Market share inequality,the HHI,and other measures of the firm-composition of a market

Data for individual markets suggest that the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index does not fully account for the inequality of market shares and the number of firms in a market. An empirical investigation is conducted to determine whether share inequality, number of firms, and major firm presence affect market profit rates independent of the HHI. The analysis controls for efficiency, among other things. Test results based on 1,684 banking markets during 1990–1992 indicate that the HHI, market share inequality, and the importance of major firms are positively related and the number of firms is negatively related to profit rates. Results on several other variables also suggest that market imperfections exist in local banking markets.     

Cross‐Border Mergers and Market Segmentation

This paper shows that cross‐border mergers are more likely to occur in industries which serve multiple segmented markets rather than a single integrated market, given that cost functions are strictly convex. The product price rises in the market where an acquisition is made but falls in the other, decreasing the acquisition price of other firms (in contrast to the results in the existing merger literature on integrated markets). Although the sum of consumer surplus across the countries may rise in response to a given acquisition, one of the countries gains at the expense of the other.     

The Number of Firms and Production Capacity in Relation to Market Size

Many oligopoly theories predict a positive correlation between market size and the equilibrium number of firms and some also imply that competition is more intense in larger markets. We test these predictions on a sample of driving schools in 250 Swedish regional markets by estimating the relation between the number of firms, production capacity, and market size. The number of firms increases less than proportionally with market size. Market size per capacity unit is smaller in large markets. Since firms produce a fairly homogenous good, we argue that this is evidence that profits per capita is decreasing in market size.     

Mixed Oligopoly and Market Power Mitigation: Evidence from the Colombian Wholesale Electricity Market*

Using information on price bids in wholesale electricity pools and empirical techniques described in the literature on electricity markets, this study identifies the market power mitigation effect of public firms in the Colombian market. The results suggest that while private firms exercise less market power than is predicted by a profit-maximization model, there are marked differences between private and public firms in their exercise of unilateral market power. These findings support the hypothesis of the market power mitigation effect of public firms.     

Welfare losses under Cournot competition

In a market for a homogeneous good where firms are identical, compete in quantities and produce with constant returns, the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) is small with as few as five competitors for a class of demand functions which includes linear and isoelastic cases. We study markets with positive fixed costs and asymmetric firms. We provide exact formulae of PWL and robust constructions of markets were PWL is close to one in these two cases. We show that the market structure that maximizes PWL is either monopoly or dominant firm, depending on demand. Finally we prove that PWL is minimized when all firms are identical, a clear indication that the assumption of identical firms biases the estimation of PWL downwards.     

Buyer power with atomistic upstream entry: Can downstream consolidation increase production and welfare?

This paper investigates the effects of buyer power on entry into an atomistic upstream market and economic welfare. Under reasonable market conditions, we show that industries with a few buyers induce more upstream entry than industries with a larger number of firms. In particular, monopsony can be more conducive to entry and lead to higher social welfare than more fragmented industry structures. This seeming paradox arises because a single buyer better internalizes the positive effects of entry on later-periods’ supply conditions than a collection of firms. This result is relevant in a number of market settings, including markets for specialized labor and processing markets for agricultural products.     

Advances in the competitiveness of pan‐European rail freight services: findings from a case study

The European rail freight market is ostensibly a free market where, from 1 January 2007, both incumbent and new‐entrant operators are able to compete on every line and in every European Union country. The main objective of this research paper is to assess the advances in the competitiveness of the pan‐European rail freight services operated by a new‐entrant (private) operator. Its main focus is to assess and contribute to the understanding of the advances towards competitiveness and the future prospects in the open European rail freight market, including dealing with challenges (e.g. dormant and departure of partners, suspension of the project, indistinct roles and responsibilities of operating partners) at different phases of the research, development and service offerings, that will be an important contribution to the Research and Development (R&D) policy and management arena in the Europe rail freight transport sector. The current research applies a case study research approach. The assessment of the rail freight service is performed by conducting two phases: first, a comparison of the progress between first and second year of the REorganisation of Transport networks by advanced RAil freight Concepts (RETRACK) rail freight service, operated by a new entrant and conducted on the corridor between two hubs – Cologne, Germany, and Györ, Hungary, and secondly a comparison of the opinions of customers on the RETRACK service and its competitors. From the comparative study between the first and second years, the study finds that the new‐entrant operator was able to offer an increased number of services by consolidating cargo from satellite connections at both ends of the operational corridor by adopting a pragmatic and flexible approach. The customer satisfaction survey suggests that the new‐entrant operator offered better service in terms of price, transit time, reliability and information flow/management compared to its competitors' services (offered by incumbent rail operators) on the corridor. However, their service was inferior to that of its competitors, in terms of frequency and availability of service. These less‐well performed service factors have improved gradually over time. The study suggests that intra‐rail competition has improved, but that inter‐modal completion is yet to be achieved. The ups and downs of the project provide important lessons for R&D management, academia and policy makers. The study suggests that a pan‐European rail freight service can be efficiently and effectively run by new‐entrant operators, and this will lead to more intra‐modal competition. However, they have yet to achieve competitiveness that will result in a shift of cargo from road to rail by offering an improved service that at least matches the major attributes of road freight service, e.g. price, transit time, door‐to‐door service and working in a collaborative way with other actors.     

NATIONAL TELEVISION AND THE MARKET FOR LOCAL PRODUCTS: THE CASE OF BEER*

Information technology lowers the cost of distributing information to dispersed consumers. Because national firms reap larger benefits from new media than firms serving only local consumers, media innovations may reduce the market for local products. This paper considers the effect of television on the market for local beer. Using market‐level data on television penetration, local breweries and brewery production from 1945–1960, results show that increases in television penetration are associated with fewer local breweries and less local beer production. The results indicate that the industrial organization of media markets can affect the structure of markets for local products.     

Employer discrimination and market structure: Does more concentration mean more discrimination?

We formalize Gary Becker’s dynamic conjecture that competitive forces drive discriminating employers from the market in the long run, using a dynamic model of a monopolistically competitive industry characterized by sunk costs and sequential entry. An advantage of this formalization is that it demonstrates the importance of the structure of production costs, as well as market power, in explaining the long-run survival of discriminatory firms. In addition, we show that, despite decades of empirical research on this connection, there is no consistent theoretical relationship between the degree of market concentration within an industry and the degree of discrimination. However, we do find an indirect link in which market liberalization has a more pronounced effect in reducing discrimination in more concentrated markets.     

Labor market power and the distorting effects of international trade

This article examines how final product trade with China shapes and interacts with labor market imperfections that create market power in labor markets and prevent an efficient market outcome. I develop a framework for measuring such labor market power distortions in monetary terms and document large degrees of these distortions in Germany's manufacturing sector. Import competition only exerts labor market disciplining effects if firms, rather than employees, possess labor market power. Otherwise, increasing export demand and import competition both fortify existing distortions, which decreases labor market efficiency. This widens the gap between potential and realized output and thus diminishes classical gains from trade.     

Decoupling market incumbency from organizational prehistory: Locating the real sources of competitive advantage in R&D for radical innovation

The creative destruction literature has argued that differences in R&D performance of incumbent vs. entrant firms can be explained through organizational change theories about established vs. de novo firms. A disconnect exists between these theories and the available empirical evidence because often the best performing firms are established firms as well. I propose to resolve this disconnect by distinguishing between market incumbency (presence in a market prior to a discontinuity) and organizational prehistory (organizational experience prior to a transition, whether between technologies or between markets). Doing so allows me to contrast incumbent vs. entrant and de alio vs. de novo studies, and to suggest more robust future research designs. I illustrate my proposition using qualitative data from the anticancer and AIDS‐treatment drug markets. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do firms sell forward for strategic reasons? An application to the wholesale market for natural gas

Cournot models of oligopolistic interaction in forward and spot markets have shown that firms may sell forward for risk-hedging reasons only, or for both risk-hedging and strategic considerations. Using data from the Dutch wholesale market for natural gas where we observe the number of players, spot and forward sales, churn rates and prices, this paper presents evidence that strategic reasons play an important role at explaining the observed firms’ hedging activity. Our test for strategic behavior is based on the theoretical relationship between the number of sellers and the incentives to sell forward: if risk-hedging is the only motive behind firms’ decision to sell forward, then hedging activity ought to decrease in the number of firms; otherwise, if strategic reasons are relevant, then firms incentives to sell forward should increase in the number of competitors.     

Market Power and Multimarket Contact: Some Evidence from the Spanish Hotel Industry

This paper analyses the effect of multimarket contact on firms’ behaviour. According to Bernheim and Whinston [1990], firms that meet in several markets for an infinite number of periods may find it profitable to redistribute market power among markets where they are operating. We present evidence supporting this prediction by using data from the Spanish hotel industry. Moreover, we also find that the omission of variables measuring multimarket contact creates a downward bias on the effect of concentration on prices. This result questions previous conclusions about the role of competition in industries where multimarket behaviour is expected.     

Competition for imperfect consumers

This lecture provides a selective discussion of some issues in the economics of competition for imperfect consumers. Limited consumer awareness – about what deals are on offer, or about the consequences of purchasing decisions – is a central feature of many markets. Consumer imperfection can give rise to market power, but can also co-exist with strong rivalry between firms, and then is more for ‘consumer policy’ than competition policy. Two recent court cases illustrate some of the issues involved. The lecture then reviews a line of theoretical work on competition for imperfect consumers. The analysis highlights some policy tradeoffs, and a key theme is how patterns of consumer awareness matter for patterns of competition among firms.     

Bargaining over employment as a firm strategic choice

This paper develops a simple model as to why unionized Cournot firms acting non-cooperatively in the product market may find it optimal to commit to bargaining outcomes with their specific union, which are off the labor demand curve, hence restricting their behavior to non-profit maximizing practices in their product markets. The prediction that power over labor conceded strategically to the union by the firm is negatively linked to union wage power is not rejected on a panel of Belgian firms as well as the prediction that the union bargaining power can be affected by product market structure and other variables affecting union wages.     

Dynamics of dyadic competitive interaction

In this study of firms’ entries into and exits from each other’s markets, we link research on multipoint competition to the emerging action‐oriented, dyadic approach to interfirm rivalry by specifying market interdependencies between pairs of firms that condition their potential for rivalry over time. Our dynamic analysis of competitive interactions between pairs of commuter airlines in California reveals the idiosyncratic and asymmetric market microstructures that characterize dyadic competitive relationships and helps explain why firms grapple vigorously with some of their competitors while being passive toward others. We show that there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between firms’ rates of entry into and exit from each other’s markets and the level of multimarket contact in competitor dyads. We also show how this basic curvilinear effect varies from dyad to dyad as a function of relative levels of multimarket contact with competitors in other dyads and the relative sizes of competitors in a focal dyad. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

INEFFICIENCIES AND MARKET POWER IN FINANCIAL ARBITRAGE: A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY MARKETS*

For two years prior to the collapse of California's restructured electricity market, power traded in both a forward and a spot market for delivery at the same times and locations. Nonetheless, prices in the two markets often differed in significant and predictable ways. This apparent inefficiency persisted, we argue, because most firms believed that trading on inter‐market price differences would yield regulatory penalties. For the few firms that did make such trades, it was not profit‐maximizing to eliminate the price differences entirely. Skyrocketing prices in 2000 changed the major buyers' (utilities') incentives and exacerbated the price differentials between the markets.     

Supply function equilibria with capacity constraints and pivotal suppliers

The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model generators' bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute to market power of generation firms. If a generation firm's rivals are capacity constrained then the firm may be pivotal; that is, the firm could substantially raise the market price by unilaterally withholding output. However the SFE literature has not fully considered the impact of capacity constraints and pivotal firms on equilibrium predictions. We characterize the set of symmetric supply function equilibria for uniform-price auctions when firms are capacity constrained and show that this set is increasing as capacity per firm rises. We provide conditions under which asymmetric equilibria exist and characterize these equilibria. In addition, we compare results for uniform-price auctions to those for discriminatory auctions, and we compare our SFE predictions to equilibrium predictions of models in which bidders are constrained to bid on discrete units of output.     

Growing with the market: How changing conditions during market growth affect formation and evolution of interfirm ties

Research Summary: Market conditions are known to matter for firm performance and growth. This study explores how changing levels of uncertainty and competition affect interfirm ties of entrepreneurial firms as markets transition from nascent to growth stage. Tracing six entrepreneurial game publishers during the growth stage of the U.S. wireless gaming market, the findings reveal that in a growth stage market, as uncertainty decreases, certain ties of entrepreneurial firms are terminated. First, existing partners may cut ties and become competitors after entering the market directly. This is a “winner's curse” as more successful firms are more likely to entice their partners to enter the market directly. Second, ties may be terminated as prominent firms that are “overwhelmed” with too many partners cut ties with low to mediocre performance, while their remaining partners enter a positive spiral of tie strength and performance. Finally, as uncertainty decreases, new firms may enter the market as competitors to prominent firms. While entrepreneurial firms with high‐ and low‐performing ties to prominent partners may find ties with these new entrants attractive, those with mediocre ties to few prominent partners find this move too risky and wait for a first mover to legitimate it. Overall, the findings show that changing levels of uncertainty and competition in growth stage markets can have different consequences for firms due to heterogeneity in their ties and power relative to partners. The findings provide several contributions to literature regarding the relationship among interfirm ties, firm performance, and market evolution. Managerial Summary: Based on interviews at six entrepreneurial game publishers in the United States and their partners, this study shows how changing levels of uncertainty and competition in growing markets can have different consequences for firms based on the different types of alliances in their portfolio and their power relative to partners. The findings highlight the importance of managing partners differently based on alliance type and goal of the partner. They advocate remaining flexible in alliance management as information asymmetries, intentions and bargaining power of partners can change and lead to abrupt alliance dissolution. They show that alliance portfolio management goes beyond a firm's capability of managing individual alliances, and provide a tool for managers to evaluate their alliance portfolios and take the necessary precautions.     

The moderating influence of firm market power on the transaction cost economics model: An empirical test in a forward channel integration context

Transaction cost economics (TCE) has guided a variety of research on governance in the strategic management literature. An important question arises, however, as to whether the TCE framework is equally appropriate for all types of firms in all business settings. In this paper, we argue that TCE is not and suggest that firms with high market power may be able to lower transaction costs under high asset specificity and uncertainty in nonintegrated distribution channels, avoiding the need to utilize highly integrated channels as a result. We test our hypotheses with data collected from 40 manufacturers of electronic and telecommunications products in 109 product‐markets in the United States. The results support our hypothesis that transaction cost factors are better at explaining forward channel integration for firms with low market power than for firms with high market power. Our results indicate that the basic TCE framework must be supplemented by the market power construct to adequately explain forward channel integration decisions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.