Zum Problem der Exportsubventionierung

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Zum Problem der Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte

Ohne ZusammenfassungHeinrich Sieveking, Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Enzyklopädie der Rechts- und Staatswissenschaften. Band 47. Julius Springer. Berlin 1935. 209 S.Ernst K. Winter, Rudolf IV. von Österreich. I. Reinholdverlag, Wien 1934. XVI u. 410 S. II. Gsur u. Co. 1936. XV u. 531 S.     

Zum Problem des sog. wirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichtes

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Zum Problem der teleologischen Theorie der Wirtschaft

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Zum Begriff des Kapitals

Ohne ZusammenfassungAus dem Deutschen übersetzt von Erich Allina, Wien.     

Zum Begriff ‚Wirtschaftsstruktur‘

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

国有上市公司并购中的高管代理问题

公司并购是资本市场的永恒焦点.本文以2007-2010年沪深两市A股国有上市公司为样本,考察国有上市公司并购中的高管代理问题.实证结果发现并购频率与并购规模对高管薪酬的不同部分其影响具有差异化:并购频率对高管显性薪酬总额有显著正影响,分别与货币薪酬正相关、与持股薪酬负相关;并购频率对高管隐性薪酬没有显著影响.说明虽然资本市场对公司频繁并购给予负面回应,高管持股薪酬下降,但高管货币薪酬的上升会抵消这部分下降的幅度,高管依然可通过实施更多的并购来提升显性薪酬总额;并购规模对高管显性薪酬、显性薪酬的两个组成部分(货币薪酬和持股薪酬)、隐性薪酬皆有正影响.国有上市公司高管通过操控并购频率与并购规模进行权利寻租.     

公司治理研究中的认识论问题

公司治理的理论基础及分析方法之争,说到底是一个认识论问题,认识论的不同必然影响到公司治理理论上的建构及方法上的选择.本文从认识论的角度反观公司治理的理论及分析方法研究本身,试图为公司治理研究提供一个新的视角,以裨益于我国目前公司治理实践.     

税收流失中的双委托-多代理问题

本文首次给出了税收流失问题中的多委托—多代理模型分析框架,并将政府、国税局和地税局、纳税人置于统一的博弈框架下,作为博弈的三方进行讨论。只要政府给国税局和地税局以适当的激励,政府仍然能设计出让纳税人"诚实"申报的显示机制;国税局和地税局作为税收征管者和纳税人之间的博弈可以看成是一个双委托—代理问题,此时税收征收上的"正外部性"和税收监菅上的"搭便车"效应将是双委托—代理问题中的新现象。     

中小企业融资问题及对策

中小企业是国民经济发展中的一支重要力量,在促进经济增长和解决劳动力就业方面起着重要作用,如何有效解决中小企业融资难问题已关系到我国构建和谐社会的进程.造成中小企业融资难的原因是多方面的,中小企业自身的管理问题,不会合理利用先进的融资方式寻找融资方案,金融机构自身也存在很多问题,政府的法规还不完善以及监管的不够完善,等等.解决我国中小企业融资问题需要把企业、金融机构和政府的力量结合起来.     

海德格尔的纳粹问题——事实与思想

本文依据各种材料,比如有关的海德格尔传记、文章、回忆录、海德格尔本人的著作、通信、和在此问题上的自我辩护等等,就事实与思想两个方面探讨海德格尔与纳粹的关系。关于事实的部分首先概述了海德格尔对此问题的解释,然后给出了不同意这种解释的人们所找到的最重要的一些相关事实。从中可以看出,海德格尔涉入纳粹运动的动机与程度比人们以前所知者更深,但并没有确凿证据证明他有反犹太的种族主义倾向。关于思想的部分在研究海德格尔1933年校长就职演说(“德国大学的自我主张”)的思想来源的基础上,将他的思想与纳粹意识形态做了对比。这些来源中最重要者是他的解释学化的现象学思路和表达方式,以及恩斯特·荣格尔表达于“总动员”和《工作者》之中的观点。在“德国大学的自我主张”中,他用“对于(当场显示)本性的意愿”代替了尼采和荣格尔的“对于力量的意愿”,阐释了这本性“站立在风暴之中”,就在不屈不挠的“发问”中达到实际生活经验本身的“形式—境域显示”,并因此而“保持住了人民的土与血元气的力量”的特点。这种纯构成化的思路与纳粹的现成化了的反现代主义貌合神离。因此,海德格尔在较短时间内看出了纳粹运动不可改变的技术化本质,并在关于尼采的讲课中批判之。 总之,海德格尔绝不是偶然地     

Australia's Unemployment Problem

A number of Australian studies have provided microeconomic and macroeconomic perspectives on the causes of, and solutions to, Australia's unemployment problem. This paper provides an evaluation of these studies. Several important findings can be noted. First, from the cross-sectional studies economists have gained a good understanding of the factors contributing to a high probability of unemployment. Effective use is currently being made of this information. Second, there is general consensus from the time-series studies regarding the estimates of the aggregate labour demand wage and output elasticities. In addition, it has been widely acknowledged that lower real wages and economic growth would help reduce the high rate of unemployment. Despite the information available we are making slow progress towards reducing the unemployment rate. This may be due to political reasons or because we are unsure of how to deliver the wage cuts and faster rates of economic growth presented as solutions to the unemployment problem.     

The Potluck Problem

This paper proposes the Potluck Problem as a model for the behavior of independent producers and consumers under standard economic assumptions, as a problem of resource allocation in a multi-agent system in which there is no explicit communication among the agents.     

关于现代主体论述的几点分析

任何一方面的建设和批判,都不可能是孤立的,孤立的理解会造成历史内在的不平衡。在我看来,主体问题似乎是一个将各方面问题有机统领起来的枢纽,如果中国今天的建设不能落实于这样一种相互贯通的主体形成,那建设的意义将可能又一次被一种现代中国的内在历史悖论关系所牺牲。     

Ein Problem der Dynamik

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

The Scholarship Assignment Problem

There are n graduate students and n faculty members. Each student will be assigned a scholarship by the joint faculty. The socially optimal outcome is that the best student should get the most prestigious scholarship, the second-best student should get the second most prestigious scholarship, and so on. The socially optimal outcome is common knowledge among all faculty members. Each professor wants one particular student to get the most prestigious scholarship and wants the remaining scholarships to be assigned according to the socially optimal outcome. We consider the problem of finding a mechanism such that in equilibrium, all scholarships are assigned according to the socially optimal outcome. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D78.     

The Normative Problem of Merit Goods in Perspective

Abstract

In his Theory of Public Finance (1959), Musgrave invented the concept of merit wants to describe public wants that are satisfied by goods provided by the government in violation of the principle of consumer sovereignty. Starting from Musgrave’s mature discussion (1987), I construct two categories to classify the explanations of merit goods. The first strand of thought attempts to justify merit goods within the New welfare economics, by modifying its assumptions to accommodate irrationality, uncertainty, lack of information, and psychic externalities. The second category encompasses more radical departures from consumer sovereignty, drawn from philosophical critiques of economics. In the third part of the paper, I argue that the two strands might be represented by a non-individualistic social welfare function. I also show how this solution echoes Musgrave’s early views on public expenditures before he coined the concept of merit wants. From an historical perspective, the survival of the concept highlights the persistence of a social point of view in welfare economics.     

The Value of Information in the Hold-Up Problem

Abstract In the literature, the information structure of the hold‐up problem is typically assumed to be exogenous. In this paper, we introduce an additional stage at which the head office may grant individual divisions access to an information system before they undertake their specific investments. Although more information ceteris paribus enhances each divisions' profits, more information can reduce divisions' investments and destroy synergies for the other division that would have been generated by the investments. If this negative effect dominates, then information can be harmful for the entire company. Hence, information control can be a subtle force to deal with the hold‐up problem to a certain extent. In this paper we analyze those conditions under which information is either harmful or beneficial for central management.