Impact of corporate governance and related controversies on the market value of banks

Effective corporate governance of financial institutions, particularly in the banking sector, is vital for the stability of the financial system and the prevention of financial crises. Thus, this study examines the impact of corporate governance and related controversies on the market value of banks. For this purpose, we utilized Refinitiv’s corporate governance scores, including management, shareholder value, and corporate social responsibility (CSR), as well as its corporate governance controversies scores to analyze their impact on the market value of 242 banks in 43 countries. Using Refinitiv’s ESG database from 2017 to 2021, we conducted a path analysis and found a positive and statistically significant relationship between the CSR strategy scores and the market value of banks as well as between the management scores and the market value of banks. Moreover, there is a statistically significant relationship between the corporate governance controversies scores and the market value of banks.     

城市商业银行上市与公司治理结构优化

公司治理问题是困扰我国城市商业银行健康发展的重要因素之一。随着商业银行监管制度的不断完善,城市商业银行的公司治理问题虽有所改善,但治理效率仍然低下。资本市场的开放,使得城市商业银行迈入上市公司的行列,为上市城市商业银行公司治理结构优化和治理效率提高奠定了制度性基础。     

国有商业银行公司治理结构的特殊性及其改革

公司治理结构的所有原则都来源于商业银行活动的基本实践.银行治理结构的缺陷最终会损害银行的竞争力,增大银行体系的风险.在当前面临外资银行激烈竞争的新形势下,建立国有商业银行良好的公司治理结构应是银行业改革的首要议题.鉴于我国国有商业银行公司治理结构的特殊性,其公司治理机制的构建应从利益相关者治理的角度出发,顺应国际公司治理的发展趋势,科学地借鉴国外公司治理的典型模式,通过有效的激励机制和内部控制体系,完善信息披露制度,以及逐步健全外部治理等措施,实现国有商业银行富有成效的改革,促进金融行业国际竞争力和资源配置效率的提高.     

金融危机后的泰国银行业公司治理

本文在简要回顾1997年东南亚金融危机爆发后泰国政府和银行业为加强银行公司治理而采取的措施基础上,分析了泰国银行业公司治理的现状与不足,并应用制度经济学的相关理论对泰国银行业公司治理的改革前景进行了展望。     

关于把商业银行建成精品银行的战略思考

本文结合国内外商业银行发展的新趋势,归纳了精品银行的基本特征.作者通过深入分析中国商业银行在发展战略、公司治理、资产质量、经营效益、金融创新、人力资源和银行文化等方面存在的问题,有针对性地提出了中国商业银行在推进精品银行建设过程中需要采取的战略性措施,包括:构建具有领先型、竞争型和可持续型的发展战略;不断改进和完善公司治理结构;打造具有竞争力的核心业务和优势业务,推进业务流程再造;建立全面、及时、审慎、有效的风险管理系统,不断提高风险集中管理能力;坚持以人为本,构建先进的人力资源管理与开发体系,提升人力资本在建设精品银行中的决定性作用.     

科学认识竞争力比较分析 努力提升中国银行业竞争力

在银行竞争力的比较研究中,采用不同的技术方法会导致结果迥异,因此银行竞争力比较应注意研究方法的局限性。实际上,国有商业银行在资产规模、抗风险能力、市场影响力、商誉及网络技术等方面的现实竞争力具有明显优势,但由于历史和体制原因,在公司治理、资本充足率、资产质量及安全、盈利能力等方面的竞争力处于相对劣势。随着国有商业银行的股份制改革,公司治理结构正在不断完善,国有商业银行的竞争力正在不断加强。科学认识银行竞争力,面对竞争,抓住机遇,加快改革,不断提升中国银行业的整体竞争力水平,将是对银行竞争力比较研究的最终归宿。     

地方政府干预、境外战略投资者引入与城市商业银行治理

本文以8家城市商业银行的42份年报作为研究样本,利用主元分析法实证研究了地方政府和境外战略投资者对城市商业银行公司治理的影响,及其作用于城市商业银行的具体机制。研究结果表明,地方政府对城市商业银行治理产生了负面影响,境外战略投资者在一定程度上抑制了地方政府对城市商业银行的干预,促进了城市商业银行治理的改善。为了提升城市商业银行公司治理水平,本文建议地方政府进一步退出城市商业银行,取消城市商业银行中境外战略投资者持股比例监管限制,鼓励外资派驻更多的董事和高管实质性参与城市商业银行的经营管理。     

商业银行公司治理机制的发展趋势研究

公司治理机制是现代公司制度的基本架构。从公司制度诞生至今,良好的公司治理机制始终和公司的健康运行密切相关。由于商业银行区别于一般公司的特殊性,构建良好的公司治理机制一直是国际银行业所关注的焦点。本文从公司治理机制的理论和制度两个层面分析商业银行公司治理机制的发展趋势,并探讨这种变化趋势对中国商业银行公司治理改革的借鉴意义。作者认为商业银行应当按照国际会计准则提高信息披露的质量,利用市场竞争的力量来改善公司治理机制,注重外部审计和内部审计力量的结合,注重法律在公司治理机制中的作用,实现商业银行激励与约束机制的创新。     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AN EMERGING MARKET: THE CASE OF ISRAEL

Despite significant capital-market reforms in the mid-1980s, the Israeli government and banks continue to play an unusually dominant role in Israeli financial markets. Israeli banks operate as merchant banks and, through pyramid structures of ownership, control large segments of manufacturing, construction, insurance, and services. In addition, the banks dominate all facets of the capital market, including underwriting, brokerage, investment advice, and the management of mutual and provident funds.
Because of this dominance by the banks, several important mechanisms of corporate governance are missing. There is no effective market for corporate control; institutional investors have little incentive to monitor corporate managers; and those managers in turn have little incentive to improve firm performance and increase shareholder value.
To be sure, there has been an impressive wave of IPOs on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) in the 1990s. But those firms' stocks have substantially underperformed the market since going public, and many "higher-quality" Israeli firms have chosen in recent years to list their securities on the NASDAQ and not at home. The main reason the most promising Israeli firms go public in the U.S. is because that is where U.S. and other foreign investors want to buy them; such investors want the assurances that come with the U.S. corporate governance system.     

我国银行业改革与引进外资的开放竞争策略

针对我国银行业面临的问题和外资银行进入后的竞争压力,本文通过分析几种不同改革思路后认为,我国银行业改革的核心问题是产权和公司治理,两者紧密相连,产权改革是为了获得良好的公司治理,私有化和引入外资都是可供选择的产权改革方式之一,理论上不存在何者更优.国有商业银行改革的关键在于改变国有独资所有权结构为多元投资结构,可供选择的方案有不改变所有权性质的多个国有投资主体的单一所有制和引进包括国有、民营、外资参股的多元所有制.鉴于我国银行业目前的特点,外资参股并不是一种最优的选择,引进外资银行的正确策略是:独资优于合作,合作优于合资.     

How to explain non-performing loans by many corporate governance variables simultaneously? A corporate governance index is built to US commercial banks

This paper aims to combine the principal component analysis and GMM dynamic panel data methods in order to estimate the effect of corporate governance system on non-performing loans. The first method is meant to construct a corporate governance index for US commercial banks. The second one allows us to study the relation between the built index and non-performing loans. The advantage of the combination of these methods is reducing the number of corporate governance variables into a single one and ensuring the consistency of GMM estimates, given that a high number of variables leads to an increase in the number of GMM instruments, which in turns results in biased estimators. Applying these methods to US commercial banks, for a period including the financial crisis years, we find that small banks are characterized by a sound corporate governance system that reduces their non-performing loans. In opposition, the corporate governance fails to protect medium and large US commercial banks from excessive risk-taking that damages their loans’ quality and even leads to enormous losses especially during the global financial crisis.     

Macroeconomic effects of corporate default crisis: A long-term perspective

Using an extensive data set on corporate bond defaults in the US from 1866 to 2010, we study the macroeconomic effects of bond market crises and contrast them with those resulting from banking crises. During the past 150 years, the US has experienced many severe corporate default crises in which 20–50% of all corporate bonds defaulted. Although the total par amount of corporate bonds has at times rivaled the amount of bank loans outstanding, we find that corporate default crises have far fewer real effects than do banking crises. These results provide empirical support for current theories that emphasize the unique role that banks and the credit and collateral channels play in amplifying macroeconomic shocks.     

中资银行迎接外资银行全面竞争的策略研究

随着中国银行业市场不断扩大对外资银行的开放程度,在华外资银行已在市场份额、客户营销、业务经营及人才吸引等方面对中资银行的经营形成挑战。中资银行只有加快改革进程,进一步提升自身的竞争力,才能在2006年底中国银行业全面开放后从容应对外资银行的激烈竞争。本文结合当前中国银行业的改制过程,提出了中资银行的应对策略,即通过与外资银行的业务及股权合作来弥补自身不足,通过调整经营结构实现经营战略的转型,通过完善公司治理培育自身的核心竞争力,通过解决经营中的实际问题提高市场应变力,通过落实“以人为本”的理念切实提升人力资源价值。     

风险管理、内部控制与国有商业银行海外上市

本文探讨了风险管理、内部控制与国有商业银行海外上市的关系。共分四个部分:一、关于银行风险的几个基本问题;二、关于银行风险的监管要求;三、关于公司治理和内部控制的监管要求;四、关于国有商业银行完善风险管理、内部控制制度的几点建议。第一部分是本文的分析框架;第二、第三部分是从该分析框架的角度对上市监管要求进行的阐述;第四部分是结合分析框架和监管要求,对国有商业银行风险管理改革提出的建议。本文的基本论点是,满足海外上市监管要求是国有商业银行海外上市需达到的最低要求;制定并实施与自身业务战略相适应的风险战略,将直接影响国有商业银行的股票投资价值。     

强制性次级债与商业银行的公司治理

对于商业银行而言,次级债除了具有补充资本、融通资金的功能外,还具有特殊的公司治理功效。基于这一视角,本文对次级债在商业银行公司治理中功效的比较优势进行了论述,介绍了强制性次级债市场约束效用的两步骤分析框架,并就强制性次级债政策提供了相应评论。本文得出以下研究结论:恰当的强制性次级债政策有助于商业银行公司治理的完善以及国内金融生态的改善;为了确保MSDP(MandatorySubordinatedDebtPolicy)的投资者确实具备对银行风险变化进行监督和有所反应的动机,应该对由“内部人”持有的债券数量进行限制并完善信息披露制度;加快推进国有商业银行的股份制改革,培育市场化的发债主体和机构投资者是实施MSDP的必要基础条件。     

国有商业银行公司治理改革问题研究

本文通过对公司治理的内涵和发展历程的分析,在公司治理国际比较的基础上讨论了商业银行公司治理与一般公司治理的区别,并提出了国有商业银行公司治理改革的几条重要思路.本文主要有以下几个观点,首先,明确的责权划分、有效的约束与激励机制、加强信息披露以提高透明度是国有商业银行公司治理改革的核心;第二,银行产权改革并非是银行公司治理改革的必然前提,两者可以并行不悖;第三,由于商业银行的特殊性,所以国有商业银行公司治理改革的目标应该充分考虑利益相关者的利益;第四,国有商业银行激励机制创新的关键在于破除"官本位"思想,推行以专业技术资格为定位标准的行员等级制.     

金融集团的公司治理:典型模式的案例分析

本文对花旗集团、德意志银行集团以及三菱东京金融集团的公司治理实践进行了详细的比较分析。研究表明,三种金融集团治理模式之间存在着显著差异,但又不乏一些共性。比较分析后得到如下启示:国有商业银行应该进行股份制改造并成为上市公司;商业银行的公司治理应该以“长期股东价值最大化”为目标;要进一步明确以风险管理原则为基础构建商业银行治理结构的重要性;应该进一步强化监事会的功能,保证监事会的独立性,并使监事具备任职的积极资格;实现责任人的绩效与薪酬额度的有机结合是我们构建高效的激励机制的努力方向;要实现我国银行业的国际化、集团化与多元化。     

The rise of corporate governance in corporate control research

This article has two related tasks. First, we review the articles published in this Special Issue on Corporate Control, Mergers, and Acquisitions. These articles provide new evidence on several aspects of corporate control and governance including the value and performance effects of various ownership groups, the impact of internal governance structures, the effects of regulatory changes on specific industries and evidence on bidding strategies in takeovers. This analysis leads us to our second task – to examine the evolution of corporate control research, broadly defined. Our analysis shows a movement in research from mergers and acquisitions to a broader analysis of corporate governance, especially internal governance features. We suggest that there is a trend toward an increase in the relative importance of internal governance compared to discipline from the market from corporate control. This trend reflects an important change over the past several decades in the means through which the market disciplines corporate behavior.     

Differences and similaritites between corporate governance principles in Islamic banks and Conventional banks

The purpose of this paper is to present the some differences and similarities between corporate governance principles in Islamic banks and conventional banks by paradigmatic diversification. Since Corporate governance in Islamic banks is a social phenomenon in Islamic societies, the paper uses social theory paradigms (functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist) to compare between corporate governance in Islamic banks and conventional banks. This paper demonstrates that mainstream corporate corporate governance theories are not a law of nature but a social construct.     

Beyond takeovers: politics comes to corporate control

In the 1990s, politics will replace takeovers as the defining tool for corporate governance challenges, and a marketplace of ideas will replace the frenzied activity that once dominated the financial marketplace in the 1980s. In the transaction-driven market of the past, corporate raiders used junk bonds and other financial tools to take control of their targets. In the new marketplace of ideas, debate will replace debt as active shareholders press specific operating policies for their target corporations in a new politicized market for corporate control. John Pound, associate professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, reports that investors are already using shadow management committees, independent director slates, and outside experts to influence management policy. Pound cites Carl Icahn's battle for control of USX as an example of the emerging trend. What began as a hostile takeover ended with a negotiated solution in which many constituencies ultimately played a role in the restructuring of the company. This political approach to governance gives management a chance to embrace a bargain that is in its long-term interest. By promoting politically based tactics, managers can generate political capital with their major investors. Managers in companies as diverse as Avon and Lockheed now meet regularly with investors, seeking their input on both financial and strategic decisions. In the new politicized market for corporate control, striking a bargain with long-term investors is ultimately in the best interest of the corporation.