Structuring cooperative relationships between organizations

Alliances and similar cooperative efforts are receiving increased attention in the strategic management literature. These relationships differ in significant ways from those governed by markets or hierarchies, and pose very different issues for researchers and managers. In this paper we address alternative forms of governance in cases where multiple organizations repeatedly cooperate. We explore their characteristics and follow this with a discussion of criteria which we believe bear on the choice of governance: risk and reliance on trust. We offer propositions on relationships between these criteria and the choice of governance mechanisms. In the concluding section of the paper we explore the implications of our analysis for managers and scholars.     

Bridging inter- and intra-firm boundaries: management of supplier involvement in automobile product development

Outsourcing has become an important strategy for many firms. Yet, firms need to compete with their competitors who also outsource and may share the same suppliers. This article explores how a firm could outperform others in managing the division of labor with a supplier in product development. Drawing on the empirical data collected from the Japanese auto industry, this paper shows that an automaker needs capabilities to coordinate various activities both externally with a supplier and internally within its own organization, in order to gain better component development performance. Overall, the results imply that outsourcing does not work effectively without extensive internal effort. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Parallel sourcing and supplier performance in the Japanese automobile industry

Japanese auto makers are reported to enjoy high supplier performance through long-term relationships, specific investments, and sole sourcing. Quality management consultants in the U.S. have been strongly advocating adoption of these practices. But economic and management theorists would predict that the combination of a high level of relationship-specific investments and sole sourcing will lead to problems with supplier performance. In fact the Japanese auto makers use a hybrid form of organization we term parallel sourcing. We present a transaction costs model that shows how parallel sourcing provides incentives for supplier performance associated with multiple sourcing while preserving claimed benefits of sole sourcing.     

Does a long‐term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity

Research summary : In this paper, we theorize and empirically investigate how a long‐term orientation impacts firm value. To study this relationship, we exploit exogenous changes in executives' long‐term incentives. Specifically, we examine shareholder proposals on long‐term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. The passage of such “close call” proposals is akin to a random assignment of long‐term incentives and hence provides a clean causal estimate. We find that the adoption of such proposals leads to (1) an increase in firm value and operating performance—suggesting that a long‐term orientation is beneficial to companies—and (2) an increase in firms' investments in long‐term strategies such as innovation and stakeholder relationships. Overall, our results are consistent with a “time‐based” agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Managerial summary : This paper shows that corporate short‐termism is hampering business success. We show clear, causal evidence that imposing long‐term incentives on executives—in the form of long‐term executive compensation—improves business performance. Long‐term executive compensation includes restricted stocks, restricted stock options, and long‐term incentive plans. Firms that adopted shareholder resolutions on long‐term compensation experienced a significant increase in their stock price. This stock price increase foreshadowed an increase in operating profits that materialized after two years. We unpack the reasons for these improvements in performance, and find that firms that adopted these shareholder resolutions made more investments in R&D and stakeholder engagement, especially pertaining to employees and the natural environment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?

Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed as substitutes for complex contracts in interorganizational exchanges. Many argue that formal contracts actually undermine trust and thereby encourage the opportunistic behavior they are designed to discourage. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative perspective: that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements. Using data from a sample of information service exchanges, we find empirical support for this proposition of complementarity. Managers appear to couple their increasingly customized contracts with high levels of relational governance (and vice versa). Moreover, this interdependence underlies their ability to generate improvements in exchange performance. Our results concerning the determinants of these governance choices show their distinct origins, which further augments their complementarity in practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于合约化质量管理框架下的质量创新模式研究

本文首先从现代合约理论出发，对传统质量概念中的合约化内涵进行发掘和深化，并进一步对质量合约的风险特征及原理进行讨论。在此基础上，进行质量创新理论的探析，研究表明：绝对质量价值管理、相对质量价值管理和证券化质量价值管理都是基于合约化质量理念下的质量创新的新模式——质量价值管理的三种形态，是在不同的竞争环境、不同的发展时期、具有不同质量风险特征的企业的不同选择而已。但从质量风险收益来看，证券化质量价值管理代表着质量创新模式的发展方向。     

Making new franchise systems work

This paper argues that new franchise systems are more likely to survive if they are structured to economize on agency costs. After controlling for industry effects, and firm age and size, this paper shows empirical support for six of nine hypotheses about the linkage between mechanisms for economizing on agency costs and the survival of new franchise systems. © 1998 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于物元可拓法的培训机构人员流失风险预测

为了帮助中小型教育培训机构解决人员流失的问题,减少人员流动带来的经济损失、降低企业运营成本,建立了基于熵权法及改进物元可拓法的培训机构人员流失风险预测方法,在经典物元可拓模型的基础上,提出\"极值最优点\"的改进物元可拓模型,可为物元可拓模型中的极端经典域构建不同的关联函数,取得了关联度的最优拟合效果,并以A教育培训机构为...     

Expropriation and control rights: A dynamic model of foreign direct investment

This paper studies the strategic interaction between a foreign direct investor and a host country. We analyze how the investor can use his control rights to protect his investment if he faces the risk of “creeping expropriation” once his investment is sunk. It is shown that this hold-up problem may cause underinvestment if the outside option of the investor is too weak, and overinvestment if it is too strong. We also analyze the impact of spillover effects, we give a rationale for “tax holidays” and we examine how stochastic returns affect the strategic interaction of investor and host country.     

Great School Milk Conspiracies Revisited: Rejoinder

A re-examination and analysis ofdata in court records covering sealed-biddingpractices, market shares, incumbency rates, andprofit margins of two dairies charged with bid-riggingdisclose that Scott's analysis is flawed in severalimportant respects: reliance on selective bid data,omission of relevant bid data, and errors in reportedbids. Accordingly, Scott's hypothesis (that twodairies may have been engaged in tacit collusioninstead of overt collusion) was found to be basedlargely on conjectures, not hard data, and thus shouldbe rejected.     

基于代理理论与管家理论视角的家族企业的公司治理选择：一个理论框架

企业组织是一个非常异质性的组织,企业的不同治理选择潜在影响着企业的代理成本和管家态度。最终体现为能力和企业绩效上的重要区别。本文从代理理论与管家理论这两种不同公司治理视角,分析了家族企业公司治理的四个维度即家族所有与控制、家族领导能力、多个家族成员的广泛参与、以及家族传承计划与实际参与下的各自的代理成本和管家态度,以及对企业能力和绩效的影响。