Siren Voices on 'Reflation'

The growth in government spending and its resistance to reform can be explained through the activities of interest groups. Barry Craven (right), of the Newcastle-upon-Tyne Polytechnic, offers local experince to reinforce the argument of Rosalind Levaćić pp.4–8.     

地方政府政绩诉求、政府控制与国有企业税负

以我国2004—2012年A股非金融类地方国有上市公司为研究样本,在区分了省级政府与市级政府控制的基础上,实证检验了各级地方政府不同的政绩诉求对国有企业控制程度是否存在差异及该控制程度对国有企业税负的影响。研究发现：地方政府的政绩诉求（包括财政盈余、相对经济增长率、失业率等）显著影响地方政府对国有企业的控制程度,且省级政府更注重相对经济增长率及失业率,市级政府更关注财政盈余水平;三个政绩诉求中相对经济增长率对政府控制的影响最为显著;地方政府对国有企业的控制程度与企业税负显著正相关;与省级政府相比,市级政府控制的国有企业税负更重。这表明,增加地方国有企业税负是市级地方政府实现其政绩诉求的重要途径。     

A Façade of Collaboration

Abstract

The study presented in this article examined the relationship between philanthropic foundations (PFs) and the government in social policy-making. The Yaniv Project, which aimed to establish collaboration between PFs and the Israeli government in the field of children and youth at risk in Israel, is analysed as a case in point. The findings reveal that the collaboration that emerged was ceremonial and symbolic. The government and the PFs perceived the collaboration more as a technical means of achieving their own goals and gaining control than as a relationship that benefits both parties. The article discusses the implications of those relationships for PFs and the government.     

政府内部控制的内涵界定、外延定位与预算选择

政府内部控制是一个比较宽泛的概念,科学界定其内涵与本质是学术研究与实践发展的逻辑起点。政府内部控制的内涵应着眼于行政管理活动,体现管理控制的基本特性,因此对其边界范围、目标定位、设计视角和实施效果的分析有助于深刻理解它的本质特征。目前中国政府内控应以经济活动为边界;目标应包含资产目标和战略目标;设计视角应该多元化。政府内控是对传统行政监督模式的制度创新。采用政府内控导向的预算模式、完善法律法规体系、建立预算内控报告制度、合理界定内控的职能、培育良好的控制环境、完善预算内控的评价体系可作为中国预算管理推行政府内部控制的政策选择。     

Markets for Efficiency and Fairness

The allocation and distribution of resources by the state has failed to achieve the egalitarian ends socialists had predicted. Rosalind Levaćić, Lecturer in Economics at the Open University, outlines the advantages of the market in raising incomes and socio-economic status. Bureaucratic allocation should be replaced by personal purchasing power underpinned by redistributive taxation.     

政府审计、内部控制与企业创新

利用手工收集的政府审计公告数据,以2013—2017年的国有上市公司为样本,采用PSM+DID方法检验政府审计对国有上市公司创新活动的影响,并进一步根据内部控制质量和是否存在内部控制缺陷对样本进行分组检验两者之间的关系。研究结果表明：政府审计显著增加了国有上市公司的创新投入和创新产出;在内部控制质量高和不存在内部控制缺陷的样本企业中,政府审计对企业创新活动的促进作用更加显著。     

Political Influence and the Banking Sector: Evidence from Korea*

This paper uses panel data to compare the performance of Korean banks with and without effective government control of the appointment of chief operating officers. A privatization programme succeeded in spreading ownership of banks widely among the public, but government retention of an ownership stake in an institution meant de facto control by government. Despite charging lower loan rates, banks controlled by government experience higher bad loans ratios. This is in line with expectations of regulatory forbearance and government protection for recipients of political loans. Banks controlled by government are less efficient than privately controlled banks and bad loan variables are higher at banks with lower efficiency scores.     

Reorganizing the welfare state administration

Abstract

This article addresses the big welfare administration reform in Norway. The reform is a merger of the employment and national insurance administrations, combined with more formal collaboration with the local government social services administration. The reform introduced a mandatory partnership model between central and local government. This model is a hybrid of hierarchy and network. A substantial dilemma in the particular partnership model chosen is how to enhance vertical control at the same time as sustaining the autonomy of local government. The partnership model created to solve this dilemma represents a delicate and ambiguous balance between accountability to the central government and to the local council.     

我国城市基础设施融资投资结构分析

文章通过分析我国几类有代表性城市基础设施项目融资中的投资结构,认为我国投资结构的分类主要由项目本身所提供的公共品程度决定,对于提供完全公共用品项目,投资结构构成以政府控制为主;提供半公共品的项目,实现政府与企业相机治理;以及能实现稳定的现金流、经济收益较大的项目,可通过采用公司制方式进行所有权配制。     

我国城市生活垃圾管制政策的实践回顾——主题演变和简要评述

通过对二十多年来我国城市生活垃圾管制政策主题的回顾归纳,认为我国垃圾管制政策的演变可分为四个阶段。其主题演变可以归纳为责任的转移过程:一是垃圾末端治理责任从政府向社会转移,二是垃圾整合管理责任从政府向社会转移。今后,政策进一步演变的重心和主旋律将体现在三方面:一是从垃圾末端治理走向垃圾整合管理,二是垃圾管理责任的再明确,三是从命令控制型政策向激励性政策的历史性转变。     

THE USE AND ABUSE OF MARKETS IN HOUSING POLICY

This paper argues that, despite its rhetoric in support of markets, government does not understand how markets work, but is rather trying to use certain aspects of markets to control social housing. The paper looks at three areas: first, the idea of private finance and how this is used by government as a form of public policy; second, the notion of risk and whether it actually occurs in social housing; and third, the contention that government is incapable of appreciating the manner in which markets operate because it only wishes to provide safe options and so cannot countenance real choice and competition.     

债务率、偿债压力与地方债务的经济增长效应

研究目标：中国地方政府债务对于经济增长的门限效应。研究方法：基于债务率,即债务存量与地方政府综合财力的比值的视角,利用中国30个省份2010~2014年年底的地方债务余额数据,对地方债务的经济增长效应进行了实证研究。研究发现：中国地方债务存在明显的经济增长门限效应：当债务率高于112%左右之后,原本正向显著的经济增长促进作用基本趋近于无,而其作用渠道可以明确为如下传导机制,债务率高企带来地方政府偿债压力从而影响经济发展导向的财政支出。研究创新：引入债务率指标并基于偿债压力视角分析了地方债务对于经济增长的作用机制。研究价值：对于我国地方政府债务的管控治理和风险防范,具有重要的参考价值。     

Does local government competition aggravate haze pollution? A new perspective of factor market distortion

Haze pollution has become a new threat to China's sustainable development, but it may be that local government behaviour can play an important role in the prevention and control of pollutants. A dynamic spatial autoregressive (SAR) model is used to study the relationship between local government competition and haze pollution. To further explore the indirect impact of factor market distortion on haze pollution and control potential endogeneity problems, a newly developed intermediary effect model that incorporates the characteristics of the generalized method of moments (GMM) is utilized to explore how factor market distortion indirectly affects haze pollution. The research results show that regional haze pollution in China is characterized by significant spatial correlation, and local government competition has a positive impact on haze pollution; that is, local government competition exacerbates haze pollution. In general, local government competition not only directly leads to an increase in haze pollution but also further intensifies it by distorting the local factor market, and the intermediary role of factor market distortion is approximately 7.04%. The results of the regional inspection found that competition among local governments in the eastern region did not lead to haze pollution, and distortion of the factor market did not exist as an intermediary effect. However, both direct and intermediary effects are significant in the central and western regions. Therefore, an official performance appraisal system that includes ecological constraints should be established to guide the benign transformation of local government competition, and an environmental management mechanism must be developed for joint prevention and control to reduce haze pollution. In addition, the free flow of factors and marketization are equally important.     

Political Bargaining: Bricks, Bluff and Blackmail

The market does not always work well but, argues Rosalind Levačić of the Open University, neither does its alternative – jostling for advantage by interest groups. She draws on a case study to demonstrate that the bluff and blackmail of political bargaining leads to results that should be examined as closely as market failure.     

医药行业的政府价格管制效率评价

就基于我国政府在对医药企业的管制中,存在信息不对称,从政府加成成本定价出发,建立政府管制模型和企业策略模型。同时,利用博弈论分析政府管制失灵和虚高药价的原因,指出政府直接管制定价将不可避免地形成对医药行业企业成本监控的失效,并且不能形成激励相容机制。     

日本地方政府债券风险控制制度及其启示

日本地方政府债券几乎没有违约事件,其风险基本为零。这得益于其有效的风险控制制度。日本地方政府债券风险控制制度包括中央政府的"隐含担保"制度、审查和控制制度以及财务控制制度,具有以下几个特性:典型的行政控制、弱化的市场机制,以及零违约风险下的低经济福利。这给予中国有三大启示。正式制度是控制地方政府债券风险的关键;建立多层次风险管理制度;风险管理制度要顺应财政体制,即地方政府债券风险管理制度应"以民为本"、彻底的财政分权并非地方政府债券风险管理制度的必然基础。     

Incremental vs. Comprehensive Reform of Economic Regulation: Predictable Outcomes and Unintended Consequences

A bstract . Examination of the theory and politics of reform of government regulatory policy leads to the conclusion that comprehensive reform of economic regulation is desirable and possible, given that we understand how existing regulatory decision-making processes operate and how reform efforts in the past have failed. Options exist along a dimension of magnitude of change: incremental versus comprehensive reform. Under certain conditions regulatory reform is best achieved through comprehensive change and equilibration to new policy, rather than marginal adjustments to existing policy that often lead to more rather than less government regulation.
Comprehensive reform is held to be complete or nearly complete relaxation of government control over price, market entry and other aspects of competition among firms across an entire industry , or assumption by government of new , broad-scale controls over private lector market behavior. Comprehensive reduction of government control, i.e., deregulation , is in accord with the observation that government decision-makers sometimes behave as if economic efficiency were an important objective.     

我国政府审计质量控制体系研究

我国政府审计质量的内涵包括发现、报告和处理违法违纪问题三个层面。借助系统科学和全面质量管理的相关理论与方法可以设计出由程序链、证据链和检查链组成的质量控制体系框架。在此基础上搜寻影响审计质量的关键控制点并加以关联和制衡,从审计组组建机制、审计准则规范、审计公告制度、审计环境建设等四个方面加强政府审计质量控制。     

Bank of England: Servant or Master?

The developing discipline of the economics of politics examines the behaviour of bureaucrats and politicians as maximisers of self-interest like anybody else. The insights derived from this analysis can be applied to other forms of governmental activity, not least in the Bank of England. Rosalind Levačić assesses the extent to which the Bank's officials maximise their own well-being instead of implementing Government policy.     

Effects of rent dependency on quality of government

This paper introduces quality of government rather than regime type as dependent variable in studies of political effects of natural resources. It consists of two parts. First, it argues for an effect of fiscal dependency of oil and gas rents on quality of government. Second, it finds significant, negative effects of oil and gas rent dependency on three empirical indicators of quality of government—low corruption, bureaucratic quality and legal impartiality—in a sample of 139 states in the period 1984–2006. The results hold for inclusion of control variables such as regime type, income, region and religion.