State and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes

This paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions (and/or states). If one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes, and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite, then (in Nash equilibrium) the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate, housing consumption is suboptimal, and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction. If a very large state (or country) is divided into local jurisdictions, and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously, then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome.     

Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure

This paper considers a federal country composed of local jurisdictions that differ in their inhabitants' tastes for public goods, and which finance local public expenditure through a source-based tax on capital income. The taste for public goods is the private information of local governments. The central government seeks an optimal policy, in which grants to local governments are conditioned on local tax rates. The uninformed central government seeks both to allocate capital efficiently among jurisdictions, and to induce jurisdictions to provide an efficient mix of private and public consumption. It is shown that there persist at this constrained optimum both some misallocation of capital and some violation of the Samuelson rule for optimal public good provision in every jurisdiction.     

Is it tax competition or tax exporting?

This paper extends the basic tax-competition model to a framework in which jurisdictions have market power over the price of the output produced within their borders. If firms within the jurisdiction are competitive, the jurisdiction can play the role of monopoly-rent collector by using taxes to restrict the level of output. It is shown that the basic tax competition model can be thought of as a special case of this more general framework. In this framework, the opportunity to export the tax burden can partially or fully offset the well-known effects identified by the tax competition model.     

On the theory of interregional tax incidence

The state of factor income distribution prevailing in a local jurisdiction may be greatly influenced by the change in tax policies carried out by some other local jurisdictions through the market mechanism. The theory of interregional tax incidence is concerned with the problem of interactive distributional effects among local jurisdictions when each local government executes independently tax policies. This paper develops a new method of conducting a comparative static analysis on the current issue by making use of a general equilibrium model of interregional tax incidence characterized by the assumption that labor is perfectly immobile between different jurisdictions.     

Income taxes and the destination of movers to multistate MSAs

We examine how differences in state income tax rates, as well as other state and local taxes and public service expenditures, influence the choice of state of residence for households (federal tax filers) moving into multistate metropolitan areas (MSAs) using data from the IRS on the migration of taxpayers. MSAs that are on borders provide a spatial discontinuity—discrete differences in state tax rates within a single labor market. These MSAs allow residents to live in one state and work in another state. We find that differences in state income tax rates have a significant impact on the relative rate of migration to the states within an MSA. However, contrary to what would be expected, this impact is only significant in MSAs in which the filing state is based on employment (states without reciprocity) and not for those states in which the filing state is the state of residence (states with reciprocity). In MSAs where states do not have reciprocity agreements, a difference of ten percent in tax rates leads to a 4.1 percent difference in the relative rate of incoming taxpayers. Analogously, we find that a ten percent difference in state tax rates in these MSAs results in a 3.3 percent difference in the rate of tax base inflow (AGI). Our results suggest that one reason that differences in state income taxes appear to have more impact in multistate MSAs without reciprocity is that only relatively large differences in state income tax rates have any impact on migration and these differences are much more pronounced in MSAs without reciprocity.     

Tax Competition with Heterogeneous Firms

Abstract

This paper studies tax competition in an economic geography model that allows for agglomeration economies with trade costs and heterogeneous firms. We find that the Nash equilibrium involves a large country charging a higher tax than a small nation. Lower trade costs lead to an intensification of competition, a drop in Nash tax rates and a narrowing of the gap. Since large, productive firms are naturally more sensitive to tax differences in our model, large firms are the crux of tax competition in our model. This also means that tax competition has consequences for the average productivity of big and small nations' industries; by lowering tax rates, a small nation can attract high-productivity firms.     

Mobile Labor, Multiple Tax Instruments, and Tax Competition

The tax competition literature shows that local governments keep property tax rates inefficiently low to prevent capital outflows, thereby underproviding local public goods. This paper adds mobile labor and an alternative tax instrument to the model. Jurisdictions have access to a property tax levied on land and capital, plus either a head tax or a labor tax. Scale economies in public good provision create incentives to use the property tax, but these incentives are not accompanied by increased incentives to underprovide public goods. In contrast, underprovision is associated with the use of a distortionary labor tax.     

Identifying strategic interactions in Swedish local income tax policies

This paper uses data on Swedish local governments to test for strategic interaction in local tax setting. We make use of a number of indirect predictions from the theories of tax competition and yardstick competition in order to test for the presence of strategic interaction in these forms. Using such additional predictions of the theories serves a twofold purpose—first it helps us establish if the spatial coefficient is due to strategic interactions or merely reflecting spatial error correlation, and second, it helps identify the source of interaction. The analysis provides strong evidence for spatial correlation in tax rates among Swedish local governments. Moreover, we find weak evidence of tax competition effects in the setting of tax rates.     

Property Tax Assessment Reform: A Source of Local Revenue Windfall or Fiscal Retrenchment

Abstract . Researchers, state officials and taxpayers have often speculated that property tax assessment reform would lead to an increase in the overall tax burden. They contend that, given the large non-discretionary increase in the tax base during the reform, local governments can raise more resources without increasing the nominal tax rate. An empirical analysis of 74 towns in New York supports that position. However, two types of tax shifts that occurred in the wake of reassessment—interclass shifts of tax burden to the owners of residential propertieskovn the other property classes and intra-class shifts observed among residential property owners—have caused significant moderation in this pattern of local government behavior. Therefore, tax reform, while it bestows revenue windfalls upon some local governments, may require fiscal retrenchment by others.     

A theory of interregional tax competition

A general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition, where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels. An exact definition of tax competition is provided, and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible. It is argued, however, that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions. Inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled. The amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms.     

TAX COMPETITION AS A CAUSE OF FALLING CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

Abstract Since the mid 1980s, tax rates on corporate income have declined in most industrialized countries. Tax competition between countries for mobile capital has frequently been mentioned as an explanation for this development. A vast empirical literature dealing with tax competition for mobile capital has emerged. This paper categorizes and summarizes the existing empirical studies on this issue. Particular focus is placed on the isolation of the substantive implications the quantitative study outcomes convey. Given the empirical evidence surveyed, it appears that tax rates indeed decline due to tax competition between countries, and in particular due to competition for profits. In addition to summarizing the substantive implications of the existing empirical literature, the paper addresses the question of whether the existing studies can convincingly isolate tax competition as a driver of falling corporate income tax rates.     

外商直接投资与资源环境绩效的实证研究

基于地方政府竞争的视角,本文运用空间计量和探索性空间数据方法实证分析了地方政府间的策略性引资竞争对资源环境绩效的影响,研究结果表明：在政治晋升和经济发展激励下,FDI对资源环境绩效的影响不仅取决于它在地区内和地区间的溢出效应,而且还取决于当地及邻近辖区的财政支出水平。其中本辖区政府为吸引FDI而展开的财政支出竞争对资源环境绩效的影响存在显著的“门槛效应”,而邻近辖区的策略性引资支出显著降低了资源环境绩效水平并表现出明显的结构性偏好,对经济建设的过度支出和公共服务的有限投入成为辖区间竞相效仿的支出政策。探索性空间数据分组检验的估计结果进一步显示不同集聚区内的引资策略互动对资源环境绩效的影响存在显著的差异,在FDI高值集聚区内,邻近辖区的引资支出显著降低了本地的资源环境绩效;而在低值集聚区内,邻近辖区的引资支出对本地资源环境水平没有显著的影响。     

Lowering the Marginal Corporate Tax Rate: Why the Debate?

In an effort to attract new investors and retain existing producers, governments use corporate tax rates as a policy tool for industrial recruitment, resulting in inter‐state tax competition. Foreign direct investment (FDI) growth and GDP growth are the two policy outcomes gauged in inter‐state tax competition. The assumption is that lower corporate taxes lead to increases in FDI, which results in capital formation that generates GDP growth. This 60‐nation panel study tests that assumption through examining economic indicators contingent on taxation, such as FDI and mergers and acquisitions among multinational corporations between 1999 and 2009. The results suggest that reduced corporate tax rates can increase FDI but decrease annual GDP growth. The main policy implication is that tax competition may attract investment, but may not promote overall economic growth, offering support for value‐extraction theories.     

Some Comments on Tax Competition and Its Potential Effects on Tax Rates and Revenues

Corporate taxation is seen as the price of investing in a country, that is, the price either for the right to do business within the jurisdiction or for the supply of public goods. If consumption of that right or those public goods is mobile between jurisdictions and price competition ensues which will force prices together. Also, in the case of high tax regimes, a fall in the tax burden would be anticipated. In other words, countries will spontaneously harmonize their tax systems or face the loss of intemational investment and the disadvantages they bring.     

The Spatial Effects of Wage or Property Tax Differentials, and Local Government Choice between Tax Instruments

This paper considers the spatial effects (on wages, employment, and business capital as functions of location) of a localized differential in source-based wage tax rates or business property tax rates between (for example) a central city and the surrounding suburbs. A simple model is used in which business production uses only labor and capital inputs. Consumers have fixed residential locations but may commute to work. Wage and property tax differentials have effects that are similar in some ways but different in other ways. If given a choice, a local government would choose to set its business property tax rate equal to zero and use only a wage tax.     

Do Urban Tax Rates Converge?

A bstract . Using a multiple regression model that seeks to explain why tax rates vary, the hypothesis is tested that similarly sized cities with similar economic functions would tend to have property tax rates that converged. What variations there are in an array of urban tax rates of 20 cities in the 100,000 to 200,000 class seem to be explained by density of settlement and by the extent to which non-property tax sources bulk importantly in total urban revenues. The inference is drawn that convergence is in fact observable. Convergence would, of course, imply tax competition as among these cities.     

Challenges to the Ideal Property Tax

A bstract . In the 19th century state-appointed tax revision commissions began to influence the reform of the property tax. By 1893, some 28 commissions had been appointed. Their remarkably similar calls for reform set the parameters for much of the academic research in the 20th century when this tax instrument was transformed from a local tax to a federal-state-local exaction. As now administered, the property tax is no longer a unified tax. Separate assessment criteria make it a tax on mines, utilities, business property, household personalty and on housing. The latter is modified in different ways by homestead exemption (41 states), circuit breakers (50 sates) and use of classified schedules (17 states). Along with unprofessional and inaccurate assessments as well as politicized assessment practices, this has changed the tax to a general title for disparate fiscal activities in the 68,000 jurisdictions that use the property tax.     

Shocks derived from mining windfalls and horizontal transfers: Exploring the permanent income hypothesis in Chilean municipalities from a spatial competition approach

We explore how spatial interaction affects the strategic use of municipal income when deciding between 1) an optimal long-run expenditure strategy versus 2) using the current income to finance current activities, a phenomenon known as the permanent income hypothesis. Even when this hypothesis is grounded in temporal logic, insufficient attention has been given to the impact of spatial dependence on this type of budget decision. Therefore, we present two reasons why spatial interaction adds new insight to this discussion. First, subnational governments located inside larger functional areas have lower average costs due to the population concentration, allowing for coordination between jurisdictions to achieve more power of negotiation and to potentially exploit economies of scale. Second, local government decision-making is not independent of other jurisdictions as municipalities would constantly evaluate the others’ actions regarding local tax effort, spending, and debt. While this spatial consideration remains a challenge for theoretical modeling, we offer empirical evidence to evaluate how robust the permanent income hypothesis is when geography is incorporated. Our empirical approach uses dynamic panel data with spatial dependence on debt, expenditure, and the error term. To evaluate our hypothesis, we exploit panel data from 320 Chilean municipalities between 2008 and 2020 and use two sources of income: non-matched grants via mining windfalls and horizontal fiscal transfers among cities. The evidence indicates that jurisdictions make backward-looking decisions regarding spending; that is, there are no significant differences between the short and long run. The results for debt, however, are not robust. Policy pertaining to the use of public resources should consider the spatial dependence between municipalities which should be a crucial factor in budgetary decision-making.     

Globalization and tax policy

Globalization is thought to reduce the ability of governments to collect taxes. If labor and capital can move between jurisdictions, then attempts to tax these factors will lead to a “vanishing taxpayer” as factors flee from high- to low-tax regions. More broadly, globalization suggests that there will be some convergence in tax rates across countries. This paper questions this view by examining the impact of globalization on taxation using a two-country, two-factor, two-good model. In particular, we ask how globalization, measured by increased international factor mobility, affects the ability of governments to tax factors. Our quantitative analysis indicates that, while increased mobility reduces revenues to some extent, governments still retain significant ability to collect taxes.     

The new view of the property tax A reformulation

The ‘new view’ of the property tax is reformulated within the context of a model with interjurisdictional competition, endogenous local public services, individuals who are segregated into homogeneous communities according to tastes for local public services, a simple form of land use zoning, and a political or constitutional constraint on the use of head taxes by local governments. Expressions for the ‘profits tax’ and ‘excise tax’ effects of the property tax are derived. The effects of a ‘consumption distortion’ away from government services due to local reluctance to tax mobile capital are also examined.