Vertical integration and product differentiation

We study a new channel of downstream rent extraction through vertical integration: competition for integration. Innovative downstream firms create value and profit opportunities through product differentiation, which however affects an upstream monopolist’s incentive to vertically integrate. By playing the downstream firms against each other for integration, the upstream firm can extract even more than the additional profits generated by the downstream firms’ differentiation activities. To preempt rent extraction, the downstream firms may then reduce differentiation, which reduces social welfare. We show that this social cost of vertical integration is more likely to arise in innovative and competitive industries, and that the competition for integration channel of downstream rent extraction is robust to upstream competition.     

The timing of product introduction and the credibility of compatibility decisions

We analyze the compatibility choices of two firms which must also decide when to introduce their goods in a market characterized by network externalities. We show that the firms' incentives to achieve compatibility depend crucially on the time at which the degree of compatibility must be chosen. This raises the possibility of time inconsistencies, as a firm which initially favors compatibility might prefer incompatibility once one of the two goods has been introduced. We also determine the socially optimal standardization policies, both in a domestic and in an international context.     

Types of firms generating network externalities and MNCs' co‐location decisions

This study identifies and examines sources of network externalities that influence MNCs to agglomerate their foreign operations in specific regions. Using data for Korean firms that invested in China, this study found that network externalities were sensitive to the types of firms constituting a regional network. It also found stronger network externalities within firms than across firms, from firms of the same nationality than from those of different nationalities, and from firms in the same industry than from those of different industries. As we defined the types of firms more precisely, distinctive curvilinear relationships between network externalities and the likelihood of co‐location emerged. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Product compatibility as a signal of quality in a market with network externalities

In this paper, I consider the compatibility decision as a signaling device of the quality of a newly introduced technology of which users are not informed. Provided that firms are located sufficiently far apart in Hotelling’s [0,1] interval, I find separating equilibria where low compatibility signals high quality. This possible separation is due to the fact that low compatibility is more advantageous to the high-quality entrant than to the low-quality entrant, since it can prevent users of the established technology from enjoying network benefits from the new technology very much.     

Local network externalities and market segmentation

This paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral interaction. It departs from the standard Katz–Shapiro framework by assuming that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents. It shows that even if rival firms engage in Bertrand competition, this form of network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up the market and earn positive profits. The analysis also shows that some graphs or network structures do not permit such segmentation, while for others, there are easy to interpret conditions under which market segmentation obtains in equilibrium.     

Tactical product decisions

The focus of this article is a discussion of both how and when to make tactical product decisions for existing products. Although the literature refers to these decisions in the context of strategic planning, the author considers that it is inadequate in explaining how and when these decisions should be arrived at relative to tactical planning. A range of criteria for tactical decisions is proposed.     

Dynamic monopoly pricing with network externalities

In this paper, we study the optimal dynamic monopoly pricing for a good which exhibits positive network externalities. When network externalities are of sufficient magnitude, we show that, contrary to the Coase theorem, (1) there is no time inconsistency problem; (2) subgame perfect equilibrium prices increase as time passes. From this point of view, positive network externalities allow the monopoly to commit itself credibly to increasing future prices.Ce papier étudie la tarification optimale intertemporelle d'un monopole qui vend un bien exhibant des externalités positives de réseau. Lorsque ces externalités sont suffisamment importantes, nous montrons que, contrairement au théorème de Coase, (1) il n'y a pas de problème d'incohérence temporelle, (2) les prix d'équilibre parfait croissent avec le temps. De ce point de vue, les externalités positives de réseau permettent au monopole de s'engager crédiblement sur une politique de prix futurs à la hausse.     

Biases in optimal pricing with network externalities

Access and usage externalities affect consumer welfare and behavior in regulated communications networks, but nobody has ever adjusted prices to allow for externalities with a binding revenue constraint. If we fail to account for network externalities when we set (profit-constrained) welfare-maximizing access and usage prices, are the resulting prices too high or too low? This article demonstrates that the outcome depends upon what size of customer is likely to exit the network. It determines ranges where the access price increases and the usage price decreases, as well as the reverse.     

Technology revolutions in the presence of network externalities

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of varying consumer preferences over technology advance and network size on the timing and frequency of new technology adoption in the presence of installed bases resulting from network externalities. The paper shows that the duration of each adopted technology and the frequency of technology adoptions depend on (a) whether (in consumers' perspectives) the network size effect is a substitute for or a complement to the quality of the technologies; (b) the degree of compatibility of new technologies with the old technology; and (c) the technology growth rate and consumer population size.     

R&D in markets with network externalities

This paper studies the consequences of network externalities on R&D rivalry between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. In the model, all differences between the R&D projects chosen in market equilibrium and the socially best projects are solely due to network externalities. From a welfare perspective, the incumbent chooses a too risky and the entrant a too certain R&D project. Rothschild and Stiglitz's mean preserving spread criterion is used as a measure of risk. Adoption of a new standard is more likely in equilibrium than in the social optimum.     

Complementarity in product,process, and organizational innovation decisions: evidence from European firms

This work uses a sample of firm-level data from seven EU countries to explore the possible roles of simultaneity and heterogeneity in determining firms' decisions to engage in three types of innovation. Process, product, and organizational innovations are considered jointly, by applying a multivariate probit specification. The results support the hypothesis that the three innovation decisions are interdependent. This has straightforward implications for the practice of R&D managers. In order to gain advantages from an innovation, innovation managers need to jointly exploit these different types of innovation activities and their potential synergies. Given that the innovative firms in the sample, desire additional credit which actually they do not obtain, R&D managers should also be concerned with the financing sources firms have access to. Finally, from the analysis it also emerges that public support boost all the three forms of innovation.     

Timing decisions of new product preannouncement and launch with competition

We develop a game-theoretic model to study the timing of new product preannouncement and launch under competition. We derive firms’ optimal timing choices and conducted a numerical analysis to evaluate the role of various factors. Our analytical and numerical results showed that anticipated competitor’s timing choices are the most significant factors. A firm should not preannounce early unless the preannouncement is effective in creating pent-up demands. However, the preannouncement and launch should be rushed if the quality or profit margin of the new product is high, and postponed if the market share of the existing product is high. The market leader should preannounce earlier in a simultaneous game than in a sequential game, but the opposite for the market follower. Data collected from the microprocessor industry validated our model.     

Oligopolistic competition,IT use for product differentiation and the productivity paradox

Empirical studies suggest that the huge investment in information technologies (IT) of the past two decades has led to no significant increase in productivity; this phenomenon is known as the ‘productivity paradox’. It has been argued that the paradox might result from oligopolistic competition: because of strategic interaction, each individual firm might find it profitable to invest in cost-reducing IT, but total investment might then be excessive from the industry’s point of view. I confirm this view and strengthen it by allowing IT investment to be also devoted to product differentiation which makes the productivity paradox more likely. The emergence of Web-based electronic commerce provides an illustration of the forces identified in the model.     

Horizontal product differentiation,prices and quantity selection of a multi-product monopolist

A monopolist which serves a market in which tastes are uniformly spread along a circumference of a circle selects an optimal set of product varieties. The cost of installing an additional variety increases with the difference from the ‘main product’. It is shown that variety prices decrease and the degree of differentiation between any two varieties increases as products get more differentiated.     

Applying financial portfolio and multiple criteria approaches to product line decisions

This article describes the application of decision rules from financial portfolio theory to the evaluation of product lines. The focus is on the risk/return implications of an “add” decision to the total portfolio versus the individual product. Multiple criteria approaches that aid product line evaluations are also presented.     

Technology of upstream firms and equilibrium product differentiation

Using a Hotelling-type product differentiation model (linear city model), we investigate the location strategies of upstream and downstream firms. We show that when transport costs of upstream firms are large, higher transport costs decrease the level of product differentiation of downstream firms. We also show that more inefficient transport technologies of upstream firms may enhance welfare. We briefly discuss vertical mergers and show that vertical mergers occur if the transport costs of upstream firms are large enough.     

Competition network structure and product market entry

This study proposes and tests a theory of the effects of competition network structure on product market entry. Competition networks are defined as the patterns of interdependence between rivals that emerge from direct competition. Studying networks based on competitive interdependence allows us to extend social network theory to new territory and to enhance our understanding of product market entry. We propose that the size, interconnectedness and diversity of competition networks influence subsequent product market entry in a systemic way. We test our hypotheses in a unique dataset drawn from the aircraft modification industry. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cybersecurity: Stakeholder incentives,externalities, and policy options

Information security breaches are increasingly motivated by fraudulent and criminal motives. Reducing their considerable costs has become a pressing issue. Although cybersecurity has strong public good characteristics, most information security decisions are made by individual stakeholders. Due to the interconnectedness of cyberspace, these decentralized decisions are afflicted with externalities that can result in sub-optimal security levels. Devising effective solutions to this problem is complicated by the global nature of cyberspace, the interdependence of stakeholders, as well as the diversity and heterogeneity of players. The paper develops a framework for studying the co-evolution of the markets for cybercrime and cybersecurity. It examines the incentives of stakeholders to provide for security and their implications for the ICT ecosystem. The findings show that market and non-market relations in the information infrastructure generate many security-enhancing incentives. However, pervasive externalities remain that can only be corrected by voluntary or government-led collective measures.     

Postponed product differentiation with demand information update

This paper studies the problem of how to coordinate postponed product differentiation and forecast update to improve manufacturing efficiency. We consider a two-stage model of multiple products with a common component. In stage 1, the manager obtains a prior demand distribution of each product and decides the production quantity of the common component. In stage 2, the demand forecast is updated and the common component is differentiated into various final products. Then the final demand of each product is realized and inventory leftover (shortage) is assessed. We use stochastic programming to model this problem, and propose an optimal bundle-type algorithm to solve it. Furthermore, we develop some simple and effective approximation algorithms for several special cases. Extensive numerical experiments are conducted to show the effectiveness of the approximation algorithms, to compare the performance between the traditional production model and the postponement production model, and to examine the impact of parameters on the performances of the two systems.