The suspension of borrowing: an implicit penalty for loan default under imperfect information

A credit seeker may be suspended from borrowing for a period of time due to a previous default. Such suspension is widely used in bank lending through credit check. Our work analyses the effects of suspension on the investment choice of borrowers under uncertainty and on the lending policy of banks facing asymmetric information. We show that suspension should be tightened at low loan rates, but loosened otherwise, to improve the repayment performance of borrowers. We also show that although credit rationing may not be completely removed due to imperfect information, the excess demand for credit or transitive waiting in the market can actually be attenuated by such efficient use of suspension. Our theoretical predictions are consistent with observed cyclical patterns of changes in lendingrates and suspension severity.     

问询函监管与银行信贷决策的改善*

近年来,证券交易所推行的问询函监管逐渐成为保障和改善上市公司信息披露质量的重要机制,其实施效果自然成为监管者和学者关注的焦点。本文从银行的角度研究问询函监管对外部利益相关者的溢出效应,具体考察问询函监管对银行信贷决策的影响。研究发现,在公司被出具问询函后,银行的贷款利率显著更高,贷款期限显著更短,银行贷款要求提供担保的可能性和比例更高。进一步研究发现,当公司处于信息风险和信用风险相对较高的情境中,或银行对信息风险和信用风险较为关注的情况下,银行贷款利率上升幅度更加显著,不过,贷款期限、担保要求等非价格条款并没有显著差异。同时,问询函对银行信贷决策的影响在银企之间存在较强的信息不对称时更加显著。最后,本文发现公司收到问询函以后,分析师预测分歧度显著提高,这表明信息风险是问询函监管影响银行信贷决策的一个可能渠道。     

Economic effects of positive credit information sharing: the case of Korea

In many countries, in addition to negative credit information such as loan default and arrears, positive credit information is also exchanged on a voluntary and reciprocal basis. Employing optimal credit decision models of profit maximizing banks, and utilizing a unique dataset of 2?million consumer loan obligors in Korea, we investigate the economic effects of sharing positive credit information in addition to negative credit information already exchanged. We find that the discriminatory power of the credit scoring model improves significantly. We proceed to investigate the economic effects of the information gap in a competitive credit market by assuming two representative banks that differ only in the level of credit information sharing. The bank that utilizes negative information only suffers from deterioration of the borrower pool and reduced profit, as high credit risk borrowers are more concentrated on this bank due to underpricing of risks. Our finding suggests that banks have incentives to voluntarily participate in the positive information sharing mechanism, since even a small difference in discriminatory power stemming from the information gap may lead to a significant fall in profitability as the distribution of borrower quality changes endogenously due to adverse selection problems.     

The relevance of supply shocks for inflation: the spanish case

A retrenchment in crossborder credit is under way, the product of both market forces and political pressure on international banks to lend at home (Economist, 2009). In addition, banks, particularly the largest, have also dramatically expanded their retail banking operations over the past few years (Hirtle and Stiroh, 2007). Our goal, in this article, is to study the effects of default risk on equity returns through bank interest margin management under a renewed focus on domestic retail banking, a trend often attributed to the stability of banking activities. Specifically, this article explores the determinants of optimal bank interest margins based on an option-based firm-theoretical model with multiple sources of structural breaks due to political pressure. The model demonstrates how capital regulation and political pressure on foreign lending return and risk conditions jointly determine the optimal bank interest margin decision. We show that a more stringent capital requirement is linked with lower equity return, but higher default risk of the bank in the return to domestic retail banking. An increased focus on the political pressure on foreign lending return is linked with higher equity return and default risk of the bank. It is also showed that an increased focus on the political pressure on foreign lending risk decreases the bank's equity return and default risk. We conclude that the return to domestic retail banking may be a relatively stable activity when the political pressure decision impacts only the expected risk of the bank's foreign lending and not the return.     

On the rationale of bank lending in pre-crisis Thailand

Evidence from credit files is provided to examine bank lending determinants of Thai commercial banks. Their lending practice follows reasonable patterns as a standard set of variables, including indirect risk variables, explains much of the variance in interest rate spread. Reflecting institutional differences with mature markets, we find a higher importance of relationship banking and risk control via credit availability. Information about later default reveals prudent relationship lending. However, banks could have made better use of available information about borrowers’ riskiness. These findings do not support a general verdict of bad banking but indicate room to improve lending decisions.     

Corruption in a model of vertical linkage between formal and informal credit sources and credit subsidy policy

The present note develops a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets highlighting the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing dominant moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially. The existing moneylender acts as a Stackelberg leader and unilaterally decides on the informal interest rate. We show that there may arise a case where an increase in the supply of formal credit results in an increase in the informal interest rate under reasonable parametric restrictions. This shows that apart from (i) asymmetric information on the part of informal sector lenders (Bose, 1998), (ii) an increase in the probability of default of all informal sector lenders (Hoff and Stiglitz 1997), and the (iii) possibility of informal lenders to collude (Floro and Ray 1997), the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit might be another factor responsible for the policy of vertical linkage to break down.     

Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information

We study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers' default probabilities. Admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability, the loan quantity, the loan interest rate and the collateral required. The principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers; moreover, the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information. No credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers.     

Banks,relative performance,and sequential contagion

We develop a multi-period general equilibrium model of bank deposit, credit, and interim inter-bank loan markets in which banks initially specialize in their choices of debtors, leading to under-diversification, but nevertheless become entwined via inter-bank markets, leading to the fortunes of one bank affecting the profits and default rates of the other in a sequential manner. Lack of (full) diversification among credit risks arises in our model owing to a relative profit argument in each banker’s utility function, which is otherwise risk- and default-averse. We examine its implications for the welfare of depositors and debtors. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Managing Credit Risk: A Challenge for the New Millennium

The importance of credit–risk management has never been more important with the current high default rates and bankruptcies; but, there was heightened interest even before the current scenario. Indeed, in 1999, at the end of the benign credit cycle, banks, regulators, and financial market practitioners were spending considerable time on this subject due to:
(1) Increased emphasis on sophisticated risk management techniques in a changing regulatory environment – mainly revisions to the so–called 'Basel Accord'
(2) Refinements in credit–scoring techniques
(3) Establishment of relatively large, relevant data bases on defaults, recoveries and credit migrations
(4) Treatment of bank loans as securities
(5) Development of 'offensive' credit–risk mitigation techniques such as securitizations, credit derivatives and credit insurance products
(6) Portfolio management techniques for credit assets.
(J.E.L.: G14, G21, G33).     

Expansion and welfare in microfinance: A screening model

The expansion of microfinance has triggered concerns of rising indebtedness, and higher default and interest rates. Using a screening model, we show that even if interest and default rates increase due to expansion, borrower welfare may improve. This is because: (i) all borrowers previously denied credit can obtain loans, and (ii) screening costs for pre-existing borrowers go down. Hence, policies that seek to regulate interest and screening levels can be counterproductive.     

A Model of Money and Credit, with Application to the Credit Card Debt Puzzle

Many individuals simultaneously have significant credit card debt and money in the bank. The credit card debt puzzle is as follows: given high interest rates on credit cards and low rates on bank accounts, why not pay down debt? While some economists go to elaborate lengths to explain this, we argue it is a special case of the rate of return dominance puzzle from monetary economics. We extend standard monetary theory to incorporate consumer debt, which is interesting in its own right since developing models where money and credit coexist is a long-standing challenge. Our model is quite tractable—for example, it readily yields nice existence and characterization results—and helps put into context recent discussions of consumer debt.     

Unilateral CVA for CDS in a contagion model with stochastic pre-intensity and interest

Price of a financial derivative with unilateral counterparty credit risk equals to the price of an otherwise risk-free derivative minus a credit value adjustment (CVA) component, which can be seen as a call option on investor's NPV with strike 0. Thus modeling volatility of NPV is the foundation for CVA valuation. This paper assumes that default times of counterparty and reference firm follow a special contagion model with stochastic pre-intensities that allows for explicit formulas for default probabilities. Stochastic interest rate is also incorporated to account for positive correlation between pre-intensity and interest. Survival measure approach is employed to calculate NPV of a risk-free CDS, and semi-analytical solution for CVA is obtained through affine specifications. Numerical analysis shows that contagion has more significant impact on CVA than diffusion of pre-intensities, and the positive correlation between interest and reference firm's pre-intensity has monotonic decreasing impact on CVA.     

小企业信用评估的模型构建与实证分析

文章采用我国东部某银行小企业信贷数据,使用Logistic模型与因子分析相结合的方法提出了构建小企业信用评估体系的思路。研究结果表明,财务因素中资产负债率与违约概率正相关,非财务指标中对违约概率影响最大的是基本存款账户是否在本银行和银行客户类型。与以往研究相比,文章综合考虑了财务与非财务指标,研究结果对构建小企业信用评估指标体系具有重要的参考价值。     

Interest rate policy,effective demand,and growth in LDCs

Orthodox criticisms of ‘financial repression’ in LDCs argue that interest rate liberalization promotes investment and economic growth by increasing the supply of bank credit and improving the efficiency of credit allocation. The present paper develops a Kaleckian model in which increases in deposit interest rates may lower investment and growth by placing downward pressure on effective demand – even if interest rate liberalization results in decreased borrowing costs. The focus of the Kaleckian model on effective demand issues is then contrasted with prior criticisms of the proliberalization view. Finally, the relevance of the Kaleckian approach is demonstrated in connection with the important role of effective demand and distributional effects in the failure of the Chilean financial liberalization to promote a stable growth of output and investment.     

基于Poisson跳跃的信用价差期权定价

信用价差是用以向投资者补偿参照资产违约风险的、高于无风险利率的利差。信用价差期权作为风险控制的重要手段之一,其定价也日益得到人们的关注。现有文献几乎是单纯地利用几何布朗运动来刻画资产的价格变化过程从而对信用价差期权进行定价。而在实际中会出现某些不寻常的事件导致资产价格出现不间断的跳跃现象,普通的定价方法对这种现象的解释力度不够。因此本文引入Poisson跳跃来描述信用价差变化过程中的异常情况,更好地解释当遇到金融危机等情况时资产价值的跳跃现象。由于Longstaff和Schwartz的模型引入了随机利率,可以给出定价公式的封闭解析解的优点,本文在此模型上进行进行研究,将刻画信用价差动态过程的O-U过程与Poisson跳跃结合,利用伊藤公式进行推导并引入了利率的平方根过程,得到了欧式信用价差期权的定价公式,更好地考虑了资产价格的跳跃情况。     

Pricing Loans Using Default Probabilities

This paper examines the pricing of loans using the term structure of the probability of default over the life of the loan. We describe two methodologies for pricing loans. The first methodology uses the term structure of credit spreads to price a loan, after adjusting for the difference in recovery rates between bonds and loans. In loan origination, it is common practice to estimate the probability of default for a loan over a specified time horizon and the loss given default. The second methodology shows how to incorporate this information into the arbitrage free pricing of a loan. We also show how to derive an estimate of the credit spread due to liquidity risk. For both methodologies, we show how to calculate a break–even credit spread, taking into account the fee structure of a loan and the costs associated with the term structure of marginal economic capital. The break–even spread is the minimum spread for the loan to be EVA neutral in a multi–period setting.
(J.E.L.: G12, G33).     

Unexpected loan losses and bank capital in an estimated DSGE model of the euro area

We present a stylized DSGE model in which banks face unexpected losses in their loan portfolios and are subject to capital regulation. The framework is used to explore the importance of the interaction between macroeconomic conditions, credit default and bank capitalization for the transmission of macroeconomic shocks. We fit the model to euro area data. Impulse response analysis shows that the aforementioned interaction substantially magnifies the responsiveness of the economy to demand side and monetary disturbances. The amplification is especially strong with respect to government spending shocks. The model is further capable of replicating two financial market characteristics that are documented in the empirical literature, i.e. the pro-cyclicality of bank profitability and the counter-cyclical response of firm default rates and credit spreads to monetary policy shocks.     

Standby Letters of Credit and Bank Default Risk

This paper examines the relationship between Australian banks' use of standby letters of credit, an off-balance sheet direct credit sub stitute, and default risk on bank liabilities. We find strong support for the sub-optimal investment (or under-investment) hypothesis. Riskier banks, defined as those with higher CD premiums, and those with higher proportions of long-maturity liabilities make greater use of SLCs than less risky banks. However, there is little evidence of a feed-back effect from SLCs to bank default risk     

Firm size,credit scoring accuracy and banks’ production of soft information

Research on SME bank financing generally assumes that smaller firms are more opaque from a lender’s perspective. We propose that the discriminatory power of credit scoring models can be thought of as a proxy for firm opaqueness, given that when these models perform poorly, lenders must invest in the production of ‘soft information’ to supplement the financial data used in these models. Measuring the discriminatory power of probit default models across quintiles of the Irish SME size distribution, we show that our proxy for firm opaqueness increases monotonically as firms get smaller. This finding supports an assumption that is the starting point to a wide strand of literature on SME bank financing. Our findings can also be interpreted as providing an insight to the literature on the determinants of banks’ choice of lending technology. While smaller banks may, as found in a substantial previous literature, produce larger amounts of ‘soft information’ due to their organizational advantages, they may also do so out of necessity: hard-information-based default modelling is less effective among smaller firms, thereby forcing banks that lend to these borrowers to invest more in relationship banking technologies to retain competitiveness.     

Credit union loan rate determinants in the United States

ABSTRACT

Credit union participation in the consumer lending market continues to grow as an increasing number of consumers and small businesses become members and open accounts. This study investigates the determinants of credit union loan rates during a period of economic expansion in the United States using fourth quarter 2015 data for 5,942 credit unions. Five different interest rate categories are analysed using nine potential loan rate determinants. Results indicate that loan rates tend to be lower as credit union size increases, while high ratios for net charge-offs and operating costs cause interest rates to increase. Opposite to what is expected, loan rates are positively correlated with regional unemployment rates. A possible explanation for this outcome is that weak labour markets are associated with elevated loan delinquency rates and, therefore, greater default risks resulting in higher interest rates.