Industrial Concentration Reverses the Timing in a Trade Policy Game

Faced with an export subsidy by a foreign government, importing countries have to decide whether they should impose countervailing duties or not. Using a Cournot duopoly model, Collie (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 130: 191–209) shows that the subgame perfect equilibrium occurs when the importing country sets its production subsidy and tariff at stage one and the foreign government sets its export subsidy at stage two. That is, an importing country will choose to commit itself not to use countervailing duties. In this paper, we extend Collie's duopoly model to the case of a Cournot oligopoly and show that the country in which industry is less concentrated tends to emerge as the Stackelberg leader.     

Uniform versus Discriminatory Tariffs: When Will Export Taxes Be Used?

This paper examines the noncooperative interactions between two exporting countries and one importing country when all of them are seeking the optimal policies to improve their welfare. Whereas the importing country has the incentive to impose tariffs on the goods coming from the two exporting countries, the export policies chosen by the exporting countries depend on the tariff regime, whether uniform or discriminatory tariffs are used. It is argued that export taxes are chosen by both exporting countries in some cases, and that whereas the importing country prefers a uniform tariff regime, the exporting countries find a discriminatory tariff regime preferable.     

Endogenous Sequencing in Strategic Trade Policy Games Under Uncertainty

This paper examines a strategic trade policy game with endogenous timing. A trade-off between commitment and flexibility is identified. The equilibrium timing of trade policy decisions is shown to highly depend on the degree of demand uncertainty. When demand uncertainty is low, countervailing duties will never be used because the home government always sets its import tariff before the foreign government sets its export subsidy. When demand uncertainty reaches a threshold level, the home government starts to find it optimal to move second with positive probability. As a result, we provide an economic rationale for the prevailing use of countervailing duties in practice.     

Importers,Exporters and Multinationals: Exploring the Hierarchy of International Linkages

The purpose of this paper is to empirically explore two dimensions of the firm hierarchy of international market-specific linkages, using data on Swedish manufacturing firms from 1997 to 2007. First, we investigate the productivity ordering with respect to three international linkages; importing, exporting and investing abroad. Second, we explore whether differences in the productivity ordering across industries correlates with industry and country characteristics. Our findings support a general productivity hierarchy from importing to exporting and from exporting to investing abroad, as well as from a low to a high number of linkages (measuring the complexity of firms’ international linkages). However, an industry-by-industry examination shows that the hierarchical structure is only generally upheld when it comes to the number of international linkages, while the ordering of import, export and investment linkages does not exhibit the same regularity across industries. Extending the analysis, we find that the lack of a hierarchical structure is more likely in industries focusing on larger and less distant markets.     

Endogenous Price Leadership and the Strategic Acquisition of Information

We model a differentiated Bertrand duopoly in which a firm's earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading. In such a setting with second‐mover advantage, we then study the firms’ incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game. Both (i) neither firm acquiring information and (ii) one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium, but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome, even if information is free. Information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition.     

Endogenous timing in trade policy games: Should governments use countervailing duties?

Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties? - Trade policy under oligopoly is analysed in two multistage games with endogenous timing of trade policy. At the beginning of the games, the domestic and foreign governments choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or two. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of both games, the domestic government will set its tariff (and production subsidy) at stage one and the foreign government its export subsidy at stage two. The domestic country commits not to use a countervailing duty in both games, and both countries are better off than when they set trade policy simultaneously.     

论出口补贴与反补贴税对出口国福利的经济效应

本文从经济学角度分析了出口补贴与反补贴税对出口国福利和进口国福利的影响,认为补贴措施会降低出口国的总福利并容易遭到进口国的反补贴报复,反补贴税的效果受多种因素影响,具有不确定性,指出我国在实施出口补贴政策时应考虑产品市场的供求弹性,选择合适的补贴类型、数量和形式,以求在达到补贴的预期目的的同时尽量降低补贴的不利影响。     

Firms’ exporting and importing activities: is there a two-way relationship?

The literature on firm heterogeneity and trade has highlighted that most trading firms tend to engage in both importing and exporting activities. This paper provides some evidence that helps understanding to what extent this is the result of a two-way relationship. Using firm-level data for a group of 27 Eastern European and Central Asian countries from the World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) over the period 2002–2008, we estimate a bivariate probit model of exporting and importing. After controlling for size (and other firm-level characteristics) we find that firms’ exporting activity does not increase the probability of importing, while the latter has a positive effect on foreign sales. This effect is mainly channeled through an increase in firm productivity and product innovation.     

Input Trade Liberalization and the Export Duration of Products: Evidence from China

This paper introduces a quasi‐natural experimental framework into trade policy evaluation and reassesses China's trade liberalization through the survival of export products. We use propensity score matching and China's dual trade system to design a quasi‐natural experiment based on Chinese industrial enterprises, customs import and export, and tariff data over the period of 2000–2006; we then use survival analysis to study the impacts of China's trade liberalization on the export duration of manufacturing firms’ products. We find that the substantial reduction in import tariffs after China's accession to the World Trade Organization enhances the export duration of firm products, indicating that trade liberalization ameliorates the survival of export products. The promotion effects of tariff reduction on export duration are obviously stronger for core products than for noncore products.     

Effectiveness of industrial policy on firm productivity: evidence from Thai manufacturing

This paper examines the effects of industrial policy on firm productivity, using a three-year panel data set of Thai manufacturing as a case study. A range of industrial policy tools is defined, including tariff measures, subsidies, and investment incentives through the Board of Investment (BOI), which represent the main industrial policy tools used in Thailand. The effect of ‘water in the tariffs’ and partial trade liberalisation undertaken through free trade agreements (FTAs) signed between Thailand and her trading partners is also examined. The key findings concern the role traditional tools, that is trade openness, R&D, and skills upgrading, play in fostering firm productivity. Promoting a conducive environment, especially within domestic competition, is crucial in encouraging firm productivity. Some industrial policy tools are effective in promoting firm productivity, that is providing investment incentives via the BOI and lowering tariff protection. Subsidies, by contrast, tend to degrade firm productivity. Among trade protection measures, the effective rate of protection, which includes water in the tariffs encountered by exporting firms, has the greatest effect on firm productivity. The FTA-led trade liberalisation fails to add substantial competitive pressure and induce firms to improve productivity. Such statistical insignificance reflects the nature of FTA commitments that Thailand has made so far.     

Vertical trade and free trade agreements

We investigate the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on tariffs and welfare in vertical trade. We consider a three-country model, where an FTA is formed between a country exporting a final good and a country exporting an intermediate good. The FTA unambiguously leads to a reduction in the member country’s tariff, but may cause the non-member country’s tariff level to increase. In the case, where FTA raises the non-member country’s tariff level, the FTA increases that country’s welfare. In contrast, the FTA may render its member countries better off. This result implies that the formation of an FTA may not always be Pareto-improving.     

Behavior of a firm which maximizes the rate of profit: Specific features

The author challenges the well-known assumption of the modern microeconomic theory, stating that the maximization of economic profit is a natural aim of a firm. The article asserts that the behavior of a firm controlled by private owners of capital should be linked to the firm’s desire to maximize the rate of profit. The return to the interpretation of a capitalist firm’s motivation, which is characteristic of the period of the classical political economy, makes it necessary to reconsider some established views, namely, the demand for physical capital by a firm; the optimal combination of production factors used; the scale of output, which maximizes the firm’s objective function; and the character of the firm’s cost functions (both economic and accounting). The conclusions drawn by the author also have some practical significance. A deep understanding of the genuine economic aims and motives, which determine the behavior of different types of firms, is especially important for a government searching for the optimal use of its assets.     

What explains the performance of Chinese exporting firms?

Drawing on the entry mode (EM) literature and the strategic tripod framework, we examine whether firm performance is influenced by its outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) mode, controlling other firm-, industry- and institution-specific factors. It is found that employing OFDI does not improve an exporting firm’s performance. This is not surprising as anecdotal evidence shows that many Chinese firms with OFDI have been making loss in the host country. This may indicate exporting firms employ OFDI to seek complementary and strategic resources/assets, not to improve immediate firm performance. Furthermore, firm performance is influenced by strategic assets, including technology-based capabilities and brands, at the firm level, industry entry barriers at the industry level and the home and host country institutional support at the country level.     

How the Internet Promotes China's Exports: A Firm‐level Perspective

The development of information and communications technology (ICT), particularly the Internet, has reduced trade costs. However, it remains unclear whether these reduced costs are reflected in the “extensive margins” of firms’ exports (which refer to the probability of firms exporting) or the “intensive margins” (which refer to the value of firms’ export). To test this, we used the concepts of information cost and binary margins, an augmented trade model of firm heterogeneity, a two‐stage Heckman estimation, and data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey of Chinese firms in 2012. The results revealed that reduced trade costs from the use of ICT were positively related to extensive margins but that the connection with intensive margins was not significant. The results lead to the conclusion that reduced information costs related to a firm's exporting behavior were primarily reflected in variable trade costs. This study offers theoretical and empirical evidence for China's policies towards the Internet, which are relevant for the export of manufactured goods. The government should encourage the use of ICT to enhance firms’ export opportunities while facing current trade policy uncertainty.     

An eye for an eye? The trade and price effects of China's retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports

We analyze the trade and price effects of China's retaliatory tariffs on imports from the United States in the period from January 2017 to May 2019. We apply the difference-in-differences approach to the up-to-date China Customs data on imports disaggregated by eight-digit HS product category and source country. We find large reductions in the value and quantity of imports from the US and an almost complete tariff pass-through onto import prices. These results remain robust to extensive changes in the specification and in data sample and to a variety of placebo tests using processing imports or exempted products that were originally included in the tariff lists but removed before implementation. We also find that the trade and price effects are heterogeneous across products, differing either in the end-use or in the ownership types of the importing firm. Similar to recent findings in the US (Amiti et al., 2019, Amiti et al., 2020), our estimates suggest limited terms-of-trade gain due to China's tariff hikes.     

Corruption Via Media Capture: The Effect of Competition

In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co‐opts with the government. We find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former, media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption.     

Mixed oligopoly,endogenous timing and mergers

The present paper discusses endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly model, comprising one public firm and two private firms, assuming both a merger between the two private firms and between one private and one public firm. The paper proves that although a merger between the two private firms does not change the timing of the game, a merger between the public firm and the private firm into a mixed firm could change the market structure from Stackelberg to Cournot competition.     

The national security argument for protection of domestic industries

ABSTRACT

Tracing the origin of the national security argument for protection of domestic industries to Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, and Friedrich List, we study its post-GATT applications with reference to Article XXI of the WTO and highlight some recent abuses. We compare the use of tariff, production/input subsidy, and government procurement as alternative instruments of protection from the perspective of economic efficiency and study the disapproval of inward FDI to gain insights into the underlying national security concerns. The case studies of a) the US tariffs on aluminum and steel, b) German disapproval of the acquisition of a technology firm Leifeld Metal Spinning by a Chinese firm, and c) US’ all out global effort to cripple China’s telecom equipment giant Huawei are presented for illustration.     

The Political Economy of Interwar Egyptian Cotton Policy

The optimal tariff was a central concern to economists and policymakers in interwar Egypt. The government took the position that Egypt conformed to the small-country assumption in world cotton markets. Using time-series and panel data for the period 1895–1939, this article demonstrates that Egyptian long-staple cotton commanded significant market power in international markets. An optimal export tariff would have encouraged economic diversification and generated huge government revenues, making it possible to finance industrialization plans. However, the burden of taxation would have been shared by Egyptian landlords and British interests. Thus, an optimal export tariff was incompatible with the goals of Egypt's ruling elite, who dictated the orientation of trade policy until the 1950s.     

Strategic R&D policy in a quality-differentiated industry with three exporting countries

We examine strategic research and development (R&D) policy for quality-differentiated products in a third-market trade model. We extend the previous work by adding a third exporting country, so that the market structure is international triopoly. We show that the presence of the third exporting country affects strategic R&D policies. With three exporting countries, the lowest-quality exporting country gains from taxing domestic R&D and the middle-quality exporting country gains from subsidizing domestic R&D under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. As in the duopoly case, however, the optimal unilateral policy for the highest-quality exporting country depends on the mode of competition. Various cases of policy coordination by exporting countries are also examined.