The influence of relative values of outside director stock options on firm strategic risk from a multiagent perspective

Prior work has examined the effects of absolute levels of outside director stock option grants on risk behavior without recognizing that relative stock option values could differentially affect risk taking. Drawing from the house money effect perspective, we extend this literature by examining how positive deviation from prior outside director option grants values influences firm strategic risk. Additionally we draw from the behavioral agency model and the power literature to develop a multiagent contingency framework suggesting the effect of positive director pay deviation depends on the incentives and power of CEOs reflected in CEO stock ownership and CEO duality, respectively. Our empirical results indicate positive pay deviation has a positive effect on firm risk taking while high ownership and duality independently and jointly weaken this base relationship. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A dual agency view of board compensation: the joint effects of outside director and CEO stock options on firm risk

This paper contributes to multiple agency theory by examining how the compensation schemes awarded to outside directors and the CEO jointly affect firm‐level risk taking. Using data of the S&P 1500 firms from 1997 to 2006, we find support for earlier arguments that providing the CEO, the outside directors, or both with stock options increases risk taking. More importantly, we find that compensating outside directors with stock options has significantly stronger effects than CEO stock options. Finally, contrary to what one would expect, we find that these effects are mutually substituting; that is, if both the outside directors and the CEO are provided with stock option compensation, outside directors' incentives weaken the effect of the CEO's incentives on firms' risk taking. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

研发投资、企业风险与高管薪酬——业绩敏感性

企业研发投资会影响高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性。本文以2010～2014年沪深A股上市公司数据为样本,实证检验了研发投资、企业风险与高管薪酬--业绩敏感性之间的关系。研究结论表明,研发投资与企业风险呈正相关关系;增加研发投资导致企业风险加大,高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性会有所降低;进一步地,企业风险在研发投资与高管薪酬--业绩敏感性的负向关系中起中介作用。本文不仅丰富了高管薪酬--业绩敏感性影响因素的研究,也为企业针对研发活动设计合理薪酬契约提供了决策支持。     

When does incentive compensation motivate managerial behaviors? An experimental investigation of the fit between incentive compensation,executive core self-evaluation,and firm performance

We develop and test an integrative model that examines the fit between compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, and situational factors. We propose that a fit among all three factors is crucial to motivate desirable managerial behaviors. Using a specially designed management simulation, our study demonstrates that the effectiveness of incentive compensation to motivate managerial behaviors depends on executives' core self-evaluation and firm performance. Our results show that, relative to fixed salary compensation, executives with higher core self-evaluation respond to incentive compensation with greater perseverance, competitive strategy focus, ethical behavior, and strategic risk taking during organizational decline. However, these interaction effects are not present during organizational growth. Our theory and empirical evidence provide significant insights into the complex relationships among compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, firm performance, and managerial behaviors. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

设立独立董事的效果分析--来自中国上市公司独立董事的问卷调查

针对我国设立独立董事制度的种种疑难，基于国内外理论和实证研究设立独立董事效果面临的各种问题．相关文献资料得到不同的甚至是相互矛盾冲突的结论，本文通过问卷调查从另一角度来审视这些问题。通过对独立董事设立的效果、独立董事最担心的风险、独立董事发挥作用的有效条件、独立董事的薪酬待遇、影响独立董事发挥作用和导致独立董事辞职等重要因素的问卷调查和分析，有助于从内生和外生因素的角度来理解报酬、独立性、成本、风险、激励机制和外部环境因素对独立董事作用与效果的影响。     

Who gets the carrot and who gets the stick? Evidence of gender disparities in executive remuneration

This paper offers a new explanation of the gender pay gap in leadership positions by examining the relationship between managerial bonuses and company performance. Drawing on findings of gender studies, agency theory, and the leadership literature, we argue that the gender pay gap is a context‐specific phenomenon that results partly from the fact that company performance has a moderating impact on pay inequalities. Employing a matched sample of 192 female and male executive directors of U.K.‐listed firms, we corroborate the existence of the gender pay disparities in corporate boardrooms. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that bonuses awarded to men are not only larger than those allocated to women, but also that managerial compensation of male executive directors is much more performance‐sensitive than that of female executives. The contribution of attributional and expectancy‐related dynamics to these patterns is highlighted in line with previous work on gender stereotypes and implicit leadership theories such as the romance of leadership. Gender differences in risk taking and confidence are also considered as potential explanations for the observed pay disparities. The implications of organizations' indifference to women's performance are examined in relation to issues surrounding the recognition and retention of female talent. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of reference point in CEO restricted stock and its impact on R&D intensity in high‐technology firms

Prior work based on agency theory and behavioral agency model has focused on how absolute pay values affect firm outcomes. Departing from this traditional approach, we draw from behavioral decision theory to explain how relative pay levels influence firm risk taking. We investigate how CEO restricted stock value relative to reference point influences R&D intensity in high‐technology firms. We propose that negative deviation increases are related to R&D increases and positive deviation increases lead to R&D decreases, while negative deviation has greater effect than positive deviation. We establish theoretical boundary conditions by considering CEO duality and board vigilance as moderators. Drawing from agency theory, we predict the main effects will be enhanced under duality and weakened under high board vigilance. Our hypotheses are largely supported. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Using Incentive Pay and Providing Pay Supplements in U.S. Job Markets

This article investigates whether the earnings premium found with use of incentive pay is offset by lower supplemental pay. More comprehensive measures of employer costs for employee compensation are used to test the hypothesis. These data indicate that bonuses, overtime work, pension provision, and shift differentials can be less common in jobs with incentive pay, but the lower incidence of these forms of compensation does not offset the higher earnings associated with incentive pay.     

回收商竞争环境下逆向供应链协调的激励机制设计

由于回收努力程度难以用契约量化,本文利用委托代理理论研究了回收商竞争努力程度情况下逆向供应链的激励机制设计问题。分别讨论了信息对称与信息不对称情形的逆向供应链激励机制设计方法,并比较了两种情形下激励机制的不同。结果表明,信息不对称情形下回收商不但获得固定收入,而且在获得收益提成的同时承担一定风险;两种情形下回收商的期望效用均为其保留收入水平,而信息不对称情形下制造商的效用降低;制造商设计激励机制时要考虑代理成本的影响因素并做代理成本与监督成本的权衡;回收商竞争程度的增加导致回收商努力程度提高,而制造商期望效用增加,代理成本减少;制造商希望回收商回收难度大;适当的竞争对回收商有利等。     

The role of CEO relative standing in acquisition behavior and CEO pay

In this study, we develop and test a theory of CEO relative pay standing. Specifically, we propose that CEOs with negative relative pay standing status (underpaid relative to comparison CEOs) will engage in acquisition activity, as a self‐interested means of attempting to realign their pay with that of their peers. We further propose that, when CEOs with negative relative pay standing acquire, they will tend to finance those acquisitions more heavily with stock than cash, to mitigate the risk associated with those deals. Finally, we argue that acquisition activity will partially mediate the influence of CEO negative relative pay standing on subsequent CEO compensation increases; however, that pay growth will come primarily in the form of long‐term incentive pay. Our results support our predictions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

高管薪酬激励、创业战略导向与创业型企业成长性关系研究

本文基于2012～2014年创业板上市公司的非平衡面板数据,研究了高管薪酬激励与创业型企业成长性之间的关系,探讨了创业战略导向作为企业内部的增长战略倾向对上述关系的调节作用。研究结果表明：高管货币薪酬、权益薪酬、薪酬差距与创业型企业成长显著正相关;创业战略导向会负向调节高管货币薪酬与创业型企业成长性之间的关系、正向调节权益薪酬与创业型企业成长性之间的关系,而对薪酬差距与创业型企业成长之间关系的调节作用未得到验证。     

Organizational governance and employee pay: how ownership structure affects the firm's compensation strategy

This research investigated how the ownership structure is related to the firm's overall compensation strategy. The findings extend previous research that focused primarily on CEO compensation strategy. We show that there are significant differences in the compensation practices that apply to all employees as a function of the ownership structure. The results show that for owner‐controlled firms and owner‐managed firms there is significant pay/performance sensitivity for all employees. In management‐controlled firms, changes in pay are related to changes in size of the firm. These findings lead us to conclude that ownership structure not only affects upper management's pay, but also the pay of all employees through substantial differences in the firm's compensation practices. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decoupling risk taking from income stream uncertainty: a holistic model of risk

This paper builds and tests a holistic model of risk in organizations. Using structural equations modeling, we disaggregated risk into two distinct components, managerial risk taking and income stream uncertainty, or organizational risk. This allowed us to identify an array of organizational and environmental antecedents that have either been examined in isolation or neglected in previous studies about risk. Our results suggest that both organizational and environmental factors promote risk taking. Further, we found strong support for behavioral theory of the firm and agency theory on risk but not upper echelons theory. Our data also suggest that environmental characteristics have a negligible direct effect on organizational risk. Instead, the environment’s impact on risk occurs primarily through managerial choices. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO political ideologies and pay egalitarianism within top management teams

Research summary : We examine the influence of CEO and compensation committee liberalism on top management teams (TMT ) pay arrangements. Given that politically liberal individuals tend to value egalitarianism, we test whether firms with liberal CEO s tend to (1) reduce pay dispersion among non‐CEO executives; and (2) reduce pay gaps between CEO and non‐CEO executives, and whether compensation committee liberalism moderates these relationships. We find some evidence of a direct effect of CEO liberalism on TMT pay arrangements as well as some interaction between CEO and compensation committee liberalism on the pay arrangements. This study provides a better understanding of the antecedents of TMT pay arrangements and empirical evidence showing the influence of values at the top of organization . Managerial summary : Do the values of the CEO and compensation committee influence the pay of other top managers? Our study provides evidence that political ideology affects top manager pay. We examine whether CEO liberalism produces more egalitarian pay arrangements among top managers, and whether the liberalism of the compensation committee affects that relationship. We find that CEO liberalism reduces differences in the total pay among top managers, but does not influence the difference between CEO total pay and the total pay of top managers. We also find that compensation committee liberalism strengthens the negative influence of CEO liberalism on differences in total pay among top managers. Finally, we find that CEO liberalism reduces the difference between CEO bonus pay and the bonus pay of other top managers . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Compensation transparency and managerial opportunism: a study of supplemental retirement plans

Existing research on managerial compensation is based primarily on optimal contracting and managerial hegemony theories. Under the optimal contracting theory, observed compensation contracts are optimally determined, aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. Under the managerial hegemony theory, observed compensation contracts deviate from the optimum because top managers with power over boards are able to influence their own pay. I argue that the impact of managerial power over boards on managerial pay, and hence the deviation of compensation contracts from the optimum, is contingent on the transparency of managerial compensation. Within this framework, I investigate the impact of supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs)— historically the least transparent compensation component— on opportunistic decision making. An empirical analysis based on a time series sample of CEOs of S&P/TSX60 firms provides support of the compensation transparency theory. I find that SERP benefits are primarily driven by variables proxying for CEO power over the board, whereas more transparent compensation components are primarily driven by economic factors. The results also suggest that CEOs whose SERPs are contingent on firm performance appear to reduce firm R&D expenditures as they approach retirement. Both findings provide important contributions to existing research on the impact of managerial compensation on opportunistic decisions. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

TBT模式中承包商风险防范体系的研究

作为BOT模式和TOT模式的组合补偿模式的TBT融资模式还处在起步阶段，在各方面还有不完善之处。对TOT模式中风险进行分析并建立相应的风险防范体系，不仅具有理论意义，更具有实践意义。文章从项目主要参与者之一的工程承包商角度，探讨TBT模式中承包商面临的风险种类和应对措施，建立此模式下可供承包商参考的风险防范体系。     

Is R&D risky?

Research summary : Many studies use research and development (R&D) intensity or R&D spending as a proxy for risk taking, but we have little evidence that either associates positively with firm risk. We analyze the relations between R&D intensity (R&D spending to sales) and R&D spending on the one hand and 11 different indicators of firm risk on the other, using data from 1,907 to 3,908 firms in various industries over 13 years. The analysis finds a general lack of consistent positive association between R&D and firm risk, making the use of R&D as an indicator of risk taking questionable. Furthermore, R&D intensity and spending do not correlate positively, suggesting they measure different constructs. We discuss potential reasons for these nonsignificant results. Our study demonstrates that researchers should avoid casual use of R&D as a proxy for risk taking without explicitly providing a clear definition and measurement model for risk. Managerial summary : Risk is a key construct in strategic management research. Many studies in this area measure risk taking by research and development (R&D) intensity (the ratio of R&D spending to sales) or R&D spending. However, since R&D intensity and spending have also been used to measure various other things such as information processing demands, this raises the question of whether R&D intensity and spending are valid indicators of firm risk. We examine this issue by considering the associations of R&D intensity and R&D spending with conventional measures of firm risk. We find a general lack of consistent positive association between R&D and firm risk, making the use of R&D as an indicator of risk taking questionable. Furthermore, R&D intensity and spending do not correlate positively, suggesting they measure different things. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Initial compensation of new CEOs hired in turnaround situations

Our paper examines the initial compensation of new CEOs hired in turnaround situations. Building on prior literature on executive job demands, we posit that new CEOs hired in turnaround situations will receive higher pay, particularly higher performance‐based pay, and that the pay premium will incentivize them to undertake retrenchment and restructuring turnaround initiatives. An interaction between pay premium and CEO credentials is shown to have a stronger effect on the extent to which firms engage in such turnaround initiatives. Our empirical results, based on 98 new CEOs hired in 223 turnaround situations, largely support our arguments. We discuss the contribution of our study to the CEO compensation, executive job demands, and corporate turnaround literature. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A model of person‐pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements

A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The psychological costs of pay‐for‐performance: Implications for the strategic compensation of employees

Most research linking compensation to strategy relies on agency theory economics and focuses on executive pay. We instead focus on the strategic compensation of nonexecutive employees, arguing that while agency theory provides a useful framework for analyzing compensation, it fails to consider several psychological factors that increase costs from performance‐based pay. We examine how psychological costs from social comparison and overconfidence reduce the efficacy of individual performance‐based compensation, building a theoretical framework predicting more prominent use of team‐based, seniority‐based, and flatter compensation. We argue that compensation is strategic not only in motivating and attracting the worker being compensated but also in its impact on peer workers and the firm's complementary activities. The paper discusses empirical implications and possible theoretical extensions of the proposed integrated theory. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.