Tax Policy Coordination, Vertical Externalities, and Optimal Taxation in a System of Hierarchical Governments

Tax policies of two levels of government (state and federal) with overlapping tax bases are considered. This overlap leads to “vertical” fiscal externalities are considered when several different commodities are in the tax base and the tax bases of the two levels of government may not be identical. When the governments share a tax base, the mix of combined taxes is optimal. With different tax bases, combined taxes are no longer optimal as federal tax rates are adjusted to reflect state public service levels. When grants are available, a welfare-maximizing mix of taxes and public services is obtained.     

The Constitutionality of a Federal Net Wealth Tax

A bstract . Consideration of a Federal Net Wealth Tax would help settle the question of the scope and limits of the taxing powers of the United States Government. The confusion attending this, which has prevented the federal government from taxing land and kept state taxation of land too low to bean efficient allocator of this resource , can be clarified. The Constitution's Article I, Section VIII, gave the federal government power to levy taxes, duties, imports and excises, as "indirect" taxes, requiring only that the duties, imposts and excises be "uniform throughout the United States." The 16th Amendment authorized a "direct" tax on "incomes, from whatever source derived." The intent of the Founding Fathers—almost all large landholders—was to prevent the new federal government from using land as a tax base. But the distinction between the types of taxes lacks economic meaning. By making the base of a new tax the net wealth of taxpayers. Congress could obtain a Supreme Court test to end the confusion. If the Court, following precedent, required that land be excluded from the tax base, this would assure land as a tax base to the states and permit them to tax it in a way to end speculative withholding of tracts and sites and to bring about orderly development according to current need.     

Optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfer in a dynamic model with multiple levels of government

In this paper, we study the optimal choices of the federal income tax, federal transfers, and local taxes in a dynamic model of capital accumulation and with explicit game structures among multiple private agents, multiple local governments, and the federal government. In general, the optimal local property tax is zero if the local property tax is constrained to be nonnegative, whereas the optimal local consumption tax is always positive. When the local consumption tax is chosen optimally, the federal income tax can be either positive or negative. For most reasonable parameter values, our numerical calculations have shown that with a positive local consumption tax there exists a reverse transfer from local governments to the federal government.     

Vertical externalities in cigarette taxation: Do tax revenues go up in smoke?

In federal systems, where tax bases are joint property, the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other. This paper examines the interdependence of US federal and state cigarette tax rates. Our results suggest that states may reduce their cigarette tax rate by as much as 48 cents per dollar increase in the federal tax rate. Thus, a federal tax hike may reduce the amount of generated state tax revenues both directly (the overall tax rate rises and the state tax base declines), and indirectly (the state tax rate declines).     

借鉴国际经验完善我国促进循环经济发展的税收政策

循环经济是可持续发展的新兴经济增长模式,为了促进循环经济的发展,西方各国纷纷采用不同税收手段,如荷兰、丹麦、瑞典等国纷纷开征名目众多的环境税;美国联邦和地方政府分别开征不同的环境税;日本也在各不同环节开征环境税,与此同时,各国纷纷采用包括加速折旧、税收减免、税收抵免等税收优惠政策鼓励循环经济的发展,不断"绿化"本国税制。在借鉴这些经验的基础上,我国应完善立法、改革现行税制,开征新的税种,促进循环经济的发展。     

Estimating the effect of a gasoline tax on carbon emissions

Recently the proposal has been made to raise gasoline taxes in the United States to curb carbon emissions. The existing literature on the sensitivity of gasoline consumption to changes in price may not be appropriate for evaluating the effectiveness of such a tax. First, most of these studies fail to address the endogeneity of gasoline prices. Second, the responsiveness of gasoline consumption to a change in tax may differ from the responsiveness of consumption to an average change in price. We address these challenges using a variety of methods including traditional single‐equation regression models, estimated by least squares or instrumental variables methods, and structural vector autoregressions. Our preferred approach exploits the historical variation in US federal and state gasoline taxes. Our most credible estimates imply that a 10‐cent per gallon increase in the gasoline tax would reduce carbon emissions from vehicles in the United States by about 1.5%. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Revenue Adequacy of Site Value Taxation in a Ricardian System of Economic Growth

A bstract . The federal administration has sought to reduce the growth of federal expenditures by shifting some government costs to state and local governments. An increased expenditure burden for the latter governments would require increased tax rates for existing types of taxes that have adverse impacts on economic incentives. Land taxes are considered as a source of revenue because of their efficiency aspects. Unfortunately this idea is all too often dismissed because of alleged revenue inadequacy. Thus an analysis is called for of the revenue adequacy of site value taxation in a Ricardian model of economic growth. The model allows analysis of revenue adequacy over time in an economic growth context that is suited for the long range tax-expenditure planning horizon with which local governments are faced. When revenue needs are primarily dependent upon the population size, and the fisc is initially operating at a deficit, for a land tax to permit attainment of balance, per capita rents must be increasing over time. Also when the economy's public service demand is primarily dependent upon income, deficits will not occur if rental share exceeds the share of income devoted to public output. Not all income goes to fiscal output, so rent eventually exceeds expenditures.     

EDITORIAL: TAX REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION

Major tax reform to simplify the UK tax system is possible. Merging income taxes, social security taxes and corporation tax into only a single flat-rate of tax on all incomes would be a radical start. Avoiding taxes on income and expenditure which are 'too high' requires major reductions in government spending, mainly on the welfare state. Given the political will, over a period of years we really can hugely improve the UK tax system.     

Income taxes and the destination of movers to multistate MSAs

We examine how differences in state income tax rates, as well as other state and local taxes and public service expenditures, influence the choice of state of residence for households (federal tax filers) moving into multistate metropolitan areas (MSAs) using data from the IRS on the migration of taxpayers. MSAs that are on borders provide a spatial discontinuity—discrete differences in state tax rates within a single labor market. These MSAs allow residents to live in one state and work in another state. We find that differences in state income tax rates have a significant impact on the relative rate of migration to the states within an MSA. However, contrary to what would be expected, this impact is only significant in MSAs in which the filing state is based on employment (states without reciprocity) and not for those states in which the filing state is the state of residence (states with reciprocity). In MSAs where states do not have reciprocity agreements, a difference of ten percent in tax rates leads to a 4.1 percent difference in the relative rate of incoming taxpayers. Analogously, we find that a ten percent difference in state tax rates in these MSAs results in a 3.3 percent difference in the rate of tax base inflow (AGI). Our results suggest that one reason that differences in state income taxes appear to have more impact in multistate MSAs without reciprocity is that only relatively large differences in state income tax rates have any impact on migration and these differences are much more pronounced in MSAs without reciprocity.     

Australia's Carbon Tax: An Economic Evaluation

Australia's carbon tax has been in place since July 2012. Following the 2013 federal election and change of government, it is likely that the tax will be abolished. This paper evaluates Australia's carbon tax experience and draws lessons for policymakers in other jurisdictions who may be considering following the Australian example and implementing their own carbon taxes or cap and trade schemes. Overall, the policy was poorly thought through, badly implemented, and lacked majority public support before it began. Australia's carbon tax experience is an interesting case study in how not to go about implementing climate change policy.     

Federal deductibility and local property tax rates

Recent econometric work has suggested that federal deductibility of state and local taxes has raised the proportion of these taxes—especially property taxes—in local budgets. This paper lends additional support to these earlier findings by showing that one channel through which deductibility leads to higher local property tax revenues is by increasing the rate of local property taxation. Specifically, we find that if deductibility were eliminated, the mean property tax rate in our sample would fall by 0.00715 ($7.15 per $1000 of assessed property), or 21.1% of the mean tax rate.     

Reforming or Transforming the Federal Tax System: (A Review Essay)

A bstract . Several proposals to reform the federal income tax system are under active consideration. Professor Richard W. Lindholm has proposed instead that we abolish the individual and corporate income taxes and the estate and gift taxes. To replace the lost revenue he proposes a flat 15 per cent value added tax and a flat 2 per cent net wealth tax. He posits five goals for successful tax reform and discusses his proposed system in terms of them. He finds his system would be simpler and less disruptive of markets than even a simplified income tax structure.     

State and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes

This paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions (and/or states). If one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes, and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite, then (in Nash equilibrium) the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate, housing consumption is suboptimal, and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction. If a very large state (or country) is divided into local jurisdictions, and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously, then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome.     

Taxes, Federal Grants, Local Public Spending, and Growth

In a dynamic model with both private and local public capital accumulation, this paper examines how federal and local income taxes, local consumption tax, and federal matching grants for local public consumption and local public investment affect the long-run equilibrium (equilibria) of private consumption, private capital accumulation, local public consumption, and local public capital stock.     

Revenue trade-offs: Implications for state Government finance

Modifications in state level fiscal structures to address inequitable tax burdens or the issue of public sector growth have been accomplished by substituting one tax for another or by adjusting rates of existing taxes. This paper presents this fiscal adjustment process on the state level in terms of a policy in which complementary or competitive taxes are jointly determined as a tax mix in a process of revenue trade-offs.     

Double Bertrand tax competition: a fiscal game with governments acting as middlemen

In a common market with costless mobility of all factors regional governments can attract mobile firms by granting subsidies which they must finance out of wage taxes on mobile labour. Firms locate where subsidies are highest and workers settle where taxes are lowest, forcing government ‘in the splits’ (double Bertrand-type tax competition). Initially, there is unemployment in the economy. Regional governments then behave like middlemen in the labour market, and the fiscal game takes the form of competition among strategic intermediaries. Results from the theory of intermediation are applied to this framework. It is shown that government size may increase rather than decline in a fiscal competition, that industrial clustering may emerge from tax competition, and that tax competition may alleviate the unemployment problem.     

EFFECTS OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL GRANTS IN BRAZILIAN MUNICIPALITIES

The objective of the present study is to verify the flypaper effect of 476 Brazilian municipalities from 2005 to 2012, considering the new variables as instruments of grants. Political alignment, alignment of the party, and coalition of the mayor with the federal president and of the state governor were considered as instruments of grants. A municipal tax autonomy index was considered as a control variable, which represents the percentage of local taxes in the municipal total revenues. The results allow concluding that the flypaper effect exists in Brazilian municipalities and is intensified by the alignment of the representatives in the same way of theoretical literature (Hamilton 1983; Hines & Thaler 1995; Inman 2008) and previous empirical studies in Brazil. Moreover, evidences of higher flypaper effect were found in municipalities with low tax autonomy.     

Delaying integration of immigrant labor for the purpose of taxation

Delayed integration (DI) is a rule for taxing migrants. It requires that immigrants be taxed in the host country only after some period of transition. Conversely, emigrants are released from the obligation to pay taxes only after a certain period. DI is an alternative to the Employment Principle and the Home-Country Principle. The former governs the international taxation of labor. The latter is a close substitute for the Nationality Principle, on which US tax law is based. The paper studies DI in a setting which allows one to trade off the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation and of wasteful government.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Government Tax and Auditing Policies on the Size of the Underground Economy:

.
This study empirically examines the impact of federal income tax rates, IRS penalties on unpaid tax liabilities, and audit rates of the Internal Revenue Service on the size of the underground economy in the United States, Recent data generated by Edgar Feige are used to measure the size of the underground economy. Based on ordinary least squares estimates, it is found that the maximum marginal personal income tax rate raises the size of the underground economy. In addition, the size of the underground economy is found to be a decreasing function of both the percentage of tax returns audited and the penalties imposed by the IRS on unpaid taxes.     

General equilibrium and optimal taxes

It is shown that if subsidies are not excessive, there exists a general competitive equilibrium in the presence of a complex tax structure. Furthermore, under certain continuity assumptions, a tax structure which is optimal from the social point of view can be determined. Procedures maximize quasi-concave after tax profit functions. Consumers have convex budget sets reflect- ing their income from sales and profits minus taxes on fixed income and progressive sales taxes. Their preferences are interdependent, intransitive and incomplete. The government provides public goods and determines the optimal tax regime on the basis of its preferences on the final competitive consumption allocation.