous goal and providing relative performance feedback decreases performance by 8%. We discuss the insights our findings offer for the optimal design of goal setting and feedback mechanisms. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The problem of employees' network centrality and supervisors' error in performance appraisal: A multilevel theory

This article reveals an unexplored paradox for HR managers: the centrality of an employee in the social network benefits performance but hampers performance appraisal because it affects supervisors' rating errors. Central employees can be erroneously rated high on performance even when they are not high performers because supervisors tend to overappraise their performance. A distinction is made between rating precision, which depends on supervisors' uncertainty regarding employees' performance, and rating accuracy, which depends on supervisors' bias in favor of employees. Employee centrality is posited to be beneficial to precision but deleterious to accuracy because it regulates the diffusion of positive information, status, and power, all of which distort supervisors' capacity and motivation to accurately appraise performance. It is then argued that rating errors caused by network centrality affect aggregate perceptions of justice in organizations. When employees are highly connected to each other in a dense network, organizations have a strong and positive justice climate. Yet when some employees are more central than others in a centralized network, organizations have a negative and weak justice climate. The article contributes to the literature because it identifies an unexplored dark side of network centrality and offers recommendations for HR managers to cope with its deleterious consequences and for scholars to study them.     

The role of interpersonal affect in performance appraisal: evidence from two samples – the US and India

The interpersonal affect, a li ke–dislike relationship between a supervisor and his/her subordinate, has traditionally been conceptualized as a source of bias in performance appraisals. However, some researchers have argued that the interpersonal affect may not be a bias, especially where it develops as a result of past performance. In this field study, using data from 190 supervisors in the US, and 113 supervisors in India, we delineate the relationship between interpersonal affect and performance ratings. In both samples, interpersonal affect and performance level were found to have significant effects on performance ratings. Results from the US sample indicated that raters are able to separate their liking for a subordinate from actual performance when a ssigning performance ratings, suggesting that the interpersonal affect does not operate as a bias in the appraisal process. Results from the Indian sample, however, suggest that supervisors inflate ratings of low performers, suggesting that local cultural norms may be operating as a moderator.     

Order review/release in the absence of adherence to formal scheduling policies

In many plants, the performance of shop floor workers is measured by accounting-based productivity criteria. Such systems encourage workers to maximize their individual performance, often at the expense of total shop performance. One such company, Union Switch & Signal, a manufacturer of railroad equipment, has decided to increase finished goods inventory in an effort to counteract poor due date performance. Management at Union Switch & Signal feel that workers not following priorities contribute significantly to this poor performance. It has been suggested that the controlled release of jobs into the shop, i.e., Order Review/Release (ORR), may provide the operations manager a vehicle for enforcing job priorities when formal dispatching rules are not strictly followed by workers. In this study, two ORR methodologies are studied in regards to their ability to offset the dysfunctional behavior by workers who seek to maximize their own individual productivity. This type of behavior was captured by simulating the phenomenon of `cherry picking'. Cherry picking occurs when a job is selected for processing based not on its formal priority but on the difference in standard allowable processing time and actual processing time. Results suggest that at least one ORR methodology is able to reduce the difference in resulting labor productivity while improving overall shop performance.     

Implementing multiple perspective feedback: An integrated framework

Despite the recent popularity of multiple perspective feedback systems, there is little theory to guide research in this area and to promote the successful implementation of multiple perspective feedback in organizations. By integrating organizational development and individual performance perspectives, a theoretical framework is developed that illustrates the mechanisms by which feedback can lead to improved individual, work group, and organizational performance. According to this framework, when the structure and systems of the organization are congruent with the goals of the feedback program, feedback positively influences individual performance determinants (e.g., declarative knowledge, motivation). This leads to improved individual performance, which contributes to desired organizational outcomes. Based on this framework, practical questions that should be addressed before a feedback process is implemented are presented.     

FINANCIAL CUTBACK DECISIONS BY PRIORITY SCALING

This paper reports the application of the priority scaling method to financial cutback decisions in a social services organization, and provides an overview of the priority scaling method. The method is used to elicit a weighted scale of individual and group priorities between options from paired-comparison exercises, together with a measure of internal consistency of judgment. The weighted scale of option priorities may be adjusted to align with the relative values individuals and groups assign to the multiple criteria which guide their judgments, and a measure of internal coherence of judgment obtained. Decision-makers’ allocations of resources may be inferred from their priority weightings together with budgets for each option. Applying the method in reverse, decision-makers’ implied priorities may be directly inferred from proposed budget cuts. A set of reliability tests are incorporated in rigorous versions of the method.     

SCALE, PERFORMANCE AND THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LOCAL AUTHORITY SERVICES

New public management (NPM) arguments on strategy and structure suggest that performance is enhanced if large organizations are disaggregated into smaller units. the NPM perspective reflects the views of public choice theorists who claim that big organizations are unresponsive to public needs, inefficient and fail to achieve their formal goals. These arguments have underpinned many recent changes in the structure of public services at both central and local levels.
This paper uses data on six local government services to test the NPM hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between scale and performance. Five dimensions of performance are analysed: service coverage, quality, speed of provision, efficiency, and administrative effectiveness. Scale is measured through indicators of service output, caseload and needs. the impact of scale is tested in multivariate statistical models which control for other potential influences on variations in performance across local authorities.
Only around half of the statistical evidence suggests that the smallest local units are the best performers. In addition, even when performance does decline with scale, this trend is reversed in the very largest units. Thus, contrary to NPM arguments, the biggest organizations are seldom the poorest performers.     

Do Hybrid Goals Pay off? Social and Economic Goals in Academic Spin-Offs

New ventures often pursue both economic and social goals, known as goal hybridity. Yet, we know less about how organizational goal hybridity influences the performance and governance of new ventures. Goal hybridity is common among academic spin-offs (ASOs) seeking to commercialize scientific research from universities. We hypothesize that ASOs’ goal hybridity influences their subsequent performance and their governance structure. We also hypothesize that ASOs who enrol multiple stakeholders with investment goals aligned with their hybrid goals outperform the ASOs who do not. By combining several data sources, we follow Norwegian ASOs longitudinally and find that goal hybridity explains their subsequent performance differences, such that ASOs relying on both economic and social aspects of their business when formulating their goals outperform those who rely purely on economic or social goals. We also find that ASOs with hybrid goals outperform when they enrol multiple stakeholders who are aligned with their hybrid goals. Our findings have implications for theorizing in hybridity, stakeholder enrolment, and the organizational goals literatures. We also provide a fuller understanding on performance heterogeneity of ASOs, and we offer a set of practice and policy implications to academic entrepreneurship and public-private partnership literatures.     

Moderation by goal commitment of the feedback–performance relationship: Theoretical explanation and preliminary study

This paper presents goal commitment as one stage of a multidimensional goal striving process that affects feedback acquisition, processing, and use during the achievement of performance goals. Specifically, this paper argues that higher goal commitment leads to more effective acquisition, processing, and use of feedback that in turn fosters higher performance than does lower goal commitment. To provide a preliminary test of this proposition, data from an earlier field study conducted by the author and colleagues [J. Occup. Organ. Psychol. 72 (1999) 107] were used to examine the moderating effects of goal commitment on the relationship between perceived task feedback amount and work performance of 196 rehabilitation counselors. Results were consistent with this proposed interaction, as perceived task feedback amount had a positive linear relationship with work performance for higher goal commitment rehabilitation counselors and a negative linear relationship with performance for lower goal commitment counselors. The discussion urges researchers to broaden their views of goal commitment beyond the goal difficulty–performance relationship and to devote more attention to moderators of the feedback–performance relationship. Directions for future research and practical implications are also discussed.     

Feedback and Motivation in Dynamic Tournaments

We investigate the choice to conduct interim performance evaluations in a dynamic tournament. When a worker's ability does not influence the marginal benefit of effort, the choice depends on the shape of the cost of effort function. When effort and ability are complementary, feedback has several competing effects: it informs workers about their relative position in the tournament (evaluation effect) as well as their relative productivity (motivation effect) and it creates signal‐jamming incentives to exert effort prior to the performance evaluation. These effects suggest a tradeoff of performance feedback between evaluation and motivation which is in accordance with organizational behavior research and performance appraisal practices.     

Dynamic incentive effects of assignment mechanisms: Experimental evidence

Optimal assignment and matching mechanisms have been the focus of exhaustive analysis. We focus on their dynamic effects, which have received less attention, especially in the empirical literature: Anticipating that assignment is based on prior performance may affect prior performance. We test this hypothesis in a lab experiment. Participants first perform a task individually without monetary incentives; in a second stage, they are paired with another participant according to a pre‐announced assignment policy. The assignment is based on the first‐stage performance, and compensation is determined by average performance. Our results are largely consistent with a theory: Pairing the worst‐performing individuals with the best yields 20% lower first‐stage effort than random matching (RAM) and does not induce truthful revelation of types, which undoes any policy that aims to reallocate types based on performance. Perhaps surprisingly, however, pairing the best with the best yields only 5% higher first‐stage effort than RAM and the difference is not statistically significant.     

A polynomial goal programming approach to a class of quality control problems

The traditional quality control approach based on statistical tools has been very useful and effective when output and input qualities can be denned in terms of a single characteristic. However, in process industries such as paper, the output quality is denned in terms of two or more distinct characteristics; hence, reducing the deviation of one output characteristic from its permissible limits could result in forcing other output and/or input characteristics to deviate from their respective limits. Compounding this phenomenon is the fact that most of these industries produce substantial amounts of pollutants whose characteristics are a function of the input and output characteristics. Thus, with increasing costs of waste treatment and stringent pollution standards, there arises a notion of a trade-off between attaining market specified output characteristics and meeting federally regulated pollution standards.In this article a general process quality control problem has been formulated that reflects the above trade-off both in terms of a linear and a polynomial goal programming problem. Major advantages and differences between the two formulations are highlighted and illustrated with a practical example drawn from the paper industry.Three separate cases each with different priorities assigned to the output, pollutant and input characteristics are developed and solved under both formulations. Based on the analysis it is observed that the different solutions that result are contingent on the assumptions concerning the priorities associated with each goal and the manner by which one chooses to incorporate tradeoffs between goals in the objective function. Additionally, it is found that the solutions obtained under polynomial goal programming formulation are more conducive for implementation in practical quality control contexts.     

Job rotation and employee performance – evidence from a longitudinal study in the financial services industry

Job rotation, i.e. a lateral transfer of an employee between jobs within a company, is frequently used as a means to develop employees, learn about their abilities as well as to motivate them. We investigate the determinants and performance effects of job rotation empirically by analyzing a large panel data-set covering the German banking and financial services sector. In particular, we study (i) how prior individual performance affects the propensity to rotate and (ii) how performance changes after the rotation. We find that while both, low- and high-performers rotate, lateral moves are more frequent among low performers. However, those having been rotated between jobs achieve a higher performance in subsequent years as compared to other non-rotating employees in a comparable position. Interestingly, this effect is driven by high performers, whereas for low performers, we find no significant relationship between job rotation and future performance. The results thus suggest that firms should focus their job rotation programs on high performers and should not expect that low performers achieve performance gains when being rotated to a different function.     

The Provision of Relative Performance Feedback: An Analysis of Performance and Satisfaction

This paper studies the effect of providing relative performance feedback on individuals’ performance, under two incentive schemes. In a laboratory setup, agents perform a real‐effort task. We show that relative performance feedback increases performance when performance is related to pay (piece‐rate) but has no effect on performance when pay is independent of performance (flat‐rate). These effects are independent of the agent's relative position. Subjects are also asked to rate their satisfaction during the experiment. We find that under flat‐rate, feedback has no effect on agents’ satisfaction, while under piece‐rate, feedback about relative position affects satisfaction.     

Crossing the bridge from network training to development: A guide to move trainees from classroom insights to effective networks

Professional networks help employees accomplish work tasks, progress in their careers, and thrive personally. Decades of research suggest that achieving these outcomes requires more than simply amassing 'more' network contacts. Instead, networks with certain characteristics (e.g., networks that are open, diverse, and deep) enhance effectiveness. Network training teaches trainees about effective networks and helps trainees identify their network development needs by providing feedback on their current network. Once back on the job, trainees are assumed to take appropriate actions to develop their networks. However, our research and experience training MBA students, executives, and employees at all levels suggest that trainees often struggle to develop their networks after training. We studied 119 trainees engaged in network training and development to understand why. Our investigation revealed that many trainees fail to set network development goals that match their personalized feedback, identify strategies that match their goals, and take actions to develop networks that match their strategies. These mismatches create gaps in the bridge that trainees build to take themselves from network training to development. Further, even after building strong bridges by aligning their feedback, goals, strategies, and actions, many trainees encounter on-the-job barriers that prevent them from improving the effectiveness of their network. We offer a guide to help address translational gaps and mitigate on-the-job barriers, thereby enhancing the translation of network training insights into network development.     

A social procedurial approach to the Pareto optimization problematique

This article applies a variant of game theory to the Pareto multi-value problematique, that is situations where members of a group, community or society are faced with alternative allocations, institutional arrangements, or states of the world and may collectively choose an allocation, institutional arrangement or state of the world if they can agree on it. This type of multiple value decision situation is increasingly prevalent not only on the level of societal and political issues but on the level of many enterprises, particularly those advocating corporate social responsibility. Because actors hold and apply values from different perspectives, there are potential contradictory value judgments and incompatible equilibria. In a world of contradiction, incommensurability, and disequilibrium, to what extent can conflicts be resolved and social equilibrium accomplished? Force works but it is inherently unstable. Drawing on an extension of classical game theory, generalized game theory (GGT), this article addresses the multi-value problematique in terms of collective “resolution procedures.” These regulative procedures—or social algorithms—are applied to problems of conflict and suboptimality in a multiple value world such as Pareto envisioned. This paper (the first of two) outlines key elements of GGT, defines the Pareto multi-value problematique, pointing out several of the critical weaknesses, theoretical as well as empirical, of the Pareto approach. GGT is then applied in defining and analyzing several major procedures to realize improvements in a multi-value world characterized by conflict and sub-optimality. A second article conceptualizes a complex of societal games making up a social system with 2-phase multi-level game processes; it applies the conceptualization to the different societal procedures for multi-value choice under conditions of conflict. Procedures such as democratic voting, adjudication and administrative decision-making, and multi-lateral negotiation are capable of producing outcomes that in many cases are widely accepted as legitimate and become social equilibria (at least within some range of conditions). These procedures and the conditions for their activation and implementation are modelled and explicated through a generalized game approach.