基于PSO算法的股权拍卖机制设计及仿真分析

运用PSO群体智能算法模拟信息交互条件下外部投资者报价决策的学习机制和演化规律,在此基础上设计了实现风险投资退出的股权拍卖机制。Netlog仿真结果表明,所设计的股权拍卖机制能在一定程度上揭示股权的真实价值,并降低竞买人和卖方之间的信息不对称程度。进一步的仿真分析结果表明:适当的激励力度对外部投资者的投标报价具有显著影响;引入更多的竞买人能产生更有利于风险投资家的拍卖结果;即使外部投资者过于强化单一的学习能力,最终也可得到相对理想的拍卖结果,从而证明了所设计的股权拍卖机制具有广泛的适用性。     

我国风险投资退出机制比较研究

风险投资的退出机制是风险投资最关键的一个环节,本文依据2007年度中国风险投资退出特点,利用风险投资退出机制原理,研究了我国风险投资在公开上市、企业并购和股权回购以及公司清算三种退出机制中的特征。风险投资的顺利退出,对补偿风险资本承担的风险、准确评价创业资产和风险投资活动的价值、吸引社会资本加入风险投资行列,具有重要意义。     

论我国风险投资的退出通道

风险投资是创业企业融资主要来源。退出机制是风险资本投资和利润回收的关键环节。国外风险投资的成功离不开顺畅的退出机制。大致上,国外风险投资退出有四种方式：IPO退出、股权回购、项目交购和公司清算。本在借鉴国际经验的基础上,分析了我国风险投资退出的主要问题,并提出了符合国情的对策建议。     

建立我国风险投资退出机制的障碍和对策

风险投资被称为中国高新技术产业化的"驱动器"。中国的风险投资虽经历了十几年的发展,但至今仍未建立起较为完善的风险投资退出机制。分析了当前我国建立风险投资退出机制存在的主要障碍,并从公开发行上市、设立和发展柜台交易市场和地区性股权转让市场、企业并购与回购、清算退出等方面提出了适合我国风险投资退出的现实途径。     

风险投资退出股权关联价值拍卖模型及仿真研究——基于Deffuant模型的群体局部博弈及社会网络演化

首先模拟了风险投资退出市场中社会网络的形成机理和演化过程,刻画了外部投资者的私人信息在该社会网络中的传递和交互;然后考虑存在群体局部交互博弈时外部投资者对股权的评价及报价策略的动态演进;最后建立了包含社会网络演化及网络群体局部动态博弈的股权关联价值拍卖模型,并进行了仿真分析。     

风险投资退出股权关联价值拍卖模型及仿真研究——基于Deffuant模型的群体局部博弈及社会网络演化

首先模拟了风险投资退出市场中社会网络的形成机理和演化过程,刻画了外部投资者的私人信息在该社会网络中的传递和交互;然后考虑存在群体局部交互博弈时外部投资者对股权的评价及报价策略的动态演进;最后建立了包含社会网络演化及网络群体局部动态博弈的股权关联价值拍卖模型,并进行了仿真分析。     

基于比较法的我国风险投资退出机制研究

退出是指风险投资机构在所投资的创业企业发展相对成熟或不能继续健康发展的情况下。将所投入的资本由股权形态转化为资本形态,以实现资本增值或避免和降低财产损失的整个环节。风险投资的退出机制是风险投资运作过程中一个重要的内容,它能够有效的控制风险资本流通。     

风险投资的退出与公司治理

风险投资的退出机制,是风险投资运作过程的最后,也是至关重要的环节。风险投资的退出机制是否完善有效,退出方式的选择是否适当,是决定风险投资能否获得成功的关键所在。本文就风险投资几种主要的退出机制和企业公司治理行为进行了相关的分析与比较。     

我国风险投资退出方式选择

风险投资的退出是风险投资运作过程的最后也是至关重要的环节,是实现风险投资价值、促进风险投资资本再循环的保证。风险投资退出有首次公开发行、股权转让和破产清算三种方式。在分析我国风险投资退出基本状况并借鉴其他国家的制度和实践的基础上,为促进中国风险投资顺利退出及风险投资业的进一步发展提出相关政策建议。     

论我国风险投资资金退出存在的问题及对策

风险投资退出机制问题是风险投资顺利发展的中心环节,风险投资通常采用首次公开发行、出售或清算等退出方式来实现资金的退出,得到高额回报。中国风险投资业发展落后于一些发达国家,主要因素之一就是退出机制的不完善,本文就风险投资退出问题进行了分析,首先介绍了风险投资退出机制的作用,及主要影响因素,再通过中国风险投资退出机制与美国风险投资退出机制现状的分析,找出可以借鉴美国的地方。最后,提出解决我国风险投资退出机制存在问题的一些建议。     

AUCTION–LOTTERY HYBRID MECHANISMS: STRUCTURAL MODEL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This article studies an auction–lottery hybrid mechanism that is widely adopted in allocating new vehicle licenses in China. We characterize individuals' entry and bidding strategies in a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, structurally estimate individuals' value distribution from a data set of a Guangzhou program, and evaluate the performance of the mechanism. Based on the estimated distribution and counterfactual analysis, our study suggests that a hybrid mechanism preserves 83% efficiency and 52% of revenue, while it improves equity by 25 times compared to a pure auction. We show that allowing auction losers to participate in the lottery can further enhance the performance.     

Liquidity, Trading Size, and the Co-existence of Dealership and Auction Markets

This paper analyses the co-existence of two markets for the same shares, a quote-driven market and an order-driven market, as observed for example for the trading of continental shares on the London SEAQ International. The focus is on the trade-off between the uncertain execution price faced by investors on an auction market and the implicit transaction cost represented by the spread in a dealer market. We obtain that those investors who desire to make large trades will prefer to trade with the dealer, while trades of smaller size will be carried out on the auction market. Moreover, we explicitly investigate the interrelations between the two markets showing that the pricing policy followed by a dealer depends on the conditions prevailing on the auction market.
(J.E.L: G10, D40)     

向上叫价时钟双向拍卖机制设计

通过深入分析统一价格密封双向拍卖机制的诸多缺陷，充分借鉴单向拍卖市场上时钟拍卖的基本思想，将时钟拍卖引入双向拍卖市场，构建了一个无论从分配效率方面考虑还是从竞价风险方面考虑都优于统一价格密封双向拍卖机制，不仅为同类物品确定统一价格，还可以为不同类的物品确定其不同的价格的向上叫价时钟双向拍卖机制。     

基于多属性第二评分拍卖模型的物流交易研究——基于鲜活农产品物流的仿真实验

多属性拍卖突破了传统拍卖理论仅以期望收益最大为目标的限制,考虑了包括价格和质量等在内的多因素决策变量。因为物流交易因时间、地点、内容的不同而具有特殊性,因此对其真实成本信息揭示非常重要。本文构建了一个将多属性与传统二价拍卖模型相结合的多属性第二评分拍卖交易模型来解决物流交易成本信息不对称的问题,并实现了物流成本、质量等多属性综合优化。最后,基于鲜活农产品物流的仿真算例对上述模型进行了仿真实验。     

Matching users' rights to available groundwater

The amount of available groundwater in a catchment changes quickly, and the amount of water that users can take sustainably depends on where and when it is taken. However, rights to water tend to be fixed, and obtaining rights to water incurs high transaction costs. As a result, water catchments are over-allocated worldwide.In this paper, I show how a catchment manager could match users' rights to the available water, in near real time, despite uncertain future inflows, while making effective use of all available hydrological data. The solution uses the framework of a smart market. A smart market is a periodic auction cleared with the help of an optimization model. In addition to market clearing, this model allows a convenient means to adjust initial rights, and the auction revenue reflects the available water relative to users' rights. When the auction is revenue neutral, the catchment may be viewed as allocated perfectly. I suggest several ways in which a catchment manager can find this revenue-neutral allocation, assuming the manager has authority to adjust initial rights.     

Art in Africa: Hedonic price analysis of the South African fine art auction market, 2009–2014

Real asset markets are characterized by illiquidity and heterogeneous assets, presenting challenges to price estimators. Use of a new dataset of 7,553 auction fine art lots brought to market in South Africa, for 2009–14, allows us to examine the full sales hedonic price estimator over a wide set of characteristics. Results validate full sale hedonic pricing: Identities of artists, medium and genre, dating characteristics, and physical characteristics of artwork are significant. External validity of hedonic pricing is supported by out-of-sample price prediction for 40 individual artists. Auction house catalogue presentation of art work also proves correlated with realized auction prices. Art as an asset finds support: art prices move countercyclically with GDP and domestic equity markets, pro-cyclically with off-shore equity markets, implying a risk diversification role. JEL Codes: D1, L8. Keywords: hedonic price equation, art market, South Africa Word Count: 9467 (including all Tables, Figures, References).     

“三位一体化”的产权交易模式研究

研究发现,协议转让、招投标和拍卖三种主要转让方式在我国国有产权交易实践中不是独立的、相互排斥的。相反,它们结合成具有前后继起性的“三位一体化”交易模式：三种转让本质上是一个交易的三个环节,具体推进到哪一步取决于交易的竞争程度。本文从产权供求双方的现实约束及相应的行为假定对该模式及其运作机理、特点作了解释,发现它是一个有效的交易模式,在此基础上,对由该模式下的非“价高者得”原则所推出的“国有资产流失论”进行分析,最后提出该模式需要进一步解决的问题。     

An experiment on emissions trading: the effect of different allocation mechanisms

In theory, efficiency and compliance levels induced by an emission trading system should not depend on the initial allocation mechanism for permits in the absence of transaction costs. In a laboratory experiment we investigate this prediction by comparing frequent and infrequent auctioning as well as two different grandfathering schemes under market rules that closely resemble those of the European Union Emission Trading System. Our experimental results suggest that, contrary to theoretical predictions, the initial allocation procedure has the potential to affect efficiency of the final permit allocation. While we do not identify an effect of the initial allocation procedure itself (auction vs. grandfathering), we observe higher final efficiency after infrequent auctioning of permits than for frequent auctioning. Surprisingly, for a grandfathering scheme that distributes permits proportional to expected needs the high initial efficiency is substantially reduced by secondary market trading. An analysis of behavioral patterns shows that permit prices and abatement levels are initially substantially higher if permits are allocated by auction and we also find more over-banking as compared to the grandfathering treatments. Treatment differences diminish in the course of the experiment.