Informal sector: The credit market channel

We build a model of firms' choice between formality and informality. Complying with costly registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public goods, enforcement of property rights and contracts, that make the participation in the formal credit market possible. In a moral hazard framework with credit rationing, their decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality, and the relative efficiency of formal versus informal credit mechanisms and their related institutional arrangements. The model is consistent with existing stylized facts on the determinants of informality.     

非正式创业投资市场的发展及启示

非正式创业资本是指私人股权资本市场中的非中介的投资资本,包括主要创业者股权资本、天使投资资本和其他投资资本。主要创业者股权资本,是指在创业企业中拥有最大股权份额和主要财务决策权威的创业者所投资的资本额;天使投资资本,是指富有人士通过股权合同---通常是普通股,向创业早期的企业提供直接金融援助的投资资本;其他投资资本,包括创业团队成员股权投资、家庭成员和朋友的股权投资。主要创业者股权资本和其他投资资本统称为初始内部融资。非正式创业资本市场,是一个没有中介组织的资本市场,它是创业者、投资者和富裕家庭直接向创业项目进行股权投资的市场。     

Informal sector, income inequality and economic development

This paper addresses - with the help of numerical simulations - some of the issues relating to income distribution in the context of development of an economy with an informal sector and migration of both low- and high-skilled workers from the rural to the urban area. A major aim has been to see under what conditions we do or do not get an inverted U-shaped curve of income distribution. The paper finds that the tendency always is for the Gini coefficient to rise and then decline. However, once it starts declining, it need not continuously decline; it may rise, then decline, then rise again and indeed rise above the previous peak before starting to decline again and may well end at the end of the simulation at a higher value than at the start. Any case for the redistribution of income is seen to be much stronger at the later stages of development that at earlier stages, even though at later stages, Gini coefficient may be lower than at earlier stages. The policy implications of the findings are considered.     

The supply- and demand-side impacts of credit market information

We utilize a unique pair of experiments to isolate the ways in which reductions in asymmetric information alter credit market outcomes. A Guatemalan microfinance lender gradually started using a credit bureau across its branches without letting borrowers know about it. One year later, we ran a large randomized credit information course that described the existence and workings of the bureau to the clients of this lender. This pairing of natural and randomized experiments allows us to separately identify how new information enters on the supply and the demand sides of the market. Our results indicate that the credit bureau generated large efficiency gains for the lender, and that these gains were augmented when borrowers understood the rules of the game. The credit bureau rewarded good borrowers but penalized weaker ones, increasing economic differentiation.     

The determinants of trade credit use: the case of the Tanzanian rice market

Most small businesses in the developing economies suffer from a lack of access to formal external finance. One important alternative source of finance for these entrepreneurs is trade credit. Applying a unique data-set containing data on specific trade relations between rice wholesalers and rice retailers in Tanzania, we analyse the determinants of trade credit demand and supply in this market, using a simultaneous equation modelling approach. The analysis shows that while the demand for trade credit is primarily determined by the extent to which retailers need external funds, supply is mainly driven by wholesalers’ incentives to attract and keep clients. Moreover, wholesalers’ willingness to provide credit increases if they have better information about the possibility that the customer will fail to repay the credit.     

Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition

This paper studies the dynamic interaction between product market competition and incentives against shirking. In contrast with standard results, efficiency wages paid by each firm can decrease when competition (i.e. the number of firms in the product market) increases. Discretionary bonuses, on the other hand, do not vary with competition. There is an upper threshold for the number of competing firms, however, above which such schemes are no longer sustainable as an equilibrium. Industry profits with bonuses are generally higher than with efficiency wages but, when information regarding firms’ misbehaviour flows at a low rate, a competition range exists for which firms can make a positive profit by only paying efficiency wages.     

The credit market and rural development: A model of a Land Resettlement Scheme

Many markets in developing countries are imperfect, and governments often attmept to eliminate imperfections. The policy implications of completing an incomplete market have not, however, been considered theoretically in the literature. This paper fills the gap, using a model of the credit market in a land resettlement scheme. The major conclusion contradicts a common assumption of the credit rural literature, namely that freely available credit will achieve development objectives. Opening the credit market will contribute to broad objectives such as increasing the options available to settlers, but it will not necessarily achieve narrower objectives such as raising the output of a particular crop.     

Between plan and market: The role of the local sector in post-mao China

The Chinese economy has long been characterized by multilevel planning, with local governments controlling nearly half of total industrial output and allocating substantial resources. Because of the important role played by local governments, market reforms have not brought a straight-forward transfer of decision-making authority from the central government to economic agents. Instead, there has been a good deal of “leakage” in the reform process, with local governments retaining and even expanding control over enterprises through a variety of informal mechanisms, as well as through their control over geographically immobile factor resources. This paper looks at the local sector and how market reforms have affected it.     

黑龙江省农村金融领域的信用风险及其防范

信用是市场经济的基础,也是市场经济的必然产物,因此,信用风险一旦发生就会对经济发展产生诸多不利影响,在金融领域的影响尤为严重。中国作为一个农业大国,农村金融领域发生信用风险就会严重地制约经济的总体发展水平。因此,从农村金融的角度,以黑龙江省为例,提出合理防范农村金融领域的信用风险,对黑龙江省整体县域经济发展具有重要意义。基于此,分析了农村金融领域信用风险产生的原因和对区域性农业经济发展的影响,提出了相应的风险防范措施.     

Volatility spillovers and connectedness among credit default swap sector indexes

This article studies volatility spill-over effects and market connectedness using daily data of credit default swap spreads for U.S. companies over a period from 2007 to 2012. We quantify volatility spillovers by means of an unconditional analysis performed using the entire sample, and a conditional analysis which estimates the model using a rolling window. As our database contains the global financial crisis (GFC), we are able to determine how volatility spillovers spread in the economy during the recent market turmoil. Our unconditional results confirm that the Financials sector was a main contributor to the overall market volatility along with the Consumer Goods, Consumer Services and Basic Materials sectors. The conditional analysis clearly identifies that the Financials was the major feeding sector of volatility spill-over effects, and that the market volatility was successively driven by Technology and Basic Materials over a rather short period of time, followed by Consumer Goods and Consumer Services over a prolonged period of time. Our results illustrate indirect linkages between the sectors that conveyed shocks during the GFC.     

Spillover across Eurozone credit market sectors and determinants

We examine spillover and its determinants among Eurozone sector level credit markets using time and frequency domain spillover approaches. Based on network theory and connectedness analysis, we identify the sectors that are major transmitters and receivers of spillover during normal and crisis periods. The rolling window analysis shows that short-run spillover among credit market sectors intensifies during global and Eurozone crisis periods. Further, using Bayesian model averaging, we find that overall financial conditions and stock market volatility are the main drivers of total and sector-level spillover. Our findings have important implications for policymakers and investors interested in Euro-area credit risk at the sector level.     

Financial openness,market structure and private credit: An empirical investigation

Consistent with recent theoretical models, this paper finds that financial openness has a positive effect on private credit in economies characterized by a competitive banking sector, but that this effect vanishes and even becomes negative in economies with imperfect banking competition.     

Performance of interest rate rules under credit market imperfections

The stabilization effects of Taylor rules are analyzed in a limited participation framework with and without credit market imperfections in capital goods production. Financial frictions substantially amplify the impact of shocks, and also reinforce the stabilizing or destabilizing effects of interest rate rules on output. However, these effects are reversed relative to new Keynesian models: under limited participation, interest rate rules are stabilizing for productivity shocks, but imply an output-inflation tradeoff for demand shocks. Moreover, because financial frictions imply excessive fluctuation, stabilization via an interest rate rule can be a welfare-improving response to productivity shocks.     

Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information

We study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers' default probabilities. Admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability, the loan quantity, the loan interest rate and the collateral required. The principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers; moreover, the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information. No credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers.     

A credit market in early stages of economic development

Even if the relatively rich and the poor are initially caught in a poverty trap, the relatively rich can escape poverty by receiving payments from the poor. Further accumulation of wealth by the rich allows the poor to escape poverty.     

Capital requirements and business cycles with credit market imperfections

The business cycle effects of bank capital regulatory regimes are examined in a New Keynesian model with credit market imperfections and a cost channel of monetary policy. Bank capital increases incentives for banks to monitor borrowers, thereby raising the repayment probability, and excess capital generates benefits in terms of reduced regulatory scrutiny. Basel I- and Basel II-type regulatory regimes are defined, and the model is calibrated for a middle-income country. Simulations of a supply shock show that, depending on the elasticity that relates the repayment probability to the bank capital–loan ratio, the Basel II regime may be less procyclical than a Basel I regime.     

An analysis of credit terms in the eurodollar market

A model is presented incorporating various elements involved in the determination of theinterest rate in a capital market that is not purely competitive. It yields an equilibrium relation between the interest rate and the probability of default such that higher probability implies higher interest. Other factors affecting the rate of interest are the elasticity of demand, the perceived rate of loss related to default, and an extra premium due to risk aversion. The equilibrium relation is used as an econometric model which, under appropriate specifications, generates estimates of the weights attached to subjective risk indicators. The data cover transactions in the Eurocurrency market and deal only with publicly guaranteed loans to developing countries. Several economic indicators are identified as significantly affecting the subjective probability. These can be used to generate estimates of the subjective probabilities themselves.     

Tax evasion by tax deferment: Sham litigation with an informal credit market

We show theoretically how tax evasion is facilitated by informal credit market through tax deferment. Our model is empirically based. Using sham litigation, tax evaders earn a higher rate of return than the stipulated penalty rate for tax evasion while the government loses tax revenue. We propose an upfront part–payment of the disputed amount of tax as a solution to the form of tax evasion we describe.