Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union

This paper analyzes in detail the mechanisms behind fiscal stabilization policy and the role of policy commitment in a micro-founded New-Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, which is hit by supply shocks. We also explore the determinants of the gains from fiscal stabilization. While monetary policy with identical union members is concerned with stabilizing the union-wide economy, fiscal policy aims at stabilizing inflation differences and the terms of trade. Besides exploring optimal policies, we also consider monetary and fiscal rules. We study these rules both under coordination and non-coordination by the fiscal authorities.     

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

We lay out a tractable model for the analysis of optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union. The monetary authority sets a common interest rate for the union, whereas fiscal policy is implemented at the country level, through the choice of government spending. In the presence of country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities, the policy mix that is optimal from the viewpoint of the union as a whole requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, whereas fiscal policy has a country-specific stabilization role, one beyond the efficient provision of public goods.     

Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union

We consider the interaction between the monetary policy in a monetary union, and the separate fiscal policies of the member countries. We use a Barro–Gordon-type model extended to many countries and fiscal policies. Each country’s fiscal policies inflict externalities on other countries, and the common monetary policy has its time-consistency problem. But if the two types of policymakers agree about the ideal levels of output and inflation, then this ideal is attained despite disagreements about the weights of the objectives, despite ex post monetary accommodation to fiscal profligacy, without fiscal coordination, without monetary commitment, and for any order of moves.     

Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers

With benevolent policymakers and fiscal leadership, monetary unification reduces inflation, taxes and public spending. These disciplining effects of a monetary union, which become stronger if the number of participants in the union increases, are likely to raise welfare. Two types of arrangements are considered for the union's common central bank (CCB): making the CCB more conservative and imposing an inflation target on the CCB. In contrast to the results of Svensson (1997)[Svensson, L.E.O., 1997. Optimal inflation targets, `conservative' central banks, and linear inflation contracts. American Economic Review 87, 98–114], an optimally designed, conservative CCB may outperform inflation targeting. Finally, we find that fiscal coordination offsets the disciplining effects of monetary unification. Hence, subsidiarity in fiscal policymaking may enhance welfare.     

On dynamics in a Keynesian model of monetary and fiscal stabilization policy mix with twin debt accumulation

In this paper, a six‐dimensional model of flexible prices with the monetary and fiscal policy mix, describing the development of the firms’ private debt, the output, the expected rate of inflation, the rate of interest, government expenditure, and government bonds are analyzed. The stress put on the “twin debt accumulation” means that in our model both private debt accumulation and the public debt (government bond) accumulation are explicitly introduced. Questions concerning the existence of limit cycles around its normal equilibrium point are investigated. The bifurcation equation is found. The formulae for the calculation of its coefficients are gained. Numerical example illustrating the results attained is presented by means of numerical simulations.     

Optimal monetary policy in a currency union with interest rate spreads

We introduce “financial imperfections” – asymmetric net wealth positions, incomplete risk-sharing, and interest rate spreads across member countries – in a prototypical two-country currency union model and study implications for monetary policy transmission mechanism and optimal policy. In addition to, and independent from, the standard transmission mechanism associated with nominal rigidities, financial imperfections introduce a wealth redistribution role for monetary policy. Moreover, the two mechanisms reinforce each other and amplify the effects of monetary policy. On the normative side, financial imperfections, via interactions with nominal rigidities, generate two novel policy trade-offs. First, the central bank needs to pay attention to distributional efficiency in addition to macroeconomic (and price level) stability, which implies that a strict inflation targeting policy of setting union-wide inflation to zero is never optimal. Second, the interactions lead to a trade-off in stabilizing relative consumption versus the relative price gap (the deviation of relative prices from their efficient level) across countries, which implies that the central bank allows for less flexibility in relative prices. Finally, we consider how the central bank should respond to a financial shock that causes an increase in the interest rate spread. Under optimal policy, the central bank strongly decreases the deposit rate, which reduces aggregate and distributional inefficiencies by mitigating the drop in output and inflation and the rise in relative consumption and prices. Such a policy response can be well approximated by a spread-adjusted Taylor rule as it helps the real interest rate track the efficient rate of interest.     

Monetary policy surprises and interest rates under China's evolving monetary policy framework

China's monetary policy framework has evolved considerably in the past two decades, increasingly moving from using quantity-based instruments and targets to using price-based instruments and targets. This paper assesses the effectiveness of monetary policy in China by examining the influence of monetary policy on market interest rates using an event-study approach. We find that the effectiveness of price-based instruments in impacting market interest rates increases over time, and that price-based instruments are as effective as quantity instruments during the period since the completion of interest rates liberalization. Furthermore, central bank communications, an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy, affect medium- and long-term market interest rates. Our findings are robust to the use of an alternative measure of monetary policy surprise and an alternative estimation method.     

国债规模:在财政与金融之间寻求平衡

本文从财政政策和货币政策协调配合角度,探讨了国债在金融体系中的特殊地位和作用,着重分析了国债市场作为核心金融市场在提供市场流动性方面的不可替代的作用.本文的政策含义就是,为了给我国的金融市场运行创造一个良好的基础,我们的国债政策应当超越单纯财政的财政眼光.     

Monetary and fiscal policy transmission in the Euro-area: evidence from a structural VAR analysis

This paper studies the transmission of monetary and fiscal policy in the Euro-area. To do so, structural VAR models are estimated. First, the EMU countries are considered as an aggregate entity and the estimation results are compared with those for the US and Japan. Attention is also paid to interaction of macroeconomic policies and the effects of shocks in financial markets. As a next step, SVARs are estimated for the individual EMU countries to analyze cross-country differences. It turns out that, compared to the EMU aggregate, individual EU countries react rather differently to monetary and fiscal policy shocks.     

Fiscal and monetary rules for a currency union

This paper addresses the optimal joint conduct of fiscal and monetary policy in a two-country model of a currency union with staggered price setting and distortionary taxes. A tractable linear-quadratic approximation permits a representation of the optimal policy plan in terms of targeting rules. In the optimal equilibrium, monetary policy should achieve aggregate price stability following a flexible inflation targeting rule. Fiscal policy should stabilize idiosyncratic shocks allowing for permanent variations of government debt but should abstain from creating inflationary expectations at the union level. Simple policy rules can approximate the optimal commitment benchmark through a mix of strict inflation targeting and flexible budget rules. Conversely, the welfare costs of balanced budget rules are at least one order of magnitude higher than conventional estimates of the costs of business cycle fluctuactions.     

Towards an economic and monetary union

One of the most important results of the Paris Summit of the nine EEC-members was the decision taken to establish a European Monetary Union until April 1, 1973. Will the Economic Union be now approached more rapidly than in the past?     

Optimal monetary policy in a currency area

This paper investigates how monetary policy should be conducted in a two-region general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness. This framework delivers a simple welfare criterion based on the utility of the consumers that can be used to evaluate monetary policy in a currency area. If the two regions share the same degree of nominal rigidity, the terms of trade are completely insulated from monetary policy and the optimal outcome is obtained by targeting a weighted average of the regional inflation rates. These weights coincide with the economic sizes of the region. If the degrees of rigidity are different, the optimal plan implies a high degree of inertia in the inflation rate. But an inflation targeting policy in which higher weight is given to the inflation in the region with higher degree of nominal rigidity is nearly optimal.     

The trilemma of a monetary union: Another impossible trinity

A monetary union among autonomous countries cannot simultaneously maintain an independent monetary policy, national fiscal sovereignty and a no-bailout clause. These three features make up an impossible trinity, and attempts to preserve all three concurrently will ultimately end in failure. In order to save EMU, one of these three must be abandoned.     

Fiscal policy and regional inflation in a currency union

Substantial attention has been devoted to inflation differentials within the European Monetary Union, including suggestions that inflation differentials are a policy issue for national governments. This paper investigates the ability of a region participating in a currency union to affect its inflation differential with respect to the union through fiscal policy. In a two-region general equilibrium model with traded and nontraded goods, lowering the labor income tax rate in response to positive inflation differentials succeeds in compressing inflation differentials. Such policies can lead to higher volatility of domestic inflation while leaving the volatility of real output roughly unchanged. Regional fiscal policies also have spill-over effects on the volatility of union-wide and foreign inflation in our model.     

Financial stability and monetary policy

Business Economics - Financial conditions should be an important component of the Fed’s monetary policy reaction function. I don’t think financial stability is a goal that really...     

Openness and optimal monetary policy

We show that the composition of international trade has important implications for the optimal volatility of the exchange rate, above and beyond the size of trade flows. Using an analytically tractable small open economy model, we characterize the impact of the trade composition on the policy trade-off and on the role played by the exchange rate in correcting for price misalignments. Contrary to models where openness can be summarized by the degree of home bias, we find that openness can be a poor proxy of the welfare impact of alternative monetary policies. Using input–output data for 25 countries we document substantial differences in the import and non-tradable content of final demand components, and in the role played by imported inputs in domestic production. The estimates are used in a richer small-open-economy DSGE model to quantify the loss from an exchange rate peg relative to the Ramsey policy conditional on the composition of imports. We find that the main determinant of the losses is the share of non-traded goods in final demand.     

Global monetary policy under a dollar standard

This paper derives an optimal monetary policy in a world with a dollar standard, defined as an environment in which all traded goods prices are set in US dollars, so that exchange rate pass-through into the US price level is zero. We show that the US is essentially indifferent to exchange rate volatility, while the rest of the world places a high weight on exchange rate volatility. In a Nash equilibrium of the monetary policy game, US preferences dominate; the equilibrium is identical to one where the US alone chooses world monetary policy. Despite this, we find surprisingly that the US loses from the dollar's role as an international currency, since the absence of exchange rate pass-through leads to inefficient expenditure allocations within the US. Finally, we derive the conditions for a dollar standard to exist.