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1.
This study examines whether financial constraints and board governance play substitution roles in lowering agency concerns in corporate cash holdings. Using four firm-specific characteristics of financial constraints and 28 forward-looking board governance standards, we find that board governance mitigates agency concerns in cash holdings more significantly for financially less-constrained firms. Consistently, financially less-constrained firms increase the level of board governance and adopt more board governance standards. A natural experiment with the 2007 financial crisis provides robustness to our findings. Our evidence suggests that financial constraints interrelate with the effectiveness of board governance on corporate cash holdings.  相似文献   

2.
We investigate how corporate governance impacts firm value by comparing the value and use of cash holdings in poorly and well-governed firms. We show that governance has a substantial impact on value through its impact on cash: $1.00 of cash in a poorly governed firm is valued at only $0.42 to $0.88. Good governance approximately doubles this value. Furthermore, we show that firms with poor corporate governance dissipate cash quickly in ways that significantly reduce operating performance. This negative impact of large cash holdings on future operating performance is cancelled out if the firm is well governed.  相似文献   

3.
Using governance metrics based on antitakeover provisions and inside ownership, we find that firms with weaker corporate governance structures actually have smaller cash reserves. When distributing cash to shareholders, firms with weaker governance structures choose to repurchase instead of increasing dividends, avoiding future payout commitments. The combination of excess cash and weak shareholder rights leads to increases in capital expenditures and acquisitions. Firms with low shareholder rights and excess cash have lower profitability and valuations. However, there is only limited evidence that the presence of excess cash alters the overall relation between governance and profitability. In the US, weakly controlled managers choose to spend cash quickly on acquisitions and capital expenditures, rather than hoard it.  相似文献   

4.
Studies have shown that foreign investors hedge risks stemming from economic and political uncertainty in the home country through outward investment. This paper studies how foreign investors' home country risk affects their overseas investment and the host country firms' corporate cash holdings. We find that relative foreign EPU, defined as the difference between foreign investors' home country EPU and the host country of investment EPU, negatively impacts the host country firms' cash holdings through their influences on managerial decision-making. This negative relationship arises from firms' precautionary and transaction motives as foreign investors perceive lower corporate risk and better investment opportunities in the host country firms. Good corporate governance is also instrumental in yielding this negative relationship. The reduction in cash holdings due to high relative foreign EPU is more pronounced if foreign investors' home country legal environment is weaker, the two countries are further apart, and there is little trade partnership between them.  相似文献   

5.
Our study investigates whether agency costs arising from organizational structure in terms of the number of investment layers which connect the parent firm and its lowest-tiered subsidiaries within the corporate pyramid are associated with the value of cash holdings. Using a sample of Taiwanese publicly traded firms, we find that a change of a dollar in cash holdings is associated with less than a dollar change in market value. In line with our expectation, we find that the marginal value of cash decreases with the number of investment layers, supporting the agency theory of excess cash holdings. We also find that the negative association between the number of layers and the value of cash holdings is stronger for firms with high deviation between cash flow and voting rights and for family-controlled firms.  相似文献   

6.
We examine the relation between the level of trust in a country and corporate cash holdings. The precautionary savings motive predicts that firms located in countries with less trusting societies will hoard more cash in order to compensate for reduced access to capital markets. The agency hypothesis predicts that shareholders in countries with low levels of societal trust will pressure firms to disgorge cash. The first theory predicts a negative relation between trust and corporate cash holdings while the second theory predicts a positive relation between these two variables. Using data on firms located in 54 countries around the world, we find evidence in favor of the agency-based explanation for the relation between trust and corporate cash holdings. Overall, our results highlight the role played by informal institutions in shaping corporate financial management.  相似文献   

7.
This paper models the precautionary motive for a firm's cash holdings. A two-period investment model shows that the cash holdings of financially constrained firms are sensitive to cash flow volatility because financial constraints create an intertemporal trade-off between current and future investments. When future cash flow risk cannot be fully diversifiable, this intertemporal trade-off gives constrained firms the incentives of precautionary savings: they increase their cash holdings in response to increases in cash flow volatility. However, there is no systematic relationship between cash holdings and cash flow volatility for unconstrained firms. We test the empirical implications of our theory using quarterly information from a sample of U.S. publicly traded companies from 1997 to 2002, and find that the empirical evidence supports our theory.  相似文献   

8.
Using staggered board reforms as a quasi-natural experiment and a difference-in-differences approach, this study examines the impact of corporate governance on cash holdings in 41 countries. We find that board reforms are followed by significant reductions in cash holdings. This effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker pre-reform corporate governance and for firms from countries with weaker institutional environments. Analysis of cash spending suggests that, following board reforms, firms are more likely to use cash to increase R&D expenditures, dividend payouts, and share repurchases, but not to increase capital or acquisition expenditures. Finally, the results indicate that enhanced corporate governance following board reforms leads to higher (lower) cash (dividend payouts) values, consistent with the view that board reforms strengthen corporate governance.  相似文献   

9.
This study empirically investigates the value shareholders place on excess cash holdings and how shareholders’ valuation of cash holdings is associated with financial constraints, firm growth, cash‐flow uncertainty and product market competition for Australian firms from 1990 to 2007. Our results indicate that the marginal value of cash holdings to shareholders declines with larger cash holdings and higher leverage. However, firms that are more financially constrained, that have higher growth rates and that face greater uncertainty exhibit a higher marginal value of cash holdings. These findings are consistent with the explanation that excess cash holdings are not necessarily detrimental to firm value. Firms with costly external financing and that also save more cash for current operating and future investing needs find that the market values these cash hoarding policies favourably. Finally, there is limited evidence of an association between various corporate governance measures and the value of cash holdings for a shorter sample period.  相似文献   

10.
This paper investigates the relationship between organization capital and corporate cash holdings. We develop two competing hypotheses in relating organization capital with cash holding. Our analysis reveals that organization capital is related to high levels of cash holdings. Moreover, we find that the effect of organization capital on corporate cash holdings is stronger for firms experiencing high levels of financing constraint and cash flow risk. Our results remain robust to alternative measures of organization capital and corporate cash holdings, and are not driven by omitted variable bias or endogeneity issues. We also find that the positive relation between organization capital and cash holdings is not confounded by sample period or industry group. Overall, we provide robust evidence that supports the precautionary motive for corporate cash holding.  相似文献   

11.
This study investigates the influence of Shariah compliance status on cash holding levels and the speed of adjustment of non-financial listed firms in six Gulf Cooperation countries from 2005 to 2016. The results show that Shariah compliance status has a significant effect on firms’ cash holding decisions. Shariah-compliant firms have significantly higher cash holding levels than non-Shariah-compliant firms. Further, Shariah-compliant firms adjust more quickly towards their target cash holdings than their conventional counterparts. In our view, Shariah-compliant firms are subject to multiple restrictions that limit their external financing channels. Therefore, holding larger cash reserves is important as it helps gain from the transaction cost motive of holding cash. The findings of this study have important implications for regulators, investors and managers. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to compare the effect of Shariah compliance on firms’ cash holdings and the speed of adjustment towards the trade-off theory’s optimal cash holding target.  相似文献   

12.
This Work Uses Panel Data For Firms Listed In The Spanish Stock Exchange Over The Period From 1995 To 2001 To Analyse The Effect Of Accounting Quality On Cash Holdings. The Results Show That Firms With Good Accruals Quality Hold Lower Cash Levels Than Firms With Poor Accruals Quality. This Finding Suggests That The Quality Of Accounting Information May Reduce The Negative Effects Of Information Asymmetries And Adverse Selection Costs, Allowing Firms To Reduce Their Level Of Corporate Cash Holdings. The Results Also Show That Cash Holdings Decrease When Firms Increase Their Use Of Bank Debt And In The Presence Of Cash Substitutes. In Contrast With This, Firms With Higher Cash Flow Hold Higher Levels Of Cash.  相似文献   

13.
This study proposes chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence to be an alternative explanation to corporate cash holdings. We find positive effects of CEO overconfidence on the level of cash holdings and the value of cash, which are mainly due to the investment environments faced by firms. The positive effects of CEO overconfidence on cash holdings level and cash value are barely affected by the traditional motives of cash holdings based on trade-off and agency theories. The analysis of cash sources further explains why firms with overconfident CEOs can aggressively pursue risky investments and maintain large cash holdings at the same time. Although the prior literature indicates that overconfident CEOs tend to avoid equity issues for their capital investments, the contribution to cash savings from equity is higher than that from debt. Additional robustness tests also support our empirical findings.  相似文献   

14.
Poor earnings quality exacerbates information asymmetry between internal and external stakeholders of a firm. Agency considerations then persuade investors to discount the value of corporate cash holdings out of concern about the inappropriate use of funds. In this study, we show that poor earnings quality has a negative impact on the value of corporate cash holdings and a positive impact on the level of cash reserves. We find that the negative effect of poor earnings quality either neutralizes or more than offsets the positive effect of excess cash on firm value. Our results are robust to several measures of earnings quality and model specifications.  相似文献   

15.
We analyze whether the organizational structure of firms (i.e., whether a firm is diversified or focused) affects their cash holdings. Using Compustat firm level and segment-level data, we find that diversified firms hold significantly less cash than their focused counterparts. Our results are robust to industry adjustments at the segment level and to different factors previously found to be important determinants of cash holdings. Using time-series, cross-sectional, and additional robustness tests we are able to attribute the lower cash holdings among diversified firms to complementary growth opportunities across the different segments of these firms and the availability of active internal capital markets. We find that the other theories that rely on the potentially effective use of asset sales of non-core segments of diversified firms to generate cash, and the increased agency/influence costs in diversified firms do not offer an economically significant explanation for the lower cash holdings among diversified firms.  相似文献   

16.
Since the early 1980s, the composition of US public firms has progressively shifted toward less profitable firms with high growth potential (Fama and French, 2004). We estimate a dynamic corporate finance model to quantify the role of this selection mechanism for the secular trend in cash holdings among US public firms. We find that an increase in the precautionary savings motive—primarily driven by the decline in initial profitability among R&D-intensive new lists—explains about 50% of the upward trend in cash holdings. This selection mechanism also explains part of the upward trend in sales growth volatility.  相似文献   

17.
We examine the relation between corporate liquidity and political connections measured via lobbying expenditures. This is an interesting question as many of the motives for holding cash should be diminished by political connections. Results indicate a significant and inverse relation between cash levels and lobby expenses and that the marginal value of cash decreases with lobbying. Taken together, these findings suggest firms react optimally to the reduced benefits of cash linked to political connections and that the market recognizes the weakened benefits of cash. Overall, our research shows another way political connections can shape corporate policy.  相似文献   

18.
We examine the effect of CEO marital status on corporate cash holdings. Consistent with the classical agency framework, we find that firms with single CEOs hold more cash compared to otherwise similar firms with married CEOs and that the excess cash held by single CEOs is significantly discounted by shareholders. Our findings survive a battery of tests to ease endogeneity and selection bias, confirming that results are not simply reflecting innate heterogeneity in preferences. Overall, our findings indicate that a variable outside the common firm- and macro-level determinants, CEO marital status, can significantly influence corporate policies.  相似文献   

19.
Based on the privately owned enterprises in China's A-share stock market from 2007 to 2017, we investigate the relation between foreign residency rights and corporate cash holdings. The empirical results show that privately owned enterprises whose controlling persons have foreign residency rights may hold more cash. Our conclusions are robust when considering the endogeneity concerns, alternative measures of cash holdings and foreign residency rights, additional control variables, the effect of financial crisis. In further analyses part, we discuss the effect of extradition agreements, residency countries' institutional environment, law enforcement efficiency in China, political connections, verifying that the positive relation remains when: (a) controlling persons obtain foreign residency rights from countries that have no extradition agreements with China, (b) residency countries have weak institutional environment, (c) privately owned enterprises are in regions with better law enforcement efficiency, (d) privately owned enterprises have no political connections. Moreover, we explain the reason that why privately owned enterprises with foreign residency rights hold more cash from the perspective of precautionary motive, transaction motive, speculative motive, corporate governance. At last, we find that foreign residency rights are negatively associated with the market value of cash holdings.  相似文献   

20.
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - The social network centrality of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) has received tremendous attention in recent research. This study examines how CEO...  相似文献   

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