Cross‐border mergers and acquisitions: The role of private equity firms

Research summary: We show that private equity ownership (“PE backing”) of the acquirer is a signal of deal quality in cross‐border takeovers. As such, PE‐backed acquirers experience higher announcement returns in cross‐border takeovers, but only if targets are in poor information environments. We show that PE backing is a positive market signal because of PE firms' experience and networks that result from prior deals in target countries. We document that the market correctly anticipates that operating performance of PE‐backed acquirers increases as a result of cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Managerial summary: We study cross‐border acquisitions by acquirers that are partially owned by private equity firms (“PE backing”). Cross‐border acquisitions are challenging as acquirers often have little information about targets. We document that investors react positively to cross‐border deals of PE‐backed acquirers—their stock prices increase upon deal announcements. However, this is only the case if targets are in countries with poor information environments. This is because PE backing allows acquirers to access PE firms' deal experience and networks. This makes it easier to identify and evaluate good targets, making it more (less) likely that a deal eventually creates (destroys) value. Consistent with this, we find that earnings of PE‐backed acquirers increase after buying targets in poor information environments. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance of acquirers of divested assets: Evidence from the U.S. software industry

We provide a comparative analysis of acquirer returns in acquisitions of public firms, private firms, and divested assets. On the basis of a sample of 5,079 acquisitions by U.S. software industry companies during 1988–2008, we find that acquisitions of divested assets outperform acquisitions of privately held firms, which in turn outperform acquisitions of publicly held firms. While the higher returns for acquisitions of divested assets relative to stand‐alone acquisition targets can be explained by market efficiency arguments, seller distress and improved asset fit further enhance the positive returns of acquirers of divested assets consistent with the relative bargaining power explanation. Finally, we find that the effects of these buyer bargaining advantages are mutually strengthening and that they also hold for longer‐term acquirer performance Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who does private equity buy? Evidence on the role of private equity from buyouts of divested businesses

Research Summary: We examine the role of nonventure private equity firms in the market for divested businesses, comparing targets bought by such firms to those bought by corporate acquirers. We argue that a combination of vigilant monitoring, high‐powered incentives, patient capital, and business independence makes private equity firms uniquely suited to correcting underinvestment problems in public corporations, and that they will therefore systematically target divested businesses that are outside their parents’ core area, whose rivals invest more in long‐term strategic assets than their parents, and whose parents have weak managerial incentives both overall and at the divisional level. Results from a sample of 1,711 divestments confirm these predictions. Our study contributes to our understanding of private equity ownership, highlighting its advantage as an alternate governance form. Managerial Summary: Private equity firms are often portrayed as destroyers of corporate value, raiding established companies in pursuit of short‐term gain. In contrast, we argue that private equity investors help to revitalize businesses by enabling investments in long‐term strategic resources and capabilities that they are better able to evaluate, monitor, and support than public market investors. Consistent with these arguments, we find that when acquiring businesses divested by public corporations, private equity firms are more likely to buy units outside the parent's core area, those whose peers invest more in R&D than their parents, and those whose parents have weak managerial incentives, especially at the divisional level. Thus, private equity firms systematically target those businesses that may fail to realize their full potential under public ownership.     

Acquisition Motives and the Distribution of Acquisition Performance

Research summary: I examine how acquisition motives relate to the distribution of post‐acquisition performance. I argue that acquisitions motivated by operating synergies have the potential to experience greater gains than acquisitions driven by financial synergies but are harder to value and implement, making them more uncertain. Using SEC filings, conference calls and press releases to capture acquisition motives, I find that acquirers pursuing operating synergies are more likely to experience highly positive and highly negative long‐term returns than acquirers pursuing financial synergies. I also find that acquisition experience and geographic proximity to targets soften acquirers' extreme downside outcomes in operating synergy acquisitions. My theory and results suggest that approaches that emphasize average outcomes for acquirers and use industry classifications to capture acquisition motives may be incomplete. Managerial summary: Managers engage in acquisitions for various reasons. In this study, I find that reasons related to operating synergies (e.g., revenue growth through new product offerings or cost savings through economies of scale) are more likely to result in extreme high and low performance outcomes for the acquiring firm compared to reasons related to financial synergies (e.g., diversification of cash flow streams). In addition, I find that the acquirer's prior acquisition experience and the geographic proximity between the target and acquirer help soften the extreme low performance outcomes related to operating synergies. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

National corporate governance institutions and post‐acquisition target reorganization

We examine the characteristics of national systems of corporate governance to theorize about the nature of the shareholders' and employees' interests when it comes to reorganization, under the assumption that the firm is coalitional in nature. We argue that corporate governance institutions prevalent in both the host and the target country of the merging firms enable or constrain the ability of the acquirer to reorganize the target. Using a cross‐national dataset of corporate acquisitions and post‐acquisition reorganization, we found support for our predictions that stronger legal protection of shareholder rights in the acquirer country compared to the target country increases the acquirer's ability to restructure the target's assets and leverage the target's resources, while the protection of employee rights in the target country restricts the acquirer's ability to restructure the target's assets and redeploy resources to and from the target. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What they know vs. what they do: how acquirers leverage technology acquisitions

Existing research suggests that in acquisitions of small technology‐based firms by large established firms post‐merger integration both enables and hinders acquirers' efforts to leverage the technology of acquired firms. This apparent paradox can be resolved once we account for the qualitatively distinct ways in which acquirers leverage technology acquisitions. Integration helps acquirers use the acquired firm's existing knowledge as an input to their own innovation processes (leveraging what they know), but hinders their reliance on the acquired firm as an independent source of ongoing innovation (leveraging what they do). We also show that experienced acquirers are better able to mitigate the disruptive consequences of the loss of autonomy entailed by integration, though we find no evidence that they achieve greater coordination benefits from integration. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Capital subsidies,profit maximization,and acquisitions by partially privatized telecommunications carriers

A recent phenomenon in competition policy is the acquisition of a private firm by an enterprise that is either wholly owned by government or in the midst of privatization. Such an acquisition poses the question of how public ownership may alter the incentives of a firm to engage in anticompetitive conduct. It also prompts one to examine the process by which such altered incentives revert, as the level of government ownership declines, to the same incentives that face purely private firms. Using Deutsche Telekom's acquisition of VoiceStream Wireless as a case study, this article presents the economic questions relevant to evaluating the competitive consequences of acquisitions by partially privatized firms. It predicts gains or losses to various constituencies of producer groups. It then analyzes bond ratings and weighted-average costs of capital to determine whether such data are consistent with the hypothesis, advanced by parties opposed to such foreign investment, that partially privatized acquirers benefited from the government subsidization of their credit.     

ASSET REDEPLOYMENT,ACQUISITIONS AND CORPORATE STRATEGY IN DECLINING INDUSTRIES

The resource-based perspective suggests that firms are bundles of assets, some of which are fungible in nature. To the extent that some resources are fungible, firms should be able to redeploy them to enter new markets when their existing businesses decline. On the other hand, perspectives that emphasize the business-specific nature of routines or managerial skills point to inherent risks in organizational transformation. In a declining market, resources can be redeployed within the firm through diversification-oriented acquisitions, or they can be redeployed through market mechanisms through consolidation-oriented acquisitions. In this paper, we examine the differences in performance outcomes between diversification-oriented acquisitions and consolidation-oriented acquisitions in industries within the defense sector, which have experienced significant decline. Our results indicate that consolidation-oriented acquisitions outperform diversification-oriented acquisitions in the decline phase of their industries in terms of both ex ante (stock market based) and ex post (operating) performance measures. At the corporate level, we find a positive relationship between focus and Tobin’s q, even when the industry is in decline. The implication of our results is that assets from declining industries are redeployed more effectively through market mechanisms than within the firm through the acquisition of complementary assets. ©1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Money secrets: How does trade secret legal protection affect firm market value? Evidence from the uniform trade secret act

Research summary : We investigate the impact of trade secret legal protection on firm market value in the context of acquisitions. On one hand, market value may increase because trade secret assets become better protected from rivals. On the other hand, market value may decrease because trade secret protection reduces information about the target and its competitors available to potential buyers, increasing uncertainty about its value. Buyers will discount their offers in expectation of being compensated for riskier deals. Using a sample of private equity investments in the United States, we find that trade secret protection has a positive effect in industries with high mobility of knowledge workers, but a negative effect in industries with (1) high resource–value uncertainty and (2) high poor‐investment risk. Managerial summary : We argue that an increase in trade secret legal protection might not unequivocally benefit firm owners when selling their business. A stronger trade secret protection increases the market value of firms in industries with high workers' mobility, but it decreases the market value of firms in industries with uncertain resource value and/or high risk of poor‐acquisition investments. Based on the contingent effect of trade secret protection, companies may want to adjust their strategic decisions, including where to locate or relocate, based in part on whether they will derive benefits or suffer losses when trade secrets are better protected. Finally, our study should help policymakers understand more fully the economic impact of government policies associated with trade secrets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Geographic distance and corporate acquisitions: signals from IPO firms

This paper examines acquisitions of firms after they have undergone initial public offerings (IPOs). Combining insights from information economics with recent research on geographic distance in various market settings, the analysis investigates whether the presence or absence of different signals on IPO firms has an impact on the geographic proximity of acquirers. The central proposition we develop and test is that specific characteristics of IPOs—venture capitalist backing, investment bank reputation, and underpricing of issued shares—convey signals on these firms, which can facilitate acquisitions by more remote acquirers who are more likely to face the risk of adverse selection. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Linking corporate strategy to capital structure: diversification strategy,type and source of financing

This study examines the relationship between corporate strategy and capital structure, specifically the diversfication and financing strategies of a firm. The results show that equity financing is preferred for related diversification and unrelated diversification is associated with debt financing. Additionally, firms diversifying through acquisitions are more likely to use public sources of financing and those emphasizing internal development of new businesses depend primarily on private sources of financing. Using simultaneous equation estimation, we found a reciprocal relationship between a firm's financial strategy and its corporate diversification strategy. Mode and nature of diversification are also reciprocally interrelated. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Responding to public and private politics: corporate disclosure of climate change strategies

The challenges associated with climate change will require governments, citizens, and firms to work collaboratively to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, a task that requires information on companies' carbon risks, opportunities, strategies, and emission levels. This paper explores the conditions under which firms participate in this endeavor. Building on theories of how social activists inspire changes in organizational norms, beliefs, and practices, we hypothesize that shareholder actions and regulatory threats are likely to prime firms to adopt practices consistent with the aims of a broader social movement. We find empirical evidence of direct and spillover effects. In the domain of private politics, shareholder resolutions filed against a firm and others in its industry increase a firm's propensity to engage in practices consistent with the aims of the related social movement. Similarly, in the realm of public politics, threats of state regulations targeted at a firm's industry as well as regulations targeted at other industries increase the likelihood that the firm will engage in such practices. These findings extend existing theory by showing that both activist groups and government actors can spur changes in organizational practices, and that challenges mounted against a single firm or a single industry can inspire both firm and field‐level changes. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Geographic overlap and acquisition pairing

Research Summary: This study examines the role of geographic factors in explaining acquisition pairing using a novel conditional logic methodology. Drawing from information asymmetry arguments regarding acquisition decisions, we theorize that geographic overlap between the acquirer and potential targets’ businesses and operations enables the acquirer to collect more information about the potential target through its multiple business operations that are geographically proximate. We also demonstrate moderating boundary conditions. In particular, we examine acquiring firm characteristics, acquiring firm size and geographic dispersion, which both weaken the relationship between geographic overlap and acquisition pairing. Likewise, we examine two dyadic distance moderators, geographic distance and product dissimilarity, both of which increase information asymmetry between the acquirer and potential targets, which increases the effect of geographic overlap in facilitating acquisition pairing. Managerial Summary: Firms pursuing acquisition activities face severe information asymmetry when evaluating potential targets. This study investigates how acquiring firms leverage geographic conditions to overcome information asymmetry and choose targets that they can better evaluate. We find that acquirers are more likely to choose targets that have subsidiaries or business operations overlapping in the same states as the acquirers themselves. This is particularly true for small acquirers, which lack resources and capabilities to seek external assistance, and acquirers that have business operations in more concentrated locations. We also find that acquiring targets with geographically overlapped business operations is especially salient when the target's headquarters is distantly located from the acquirer or when the target offers dissimilar products from the acquirer.     

Do newly public acquirers benefit or suffer from their pre‐IPO affiliations with underwriters and VCs?

We examine whether pre‐IPO affiliations affect post‐IPO corporate events, namely acquisitions. On the one hand, newly public acquirers may benefit from their pre‐IPO affiliations through residual signaling value or/and resource‐related benefits. On the other hand, newly public acquirers may suffer from those affiliations when conflicts of interests arise during the post‐IPO period. Equity underwriters may have incentive to promote non–value‐creating acquisitions (Type II error), and venture capitalists (VCs) may have incentive to forgo strategically important acquisitions (Type I error). Drawing on a sample of 4,029 acquisitions made by 717 newly public firms, we find that on average the announcement of an acquisition by a newly public acquirer elicits a positive response from investors. The market views more favorably the acquisitions announced by newly public acquirers associated with prestigious equity underwriters, but this reaction becomes negative when the lead underwriter is retained as the acquisition advisor. The market reacts more favorably to acquisitions announced by VC‐backed newly public acquirers, but only when those VCs are committed to a longer lockup period. The effects of pre‐IPO affiliations on expected returns are stronger for newly public acquirers with a high intangible resource base and persist throughout the three‐year post‐IPO period (across each subsequent acquisition announcement). Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Much Does Ownership Form Matter?

Research summary : Previous studies have emphasized firm and industry effects on variation in firm performance, but the relationship between forms of ownership and firm performance has been the focus of limited research. This article examines the extent to which ownership form (i.e., public or private ownership) and ownership structure (including diffused ownership and blockholding) affect firm performance. The results of an analysis of 30,525 European Union (EU) firms indicate that form of ownership is an important explanatory factor in the difference in performance among firms. These results underscore the need to study firms characterized by different ownership arrangements and to provide empirical evidence for the study of firm ownership in strategic management. Managerial summary : Motivated by growing evidence on the involvement of different types of owners in the strategies of firms, we studied the extent to which a firm's ownership form (type of legal incorporation, such as public and private ownership forms) and ownership structure (diffused ownership and blockholding) affect its performance. Our study of more than 30,000 firms from the European Union shows that ownership form differences explain some of the performance differences between firms. Our results also indicate that firms with different ownership forms are differently affected by their competitive environment. Overall, the study suggests that choosing the right ownership form can have important strategic consequences. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choosing the right target: Relative preferences for resource similarity and complementarity in acquisition choice

Research summary : Corporate acquisition is a popular strategic option for firms seeking new resources. However, little research exists on the question of why one firm is chosen over another. We develop a model relating characteristics of similarity and complementarity between acquirers' and target firms' key resources, including their products and R&D pipelines, to the likelihood of the acquirers choosing a particular firm. We construct measures of similarity and complementarity between and across products and R&D pipelines, and test their effects using a novel application of the choice model. Findings reveal that acquirers view similarity and complementarity differently, based on the resource they are comparing. When making comparisons to their own R&D pipelines, acquirers prefer similarity over complementarity whereas when making comparisons to their product portfolios, they prefer complementarity over similarity. Managerial summary : Corporate acquisition is a popular way for firms to grow and obtain innovative resources. However, we know little about why acquirers choose one firm over another. We capture the influence of similarity and complementarity between acquirers' and target firms' products (current innovative value) and R&D pipelines (future innovative value) on whether a particular target firm is acquired. Insights from the pharmaceutical industry reveal that acquirers value similarity and complementarity in target firms differently, based on whether the comparison being made is with respect to their products or their R&D pipelines. Regarding their R&D pipelines, acquirers prefer that the target firm has similar, rather than complementary, resources. However, the opposite is true concerning their own products: acquirers prefer that the target firm has complementary, versus similar, resources. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How does firm experience and institutional distance impact ownership choice in high‐technology acquisitions?

One of the critical reasons for a firm to acquire other firms is to access new technology. This study seeks to understand what ownership position a firm should take in foreign markets if the target is in a high‐technology industry. Specifically, it looks at how firm‐level experience and institutional distance could impact this ownership. Using logistic regression models on a sample of 1,091 cross‐border acquisitions undertaken by firms from 36 countries over an 8‐year time period (2001–2008), we find that when firms acquire targets in a high‐technology industry, they resort to partial acquisitions. Our analysis further suggests that when firms seek targets in high‐technology industries but have experience with acquisitions or face higher institutional distance, the likelihood of full acquisitions over partial ones increases. Study findings contribute to our understanding of the interactive relationship among technology, experience, and institutional distance in determining appropriate ownership choices.     

High‐Reputation Firms and Their Differential Acquisition Behaviors

Research summary: E merging reputation research suggests that high‐reputation firms will act to maintain their reputations in the face of high expectations. Yet, this research remains unclear on how high‐reputation firms do so. We advance this research by exploring three questions related to high‐reputation firms' differential acquisition behaviors: Do high‐reputation firms make more acquisitions than similar firms without this distinction? What kind of acquisitions do they make? How do investors react to high‐reputation firms' differential acquisition behaviors? We find that high‐reputation firms make more acquisitions and more unrelated acquisitions than other firms. Yet, we also find that investors bid down high‐reputation firms' stock more than other firms' in response to acquisition announcements, suggesting that investors are skeptical of how high‐reputation firms maintain their reputations . Managerial summary: W e know that high‐reputation firms wish to maintain their elite standing in the face of high‐market expectations, but we know little about how they do so. We explore this puzzle by investigating how reputation maintenance influences high‐reputation firms' acquisition behaviors. We classify high‐reputation firms are those firms that make Fortune's M ost A dmired annual list, and we find that high‐reputation firms make more acquisitions and more unrelated ones than other firms. Surprisingly, we also find that the market tends to react negatively to these acquisitions. Thus, managers may want to reconsider their strategy of making acquisitions as a means to maintain their firms' high reputations . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interorganizational Imitation and Acquisitions of High‐tech Ventures

Research summary: This article shows that there is a positive association between the changes in the number of prior acquisitions or the changes in the prominence of prior acquirers within the focal venture's subfield and the venture's likelihood to be acquired. Results are in line with the existence of frequency‐ and trait‐based imitation in acquisitions targeting tech ventures. More importantly, these positive associations are more pronounced when (a) exogenous technological uncertainty within the venture's subfield increases and (b) there are significant differences between the focal venture's and acquirer's technological resources. Our findings are in accord with the suggestion that uncertainty in the technology domain is an important boundary condition in moderating the extent of imitation in technology acquisitions. We also discuss alternative explanations and implications. Managerial summary: The findings of this article suggest that when deciding whether or not to acquire a technology venture (i.e., startup company in a high‐tech industry), managers infer information by observing other acquisitions in the venture's subfield to make assessments about the underlying value of the potential targets. We also find that receiving some informational cues from previous acquisitions would be more useful when there is high technological uncertainty in the potential target's subfield about which technologies will be dominant, and when the potential acquirer and the tech venture operate in dissimilar technological areas. This article shows that imitation can be one way to deal with decision‐making under uncertainty when making acquisition decisions in high‐tech environments. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.